(based on Levada Center research from 2020)

Today, the "Jewish question" is not a matter of concern for Russian society. Attempts by some historians and columnists to rationalize certain aspects of the extermination of Jews or their discrimination find no resonance and are met with widespread indifference, much like other traumatic episodes in Russian history. The changes in the social structure of Russian society over the 30 years following the collapse of the USSR have, in ideological terms, most heavily impacted the status and authority of the "Soviet intelligentsia." This group, whose dual role in a totalitarian society — being part of the state bureaucracy while simultaneously serving as a guardian of culture and morality, and a critic of power — had practically exhausted itself by the mid-1990s.

With the decline of the intelligentsia, the "Jewish question" lost its relevance. Today, ideological antisemitism survives only as a residual view among marginal groups of Russian nationalists, whose organizational structures were dismantled between 2010 and 2015. Their direct influence on the public consciousness is negligible, although this does not mean it should be ignored. Ideological antisemitism remains not only a kind of intellectual resource for xenophobia but also its archetypal paradigm, a template for justifying any of its varieties. Without targeted educational and ideological efforts, judophobic prejudices settle in the minds of the lower social strata and are reproduced as routine mechanisms of collective identity.

How widespread are such attitudes in Russian society? And how do they affect the status and prospects of the largest Jewish community in the post-Soviet space and the Euro-Asian region as a whole? This study, conducted in the summer of 2020 by the Yuri Levada Analytical Center (Levada Center) and commissioned by the Russian Jewish Congress, was designed to answer this question[1]. The objectives of the study included defining the parameters of widespread xenophobia and antisemitism; analyzing the content of negative perceptions of "aliens" and their social functions; describing the socio-demographic characteristics of those harboring xenophobic and — more specifically — antisemitic prejudices, as well as describing the dynamics of ethnic attitudes and phobias.

The nationwide public opinion poll was conducted from July 13 to August 3, 2020, using a representative sample of the Russian population aged 18 and older. (A total of 1,600 people were surveyed in urban and rural settlements across 52 federal subjects of the Russian Federation). The analysis of the data incorporated the experience of previous studies on antisemitism and xenophobia conducted by the Levada Center in 1990, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2008, 2015, and 2018 [2].

Subjective Perception of Jews by Russian Citizens

Even at the end of the Soviet era and the dawn of the post-Soviet epoch, it was clear that the concept of "Jewishness" — a sociocultural group closest to the Western mindset and retaining very few traits of a classical ethnic community — merged in the collective consciousness of Russians with westernized and cosmopolitan (elitist) ideas. In our 1990 survey, a significant portion of respondents (28%) considered behavior and mindset, rather than religion or passport data, to be the defining characteristics of a Jew. "The question of whether Pasternak, Mandelstam, Marx, Kafka, Freud, or Einstein is Jewish," as noted in our previous work, "loses its meaning in this context. (Unless, in an argument with antisemites, one intends to emphasize the Jewish component in cultural history or trace the influence of Jewish roots on the thought process of a particular figure)." In other words, the issue shifts away from national or ethnic identification to belonging to broad cultural domains conventionally labeled as European, Indian, Chinese, etc.[3]

Today, traces of the former social significance of Jews in Russian / Soviet society are reflected in the persistent belief that there are "many Jews" in Russia. Thus, when asked: "How many Jews do you think currently live in Russia?" — the "average" estimate put the number at 4.7 million people (approximately the number of Jews living in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century). Despite the variance in opinions (ranging from 2 million to 6 million), educational background did not seem to influence the answers of either young students or elderly pensioners. One cannot fail to notice the stark contrast between these estimates and the official census data from 2010, which recorded the Jewish population at 150,000–160,000 people[4].

Equally revealing is that 61% of respondents struggled to answer this question, which can be attributed to the disappearance of passport self-identification (the notorious "5th point") and the subsequent perceived assimilation of Jews into the ethnic majority. This points to stereotypical collective ideas, mythological images, and archetypes reflecting the "strength of Jewish influence" on public life. The persistence of such prejudices is largely due to the extremely low level of interaction between the general Russian population and Jews. There are several reasons for this. For instance, Jews are concentrated in the largest cities (three-quarters of those who identified as Jewish in the census live in four major metropolises), whereas the share of these metropolises in the total population of the Russian Federation does not exceed 15%.

Given the low social mobility (more than half of the adult population lives in their place of birth), this pattern is unlikely to change in the near future. Currently, 64% of our sample do not have Jewish relatives or acquaintances. Over the past 30 years, this figure has slowly risen from 52%. The frequency of mentioning distant Jewish acquaintances has also halved (from 25-30% to 13% in 2020).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the shrinking sphere of interaction with Jews — contacts with neighbors, colleagues, or classmates — primarily points to the depopulation of this community due to assimilation and emigration. The figures below (Table 1) cannot be considered an accurate description of kinship and social networks with Jews, as the margin of statistical error (+/–3.5%) exceeds or matches the data presented. Therefore, they should be viewed merely as vectors of the shrinking Jewish population in Russia rather than an indicator of Russians' willingness to interact with Jewish citizens. Factoring in overlapping responses, we find that the close social circle involving Jews covers about 10-20% of respondents, with a similar share for casual or superficial contacts. Thus, the parameters of interaction with Jews remain significant.

Table 1. General Characteristics of Social
Circles Involving Jews*

*Here and below, data are presented as a percentage of all respondents surveyed (unless stated otherwise)

As shown in Table 2, everyday interaction with Jews is most common in Moscow and major cities, within "middle-class" social strata (especially the upper-middle stratum), and primarily among educated, active, and entrepreneurial individuals and their children. What is less obvious is the steady contraction of these social circles, indicating their gradual withdrawal from public life in Russia due to assimilation or depopulation.

Table 2. Socio-demographic Characteristics of Social Circles Involving Jews

In any case, it is fair to say that the absolute majority of Russians have never met a Jewish person and lack direct experience with them. Consequently, they reproduce virtual, vague representations and stereotypes in their minds.

The Intensity of Antisemitism and Its Types

In studies of antisemitism, we analytically distinguish between the intensity of anti-Jewish attitudes and the social types of antisemitism. The necessity of this distinction was established in the very first studies of attitudes toward Jews in the USSR[5].

