The invasion of the Russian army into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has exerted and continues to exert a profound impact on the Jewish movement in the former USSR, primarily on its two largest Jewish communities in the region – the Russian and Ukrainian ones. In this article, we attempt to provide a highly preliminary assessment of the current state, future prospects, and operational formats of organized Jewish communities in these countries, focusing on two pivotal issues: demographic stability and the preservation and development of their organizational infrastructure.

The empirical base for this chapter comprises recent demographic assessments of the Jewish population in the former USSR[1]; the analysis and interpretation of data gathered from several sociological studies, including a survey of members of the "extended Jewish population" across five post-Soviet states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine) conducted in 2019-2020[2]; a representative survey of repatriates from the former Soviet Union who arrived in Israel in 2022[3], alongside personal interviews and surveys conducted over various years in the former USSR, Israel, and other countries.

Demographic Dynamics

Evidently, the first major challenge to the stability of all Jewish communities in the former Soviet Union was the massive wave of emigration of their members to Israel and Western countries, as well as from Russia to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, alongside internal displacement within Ukraine.

According to estimates by Israeli "minimalist demographers," the total number of individuals eligible for repatriation to Israel under the Law of Return – which also largely defines the boundaries of the "Jewish collective" in post-Soviet Euro-Asia – exceeded 895,000 at the beginning of 2022. Two-thirds of this population (66.3%, approximately 590,000) resided in Russia, while a fifth (21.3%, about 190,000) resided in Ukraine. The "core" Jewish population (homogenous Jews and individuals of mixed ancestry with a strong Jewish identity) in these two countries at the time was estimated at 145,000 and 40,000, respectively. The number of individuals of homogenous ethnic Jewish origin who possessed a weak Jewish identity or none at all stood at 154,000 in Russia and 50,000 in Ukraine[4].

According to a study of the Jewish (in a broad sense) population in five post-Soviet states, initiated by the EAJC in 2019-2020 (prior to the societal upheavals caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine), about a quarter of the respondents were considering emigration. This included a quarter in Ukraine, a fifth in Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Kazakhstan, and approximately half in Moldova. Notably, between 40% and 80% of these potential emigrants (more than half on average across the sample) designated Israel as their destination. It was assumed that, barring any particularly dramatic events, the realization of this potential would be significantly prolonged over time.

Indeed, emigration from these communities remained fairly moderate throughout 2020, 2021, and the very beginning of 2022. The only localized spike occurred in 2021 from Belarus, which was clearly a reaction to the authorities' harsh suppression of the anti-authoritarian revolutionary attempt in the summer of 2020. (Consequently, in 2021, the number of repatriates to Israel from Belarus was 1.5 times higher than in the previous year). However, following the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, this moderate dynamic was replaced by a sharp, general migration surge. From late February to late December 2022, approximately 57,000 new repatriates arrived in Israel from the countries of the former USSR alone (including 14,332 from Ukraine and 39,301 from Russia), compared to fewer than 13,000 in 2021, and 1,048 and 1,057 individuals in January and February 2022, respectively. In the following year, 2023, 37,802 individuals arrived in Israel from the post-Soviet space, and from January to June 2024, another 13,141 new repatriates arrived, including 32,364 and 11,557 from Russia, and 2,179 and 524 from Ukraine, respectively[5].

Based on these data, it is logical to assume that the majority of those who, during our 2019–2020 survey, were uncertain about their emigration plans (26-41%) decided in favor of emigration after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Meanwhile, a significant portion of respondents who had no intention of leaving their countries at the time of the survey (ranging from 31% to 55%) likely altered their plans in the new environment. Notably, participants from Ukraine in the aforementioned study of repatriates from the former USSR who arrived between January and May 2022 stated 3.5 times more often than those from Russia that they would not have left their country were it not for the war. This largely confirms the widespread opinion that the "core" Jewish population of Ukraine includes a disproportionately high representation of individuals who deliberately chose not to follow the example of the majority of their peers who left the country in the 1990s and early 2000s, having achieved a level of economic well-being compared to which emigration to any country would entail a decline in their standard and quality of life.

The same considerations, as far as can be judged, guided Moscow and St. Petersburg Jews prior to the "Crimean emigration" of 2014, as well as Baltic Jews after their countries joined the EU[6]. Conversely, the share of members of the "military aliyah" from Russia surveyed in the same study who claimed that the outbreak of the war simply coincided with their pre-existing intention to emigrate was nearly twice as high as among those from Ukraine. Another telling point is that Israel has remained the preferred choice for the majority of Russian Jews intending to emigrate since 2014, and particularly for those who left the Russian Federation after February 2022. On the other hand, Ukrainian Jews, following the "panic aliyah" of the first two months of the war, were significantly more open than Russian, Belarusian, and other Jews to considering alternative options alongside Israel, such as the EU (primarily Germany) and other Western nations.

Precise data on the total number of Jews from all post-Soviet countries who relocated to Europe and North America are unavailable. Cautious estimates by relevant Israeli organizations as of April 2022 placed the figure between "at least 8,000–10,000 and over 15,000 people," rising to approximately 30,000 a year later, with an upward trend in the following months. Furthermore, the proportion of Ukrainian emigrants among these migrants, as far as can be determined, noticeably exceeded the share of that country's Jewish community within the "extended Jewish population" of the former USSR.

