Photo: STMegi

Preliminary remarks

The future of Jewish communities — specifically, their ability to preserve and transmit their unique identity to future generations — remains one of the most highly debated topics in the era of assimilation. In practical terms, this revolves around two questions: whether Russian Jewry will survive physically, and to what extent its existence will be secure.

This article summarizes the findings of a recent study conducted by the Yuri Levada Analytical Center (Moscow), which aimed to address these and related issues. The study was led by A. Levinson and utilized an email-based questionnaire survey (primary data processing was performed by S. Koroleva). Respondents were recruited from the Levada Center's database, supplemented by the snowball sampling method. The total number of respondents was 70. The primary selection criterion was the respondent's expertise in matters of self-organization and the prospects of Russian Jewish communities. In addition to representatives of the metropolitan (Moscow, and partially St. Petersburg) Jewry, the sample included individuals with Jewish roots who self-identify as Russian, Armenian, etc. (10 people).

The questionnaires were answered by directors of research centers and Jewish public organizations, leading scholars of Hebrew and Jewish studies, experts in other fields of the humanities, political analysts, politicians, media figures, university professors and associate professors, NGO activists, writers, and poets.

The majority of the respondents are residents of Moscow, while the rest reside in other cities of the Russian Federation, as well as in Australia, the Netherlands, the United States, and Germany. In terms of religious affiliation, the vast majority identified as non-believers, atheists, or agnostics; nine respondents identified as Jewish by religion, seven as Orthodox Christians, and one indicated being Muslim.

The political orientation of the respondents ranges from moderate-liberal to strongly liberal (the term "liberal" is used here in its contemporary sense, serving as a synonym for the word "democratic," which was compromised in the 1990s). There is reason to believe that the main segment of the high-status metropolitan Jewry falls within this spectrum. At the same time, the sample does not include Jews with anti-liberal views who belong to the upper echelons of power. Unfortunately, representatives of the business sector, particularly show business, remained inaccessible to the survey organizers. Furthermore, the study does not represent Jews who are deeply involved in communal and religious life.

Thus, the sample represents high-status Jewish (and other) intelligentsia, with a predominance of older age groups. The high average age in this case is directly linked to social status, as the respondents are employed in fields where vertical mobility is heavily dependent on seniority.

In other words, this sample represents a specific (and, crucially, historically defined) social type belonging to what is popularly termed the "creative class," which simultaneously sets the tone within the organized Jewish movement of the Russian Federation. Previous studies conducted by the Levada Center among non-metropolitan and non-elite Jewish populations demonstrated that these individuals, to an even greater extent than our respondents, exhibit a characteristically Russian lack of vision regarding the future as a collective social prospect (even while clearly articulating their personal prospects).

"Jewry" as a Category: Meaning and Substance

First and foremost, the very concept of "Jewry" as an overarching term proved to be far from obvious for many respondents.

The willingness to apply the term "Jewry" to a group implies that this community possesses distinct shared social characteristics rather than being perceived purely as an ethnic group. Indeed, no other national group in contemporary Russian is designated by collective nouns with the suffix "-stvo" (-hood/-ry)[1]. Instead, this suffix historically defines social estates and status-based groups (nobility, peasantry, clergy, gentry, officer corps, or youth).

It is no coincidence that some of the respondents objected to the generalizing phrasing presented to them:

— What is "Jewry"? I do not know or understand this term. 

— What do you mean by "Jews as a whole"?

The respondents stood in sharp contrast not only to the "traditional" Jewry of the shtetls—a social type that has long since vanished (and was largely annihilated). They also intentionally distanced themselves from the Jews who "made the revolution," who were also mostly wiped out. Speaking of themselves and their Jewish contemporaries, they noted that while they are highly represented in business, mass media, etc., "and, thank God, they are no longer to be found among the Chekists." They also distinguished themselves from the generation of the refuseniks / emigrants of the Soviet era, which they viewed as heroic in a sense. Emigration today is not perceived in such dramatic tones, as it allows for returning, maintaining dual residency, and so forth. Our respondents address the issues of identity and loyalty to Russia differently than the Jews of the 1970s. Although many have close relatives living in Israel, and some hold Israeli citizenship, they did not identify themselves with the Jews of Israel either.

It is also significant that approximately 10% of the respondents substituted or supplemented their ethnic self-identification with another marker (for example, "Muscovite" or "Jew/Muscovite"). Quite frequently, participants introduced additional definitions: "Russian Jew," "Moscow Jew," "Jew on paper, Russian by identity." In other words, they felt their distinctiveness not only in relation to the non-Jewish population of Russia but also in comparison with other Jewish groups. In the antisemitic joke "Jews are not a nation, but a profession," the first part holds partially true when applied to contemporary Russian Jewry. The second part of the formula is also somewhat accurate, as members of this community are united in their own eyes (and the eyes of others) by their type of employment, their place in the social division of labor, and so forth.[2]

In previous centuries, these professional—and essentially social estate—niches consisted of financial transactions or trade in valuable goods (ranging from diamonds to clothing and footwear). Later, this sphere expanded to encompass critical life-support services, such as medicine.

Having abandoned the shell of national tradition, Jews integrated into the cultural landscape of the host majority. It has been frequently noted that the residual elements of "strangeness" created not only obstacles but also advantages in mastering new cultural material. This culminated in achievements in the arts, sciences, technology, and education. People employed in these fields (which includes the majority of our respondents) are typically referred to the intelligentsia. They are characterized by a shared ethos and many common traits in lifestyle, speech behavior, and culture.

For the survey participants, these markers replaced the lost traditional attributes of an ethnic, national, or tribal community (in its "classical" sense). They actively participated in creating this cultural toolkit, and they are its consumers.

We are far from suggesting that this cultural-historical configuration is unique. On the other hand, the Jewish minority does not undergo the same transformations in all regions. However, in regions where the Jewish (primarily Ashkenazi, Yiddish-speaking) cultural complex underwent accelerated dissolution—within one to three generations—into the surrounding socio-cultural environment, the results of this process can be described as extraordinary. Calculations of the number of Jewish Nobel laureates, prize winners, and authors of outstanding works serve as evidence of the opportunities opened up within this host culture by agents who have mastered its normative and value systems. Yet, these agents have retained, firstly, a certain distance from it, and secondly, a number of non-inherent attitudes regulating their intellectual and emotional activity. From our perspective, the commonly implied assertions require correction:

a) these achievements were possible precisely because their authors were Jewish. This thesis is not entirely correct, nor is the opposite assertion, namely:

b) these individuals achieved outstanding results because they abandoned their Jewishness and fully immersed themselves in another culture.

We believe that the secret to the success of these near-assimilated agents lies precisely in their residual marginality[3].

Above, we discussed the formula "Jews are not a nation, but a profession," within which, where others display national traits, Jews act as representatives of a professional corporation. Now we are speaking of a mirror-symmetrical situation. In the professional sphere, partially assimilated Jews are capable of mobilizing the resources of the culture they possessed when they were a nation.

It follows from the above that the success of Jewry in the field of European culture is a phase-related effect. The remnant of Ashkenazi culture, acting as a kind of alloying additive to the European corpus of cultural resources, is present in these individuals in a situation of parting with this segment of Jewish culture—a parting that has stretched over two, three, or four generations. Now we are on the threshold of the next phase. This implies not the disappearance of Jewry, but the disappearance of this specific historical type of Jewry and the emergence of the next. This next type is manifested primarily by the absence of any vision of the future of Jewry among the respondents.

Our study has essentially captured a specific moment in the history of the metropolitan Russian intelligentsia, marked as "Jewish." L. Gudkov and the late B. Dubin long ago declared the demise of the Soviet intelligentsia[4]. Alongside all the circumstances mentioned by those authors as causes for the disappearance of the intelligentsia as a class, our Jewish interlocutors rank emigration as a mechanical loss in first place, and natural decline due to demographic factors in second place. Some, since the intelligentsia no longer exists while they still do, look for a different socio-professional definition for themselves (such as "Jewish intellectual"). Others are willing to call themselves the "remnants of the Soviet intelligentsia."

There are also those who do not believe in the end of the intelligentsia and link the fate of Jewry with the fate of the intelligentsia.

— It seems to do me that in twentieth-century Russia, Jews simply became a metaphor for the intelligentsia, and therefore the future of the Jews is the future of the Russian intelligentsia.