In terms of intensity and aggressiveness, we can identify:

1) A core of active Judeophobes (respondents who consistently voice the full spectrum of anti-Jewish reactions of varying nature and motivation), combining different stereotypes toward Jews in their reasoning — ideological, religious, nationalist, tribalist, etc. The size of this core is estimated at 8%–20% of the population, depending on the volatility of the public consciousness, the deliberate propagation of external and internal threats, and consequently, the levels of collective fear, frustration, euphoria, and similar states;

2) A "middle" layer of individuals carrying routine prejudices, demeaning stereotypes, myths, and diluted ideologemes, which in themselves do not possess the potential for violent mobilization or aggression. A significant portion of these perceptions serves to maintain the identity of the ethnic majority, which requires a distorted "image of the Jew" to highlight its own positive qualities. This is also antisemitism, at least in the eyes of Jews themselves, though not from the perspective of the ethnic majority. The "radius" of this layer in stable times is roughly 35% of the population;

3) Finally, an outer, diffuse, and weak layer of occasional, fragmented negative remarks about Jews, or reactions to specific events and artifacts of Jewish or public life. Its boundaries reach up to 60% of the population. These perceptions are not directed against Jews specifically but serve as links between different segments of cultural, political, or ideological constructs.

These parameters are, of course, highly tentative and are based on respondents' answers to diagnostic questions regarding anti-Jewish attitudes, which vary in their level of hostility. Even the middle layer of antisemitic stereotypes can include certain positive views of Jews, creating a mixture of diverse images and biases.

This scale of antisemitic hostility helps shape counter-strategies. Little can be done about the "core"; such reactions can only be contained and monitored through legal measures. Public opinion can only influence the outer layer of xenophobic prejudices by subjecting their carriers to moral condemnation and social sanctions. Today, overt antisemitic statements are widely regarded in Russian public discourse as "improper," vulgar, and typical of marginalized groups (even when expressed by prominent figures or commentators).

However, measuring the intensity of xenophobia alone leaves out the nature of ethnic aggression and the underlying motives of such thinking. The prognostic assessments of the evolution of antisemitism in Russia made in 1992 were confirmed in subsequent decades. We distinguished the following types of attitudes toward Jews:

a) Ideological or, conventionally, "doctrinal", conceptual antisemitism (or "antisemitism proper," as seen in various nationalist and Nazi doctrines, publications of Russian nationalists, or Soviet anti-Zionist treatises). This type of antisemite is free from archaic prejudices (such as objecting to marriage, working with Jews, or living next door to them); they always appeal to historiosophical or political speculation. Carries of such aggressive-Judeophobic views are more frequently found among the highly educated part of the population, although some, conversely, have low levels of education. This category is expected to respond most actively to changes in the political climate, showing a readiness for direct aggression against Jews.

According to estimates, the share of people holding such views does not exceed 6% of respondents. However, only a third of this group can be classified as actively aggressive antisemites. The rest represent their immediate reserve, so to speak.

b) Polar to it is the traditional-archaic, tribal antisemitism, often rooted in religious fundamentalism — Orthodox, Muslim, etc. This refers to dislike and hostility toward Jews as outsiders, and a reluctance to intermarry, live as neighbors, etc. This type of negativity represents a pre-national, ethnic aversion, and by nature is close to the most primitive ("zoological") xenophobia. It presupposes an ethnic consciousness characterized by a general, diffuse hostility toward anyone who is foreign in terms of language, culture, and religion.

This type of negativity toward Jews is most prevalent in two largely overlapping segments: 1) those untouched by urban lifestyles — the lower strata of peripheral groups, often rural populations, including those in ethnic autonomous regions; 2) elderly respondents, a significant portion of whom are gradually withdrawing from active social life. While they might become more vocal if antisemitic sentiments are incited, aggressive anti-Jewish behavior is not expected from these categories in the European part of the country.

c) The third type is conservative-nationalist, anti-modernization antisemitism, often colloquially termed everyday or domestic antisemitism. It is largely fueled by social resentment and envy toward more socially successful groups that can be ethnically labeled. Its functional feature is to maintain a positive self-image of the ethnic majority by attributing negative traits to other communities. This devalues the symbolic achievements of others and provides relief from one's own sense of social inadequacy. Consequently, any myths, gossip, or clichés that disqualify Jews are utilized here, and the demand for them persists regardless of Jews themselves, their numbers, or their history.

Such sentiments, held by about 30% of the population, are most common among the moderately educated urban classes. In Russia, this category, judging by our data and other sources, shows significant inertia and resistance to political extremism of any kind. Even under intense propaganda pressure, their behavior is unlikely to turn aggressive toward Jews as a group. At the same time, about a third of respondents in this category also fall into the group of those holding traditional-tribal attitudes, while about a quarter show a neutral-to-positive attitude toward Jews.

In other words, while the first type of antisemitism is common among the conditionally educated strata — bureaucracy, intellectuals, nationalists — and relies on rationalized arguments, the polar type of tribal xenophobia lacks any intellectual justification and does not require it. The first type cannot exist without institutionalized communication channels — media, the Internet, social networks — and organizations such as parties and movements with their ceremonies and manifestos. Conversely, the tribal type is reproduced through traditional means and informal mechanisms of group, communal, or confessional socialization.

The most difficult to understand is the most widespread type — populist, conservative-nationalist, anti-modernization antisemitism, as its reproduction mechanisms are not entirely clear. Yet, it is this type that dominates in contemporary Russia. While the wave of antisemitism in Europe primarily combines two types — ideological (anti-Zionist, anti-Israel) and tribal — the picture in Russia is entirely different.

Antisemitic sentiments are strongly linked to the level of urbanization. Rural residents show significantly greater distance toward "strangers," including Jews, than urbanites. For instance, residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg do not object to marriages with Jews, whereas in rural areas this met with disapproval. Residents of the capitals of former autonomous republics have no objections to synagogues and Jewish schools, while in small towns and urban-type settlements the attitude is different.

Antisemitic views also correlate with employment. Only agricultural workers aged 40+ directly express a negative attitude toward Jews in general, believing that Jews bear guilt before other nations and that those who emigrated pose a threat to our country. Some less educated workers believe that Jews are responsible for encouraging alcoholism among Russians and other peoples. Correlation analysis indicates that the bulk of antisemitic reactions falls into the category of everyday, "petty" antisemitism, which serves as the primary transmitter of Judeophobic attitudes. Compared to other types of contact, the rate of negative remarks in everyday interactions is 1.5 to 3 times higher. The peak frequency of such remarks occurs in neighborly relations and workplace contacts. Overall, among those with a "negative attitude toward Jews," only 3% have close Jewish relatives, 15% have close Jewish friends, 11% have Jewish colleagues, and 18% have Jewish neighbors.

Negative attitudes toward Jews were declared by 11% of those who occasionally encountered Jews, and by 15% of those who had no Jewish relatives, friends, or acquaintances.

A similar correlation is observed between the frequency of conflicts with Jews and the social distance. Among respondents with Jewish relatives, the share of those who have had conflicts with Jews is 3%; among those with close Jewish friends, it rises to 15%; among those working with Jews, to 40%; and among neighbors of Jews, it is recorded at 25%. Among those who have no Jewish acquaintances at all, or who interact with them extremely rarely, the share of those who have had conflicts is 27% and 42%, respectively.

The likelihood of conflict increases with regular contact when a "Jew" is perceived as representing the group traits of "Jews in general." In these cases, the conflict triggers disqualifying stereotypes of Jewish "guilt," "greed," or "hypocrisy," activating the psychological mechanism of projecting aggression onto the other.

The weakness of democratic and social institutions leads to the revival of negative clichés and stereotypes in certain environments, provoking hostility toward Jews. In its pure form, this trait is evident in individuals who have no Jewish acquaintances at all but claim to have had conflicts or arguments with them (pointing to a pre-existing negative bias).

In public and, importantly, political terms, doctrinal antisemitism is suppressed (though it has not disappeared, as it remains a key resource for the consolidation and identity of Russian nationalists). In any case, it practically does not exist today as state policy, which is acknowledged by Jews themselves. Consequently, any public aggressive antisemitic outbursts can be prosecuted as "inciting ethnic hatred" (which was the legal basis for dismantling radical Russian nationalist movements). Politically, low-level tribal antisemitism and xenophobia are also insignificant today — not because they do not exist, but because they are absent from the public arena. Neither archaic Orthodox Judeophobia nor ethnic xenophobia (especially in the provinces) is of great concern to the liberal public, the authorities, or Jews themselves.

What remains is routine anti-modernization antisemitism, tied to the national identity of Russians themselves. The fading of ideological antisemitism creates the impression that the overall level of antisemitism is declining. This impression is correct, because without state institutional support, amorphous conservative antisemitism has no chance of turning into a mass movement or a policy of open discrimination against Jews (or any other ethnic group[6]); it lacks violent potential. However, this also means that educational efforts regarding Jewish history, persecution, or the Holocaust will not yield major results, as the issue is rooted in the broader conservative trend of Russian society — the difficulty of overcoming the Soviet past. Without a deep reflection on the past (as occurred in Germany and is slowly happening in Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Lithuania) and without changing Russia's institutional system to reckon with the remnants of Soviet totalitarianism, the problem of antisemitism cannot be resolved. By "resolving the problem," we mean the creation of effective legal, public, and reputational mechanisms to control aggressive, offensive, and discriminatory forms of xenophobia and antisemitism, which could otherwise become a basis for ethnic mobilization under certain conditions.

It is constantly noted (and confirmed by research) that with the disappearance of state-sponsored antisemitism, everyday antisemitism also begins to decline. Yet, even in Soviet times, a persistent set of negative stereotypes existed for Jews, Armenians, and Central Asians alike, remaining highly resilient in the public consciousness.

Attitudes toward Jews

The belief that Jews are "not like other nations" has taken root in the collective consciousness (in 1992, 64% held this view; in 2020, it rose to 71%). The persistence of this view is driven by the conviction that: a) this people survived for two thousand years without their own territory or state (at least until the creation of the State of Israel); b) despite this, they preserved their culture, language, and historical memory in the face of persecution, hostility, and the Holocaust; c) Jews are a high-status group, fundamentally different from the "lower social strata" (peasants, workers), with no marginalized segments. These perceptions took shape in the late Soviet period and persist today. They are supported by the acknowledgment that "Jews have made a major contribution to global science and culture" (61% agree, 25% disagree). According to respondents, Jews are most active in business and finance (40%), science (30%), medicine (30%), politics (29%), trade (27%), and the arts, music, and literature (25%).

At the same time, these perceptions lack specificity. Some clarity on who the public considers prominent Jewish figures is provided by answers to the question about individuals "who made the greatest contribution to global science and culture." 67% of respondents could not name a single person (in 1990, this figure was 61%).

Table 3. In which professional areas do Jews achieve the greatest success?

*Ranked by 2020 data.

Among over 100 names mentioned, only Albert Einstein received 15%. About ten other names were mentioned by 1% to 2% of respondents, with the rest consisting of isolated mentions. Interestingly, many non-Jews were named (such as J.S. Bach, I. Kant, L. Beria, M. Curie, A. Nobel, E.M. Remarque, A. Solzhenitsyn, D. Shostakovich, K. Tsiolkovsky, etc.). Respondents named non-Russian famous figures whom they believed to be Jewish. Such figures accounted for 6-7% of all names.

The core of these perceptions consists of scientists and poets; there are almost no politicians, public figures, Israeli leaders, or religious figures. This list has remained virtually unchanged for 30 years. In essence, these are pop-culture perceptions typical of moderately educated urban residents, or pop-culture phenomena associated with Jewishness. Individuals with higher education and residents of large cities possess slightly more knowledge of Jewish achievements, but their level of information should not be overestimated. Perceptions of Jewish culture, religion, and traditions completely lack historical depth. This circumstance must be kept in mind when discussing the future of Russian Jewry.

In contemporary collective consciousness, Jews are not so much a representation of a real nation or ethnic community as they are a mix of archaic ideas about a group that carried modern values during periods of rapid modernization. This image is based on a set of stereotypes formed 70–100 or more years ago when Jews were leaving the Pale of Settlement in large numbers. Today, these prejudices are reinforced by Russian complexes of national inadequacy, triggered by the collapse of the communist project and the erosion of the "Great Power" ideology.

Any ethnic image consists of characteristics of social roles, status, and professional occupations associated with that ethnicity, as well as perceptions of its attitude toward the collective identity values of the majority. This image cannot be viewed in isolation from the social and cultural context, as it is largely a projection of the majority population's self-image. By projecting negative traits onto "Others" ("imagined Others"), an ethnic group not only expresses its own hopes and fears but also shapes its views on the identity and history of society.

Contrary to expectations, the image of Jews has not changed significantly over the past 30 years. The resilience of these stereotypes (despite extremely limited real interaction) suggests that the need for such an image of the "Other" is driven by internal mechanisms of maintaining collective identity among Russians and other ethnic groups. Shift in ethnic self-perception, caused by crises in the country, are reflected in the emphasis on certain values that shape attitudes toward Jews. This is not about changes exclusive to Jews.

We must emphasize this key point — such fluctuations (rises or falls in hostility) reflect changes in the overall level of ethnic negativity. It rises equally toward Caucasians, people from Central Asia, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Estonians, etc. This mutual negativity shares common roots: feelings of displacement, crisis, frustration, and the weakening of moral restraints.

Xenophobia stems from the nature of Russian national identity as the "state-forming nation." Its main pillars are imperial or great-power consciousness and a latent belief in strength as the basis for other nations' respect[7]. Therefore, a certain level of negative perceptions of others, serving to justify one's own aggressiveness, is inherently assumed by the collective consciousness in Russia. This play a critical functional role in generating ethnophobia.