As noted earlier, the question of the future of Jewry in Russia proved to be the most challenging. Refusal to answer was the primary reaction of the audience.

The sharply elevated emotionality of these refusals is highly indicative:

— I am not Vanga! 

— I am not Nostradamus. 

— As a historian, I do not find it possible to... 

— This is an unprofessional question... 

— How can you ask such questions?! 

From the answers to other questions, one can reconstruct what perceptions of the future of Jewry (and thus their own future) exist among the respondents, which ones are blocked, and where the gaps lie.

The complexity of this cognitive situation, which triggers the refusal to answer, stems from the respondents' feeling that people like them will no longer appear in Russia. This is driven by both the shrinking reproduction of the Jewish population itself and emigration. However, it is also threatened by the well-known decline (degradation) of science as an institution and the disappearance of the demand for the activities in which they achieved success.

At the same time, these individuals are not ready to admit their own irrelevance in contemporary and future Russia. The survey involved individuals who are not inclined to emigrate. Their ethos presupposes a responsible attitude toward their citizenship; hence, the numerous statements that "Jews are and will be needed in Russia."

Cognitive dissonance arises from the clash of two assertions: "Jews will always be needed in Russia" and "people like us will not be needed in Russia."

Additional complexity is introduced by the question of antisemitism.

Its absence in contemporary Russia is acknowledged, with various qualifications, by virtually everyone, which is favorable for the flourishing of "Jewish life." However, there are numerous slips of the tongue suggesting that "there is no Jewry without antisemitism", and without it "it disappears. Without antisemitism, Jews in Russia have no future of their own, in my opinion." (This issue is examined in more detail in the relevant section).

Such considerations in the collective consciousness of a segment of Jewry also induce a kind of stupor.

Consequently, one cannot answer the central question of the study "on the future of Jewry as perceived by Jews" simply by aggregating the opinions of the respondents—because they do not exist. We are forced to reconstruct this answer from other reactions and arguments.

The historically defined type of Russian metropolitan Jewry we have examined will begin to exit the stage in the near future, and will do so completely. But this will not lead to the disappearance of Jewry from Russian life. What is disappearing is the type of Jew who fought for prominence in Russian and European culture—the type that produced a constellation of celebrities. The study only allows us to guess at the nature of the type replacing it (the final part of this paper is dedicated to this).

Respondents acknowledge that Jews in Russia no longer perform the function of modernization agents:

— In contemporary Russia, Jews play no role. In the Middle Ages and the early Modern period, they had a specific place (role) in the then structure of society, economy, etc. In the 19th and 20th centuries—the era of universal emancipation—Jews, not as a community but as individuals with a shared destiny, acted as agents of change. Even in the 1990s, this was true to some extent. Today, however, Jews have no special role.

This does not mean that innovation has ceased in Russia; rather, the institutional forms of adoption have shifted.

The first path is direct import. In our previous study, where respondents were mid-level Jewish professionals, it was noted: "We don't produce anything ourselves now; everything is imported — every nut, every carrot..." Respondents in the current study point to the lack of jobs for highly qualified experts (previously needed to adopt and master imported technologies):

— The young, highly educated individuals (among whom, by inertia, there are many Jews) are departing for more developed labor markets abroad.

The second path involves innovations entering without intermediaries, through the direct entry of foreign companies bringing their own technologies.

The third vector, characteristic of popular culture, is the mass adaptation of innovations by internet users. Mediation certainly exists there, but it is structurally integrated into the fabric of communication (rather than being isolated as a distinct function).

All these forms exclude the function performed by Jews over the course of two to four generations in Russia (and some other countries). This role as introducers and innovators gave its practitioners such weight that they often emerged as leaders in various collectives, a status institutionally reinforced by their holding of managerial positions.

Another outcome of the same circumstances was that Jews acquired not power, but authority, which was formalized in titles, awards, and popularity/fame.

The paroxysms of the campaign against "cosmopolitans" or the introduction of the unofficial "quota system" restricted both of these trends. Even if the executors of the purges and exposures of "enemies of the people" had no personal prejudice against Jews, the repressions physically destroyed or stripped of status a significant portion of Russian Jewry that had achieved prominent positions in Soviet society.

Today, as the era of Jews holding vanguard positions draws to a close, it leaves behind a trail of memories. The older generation is accustomed to seeing a Jew in any context as a distinct figure marked by special attitudes—a mix of honor and respect alongside negative feelings of envy, contempt, and rejection.

For the younger generation, it is natural that if a Jew stands out, it is not by status or vertical positioning, but by the manner of performing their role (positioning in horizontal social roles). This marks a new era in the history of Russian Jewry.

We use the term "Jewry" to designate the object of study, although defining the social category represented by this word proved extremely difficult for our respondents.

— The integrity of Jewry is itself questionable. In former times, when Jews were held together by religion and language, one could speak of the Jewish people as something cohesive. Today, this framing of the question seems incorrect to me.

Essentially, all answers regarding the future of Jewry fell into a framework reflecting two internal and two external processes. The internal processes are assimilation or return to tradition. The external ones are two types of antisemitism—state-sponsored and everyday.

According to the 2002 census, the median age of Jews was 57. Nearly 20 years have passed since then, and our sample is dominated by individuals aged 60+. This is likely why their perceptions of the social structure of Russian society and the place of Jews within it remain influenced by views formed in the 1960s and 1970s.

This refers to the common perception that over the last three centuries, Russian society functioned as follows: at the top is power, at the bottom is the people, and between them is the layer of the intelligentsia. In the 1960s and 1970s, Russian Jewry had every reason to count itself precisely among the intelligentsia.

This tripartite structure of society seemingly persists in the minds of our respondents. However, it has transformed, and in their view has become a system where Jewry has taken the place of the intelligentsia. Thus, Jewry is not considered part of the people (in this case, the Russian people), nor is it connected to power. This is their baseline perception of the place of Jews in Russia.

Of course, in alternative Jewish discourse, there is the assertion that Jews belong, if not to the Russian ethnic nation, then to the Russian civic nation, just as they previously belonged to the Soviet people. There are also those who believe there are (too) many Jews in power—a claim repeatedly made by antisemites and occasionally acknowledged by Jews themselves. Both opinions are known to the respondents, and both are dismissed by them as marginal to the "Russian Jewish discourse."

At the same time, they believe Russian Jewry is tightly integrated into the fabric of Russian society and lives the same life as everyone else: "I do not know what will happen to the Jews in Russia in fifty years; perhaps Russia in its current form will no longer exist, and in the new Russia, there will be no Jews."

This dependency was taken as a given. In the passion of the assertion that Jews share the same life with the entire country, with the whole people, one must recognize a clear manifestation of the assimilative component of the Jewish mass consciousness. Like any mass consciousness, it accommodates and presupposes statements of the opposite nature concerning the distinctiveness of the Jewish fate in this (and any other) country.

Antisemitism as a Factor

As noted by the respondents, the situation for Jews is determined not only by factors applicable to all Russians—such as the economic climate and government actions. An additional factor is the attitude of "everyone else" toward Jews. Since the respondents' perception of this attitude ranged from poor to very poor (the current period being an exception), it was consistently labeled as antisemitism. Many experts who were skeptical about Russia's future offered similarly bleak "Jewish" forecasts, predicting a rise in antisemitism. Conversely, the few optimists regarding Russia's future (which they envision as democratic) believed that the prospects for Jewry are also not cause for concern.

Despite the fact that the interviews began with the premise that antisemitism in the Russian Federation is at a historic low, conversations about the future of Jewry nevertheless consistently veered into discussions about antisemitism in its various forms.

Our respondents, let us recall, generally accepted the triad of people, power, and Jews as the foundation of their reasoning. Accordingly, we received three types of answers to questions about antisemitism. One concerned antisemitism in Russian society at large. Equally often, respondents spoke of state-sponsored antisemitism—the so-called official antisemitism—and the antisemitism of the people—the so-called everyday antisemitism.

This was followed by conclusions regarding the sources of antisemitism. Many of those surveyed pointed to authorities at all levels—from minor bureaucrats to the very top—as the source, while making the mandatory qualification that the current supreme leadership is not antisemitic. In this scenario, the general population was cleared of the charge of antisemitism.