This connection weakens in groups or social environments where civic identification with the state diminishes, and other values underpinning self-respect and life satisfaction take over. Conversely, in low-income groups experiencing discomfort due to low income and social status, there is a stronger need for compensatory explanations of their difficulties.

In essence, such reactions are perceived as routine nationalism and xenophobia, which reduce internal frustration by shifting aggression onto "enemies" or "strangers." The existence of this dependency is confirmed by periods when xenophobia declined: for example, in 2018, sharp negative reactions to government policies (primarily pension reform) noticeably reduced the level of articulated xenophobia. It took nearly two years for it to begin recovering.

The general conclusion is that antisemitism is not disappearing; it is being reproduced, even though there are no visible institutional channels, let alone state institutions, to transmit these attitudes (or rather, they are not obvious). The social environment preserving antisemitic and other xenophobic perceptions is maintained by routine, everyday, informal relationships in primary groups. They are passed from person to person without reflection or evaluation, habitually and almost automatically. Therefore, it is more accurate to speak of "dormant antisemitism," as the structure of such prejudices is reproduced from generation to generation almost unchanged.

Theoretically, this presents a significant puzzle. What social mechanism reproduces these ideas if the state, through its formal institutions like schools, the media, the military, the police, and the political elite, is not directly involved? The general tone prioritizing the interests and status of Russians as the "state-forming nation," in the official terminology of the current administration, sets a context of national inequality. These ideologemes are rooted in the pre-revolutionary past and Soviet nationality policy (the hierarchy of union republics, autonomous republics, regions, and ethnic groups), which was implemented in personnel policies and administrative regulation of mobility. These factors form the social soil for reproducing ethnic prejudices.

One reason for the weakening of antisemitism in Russia was the separation of "Westernism" (as a set of modern cultural models) from "Jewishness." The image of Jews as agents or catalysts of Russian modernization used to provoke strong negative reactions among competing elite groups and conservative rural or working-class urban populations. State antisemitism from the 1940s to the 1970s, characteristic of a closed totalitarian state, relied heavily on associating Jews with a stateless nation, which made them representatives of universalist values and individual achievement. In the ideology of Russian imperial nationalism, these qualities were associated with the West as the vector of global development and the embodiment of global modernism.

The modern (Western) character of Jews clashed, on the one hand, with the "Great Power" ideology, its militaristic culture, and ethnic hierarchy, and on the other, with Soviet claims to a unique mission. This contradiction was framed as Jewish foreignness, selfishness, and a reluctance to defend the collective interests of the country. The collapse of the USSR weakened this traditional link between Jews and the Western world, gradually neutralizing tensions between elite groups. Since then, the image of Jews has acquired self-sufficiency and traditionalism in the eyes of society (the perception of Jews as religious rose from 13% in 1989 to 39% in 2020, becoming the most frequently cited trait[8], Table 4).

The marginalization of the Jewish question does not mean that negativity toward Jews has completely disappeared; it simply remains unexpressed. To identify hidden, latent antisemitism, our studies used a specific method to expose these unreflective layers of the collective consciousness. For this purpose, a special list of qualities was developed back in 1989 to describe (and self-describe) various ethnic groups. Since then, many such measurements have been taken, shaping "portraits" of various nations.

A comparison of the descriptions of Jews and Russians from our 2020 study (Table 4) shows that these communities are clearly distinguished in the public mind. The dominant traits of Jews, according to respondents, are: religious, rational, cultured and well-mannered, hypocritical and cunning, secretive. The dominant traits of Russians are: hospitable, open and simple, patient, helpful, reliable, loyal. The axis of contrast is: simplicity vs. complexity, familiarity vs. foreignness. The intellectual and cultural resources attributed to Jews are viewed with suspicion by Russians, who perceive themselves as lacking such symbolic capital and being in a dependent position.

Table 4. Characteristic Qualities of Jews and Russians

*Ranked in descending order by the "Jews" column

The structure and core meanings defining the image of Jews in Russia have remained stable over the past 30 years, though the ratio of specific stereotypes and their intensity have fluctuated. The main component is the association of Jews with Western concepts of individuality and achievement-oriented behavior. Such an individual possesses self-esteem derived from cultural (including religious) value rather than state loyalty. This person is minimally inclined to join collective mobilization or blend with the crowd, which triggers suspicion and mistrust. This set of definitions becomes more pronounced during acute crises of Russian collective identity (1999) and weakens during periods of rising collective self-esteem and optimism (1994 and 2003). Overall, this set of perceptions is quite stable.

The flip side of these Jewish traits is their mismatch with Russian self-identity, which heavily incorporates a victim mentality stemming from the contradictions of identifying with an authoritarian state. That is, imperial pride (or "great-power arrogance") coexists with deep personal insecurity due to state arbitrariness, fostering a sense of chronic dependence, helplessness, and fear. Hence the high percentage of those labeling Russians as "patient" and "simple." Consequently, any ethnic images of people representing "modern culture" trigger resentment (envy, fear) and alienation. However, it must be emphasized that this component of the Jewish image (alienation, perceiving Jews as "culturally foreign") has weakened significantly over the last 30 years: its expression decreased by 2020 by 1.5 times: from 36%-37% (1989) to 23% (Table 4, compare with Table 5).

This was partly due to the growing perception of Jews as religious, which is not particularly characteristic of the largely secular Russian Jewish population. This likely reflects the normalization of relations between Jewish communities and the state, marked by the end of the "struggle against Zionism" and the recognition of Judaism as one of Russia's traditional religions. Other typological components of collective perceptions of Jews in Russia remained unchanged.

Since we deal primarily with the ethnic Russian population in surveys, three coordinate axes were identified, reflecting the most sensitive aspects of Russian national identity: modern — traditional; self — other; dominant — subordinate. The category "modern" included the following traits: energetic, rational, cultured, with a sense of dignity, hardworking. The category "traditionalists" included: lazy, impractical, irresponsible, religious, respectful of elders. The category "self" included: hospitable, open, simple, reliable, ready to help. Accordingly, the category "other" included: hypocritical, envious, secretive, selfish, stingy. The category "dominant" consisted of: freedom-loving, arrogant, cruel, power-hungry, imposing customs on others. Finally, the category "subordinate" included: peace-loving, patient, downtrodden, and humiliated.

Table 5. Typological Images of Different Ethno-national Groups (2020)

Thus, we can analyze the dynamics of typological images of various ethnic groups. Let us compare four such ethnic portraits, where Americans represent Russia's geopolitical rival, and the Roma represent extreme traditionalism and cultural distance[9]. Note that the number of responses about Russians is 30% higher than about Jews and Americans, and 38% higher than about the Roma. In other words, the majority ethnic group in Russia is much more willing to speak about itself than about others.