There is a second viewpoint, which holds that the source of antisemitism is the people, primarily the Russian (but also the Ukrainian) population. The Russian people, by their intrinsic, immanent characteristics, are seen as harborers of antisemitic attitudes. Consequently, everything depends on the government, which either allows these sentiments to run wild or, for various reasons, restrains them. In this sense, the current authorities are seen as protecting Jews from the outbursts of popular antisemitism that would be inevitable if the people were left to their own devices. This was sometimes formulated as follows: antisemitism is currently minimized, but this is merely a pause; should the authorities cease to demonstrate loyalty toward Jews, popular antisemitism will flare up, possibly in more severe forms than before.

There is also a third viewpoint, based on the idea that power and the people in Russia share a common root, and both components of this pair are inherently biased against Jews.

Antisemitism is viewed as a given, but its rise or fall is linked to the socio-political climate.

State antisemitism was discussed frequently and at length, though most agreed that it is currently absent or at a historic minimum.

— The level of state antisemitism has decreased almost to zero — by which I mean the removal of discriminatory restrictions.

— The attitude toward Jews in modern Russia is determined by the attitude of the political class. Since the main segment of this class is not interested in a surge of antisemitism, the attitude toward Jews in Russia is relatively favorable.

— Jews have ceased to be a political factor in today's Russia, which reduces the likelihood of a revival of state antisemitism.

— Regarding state policy, antisemitism will not become a part of it under virtually any political scenario.

We should note that the "optimistic" forecast was primarily articulated within a professional political science narrative. The pessimistic forecast utilizes a simpler model of determination. In some cases, respondents point to the state as an operator capable of switching state antisemitism on or off.

A more detailed explanation was provided by respondents who link the rise of antisemitism to specific processes within Russian society. The following explanations for the expected growth of antisemitism (pointing primarily to everyday antisemitism) were obtained:

— If everything here deteriorates, attitudes toward Jews will also deteriorate, because everyday antisemitism is deeply embedded in the subconscious and can flare up at any moment.

— Antisemitism will decline under an optimistic scenario, may increase slightly under an inertial scenario, and is likely to rise sharply under a pessimistic scenario for Russia's development.

However, there were also expectations of its decline due to the disappearance of Jews themselves:

— On an everyday level, remnants of antisemitism will persist for a long time, gradually fading if only due to the natural demographic disappearance of Jews in Russia.

It is important to note that the respondents' attitude toward state-sponsored antisemitism is largely rational. Its existence and potential return to Russian reality are explained "politologically," suggesting that the state uses antisemitism to resolve problems in its relations with its subjects. This thesis is common to all. However, this narrative conspicuously lacks an explanation for why state antisemitism is currently absent. Respondents noted: "For some reason, Putin is not an antisemite." Why he is not, even though he could or perhaps even should be, remains unanswered. Indeed, no answer is sought. Such a view naturally leads to the following projection:

— One cannot rule out the possibility of a change in leadership, which would once again lead to a search for scapegoats, and the old parable about the Jews and the cyclists will become relevant once more.

Regarding everyday antisemitism, there are not even attempts at a rational explanation. Although many scientific frameworks exist to interpret xenophobia in general and Judeophobia in particular, they were not invoked by our highly educated audience. Antisemitism is accepted as a given, an inherent attribute of the popular consciousness. However, since it manifests in connection with the presence of Jews, it is treated as an attribute of Jewishness. (Respondents did mention "antisemitism without Jews," but only as an exception that proves the rule). This appears to be a defense mechanism of contemporary secularized Jewry, where the chosenness of the Jewish people is confirmed by discrimination, and their uniqueness by exclusion.

We should add that many respondents spoke of the Holocaust as a symbol that unifies Jews. The Holocaust is the ultimate manifestation of both state and popular antisemitism; it exists in Jewish memory without needing or having explanations. Indeed, the memory of the Shoah, combined with the thought that the Jewish people survived despite the Catastrophe, serves the same function of confirming the distinctiveness of one's people in a modern secular environment as the concept of chosenness once did—serving as one of the most important means of maintaining social integration and reproducing the subculture of an ethnic community.

Arguments that antisemitism is absent because the conditions for it do not exist are also typical:

— For antisemitism, you need Jews, and there are very few of them left in Russia. Moreover, the majority of Jews in Russia are fully Russified and do not claim any distinct identity.

But then a reason is found why antisemitism will appear anyway:

— Antisemitism can always be artificially generated, even if Jews only live in America or Israel. In essence, this will no longer be antisemitism, but simply hatred of the outsider. This is possible both in 10 and in 50 years, if no more suitable enemy is available in a difficult moment.

The absence of antisemitism is perceived ambivalently. One often hears that antisemitism keeps Jews on their toes. A more serious consideration regarding consequences is that in the absence of antisemitism, one of the main components of Jewish identity disappears; Jews begin to vanish as soon as no one stigmatizes them as Jews.

Many respondents describe the current situation as the fading of state-sponsored antisemitism while everyday antisemitism persists. Everyday antisemitism, meanwhile, is encountered in two variants. The first is hostile/negative attitudes and attacks by Russians against Jews. Some respondents have experienced these themselves or know of such cases. The second is antisemitism without Jews as a special phenomenon, which suggests two approaches. One is ethical, where antisemitism is recognized as an evil, a defect of the human soul that does not disappear in the absence of Jews, proving the immanence of evil—either evil in general or evil inherent to a specific nation, in this case, the Russian nation. This is a regrettable phenomenon that must be tolerated due to the indestructibility of evil. The other approach can be called functional—it is shared by few of our respondents. This approach points to the functionality of antisemitism for the Russian, and perhaps not only Russian, ethnos. The theoretical groundwork for part of this issue was laid by L. Gudkov, who wrote about the functionality of the image of the enemy[5], which at a certain stage was necessary for collectives of various levels, since they established their boundaries and regulated internal relations through this image. As L. Gudkov noted, the image of the Jew in the Russian consciousness represents a projection of disapproved and denied anthropological attributes, which are marked in Russian self-awareness as alien[6], specifically as belonging to Jews, as "Yid." These include greed and stinginess, but also excessive calculation, and rationality instead of emotionality.

In the processes of socialization, i.e., communication between older and younger generations or interpersonal communication among peers, the reprehensibility of such behavior is marked by labeling it as Jewish or "Yiddish." Similarly, the pursuit of excellence that gives one person an advantage over others is also marked: "Who do you think you are, the smartest? Are you a Jew or something?"

In this context, the negative image of the Jew and the Jewish world functions in the internal communication of the Russian ethnos, mostly outside the zone of actual contact with Jews. This variant of antisemitism is not directed against actual Jews: the attitude toward real Jews plays no role here. Some respondents noted that because their Russian partners know they are Jewish, they refrain from using such critical tropes in their presence, not only toward them but also toward "their own." Furthermore, Russian neighbors often assure them that they do not see Jews as carriers of any harm. Yet, they do not cease to condemn something as Jewish or "Yiddish" in their relationships with those they raise or lecture[7].

One way or another, in the dominant narrative, antisemitism is presented simply as an evil inherent to individuals, a people, or a state. Its source is not sought due to the perception of the eternity of evil. In this connection, the prospects of Jewry in Russia are envisioned as follows: Jews will always be here, and they will forever remain the target of antisemitism. Under this approach, antisemitism proves to be an attribute of Jewish existence, which is why such respondents interpret the current situation (the practical disappearance of antisemitism) as abnormal. For if Jews have lost their antisemitism, it means they have ceased to be a distinct people; the disappearance of antisemitism is a sign of the disappearance of Jewry.

Atheism and Internationalism

The majority of those surveyed consider themselves atheists (some prefer the term agnostic). In inter-ethnic relations, they are characterized by an approach designated in Soviet times as internationalism. This is partly explained by the fact that the primary and secondary socialization of the respondents occurred during the Soviet era, when these attitudes were part of the officially mandated ideology. However, we believe that the respondents adopted these doctrines not only as Soviet citizens but also—and with emphasis—as Jews. In several instances, they stressed that they remain loyal to atheism despite the fashion for religion, whatever it may be, and are convinced of the equality of peoples, rejecting ideas of the superiority of any nation, specifically the Jewish one.

While in dispersion, Jewry, interacting with the surrounding ethnic environment, maintained its distinctiveness primarily through religion. (This was also aided by endogamy, rooted in the concept of the "blood" exclusivity of Jews, as well as a specific sphere of employment rejected by their non-Jewish neighbors.) This was the niche that protected and preserved Jewry within a foreign ethnic environment[8].

In times closer to our own, Jews emerged from this niche, and the compactness of settlement and blood ties within the group began to erode. We should note that in all periods, some Jews converted to Christianity or Islam. Sometimes this led to complete integration, with an absolute rejection of their distinct identity, while at other times it generated marginality in relation to both groups—the "old" Jewish community and the new, adopting one. There was also the practice of voluntary conversion to another faith. (Our sample includes Jews who converted to Russian Orthodoxy). Voluntary departure to a foreign religion was one of the attempts to avoid the aforementioned stigmatization, exclusion, and repression. This step often did not bring the sought-after peace of mind, yet the search continues to this day.

There are two opinions on this matter in Jewish circles. The first is that a Jew who has parted with his faith, i.e., become a non-believer, does not cease to be a Jew: "You cannot stop being a Jew. Have you ever in your life heard the phrase 'former Jew'?" Here, once again, difficulty arises in defining Jewishness, but the prevailing view is that "not being an observant, circumcised Jew does not mean you stop being a Jew." But there is also another approach: from the standpoint of religious Jews, adopting another faith means completely forfeiting one's right to call oneself a Jew[9]. Among the non-Jewish environment, there are several viewpoints, one of which sees the outcome of this process as the transformation of the Jew into an individual "just like everyone else" (from the perspective of "everyone"). Another—the opposite view (willingly shared by antisemites)—is that Jewishness cannot be erased by anything. Moreover, "converts are even worse," meaning that Jewish traits are manifested in them more sharply.

The practice of baptism demonstrates that it does not always save one from exclusion. Therefore, tools of adaptation were required, one of which was the rejection of one's own religion combined with the promotion of non-religion as an ideal offered to everyone else. The idea of uniting with individuals who had abandoned their respective confessions on the basis of atheism to form a new community of non-believers was not uniquely Jewish. However, in the event of its triumph, they would be its primary beneficiaries.

To reiterate, the absolute majority of respondents identified themselves as non-believers. The same trends were demonstrated by the previous survey in non-elite groups.

Thus, atheism, as a doctrine and a value position, was viewed by Jews not as a Jewish trait, but as something offered (by Jewry) to the world at large. And in various forms, it was accepted by this world. In particular, atheism became the state doctrine of the Soviet Union and was only recently officially displaced during the drafting of amendments to the Constitution. This atheism became an instrument for adapting Jews to diaspora existence.

Another adaptive path is internationalism. As with atheism, the author does not claim that internationalism is a Jewish invention. However, it was adapted by the social wave emerging from the Jewish enclaves; the rejection of national affiliation by these Jews was presented as an offer, an imperative for all peoples. The abolition of ethnic classification became part of the socialist/communist doctrine; ultimately, national statehood was to give way to a unified society where there would be no division into peoples, countries, and races. Then, a total unification of all based on the anthropological trait would triumph: everyone is human. In the modern version of the civic nation, this very principle is embedded: the nation consists of its citizens.

Internationalism as an attitude manifests in various subtle forms in the reactions of our respondents. As an antithesis to Zionism and Jewish nationalism, it looks like a fitting worldview for individuals who consider themselves Jews. Again, the exceptionality of Jews manifests in this readiness to renounce their own Jewishness in favor of more universal interpretations of social problems. For themselves, they see the solution to the Jewish question from these universalist, in a sense internationalist, positions. As described by one of our respondents: "I was born into a first-generation Jewish intellectual family. The values of Russian culture were held as paramount. At the same time, my parents were deeply committed to the ideas of internationalism, and any departure from these ideas saddened them to the highest degree."

Another method of adaptation/assimilation, which has already been mentioned, is the rejection of one's own Jewishness, in whatever form it may take. In relation to the Jews of Russia, this has been described as attempts by certain Jewish figures of social-democratic persuasion to dissolve their people into the culture of the Russian proletariat. This was achieved by adopting the traits and practices of the proletarian environment and rejecting everything that set Jewry apart. The experiment was deemed a failure, and subsequently, the focus shifted from "proletarianizing" the Jews to a general principle of raising children who were expected to know the Russian language and culture "better than anyone else" (i.e., better than the Russians themselves), while discarding as much as possible of what represented the "old" Jewry. Once again, we emphasize: in this sense, to be Jewish meant to be, to the maximum extent, non-Jewish. And this was esteemed as a virtue.

Assimilation

Respondents were asked under which scenario of Russian history the assimilation of Jews would accelerate, and what, conversely, would lead to the restoration of Jewish traditions?

A portion of the respondents accepted a simple framework: Russia's fate is either growing authoritarianism or a transition to democracy, while the future of Russian Jewry is either assimilation or a "return to tradition."

This model assumes that under democratic conditions, assimilation will proceed more actively, whereas under a dictatorship, the trend toward traditionalization will strengthen.

— It may sound paradoxical, but under authoritarianism, some separate Jewish life will continue. The onset of real democracy, however, will lead to an increase in assimilation.

— Assimilation, but slow and incomplete — under democratic development; restoration of traditions — under an authoritarian one (alongside the departure of those who find this unattractive).

— If the state continues its course toward "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality," the trend of strengthening Jewish identity (which is not quite the restoration of traditions, but rather a way of realizing oneself as a Jew) will continue. This will serve both as a conformist position and as a form of protest. Yet, assimilation (if we mean the cessation of observing the commandments) is an absolutely inevitable factor in the modern world.

Various modifications to this general model were also proposed.

— I think both processes will run concurrently, as is happening now. The only question is the size of the first and second groups of Jews, and in what proportion they will decrease.

— The assimilation of Russian Jews is irreversible.

— Without going into details and arguments, I believe that as a trend, assimilation will prove stronger.

— The return to "tradition" will never offset the processes of assimilation.

— Under a favorable scenario, assimilation may intensify, but there will always remain a "core" inclined to preserve traditions.

— The restoration of traditions is possible under a pessimistic scenario for Russia's development: under conditions of increasing threats to personal and group security, consolidation on this basis is forced and inevitable. Under other scenarios, assimilation will dominate.

— Under a modernization scenario, assimilation will intensify; under a conservative one, it will weaken. But I am referring to deep assimilation.

— A modernization and liberal scenario can also be accompanied by an ostentatious revival of Jewish—as well as any other—distinctiveness, wearing a kippah, visiting synagogues, and generally emphasizing one's significance by virtue of belonging to a "chosen" group.

However, more complex models were also put forward:

— A "catastrophic" scenario, highly unlikely at present, will inevitably lead not just to assimilation, but to the demise and virtually complete exodus of Jews from Russia. A "favorable" scenario, similar to the one in Russia today, leads and will lead not so much to the restoration of traditions as to the formation of specific forms of national existence, which may rely on traditions in various forms, but can also be innovative in character.

Some answers implied a rejection of the opposition between assimilation and return to tradition:

— It seems to me that this opposition is gradually disappearing — assimilation and the restoration of traditions can coexist and do coexist, and this coexistence is characteristic in the context of the declining role of ethnicity. This is increasingly a matter of cultural choice.

There were references to non-political reasons for the dynamics within the Jewish community:

— Assimilation will intensify due to the high rate of mixed marriages. I see no grounds for the restoration of Jewish traditions. The first of these is the language problem. Fewer and fewer Jews speak a Jewish language (either Yiddish or Hebrew). And Jewish religious education is inextricably linked with knowledge of the language.

A portion of the answers reflected a refusal to see this problem or the proposed opposition:

— Speaking of assimilation in our time is irrelevant, since several generations of assimilated individuals have already grown up.

Here is a detailed response that dismantles the introduced opposition:

— In relation to Russian conditions, as a "starting point" of movement "toward" or "away from" Jewishness, it makes sense to rely on the principle of self-identification. In the event of a rise in antisemitism, all Jews, regardless of how they perceive themselves, will be forced to play the role of an alien and "dangerous" national group. In the case of preserving a favorable (non-hostile) environment, Jews will have a wide choice: assimilation, adherence to Judaism, and a broad field of intermediate options (observing basic traditions at the family level, interest in Jewish history and culture, possibly participating in the life of Jewish communities, if some modern versions of "Judaism light" appear in Russia). Under such a scenario, the situation will not be one-dimensional — "assimilation or restoration of traditions" — but more complex.