Comparing the 2020 data with those of 1989, 1991, 1994, 1999, 2003, 2005, and 2008, we conclude that it is not "Jews" or "Americans" that change, but rather Russians' self-perception under the influence of ongoing social processes. This involves shifting configurations of hope, disappointment, prospects, satisfaction, income dynamics, frustrations, fears, propaganda, and other factors. Furthermore, over the 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, other sources of modern ideas have emerged, primarily through consumer culture, which has weakened the former link with Jewishness. In turn, these changes affect the intensity of stereotyping. This is key to understanding xenophobia dynamics. The decline or rise of antisemitism reflects internal processes in Russian society, not the actions of Jews or any other ethnic community.

In all cases, the weight of negative traits in the image of Jews, as well as the inclination to repeat antisemitic clichés, is noticeably higher among those who have never interacted with Jews. The percentage of highly negative or offensive ratings among such respondents is 1.2 to 1.5 times higher than among those who have Jewish relatives, friends, or colleagues. This does not mean that having Jewish relatives or friends completely eliminates antisemitic attitudes, but it significantly reduces the frequency of their expression.

Antisemitism, Its Nature and Structure

The issue of combating xenophobia and antisemitism concerns only a very small part of Russian society. This is not just a matter of public indifference or moral apathy (though both exist). More significant are the consequences of the crisis of Russian national consciousness after the collapse of communism and the USSR.

Another reason is the low level of aggressive antisemitism (especially when comparing the Russian situation to rising antisemitism in European countries). There is no real threat of pogroms, nor are there conditions for them. Today, Jews do not live in concentrated enclaves, nor are they concentrated in specific occupational sectors that would focus public anger on them, and there is no basis for a state policy of antisemitism to channel aggression.

However, this does not mean that antisemitism or xenophobia is absent in Russia. Hostile statements and materials can still be found on state television, the Internet, and social media. For these sentiments to translate into aggressive behavior, certain conditions are required: nationalist leaders scapegoating other ethnic groups, state chauvinistic propaganda, high social status of the targeted group, and a declining standard of living among the classes incited against minority communities.

Regarding Jews, several of these conditions are currently missing. This is evidenced by a specific gap between negative definitions of Jews (their association with money, wealth, and avoidance of manual labor) on the one hand, and disagreement with the assertion that Jews are a source of ethnic conflict on the other.

Parameters of Negativity toward Jews

To assess the dynamics of ethnic stereotypes, the study used two sets of stereotypical statements about Jews tested in previous surveys (Tables 6A and 6B).

Table 6A. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (A — agree, B — disagree; excluding "hard to say")

Table 6B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (A — agree, B — disagree)

"–" indicates that the option was not offered in that survey year

Changes in attitudes toward Jews are moving in two opposite directions, as those holding these views belong to different social groups. However, a significant portion of both groups overlaps. First, we observed a slight increase in low-level resentment: an envious and hostile attitude of lower social strata toward more successful and high-status ethnic groups. Second, there was a noticeable rise in philosemitic attitudes, expressed in an increase in positive traits attributed to Jews and a decrease in negative stereotypes.

Antisemitic views persist in social strata experiencing a lack of self-esteem, frustration over instability, and the threat of losing status or financial security. The share of aggressive opinions is declining, attitudes toward Jews are becoming more tolerant, and the image of the Jew is losing its former significance and provocative role in the identity of the general population.

Importantly, these changes are driven by younger generations, who are free from the ideological clichés of Soviet state antisemitism. Routine prejudices reach young people only through their parents' stereotypes rather than state socialization and propaganda. Consequently, social distance toward Jews is weaker among the youth. For example, respondents aged 18-24 are more likely to describe Jews as hospitable, reliable, loyal, open, simple, and peace-loving than older generations (25% vs 14%, 14% vs 6%, 12% vs 5%, respectively).

The stereotype that "money is more important to Jews than human relationships" is stronger among entrepreneurs (primarily small and medium ones, as large business was too small to be sampled), workers, the unemployed, minor officials, and pensioners — environments where social resentment is more common. It is least common among youth and students (on average, half as common).

The study hypothesized that chronic anxiety and frustration among respondents affect the level of xenophobia and antisemitism. At first glance, the majority of respondents (68%) describe their state as calm and balanced, with another 15% reporting an "excellent mood." However, 17% stated they constantly experience fear, anxiety, or irritation. Russian society is characterized by a high level of diffuse or background anxiety, linked to social insecurity, administrative arbitrariness, and uncertainty about the future.

Almost all types of fears experienced are not situational reactions to specific threats. This refers to chronic, stable, and socialized fears as a norm. These expectations of trouble are not controlled by individual consciousness; they form the horizon of daily existence. Given the weakness of social gratification mechanisms (rewards for achievement or "proper behavior"), fears articulate what respondents consider most important in life. In other words, this is a key mechanism for holding onto values, realized only in the context of their potential loss. These fears are the subconscious of everyday life. Constant psychological tension and the anticipation of misfortune break out in the form of negative projections onto the "culprits" of these misfortunes, serving as an easy outlet for psychological relief.

Comparing respondents' answers about fears and anxieties with their ethnic prejudices and phobias allows for firm conclusions about the correlation between these factors. The increase in ethnic hostility in the responses of highly anxious respondents ranges from 10% to 60% (depending on the type of anxiety).

Our measurements show that the lowest level of xenophobic and antisemitic (as well as anti-American, anti-Roma, anti-Caucasian, etc.) attitudes is recorded among the most successful and affluent segments of the population. It slowly rises as satisfaction with life decreases. Hostility toward "others" is relatively low among those who have adapted ("things aren't so bad, we can get by"), then rises sharply (1.5–2 times) in groups of deprived but passive respondents, reaching its peak among the maladapted. This correlation does not mean that the most adapted groups are free from prejudice (this is the sleeping nature of antisemitism), but it highlights the factors provoking the growth of xenophobia. Aggressive antisemitic sentiments become socially dangerous only when their carriers perceive themselves as speaking for the majority. This can be either an illusion or stem from real support by influential groups or institutions (as occurred during the Soviet "struggle against Zionism"). In the former case, such trends are neutralized by public opinion, criticism, and court decisions; in the latter, they turn into systemic discrimination.

Table 7. In your opinion, are there many people in Russia who are biased against Jews?

As shown in Table 7, the perception of an antisemitic majority in Russia is slowly weakening, but it has not disappeared completely. Over 30 years, it has turned into an ideological resource of marginal groups. As in previous polls, all signs point to the concentration of antisemitic views in social groups dissatisfied with their situation. These include, primarily, poorly educated youth in Moscow and major cities who lack opportunities; the unemployed; and followers of traditional religions, particularly Muslims. However, a small portion of respondents in this category, conversely, identifies with Jews, their fears, and their historical experience of persecution. Generally, this is a very small share compared to those seeking confirmation of their Judeophobia by appealing to the "majority" as the keeper of the "truth." Conversely, successful and educated respondents are more likely to state that "very few" people in Russia share antisemitic views.