This opinion is not isolated:

— A false alternative. Like Russians or Poles, Jews in the modern world fluctuate between religious and secular identity. Secular identity does not mean assimilation. A Russian does not cease to be Russian if he does not consider himself Orthodox Christian.

An observation about the nature of the "new religiosity" of Jews seems important:

— A mass return to religious life and traditions (as a lifestyle) will not occur under any circumstances. Modern Russian Jews are residents of large cities, well-integrated into urban life. Traditional religiosity is hardly compatible with this. A rise in national consciousness (and, accordingly, a limited interest in tradition) is most likely to be activated if antisemitism increases. However, even in "peaceful conditions," it is also possible within the framework of a general trend — a growing interest in family history and memory.

Here is an important thought on the functional need of society for a "Jewish" element:

— In my view, the presence of a strong Jewish community is determined not by religiosity or the presence of a secular Jewish culture, but by the host society's need for the existence of Jews, and the opportunities that this society provides to Jews.

Finally, an opinion was expressed that should be considered in its expanded form:

— I think the opposition between assimilation and turning to traditions needs major clarification from both sides.

Russian Jews have long been assimilated in the old sense that they live, with very minor exceptions, not in closed communities, but in ordinary urban settings, and are by no means restricted to Jews in their personal and professional interactions. They are not assimilated in the sense that they "know" they are Jewish, whatever qualifications this is framed with.

The concept of "traditionalism" and even religious "observance" in Jewry is highly blurred — ranging from belonging to the inner circle of the Chabad community with all that entails, to consuming matzah during Passover and adhering to specific dishes of Ashkenazi cuisine. Although synagogues play the role of community centers, orthodox religiosity is completely uninfluential; it does not form that robust layer capable of maintaining traditional norms, as we observe, despite everything, in Russian Orthodoxy, for example. Thus, for Jews in mass numbers, even more so than for nominal Orthodox Christians or "ethnic Orthodox," turning to tradition is characterized by adopting random elements (including distorted ones), which are not even the same, so it is impossible to say that there is any dominant Jewish practice.

So, in the foreseeable future, the level of assimilation is unlikely to change. Almost all Jews will remember they are Jewish, and almost all will be smoothly integrated into secular surroundings. At the same time, a certain common behavior allowing one to say that "Russian Jews do such-and-such" will not emerge, although in urban life, which permits any combination of cultural orientations, most Jews will utilize something from the traditional arsenal in some way.

Only some catastrophic events causing a surge in antisemitism are capable of changing this scenario, and even then, the most sensitive part is more likely to emigrate than to mobilize its Jewishness here. Moreover, they will emigrate not from antisemitism, but from the catastrophic events themselves.

As we can see, most experts linked the dynamics of assimilation and its opposing trends to the state of the environment external to Jewry, to processes in Russian society as a whole. At the same time, some authors believed that a rise in antisemitism would activate proponents of returning to Jewish tradition, while others, conversely, believed that this would spur further assimilation and weaken Jewish identity. (Strictly speaking, in practice, a simultaneous acceleration of both processes is possible).

There were occasional (few) attempts to deny the very fact of assimilation:

— Laments about assimilation have been heard for hundreds of years. The Jewish people have proven their resilience — the Jewish mind, the Jewish character, the Jewish humor are not going anywhere.

But generally, everyone agreed that this process is ongoing. Here is how our respondents envisioned the future of their children, determining it by the situation in the country as a whole.

— Under a democratic scenario of the country's development — assimilation, but very slow. The fact is that modern Jewish non-traditional identity, unrelated to religion and the like, is a highly successful identity. Consequently, people have no reason to abandon it. A more or less mass return to roots would only happen if the situation in the country deteriorates.

— Unless external circumstances force descendants to "become" Jewish, they will most likely turn out to be completely or almost completely assimilated.

— Much will depend on the situation in Russia and the opportunities for self-realization of these descendants. It seems to me that the attraction to Jewish roots will prevail; this is in the Jewish genotype, traumatized by genocide — a drive toward consolidation and protection.

— Departure from the country if what is happening politically in Russia continues. For the most part — a loss of connection to one's roots. For a small part — a deliberately active return to roots.

It is worth noting that the respondents do not explain why a favorable situation (democracy in Russia) would stimulate assimilation, while an unfavorable one would trigger a "return to roots." It seems it could well be the other way around.

In several instances, internal Jewish processes were explained by internal causes:

— The old will live out their days, the middle generation will integrate, and the youth will leave.

— In the context of globalization and social networks, questions of identity fade into the background, as people are occupied with other issues.

— I think that in the long run, Jews as a national-cultural community will survive only in Israel and, possibly, in the US. In other countries, assimilation in one form or another awaits them.

Respondents clarify the question of assimilation, pointing to the specific character of Jewish identity in Russia:

— It is an interesting question whether the blurred community of people who simultaneously feel their inclusion in Russian culture and a certain distinctiveness within this culture will survive. For now, this cultural phenomenon is supported by the old Russian division into "Slavophiles" (nationalists, imperialists, etc.) and "Westernizers" (universalists). But there is a feeling that this division will lose relevance in the coming decades. For them, there will be no alternative of Jew / non-Jew. The main trend will consist of multiple identities. Moreover, in some areas (food culture, for example), one identity may prevail, while in others (attitude to religious practices, etc.) — another. Of course, some will move into Jewishness, some will reject it. But these are not the paths of the majority.

— Lack of knowledge of tradition, language, not attending synagogues, etc., point not so much to assimilation as to acculturation, which, as the example of Soviet Jews shows, coexists well with national self-consciousness, especially if it is threatened by someone. Acculturated Jews have always constituted the majority in the last two centuries, which did not lead to the disappearance of the community as a whole, but led to radical changes in the form of this self-consciousness (the most striking example of which is Israel).

We place special emphasis on this conclusion:

For such Jews, the strength and degree of Jewish identity is often no less (or no less worthy) than for those who attend synagogues. It is simply different. Nothing will prevent their descendants from associating themselves with the Jewish people in the future, based on types of identity different from religion and communal life.

(Note the rare view in the responses of the future of Jews as a different future belonging to different paradigms).

It is important to observe that the process of assimilation does not move uniformly along the historical scale, but in leaps. The attitudes with which a person enters society generally change relatively little over their lifetime. The attitudes of their offspring, the next generation, will differ much more. (This is where the proverbial "fathers and sons" problem arises). Therefore, the perceptions of the future among mature and elderly Jews and young Jews inevitably differ. Our study cannot provide a complete answer regarding these differences, as youth were very poorly represented in the sample.

Departure

In the context of the assimilation problem, the question of Jewish departure from Russia inevitably arose. In particular, the highly interesting phenomenon of living in two homes, implying a close connection with Israel while maintaining a similar connection with Russia, was discussed. The following opinions were expressed regarding the prospects of this trend.

— It seems perfectly normal to me that a person chooses where to live, where to work, etc. Moving from place to place in search of studies, career, love, optimal climate for your health, etc. To me, living not just in two homes, but in three, four, or more seems like the right way to live.

The general attitude of the respondents is positive. Expectations, as in other cases, are linked to the situation in Russia.

— My expectation (wish) is that no one interferes with this process. Two homes are better than one.

— This is again connected to what Russia will be like. Under a democratic scenario of development, living in two homes is a viable option. Or even returning[10].

— I think nothing will fundamentally change, unless, of course, Russia closes its borders with an iron curtain. Living in two homes is a completely obvious global trend that will only strengthen.

— This will depend on political processes in Russia, because for many, a second — Israeli — citizenship is insurance against trouble here in the Russian Federation. And trouble specifically of a political nature. On the whole, living in two homes can become the norm.

More cautious forecasts take into account that connections with Russia for those living in two homes will gradually weaken:

— If the general situation does not change, then living in two homes will persist; there is a certain charm in this. But still, as Soviet Jews who were born and raised here pass away, the attractiveness of Russia as a second home will weaken.

No one ruled out the option of closing borders, but most deemed it unlikely. Respondents believe it will affect Jews less than other residents of the RF.

— I think this is not very likely. But if it happens, Jews will try to leave, as was the case in the USSR.

— There is a small risk of this. But I think that in any case, Jews will be able to emigrate from Russia to Israel for permanent residence, at least according to the model that developed in the USSR in the 70s of the last century.

The question of whether anyone needs to leave Russia right now was discussed.

— It is better for all young people to leave right now, regardless of nationality.

— It is better for young, educated, and ambitious people to leave. Perhaps the elderly should also leave to receive quality healthcare services.

Significantly, the study did not reveal alarmist sentiments regarding the situation with Jewry.

— It makes sense for the politically persecuted to leave. But this is not necessarily about Jews. There is no more direct threat to Jews than to the Russian intelligentsia as a whole.

— There are no specific "Jewish" reasons for an urgent departure. Anyone who wants to live in a state with better governance, democracy, development prospects, and is ready for emigration, should not delay and leave Russia.

How the Fate of Israel is Perceived

Next, the question of the fate of Israel was discussed — as a state with which Russian Jewry, in one way or another, associates itself.

The prospects of relations between the RF and Israel cause concern among respondents:

— Russian policy after 2014 has been on a path of deteriorating relations with an increasing number of countries. For obvious military-political reasons, Israel is very eager to maintain relations, but it is not a given that this will succeed.

— Relations with Russia will depend on Russia.

Some respondents note the problematic nature of the situation in Israel:

— Israel is changing very fast; it is becoming increasingly difficult to combine a modern, highly developed state on the one hand, and a frontier mentality on the other.

Others are confident that the situation there is stable, but relations with Russia may change:

— In the next five to ten years, Israel's position is unlikely to be worse than it is now. The Arabs are divided, some of them are ready to cooperate with Israel, there is strong US support, and their own economy is holding up at a decent level. As for relations with Russia, their currently decent state can change sharply depending on how Russia behaves in Middle Eastern affairs (support for terrorist organizations, supply of modern weapons to regimes hostile to Israel, etc.).

— I am not sure that Russia will maintain its current balanced relations with Israel and the leading Muslim countries in the region simultaneously. A return to partnership relations predominantly with Muslim countries (such as Iran) seems more likely.

It was interesting to encounter the opinion that Israel is not "Western" enough for Russians:

— I think all peaks of emigration to Israel have passed. For many Russian Jews, Israel is too much "East." Emigration to Europe and overseas still looks more preferable. But this is provided that manifestations of antisemitism in Europe do not increase.

And here is the answer to the main question (within the scope of departure issues):

— Will Israel survive as a "refuge country"? Of course, even in the worst years of the Intifada, the personal security of an average Jew in Israel was incomparably higher than that of an average citizen of Russia in their own country, but it is not a given that this will remain so in the future. That is, for ten years, one can almost vouch, but for fifty or even thirty — it is impossible.

The Role of Jews in Today's Russia. The Chosen People

Respondents were asked about the role of Jews in contemporary Russia, which touched upon a highly sensitive topic.

There were simple answers about the significance of this role:

— The role remains quite significant, which is due to education, urbanization, etc., as well as specific features of Jewish identity that have developed over centuries of existence in the diaspora.

— Paradoxical as it may sound, Jews in contemporary Russia primarily help Russians preserve, and possibly even strengthen, their cultural and national identity.

— Both in the USSR and in Russia, Jews are more energetic and proactive; therefore, they occupy leading positions in key areas. Back then, it was administrative bodies (the nomenklatura system), "flagships of industry," and punitive organs, later — science. Now, it is mostly business.

— In the cultural life of Russia and the USSR, the role of Jews has always been significant and remains so. In the political sphere, it is still significant, though less prominent than in the pre-war years, but more so compared to the post-war period. In the economic field, this role is more significant today than in the USSR. It is also noticeable in the public life of Russia.

— They played a major role in building oligarchic capitalism. However, they no longer play any special role today.

Respondents repeatedly pointed out that this role is now less significant than in Soviet times:

— The role has become more noticeable than in the late Soviet period, but it is lower than in the early Soviet period.

A distinct opinion is that in the actions of Jews who possessed significant influence, there was nothing Jewish. In these answers, one can see a movement from the mythology of Jewry to its sociology:

— I think discussions about the "role of Jews in the USSR" are often far-fetched. Most Jews, from the 1930s at least, and many earlier, acted not as Jews, but as Chekists, apparatchiks, Soviet scientists, etc.; there was little or no Jewish motivation in their actions.

— Jews as an organized group play no role. Individual Jews — yes. Their collective influence is linked to their relatively high status in science, business, etc.

— It seems to me that there was no "role of Jews" in the USSR. One should not confuse the role of people of Jewish origin — Yagoda and Khariton, for example, or Dymshits and Oistrakh — with the role of Jews as a group. Speaking of the role of Jews as a group, one must honestly and correctly say that there was no such role at all. Otherwise, we will slide into an antisemitic counting of Jews in the Cheka and the Central Committee; the next step: Jews overthrew the Tsar and organized the Civil War, the Holodomor, and the Great Terror. And that is a lie. Because "Jews" are not an organization, a party, or a combat unit. And antisemites play precisely on this, on the idea that Jews are indeed something like a party.

— The role of individuals of Jewish origin should hardly be viewed in isolation from their other colleagues in science, art, etc.

A continuation of this thought is the assertion that if Jews do form a community, it "works for itself" rather than for Russian society as a whole. But sometimes even in this, a benefit for Russian society is seen:

— The growth of Jewish religiosity is a positive development in terms of building a multi-confessional society.

Do contemporary Russian non-religious Jews consider themselves the "chosen people"? The most interesting answer was:

— Many non-religious Jews consider themselves special, but cannot articulate what their uniqueness consists of.

The respondent was also unable to articulate this, but reflected on this circumstance. This inability to define the primary, constitutive trait of contemporary Russian Jewry has significant consequences for the process of cultural assimilation.

— Paradoxical as it may seem, Jewish identity is built on the traditions of antisemitism. Even if a Russian Jew wants to stop being one, they will not be allowed to, in one form or another. For me, Jewish identity is linked to my family history, my grandmothers' stories about pogroms and my parents' stories about the Holocaust.

There is an explanation of another kind, but it also relies on external factors.

— To a significant extent, it is sustained by society's very expectation that people must be assigned to some ethnos. And simply refusing to assign oneself is still very difficult.

One way or another, in current conditions, belonging or not belonging to Jewry is a matter of personal choice:

— Jews are doomed to think about their Jewishness and either choose or reject it. This applies most of all to people who have "other blood" as well.

— A shared destiny (large historical memory, the Holocaust, "by Jewish blood — not that which flows in the veins, but that which flows from the veins" (J. Tuwim), involvement in the cultural tradition of Russian Jewry (Mandelstam, Pasternak, Brodsky, etc.), a shared psychotype, cultural habits (mentality), family memory.

— On memory — family memory first of all. On knowledge of history, shared culture. On established practices of perception and interaction with their own kind, who often turn out to be Jewish.

"Chosenness" as a criterion of belonging to Jewry was mentioned directly only once:

— Today, Jewish identity rests on family tradition and an inescapable sense of one's "chosenness" (or, if you prefer, "uniqueness"), although it has long since ceased to be interpreted as it was in the Torah.

The opinion that belonging to Jewry is determined by detailed criteria (Halakha) was in the minority.

— [Identity rests] primarily on genealogy — if there are some ancestors who considered themselves Jewish, then it means we are Jewish too. But this is not enough. Especially since pure Jews, i.e., those who have only Jewish ancestors, are becoming fewer and fewer. Something else is needed.

One of the respondents turned the question of identity into a research problem:

— The conventional "market" of identity offers various models, which would be good to study, comprehend, and understand how the Soviet secular identification model is transforming today in the former USSR. These studies have not yet been conducted.

Conclusion. What Kind of Future Does Russian Jewry Expect?

So, let us return to the two questions asked at the beginning of the article: will Jewry survive in Russia or disappear? And, if it survives, how secure will its existence be?

The study yielded several answers to both questions.

Firstly, regarding the direct question about the future, the absolute majority of those surveyed, as we have already reported, refused to answer. Moreover, the refusal was often given in a sharp form. The behavior of our respondents did not differ from the reactions found during other recent studies on Russia as a whole. This emphasis, the stressing of the thesis that "we cannot know what will happen to us," is an implicit criticism of the authorities who created a situation where no "confidence in tomorrow" can exist.

The second answer, indicated not directly but contextually, also coincided with the reaction typical for modern Russians: as long as V. Putin leads the country, nothing will change. The "Jewish specificity" of this answer is that no increase in (state) antisemitism is to be expected either. What will happen after Putin's departure, our respondents, like Russians in general, demonstratively refused to discuss.