In any case, we can cautiously speak of the declining influence of antisemitic carriers. The relative majority of respondents is inclined to believe that there are fewer antisemites (from 1992 to 2015-2020, the share of such answers rose from 18% to 45%-46%, while those struggling to answer decreased threefold to 14% compared to 46%).

Table 8. How have anti-Jewish sentiments in Russia changed over the last two to three years?

However, the decline in the intensity of antisemitism can be misleading. Analyzing the answers in Table 8 allows for the following conclusion: this is not about actual assessments of antisemitism levels, but rather a decline in the relevance of this topic in the public mind. The high share of those who struggled to answer (averaging 23-24%, reaching a third among youth, and over half among those with low education) and neutral answers ("same as in Soviet times" — 22%) demonstrates that people simply have nothing to compare this level to. Only one category of respondents — managers, who possess social memory — provides more definitive answers (today antisemitism is not as pronounced as "in Soviet years," the ratio of "more/less" is 0.45).

The threefold increase (from 17% to 51%) in the share of respondents choosing the answer "remained at the same level" should be interpreted not as the continuation of state discrimination against Jews in the modern Russian Federation, but rather as the Judeophobic theme losing its relevance and institutional backing. Some prejudices remain, but they lack the power of negative integration, as well as the potential for understanding the causes of antisemitism and its consequences for society. A key factor suppressing awareness of the problem is at play — blaming Jews themselves for their persecution.

Table 9. Do you agree that Jews throughout their history were not accidentally persecuted so often, that they are at least partly to blame for this?

The majority of respondents avoid making a clear moral assessment of antisemitism, leaning toward a more ambiguous "on the one hand, on the other hand" position. This indicates both a tacit refusal to accept responsibility for hostility of "one's own" and the persistent stability of anti-Jewish attitudes. This conclusion is reinforced by another consideration — the readiness to downplay the extent of Jewish persecution in the past and present, as well as the reluctance to view Holocaust denial or claims of exaggerated Jewish death tolls as "antisemitism." The share of those sharing this opinion in our first survey in 1990 was 2.5 times higher than the share of those holding the opposite view (39% vs 14%), and it continued to rise slowly, reaching 43% in 2020. Agreement with this statement is more actively expressed by the poorest and most deprived segments of the population, who are resentful of anyone demanding more sympathy than they receive — 46%.

At the same time, the share of those disagreeing with this view was also growing, and much more visibly (primarily at the expense of those who previously struggled to answer), reaching 35% of all respondents in 2020 — compared to 14% in 1990, 16% in 1992, 21% in 1997, and 31% in 2015.

The Future of State-Sponsored Antisemitism

Unlike the general public, many Jews view the cessation of state antisemitism as a fluke, a temporary phenomenon.

Such anxieties seem to us not entirely convincing. Rather, they represent mental inertia and the traumatic experience of centuries of discrimination. It is not that the level of antisemitism in contemporary Russia is low or, as many claim, non-existent. Our research allows us to assert that antisemitic prejudices retain their power and are reproduced without any support from state institutions or government intentions. Why, then, after many reforms, upheavals, and the collapse of the USSR, in a democratic and later conservative-authoritarian Russia that is restoring several key repressive institutions of the Soviet system, has state antisemitism ceased?

The motives for phasing out antisemitic policies varied across periods. The modern history of post-communist Russia can be divided into three periods: the Gorbachev era (perestroika, glasnost, and the fight against the old communist nomenclature), the Yeltsin era — characterized by incomplete, half-hearted, and largely unsuccessful attempts at democratization and institutional reform, and finally, the Putin era.

Mikhail Gorbachev did not intend to dismantle the USSR, but to remove the old nomenclature, he was forced to introduce constitutional changes, repealing Article 6, which secured the CPSU's monopoly on appointments. This brought in new people who became Gorbachev's support base, but it also destroyed key institutions of the totalitarian system. After that, everything began to unravel — the planned economy, fierce criticism of the Soviet past, including national discrimination and the persecution of repressed peoples. Antisemitism was condemned and banned along the way.

Boris Yeltsin, in his struggle with Gorbachev, championed radical democratization and "returning Russia to the global path of development," which meant dismantling the former national hierarchy and implementing equal rights and human rights protection. Conservative resistance to his actions and defense of the Soviet past were openly antisemitic. One can recall General A. Makashov, speeches by prominent "Russian writers" V. Astafyev and V. Rasputin, works by I. Shafarevich, etc. Numerous Judeophobic or even Nazi publications and groups emerged (RNE was only the most prominent). In other words, from the authorities' perspective, antisemites suddenly became enemies of the emerging state, opponents of the regime to be suppressed or at least isolated and neutralized. It was during this period that antisemitism was labeled as extremism, anti-government, anti-state, anti-constitutional, and unacceptable. Yeltsin, even more than Gorbachev, needed new, proactive, and competent personnel, who could only come from former Jewish "holding areas" — academic science, the gray economy, journalism, talented opportunists, Komsomol activists, etc. Many of them became pillars of the new regime as administrators, bankers, financiers, etc.

For Russian nationalists (as in Poland or Hungary), "Jews," "the revolution," and "cosmopolitans" were traditional targets of criticism. For the ruling authorities, however, antisemitic ideas were not just alien; they held anti-regime potential for independent movements and parties exposing elite corruption and its plutocratic nature. The government was fully aware of the uncompromising nature of Russian nationalists, their readiness to sacrifice for "the people," and feared a repeat of radical revolutionary actions of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Moreover, having barely suppressed decentralization, the Kremlin leadership was extremely fearful of social conflicts taking on ethnic dimensions. Consequently, the protection of Russians under V. Putin was practically not raised until very recently; the government limited itself to statements about the "state-forming nation" and tried to avoid provoking minority mobilization.

Finally, we believe that fears of a return to state-sponsored antisemitism are driven more by the need to preserve identity than by real threats of discrimination.

The Holocaust

There are relatively few Holocaust deniers in Russia, but they do exist. About 2-3% of respondents encounter such statements "constantly"; another 4% "frequently"; and 14% "sometimes." Meanwhile, 79% have never heard anything of the sort. This share of survey participants (one-fifth) roughly corresponds to the proportion of respondents who answered negatively to the question: "When, in which eras, were Jews subjected to special persecution?"