From the statements of the participants, one can also extract an answer to the question of whether Jewry will disappear in Russia. Notably, the viewpoint that demographic causes (primarily aging and emigration) will lead to the disappearance of the Jewish population in the RF was virtually unmentioned by the respondents. Many, on the contrary, proceed from an unspoken conviction that Jewry in Russia will somehow always exist. (There is something here of the idea of the indestructibility of Jewry, whatever trials it may undergo.) This irrational conviction is sometimes supported by rational arguments that the Jewry of Russia will be replenished by people who previously did not consider themselves Jewish, but discovered "Jewish blood" and "Jewish roots" in themselves. How many such people there are is impossible to say, so this reserve seems inexhaustible.

Alongside this reasoning is an observation, not devoid of sociological sense, that Jewry in Russia is not an element that came from outside, but, on the contrary, was born of Russian society itself as a component necessary to it, and therefore will exist as long as Russia itself exists.

Summarizing the most common opinions, one can state: they rely on the thesis that the fate of Jews in Russia will depend on the vector of political processes in the country. Our respondents, like most Russians, are ready to make assumptions for the next decade[11] and refuse to forecast the fate of Russia in a more distant future. Regarding the next decade, forecasts vary from the version "it will be the same as now" to assumptions of a moderate or severe tightening of authoritarianism. A democratic prospect is predicted only by a few young respondents.

With the "tightening of the screws," one should primarily expect an intensification of Jewish emigration to Israel and other countries. If the borders are closed, it is expected that Jews will behave as in the 1970s, i.e., fight for the right to leave and, most likely, achieve it.

A deterioration of the political or economic situation as a whole, it is expected, may provoke a rise in antisemitism. It is considered highly probable that the ruler who succeeds Putin will not restrain authorities at various levels from antisemitic policies or will directly provoke a Judeophobic campaign. One way or another, spikes in antisemitism in the next 10-15 years are expected by many of those surveyed. True, they more often speak specifically of spikes rather than a sustained high level of xenophobia.

The outlined forecasts and expectations are trivial. Our previous studies, conducted among provincial, by no means elite Jewry, yielded the same results[12]. This allows us to consider that there exists a platform or plane of identification common to Russian Jewry[13].

The originality of the results of this study lies elsewhere. Firstly, it is the idea that Jewry in Russia is called to life by the needs of this society and exists as a functional part of the Russian social fabric. From this, the conclusion is drawn that the prospects of Jewry are determined not by internal processes and not by the measure of hostility/tolerance of the Russian environment, but by structural-functional factors within Russian society.

Paying tribute to this idea, we note that in the already mentioned works of L. Gudkov and the author of this article, observations were made that Jewry in Russia, as a country undergoing modernization, performs the functions of a carrier and introducer of intellectual and artistic products of Western civilization. As if responding to this thought, a number of respondents stressed that this function of Jews is manifesting weaker and weaker, particularly in science.

Another idea regarding the future of Russian Jewry, presented in only a few interviews, is that the type of Jewry that formed in the Soviet era will soon depart. Currently, this type seems dominant, and since it is difficult to imagine any other, its departure is perceived as the disappearance of Jewry as such.

From the scattered observations of our respondents, one can assume that this new type (or types) will display its loyalty to Russia differently. One example of this trend is the recently emerged practice of living in two homes. One home is Russia, the other is Israel or another country. A portion of the respondents believes that this practice has a great future, while others believe that it will fade after some time.

The mechanism of dual citizenship as a marker of readiness to leave the RF also gradually births a new type. Loyalty to Russia turns out to be not absolute, as demanded by the ethical norms adopted by Soviet Jewry, but conditional. If certain political, economic, and other conditions are not met, then individuals holding two homes or two passports renounce one of them — the Russian one (temporarily or forever).

One way or another, the history of Russia from the end of the 19th century to the present proves: Jews at different stages renounced loyalty to Russia and left it if the conditions of stay in the country became intolerable. Our respondents recall only the emigration of the 1970s, not linking it with the problem of loyalty to the USSR. The point, apparently, is that contemporary Jewry largely consists of individuals (or their children) who did not renounce this loyalty for one reason or another.

However, normalized relations with Israel, allowing many Jews to maintain contact with relatives and acquaintances in that country, as well as new channels of communication with the outside world, increase the likelihood of the appearance of people with new forms of identity and a new type of relationship with the host country in place of "Soviet" and "post-Soviet" Jews. Perhaps, the future lies with this new Jewry[14].

The question of the future of Jewry is addressed, or rather, not addressed by respondents in several formats.

The first of them consists in refusing to consider the question. In this, this group coincides with the mass consciousness of the Russian population as a whole. The "abortion of the future" (L. Gudkov's metaphor) as a phenomenon of the contemporary mass consciousness of Russians is described in detail in the works of the Levada Center. Jews of various status, with whom this question was discussed during several studies, transmit the same attitudes, demonstrating alignment with the dominant narrative.

The aforementioned refusal to discuss the future is, so to speak, an objective and unreflected coincidence of the Jewish narrative with the general Russian one. Another format is the conscious identity of the history of Russian Jews with general Russian history. In the question of the future, such an approach is realized in two positions. The first: we can know nothing about the future of Jewry because we cannot know the future of Russia. Close to this position is another: Russia has no future, in the sense that the present will stretch on indefinitely, and this also applies to Jewry as an integral part of Russian society.

The idea of extending the present into the future (or replacing the future with the present) is highly relevant, since "the present" in this case refers to Putin's rule and the expectation that his presidency will last indefinitely.

No respondent dared to summon antisemitism upon themselves for the sake of saving Jews from dissolving into Russian society, but the reasoning of many came very close to this.

The variant of Russian mass consciousness studied in this research is the consciousness of the so-called thinking part of society. If even these people not only lack answers to questions about the future but do not even pose such questions, the situation is highly unfavorable for the prospects of social development. But a qualification must be made.

News

Our sample, as already noted, is generally characteristic of metropolitan high-status Jewry. However, due to the snowball sampling method applied, it does not include at least two important social types. The first is the elite category of Jews engaged in direct ideological service to the authorities, primarily in the mass media. The second is Jewish youth.

Regarding the "comprador" faction, one can assume that if they have differences in views on the future, it is only in terms of their coloring, declaring the "Putin future" a special blessing for Russia. Prophecies of wars imposed on Russia by its enemies, but bringing defeat to those very enemies, are possible. A fundamentally different perception of the time "after us" is not to be expected.

We know the views of youth poorly. But what we know from direct and indirect evidence allows us to speak of fundamental differences between their perceptions and the described views of the high-status and elderly public. These young people grew up in an environment not simply devoid of antisemitism, but, on the contrary, characterized by some encouragement of Jewishness. Israel became not only a friendly country, but also a source of positive signals in everyday life — good vacations, good medical treatment, good goods and products, as well as a good army, good weaponry. This or that connection with Israel is a decent contribution to social capital[15].

The residual marginality mentioned earlier has manifested itself in the youth environment as well. It helps a young person stand out, to appropriate symbolic meanings assigned to Jewishness in contemporary Russian culture, turning a former stigma into a distinction, an advantage:

— When asked about my nationality, I am pleased to say that I am Jewish.

— Being Jewish is fashionable now.

We have repeatedly recorded, both among provincial and metropolitan Jews, stories of how people return to Jewishness in one sense or another. Various forms were meant, from purely secular to deep immersion in religious tradition, from superficial-playful to emotionally profound, associated with the restructuring of identity. Among "older" Jews, returning as a fashionable trend was not always approved:

— "Returned" or secondary Jewishness (at least for the moment) is characterized by a) an elite character, not yet very typical for the "grassroots"; b) has a somewhat playful character, something like a fashion "it is worn this way now"; c) is linked precisely with a protest against the universality and facelessness of urban life, and therefore has a personal rather than mass character; d) comes not so much from the heart and family tradition (inherent "primordial identity") as from the mind and a conscious need to place oneself in some social niche — so as not to dissolve tracelessly in Lethe ("not to perish alone"). That is, "constructivist" identity is more rational.

We believe that these phenomena should be considered part of the process of forming a new Jewish type or types.

Other respondents treat such an idea with doubt:

— As for the construction of new Jews and "Jewish life," under any scenario this will remain the domain of a minority; it's just that with the development of democratic trends, the minority could be larger.