The vast majority of respondents (87%) are aware of the mass extermination of Jews. 12% had never heard of the Jewish genocide or learned about it for the first time from the survey. The level of knowledge about the Shoah has been slowly declining over recent decades due to youth indifference. The most educated categories of the population are best informed, primarily Muscovites (97%), half of whom have higher education, respondents in the most active age bracket of 25-39 (81%), and especially those over 40 (92-93%). However, a quarter of young people (aged 18-24) heard about the genocide of Jews for the first time during the survey itself (with more women — 16% than men — 6% among them). This knowledge declines as one moves from urban environments to rural areas, although even in the countryside, 82% of respondents are aware of it. 1% heard of the mass extermination of Jews during World War II but do not believe it (among youth, this figure is 3%).

The question regarding the scale of the Jewish tragedy caused significant difficulty. More than half of respondents (58%) struggled or refused to answer it (among women — 65%, men — 50%; in the category of people with below-secondary education — 87%). Even among the most educated groups, more than half of respondents (54-56%) did not answer the question about the number of Jews killed during World War II. This means that the scale of the Holocaust remains outside emotional empathy, treated rather as a well-known but hollowed-out fact that does not touch the soul. The remaining 40% of respondents estimated the dead at 3.5 to 6 million.

Attitudes toward this topic are not simple: more than half of respondents (55%) believe it is important to teach the Shoah in school history lessons, along with the oppression of Jews in the Russian Empire and Soviet times. However, about a third of respondents (31%) object to Holocaust lessons, considering them unnecessary for raising the younger generation, building national pride, and patriotism.

Among those who believe history lessons should address not only the Holocaust but also the history of antisemitism and persecution of Jews, the youth, pupils, and students are the largest group (64%).

Here we encounter a subtle competition between two ideologies. One is liberal and humanistic; the other is state-nationalist, aimed at instilling imperial Russian nationalism with its emphasis on self-sacrifice and a low value placed on individual human life. In this context, discussions about xenophobia and antisemitism in Russia are seen as "unpleasant" for Russian nationalists.

There is nothing uniquely Russian about this attitude toward the Holocaust or discrimination against Jews — resistance to reflecting on an unwanted past is evident (and much stronger than in Russia) in regions of the former Pale of Settlement — in Lithuania, Poland, and elsewhere.

Perceptions of Periods of Discrimination against Jews

Russians' perceptions of the nature and periods of Jewish rights violations in Russia are fragmented and characterized by a lack of interest in the past. 43% agree that "in the past, Jews lived in an atmosphere of hostility and insult," but almost as many (39%) disagree, and 18% struggled to answer. This distribution shows the low relevance of the issue.

Table 10. When were Jews subjected to special persecution?

The relative majority tends to view "Stalin's times" as the peak of antisemitism (41%). These respondents might not even have had in mind the "struggle against rootless cosmopolitans" of 1948-1953, but were simply reproducing general stereotypes about mass repressions under Stalin. This option was chosen more often by Muscovites (50%), and slightly less frequently by residents of provincial cities or rural areas (from 42% to 46%). The second most common answer (20%) — "during the revolution and Civil War" — is typical of more educated strata or youth, who retained school knowledge of pogroms during this period. 17% believe Jews were persecuted only in Tsarist times. Very small groups pointed to state-sponsored antisemitism under Khrushchev and Brezhnev — 5-6%. 15% deny any persecution of Jews in post-revolutionary Russia (among them, twice as many men as women — 20% vs 11%), while 6% of respondents do not believe that "the persecution of Jews ever occurred at all." 19% struggled or refused to answer, primarily those with low education, older women, and rural residents (24%).

In other words, the history of Jews is viewed through the general template of Soviet history, which had no room for ethnic discrimination and the ethnocratic hierarchy typical of an imperial state, as was both Tsarist Russia and the USSR.

We have already noted poor knowledge of Jewish history, culture, and traditions. Only 8% of respondents understand what the "Pale of Settlement" was and its social consequences.

Very few survey participants named the founding date of the State of Israel. Elderly and educated respondents did better; among them were more individuals who identified the main sacred books of the Jews (12% named the Torah and 18% the Talmud). Such knowledge is possessed mainly by the fading intelligentsia concentrated in the largest cities; in Moscow, for example, 24-32% named these books, compared to only 2-3% among young respondents.

Most Russians support special measures to protect Jews from discrimination (Table 10), as well as the need to teach past persecutions (Holocaust history classes). Intended to restore historical justice, they should also prevent such tragedies in the future. Opposition to such policies comes mainly from poorly educated individuals. However, the level of support for punishing overt antisemitism should not be exaggerated — this is largely a formal agreement with the options in the questionnaire and a common reluctance to give negative answers. As with de-Stalinization and the revision of Soviet history, despite superficial approval, public indifference remains the dominant force.

The overall trend over 30 years shows a decline in the perception of the universality of legal norms. The share of those agreeing that insulting human dignity should be punished, "regardless of status," steadily decreased from 68% to 42% in 2015 — the peak of nationalist euphoria and rising great-power resentment in Russia (later recovering slightly to 52% in 2020). This suggests a dual process: a) the weakening of active antisemitism; b) a reluctance to share responsibility for past antisemitic campaigns by the state and society, alongside a desire to smooth over these issues. In other words, resistance to xenophobia and antisemitism has weakened, as has the understanding of the threats they pose.

The West has integrated the tragic history of the Jewish people, especially the Holocaust, into its public consciousness. Countless books, studies, films, and TV series target different audiences. The tragedy is integrated into education, publishing, political and legal culture, and broader culture, serving as an antidote to such ideas and practices. Nothing of the sort happened in Russia. Respondents' agreement with the need for Holocaust education does not imply an understanding of the importance of reassessing the past and the causes of genocide.

This partly explains why the absolute majority (76%) resolutely rejects the assumption that "Jews still live in an atmosphere of hostility and insults"; another 14% struggled to answer because they have never met a Jew and have no basis for judgment. However, 8% agree that antisemitic sentiments and incidents persist. Such opinions are expressed more frequently by those with Jewish relatives or by Jews themselves.

In a survey, it is impossible to separate answers based on real experiences with antisemites from inertia-driven opinions (such as: "In Russia, the majority are antisemites, and it has always been that way"). Older individuals are more likely to give a negative answer, as they can compare the present with the past. Mature respondents were slightly more likely (79%-81%) to state that there is no active antisemitism in Russia today. Among youth (aged 18-24), 71% share this view; young people struggled to answer more frequently than other age groups.

To explain the mixed dynamics of antisemitism in Russia (the decline of aggressive ideological forms alongside the persistence or even expansion of routine antisemitism), two versions can be proposed: 1) the gradual forgetting of Soviet discriminatory practices (especially noticeable among the young); 2) a subconscious desire to neutralize ethnic issues of other communities against the backdrop of nationalist mobilization, mass euphoria, and great-power pride after the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas. In this context, it is not about the Jewish question per se, but about suppressing the relevance of any kind of xenophobia.