The fundamental possibility of such a social transformation is proven most clearly by the transformation, in a historically very short time, of European (and other) Jews into Israelis. But the history of Russian Jewry has also shown that the change of generations of Jews in the 20th and 21st centuries coincides with the change of social/human types.

Social dynamics in minorities and marginal environments may differ from those in the majority. It seems that Jewish youth, along a number of "specifically Jewish" parameters, differ more significantly from their parents and grandfathers than Russian youth, but they coincide along many other lines.

Our respondents, as members of the "father-grandfather" generation, insist on the critical role of antisemitism and its most terrible manifestation, the Holocaust, in forming Jewish identity. They frequently recalled the "struggle against cosmopolitanism" at the end of the Stalin era, and less frequently, the pogroms of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

To these well-known components of the Russian Jewish trauma, one must add the complex memory of emigration. Unlike other events in the life of Russian Jews, the history of their struggle against such a powerful adversary as the Soviet state culminated in victory. But the heroes and victors left. To the respondents of our study remains the won, many times simpler right to leave and return, as well as faith in the strength of the remaining Jewry. During the study, a question was asked about the probability of closing departure for Jews (to Israel or from the RF in general). Most answered with optimism. Most often, they denied the very probability of closing the borders:

— They [the authorities] will not do this; they do not need it.

— Totalitarian regimes close borders, but this is not characteristic of authoritarian ones.

And here is what was said about closing borders specifically for Jews:

— No one will hold Jews by force.

Those who did admit the probability of closure more often expressed confidence that "Jews will fight, as in the 1970s, and will succeed." Still more interesting is that even those who admitted the possibility of closing the country and did not believe in the ability of Jews to achieve exit, spoke with an optimistic intonation: "Well, they will live as they have always lived here."

As for young people, for them open borders are "the normal position of the barrier." They admit their closure in connection with extraordinary circumstances, such as a pandemic. But these are precisely extraordinary, i.e., temporary measures. Otherwise, they admit closure as a theoretical possibility, but so is a world war and the demise of the world in a thermonuclear catastrophe. In their life plans, they do not proceed from such a scenario.

Our "adult" respondents ask the question: "Will the blurred community of people who simultaneously feel their inclusion in Russian culture and a certain uniqueness within this culture survive?.. There is a feeling that this division in the very coming decades may cease to be relevant."

Young Jews, on the other hand, are people who grew up with an identity predominantly or specifically Jewish. For them, Russia is a country of temporary stay; at a certain point (most likely after graduating from school or university) they will relocate to another country, possibly Israel. This is a new type of Jew; Russian soil has not produced such before. Their departure, apparently, will not bear an ideological character; it will be taken for granted, like moving from grade to grade, from school to university. In Russian culture, they will be included by fact of birth stronger than in any other; it will be for them a part of the global culture, a guide into it. But they will not feel obligations toward Russia. Relocating from Russia for them will become a technical act, not emigration in the sense of the 1970s.

The Jewry of today, with its current measure of loyalty to Russia, recognition of it as the Motherland, etc., will also be reproduced, but on a shrinking scale.

Most interesting seems another kind of, conditionally speaking, new Jewry. It is in this category, as we assume, that in new combinations meet the traits that distinguish its Jews from previous eras. For these young people, the Jewish experience is not predominantly an experience of trauma. Victimhood, which, in the opinion of one of the respondents of the older generation, is inherent to Russian Jewry, is absent in their worldview.

The work ethic of these young people includes an understanding that one must know one's business well and perform it accordingly. But these attitudes are not built, as before, on the motivation "because you are Jewish," suggesting that one's perfection must compensate for discrimination. These people have neither a sense of guilt before others, nor a sense of superiority. Their attitude toward Russia is characterized not by the word "love," but by the word "responsibility." What is particularly important, such young people, assuming the prospect of living in two homes, believe that in doing so, a person bears responsibility for both countries. With this "double loyalty, you feel responsible for two peoples and cultures at once."

— With the development of globalization, there will be more people living in two homes. [Since] these people consider it important to live not only for themselves but also for the Fatherland, such people enrich both of their homelands...

The young people who participated in the study do not rule out that in the long run, the political situation in Russia may deteriorate. But they do not predict a rise in antisemitic sentiments, as "adult" Jews do. Their forecasts have in mind entirely different processes, for example, a rise in consumption. Here is a concise two-option forecast:

— Two scenarios — pessimistic and optimistic. Pessimistic — closing the country, digital control, while, possibly, the consumer society prospers. Optimistic — liberalization based on the same consumer society.

Their optimism is explained by growing up in conditions radically different from the socialization conditions of older generations. They argue their forecast with entirely rational arguments of a sociological order:

— I look with interest and pleasure at my students, those to whom time will belong in thirty and fifty years. Among them, many plan to leave, but even among those who remain, there are more interesting, smart, driven people than in my generation. I look with optimism.

An obvious methodological conclusion from the conducted study will be the formulation of a new task: to study the attitudes and practices of Jewish youth in Russia. This will significantly deepen our perceptions of the future of Russian Jewry.

1 |  An exception is the word "slavyanstvo" (Slavdom), marked in dictionaries as obsolete. If Cossacks are considered an ethnos, then the second exception is "kazachestvo" (Cossackdom).

2 |  See on this: Slezkine Y., The Jewish Century. Princeton University Press, 2004.

3 |  The very idea of the success of marginals is by no means original. Similar phenomena arise when people from Chinese culture penetrate European culture. Whether they arise in the reverse combination, we do not know.

4 |  See Gudkov L., Dubin B., The Impossibility of History. Vittorio. M.: Tri kvadrata, 2005.

5 |  Gudkov L., "The Ideologeme of the Enemy: 'Enemies' as a Mass Syndrome and Mechanism of Sociocultural Integration." The Image of the Enemy. M.: OGI, 2005, pp. 7-80.

6 |  Gudkov L., "Ethnic Phobias in the Structure of National Identification." Economic and Social Changes: Monitoring of Public Opinion. 1996. No. 5, pp. 22-27 = Ethnic Phobias in the Structure of National Identification // Sociological research. Armonk, N.Y., 1997. July-August Vol. 36. No. 4, p. 60-74; Gudkov L., "Antisemitism in Post-Soviet Russia," Intolerance in Russia: Old and New Phobias. M.: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1999, pp. 44-98.

7 |  A similar situation may develop in relation to other ethnic groups. As characters of the folk theater of nations, they exist, serving internal communicative, socialization processes in Russian and other ethnoses, most often without the presence of carriers of the national, ethnic traits attributed to them.

8 |  See Slezkine, op. cit. The Jewish Century.

9 |  However, there is an authoritative opinion that "a Jew who converted to another religion always remains a Jew." See Rabbi A. Boroda (FEOR). "Rabbi: we still consider a baptized Jew a Jew," RIA Novosti, 19.11.2015 https://ria.ru/20151119/1324198458.html (access date: 13.10.2020).

10 |  L. Borusyak studied and described the practice of returning to Russia of young people who completed their education in the US and Europe and had work experience there. In the sample of her study, the proportion of Jews was high (in that broad sense which also applies to the sample of our study). See: Borusyak L., "Young Intellectuals: Why Do They Leave, and Then Decide to Return?", Bulletin of Public Opinion. 2020. No. 1-2 (130), pp. 191-205.

11 |  In this sense, all Russian public opinion and the opinion of Jews as a part of it can be considered to be in a dependence on the authorities / ruler characteristic of totalitarian situations, as symbolically representing the whole society and ensuring its cohesion, outside of which it cannot exist.

12 |  See, for example: [Gudkov L., Levinson A.] Perception of Antisemitism through the Eyes of the Jewish Population of Russia. Research report. M.: Levada-Center and Russian Jewish Congress, 2018, pp. 3-16 https://archive.jpr.org.uk/object-803.

13 |  Its description and study represents a well-known ethnological interest. We had to approach its study (Perception of Antisemitism, pp. 58-71). The purely applied nature of the tasks, for the solution of which this was needed, did not allow conducting this study on the proper scale. Continuing this research seems highly important.

14 |  For more details on the new models of identity of Jews of the former USSR, see the article by Khanin and Ben Yaakov in this collection.

15 |  This hypothesis found its confirmation in a number of studies of recent years. See for example: Khanin V., Pisarevskaya D. and Epstein A. Jewish Youth in Post-Soviet Countries. Ramat-Gan and Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies RAS and the J. Look