The absolute majority of Russians are convinced that "Jews in Russia have the same rights and opportunities as other Russian citizens" (in 2015, 83% held this view; only 9% disagreed, predominantly respondents with Jewish relatives, along with a small number of antisemitic marginals who believe "Jews have too much power and privilege"). Thus, while the steady decline in the perceived need to protect Jews may seem strange at first glance, it is logical within the framework of these interpretations.

Conclusion

Overall, we can cautiously speak of an increase in general tolerance, primarily thanks to the younger generation, which is less susceptible to traditional prejudices and antipathies. This observation is necessary to avoid a one-dimensional description of attitudes toward Jews, as this report focuses on the negative aspects of these relations.

Antisemitism in Europe and Russia has always existed, merely changing its forms. Developed Western political cultures are currently balancing between a crisis of democracy and liberalism and the rapid growth of far-right parties. In Russia, ideological antisemitism is limited to minor nationalist parties and movements, influencing a very narrow layer of radical citizens.

In the post-Soviet period, especially since the 2000s, old state antisemitism transformed into defective socialization. The history of the Soviet period, Stalin's repressions, persecution in the Russian Empire, pogroms, collaboration with Nazis, and observer indifference did not enter the national culture or the perception of Jews by Russians, many of whom have distant Jewish roots (considering that in the 1970s, the Jewish population was about 2.5 million).

Today, these historical issues are meaningful only for a narrow layer of the remaining Jewish intelligentsia and intellectuals (though applying this term to Russian reality is highly debatable). For most Russians, the Holocaust is not a significant or marked topic, despite some vague awareness of the tragedy. The Shoah does not play a major role in attitudes toward Jews — this is one of the conditions for reproducing latent antisemitism, essentially low-level xenophobia.

Currently, there are no signs of a rise in aggressive or radical antisemitism in Russia; the forecast in this sense is quite favorable.

The bulk of the Russian population views Jews favorably and with respect, perceiving them as a high-status social group with recognized achievements in highly valued fields — medicine, culture, science, finance, and the media. Antisemitism is perceived as a sign of low social status or failure, which restrains the expression of antipathy toward Jews.

At the same time, antisemitic perceptions have been reproduced almost unchanged throughout the 30 years of monitoring by Levada Center sociologists. This type of conservative antisemitism can be described as dormant, latent, and diffuse; without active propaganda, it does not pose an immediate public threat. This creates the impression of a low level of antisemitism in Russia, which is inaccurate.

It is not the perceptions of Jews that are changing, but Russian society itself, and these changes, quite ambiguous and contradictory, are reflected in attitudes toward Jews. The likelihood of a return to state-sponsored antisemitism in the foreseeable future remains low.

The struggle against antisemitism and xenophobia in Russia can be successful only in the context of overcoming the Soviet past with its ethnic hierarchy and state antisemitism. Isolated educational projects (such as Holocaust school lessons, stories of the Righteous, etc.) can only yield partial results. The real issue lies in the general humanization of Russian society and the development of a legal culture, which remains a highly challenging task.

1 | The research working group included N.A. Zorkaya, E.V. Kochergina, K.D. Pipiya, and A.I. Ryseva.

2 | Gudkov L., Levinson A. Attitudes of the USSR Population Toward Jews and the Problem of Antisemitism in the USSR: Research Report. — Moscow, Oct. 1990; Gudkov L., Levinson A. Attitudes of the Former USSR Population Toward Jews. 1992; Lev Gudkov and Alexey Levinson, “Attitudes Toward Jews in the Soviet Union: Public Opinion in Ten Republics”, in D. Singer, ed. Working Papers on Contemporary Antisemitism (N.Y.: Institute of Human Relations, American Jewish Committee, 1993); Lev Gudkov and Alexey Levinson, “Attitudes Toward Jews in the Commonwealth of Independent States”, in D. Singer, ed. Working Papers on Contemporary Antisemitism (N.Y.: Institute of Human Relations, American Jewish Committee, 1994); Gudkov L. Attitudes of the Russian Population Toward Jews and the Problem of Antisemitism in the USSR: Research Report. 1997; Levinson A. Antisemitism in Modern Russia: Research Report on Russian Jews. — M., 2016; Gudkov L., Zorkaya N., Kochergina E., Lezina E., “Antisemitism in the Structure of Mass Xenophobia in Russia: Negative Identity and Mobilization Potential.” The Bulletin of Public Opinion. 2016. No. 1-2, pp. 140-197; Gudkov L., Pipiya K. “Parameters of Xenophobia, Racism, and Antisemitism in Modern Russia.” The Bulletin of Public Opinion. 2018. No. 3-4 (127), pp. 33-64.

3 | Gudkov L., Levinson A. Attitudes of the USSR Population Toward Jews and the Problem of Antisemitism in the USSR, 1990, pp. 8-9.

4 | Editor's note. Considering the ongoing population decline, and at the same time — Jews not covered by the census, Israeli "minimalist" demographers estimate the core Jewish population of the RF at 155,000 (Mark Tolts, Annual estimates of Jewish population in Russia and Ukraine (Dataset). Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2020 (https://archive.jpr.org.uk/10.13140/RG.2.2.29107.25127/2). And the "expanded Jewish population," including individuals of mixed origin and non-Jewish family members of Jews, at 460,000. (Sergio DellaPergola and L. Daniel Staetsky, Jews in Europe at the turn of the Millennium. Population trends and estimates. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research (IJPR), October 2020, p. 69).

5 | Lev Gudkov and Alexey Levinson, “Attitudes Toward Jews in the Soviet Union: Public Opinion in Ten Republics”, Working Papers on Contemporary Antisemitism (New York: Institute of Human Relations, American Jewish Committee, 1992), pp. 22-24; Lev Gudkov and Alexey Levinson, “Attitudes Toward Jews in the Commonwealth of Independent States”, Working Papers on Contemporary Antisemitism (New York: Institute of Human Relations, American Jewish Committee, 1994).

6 | That such a turn is entirely possible under modern conditions is demonstrated by the deportation of Georgians from Russia, carried out several years ago.

7 | "Military power, nuclear weapons" is the most popular answer to the question of what, above all, causes respect for Russia among other states today. Levada Center press release: https://www.levada.ru/2016/11/14/obraz-rossii-na-mezhdunarodnoj-arene/.

8 | This is surprising, given the scale of secularization of Soviet Jewry, as well as the majority of the Russian population. In 1989-1990, only 16-19% considered themselves believers, compared to 70% today.

9 | In other studies, Russians and Jews were compared with Uzbeks, Chechens, Tajiks, Lithuanians, British, Germans, Chinese, Swedes, Finns, and several other national communities.

*"–" indicates that the option was not offered in that survey year