For instance, the Central Council of Jews in Germany (CCJG) estimated that the total number of Ukrainian refugees who arrived in the country between late February 2022 and April 2023, and who were in contact with local Jewish communities to obtain informational, material, or other assistance, stood at 11,000. Out of these, 5,000 had Jewish roots, while the remaining 6,000 belonged to the broader Jewish population "cloud" (spouses of Jews and other members of Jewish households)[7]. The total number of Jewish refugees from Ukraine in other European countries, based on a survey conducted by JDC and CCJG experts in March 2023, was nearly 3,000[8]. It is difficult to ascertain the current demographic situation today (in 2024), particularly regarding Jewish emigrants from Russia and other former Soviet republics, who attract far less attention from Western Jewish communities and government agencies than their Ukrainian counterparts.

Regardless of the motives and destinations of Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union, it represents virtually the entire social spectrum of the extended Jewish population, similar to the "Putin" aliyah from Russia and the "economic" aliyah from Ukraine and other post-Soviet states in 2014-2020, but on a numerically more significant scale. This spans from pensioners to highly affluent and influential individuals, and has impacted the Jewish communities of major post-Soviet metropolitan areas far more actively than previous waves.

It remains unclear how many of these migrants from Ukraine and Russia intend to return to their home cities and countries after the active phase of the armed conflict ends. Regarding the general prospects of Ukrainian citizens who sought refuge abroad, local demographers believe that "undoubtedly, a portion of the evacuated women and children will settle abroad, establish their lives, and never return to Ukraine. Moreover, they will be joined by their husbands and parents as soon as such an opportunity arises"[9]. It is reasonable to assume that Ukrainian Jews will be subject to the same processes, showing no major differences in this regard from Jewish emigrants from other regions of the former USSR.

Judging by the sentiments of the largest "reference group" of Jewish (in one sense or another) emigrants from the former USSR – members of the "military aliyah" that began in late February 2022, surveyed by the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration – about 80% of those from Ukraine and over 80% of those from Russia believed, or were even certain, that they would remain outside their countries of origin. Furthermore, the willingness to settle permanently in Israel was directly proportional to the strength of the respondents' Jewish identity. While we lack comparable data for other host countries of post-Soviet Jewish emigration, observers reported similar attitudes among the majority of Jewish refugees there as early as March-April 2022. However, in contrast to the initial weeks and months of the war, by late 2022 European authorities began to signal increasingly clearly that Ukrainian and Russian Jewish refugees were there temporarily. As British anthropologist Marina Sapritsky observed, "initially welcomed with open arms, Ukrainian Jews in Berlin began to realize the emotional and social costs of refugee life. Some even complained that 'the Berlin community cares for us, but also treats us like infants, unable to comprehend how difficult life is'"[10]. Consequently, according to a competent source within the Israeli government, many refugees are currently contemplating returning.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it is estimated that by the time of writing, nearly half of the 40,000–45,000 members of the local Jewish community's ethnic core had become displaced, with approximately two-thirds relocating abroad. The main source of Jewish emigration from the Russian Federation has been its metropolitan and other large industrial, business, and cultural centers, where the proportion of the ethnic core of the local Jewish community is significantly higher than the national average – a factor that could have fresh demographic consequences. Over the past three post-Soviet decades (1991-2021), negative demographic trends, including emigration, affected the size of the "ethnic core" and the extended Jewish population in the CIS differently; depopulation had a less pronounced effect on the decline of the latter group than on the former.

In the current environment, however, the accelerated erosion of the ethnic core of post-Soviet Jewish communities may exert a far more detrimental impact on the broader Jewish community "cloud." In other words, the deflation of the Jewish ethnic core will negatively affect the size of the "extended Jewish population" of post-Soviet Euro-Asia, roughly 90% of which is concentrated in the two aforementioned countries. Indeed, according to estimates by Sergio DellaPergola[11], at the beginning of 2023, the extended Jewish population of the former USSR stood at 814,000, representing a 9% overall decline (by more than 80,000 people) since the end of 2021. The reduction of the Jewish population, in its broader sense, in Russia and Ukraine amounted to 40,000 people in each country, but while the decline of the Russian community during that period was less than 7%, the Ukrainian community lost over a fifth of its population.

Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Jewish Communities

To what extent will these demographic and other trends affect the stability and prospects of the infrastructure of organized Jewish life that has emerged in the post-Soviet states over the last three and a half decades? This concerns local and umbrella organizations, educational, cultural, and charitable institutions, religious communities of various denominations, memorial, athletic, and other associations, Jewish media, and so forth.

In the case of Ukraine, the restoration of organized Jewish life to its previous scale seems unlikely in the face of mass emigration, even if some refugees return. According to observers, organized urban Jewish communities can be categorized into four groups based on their current status.

The first group comprises communities in cities where the vast majority of Jewish residents have left, and the institutional infrastructure has been almost entirely destroyed. This category likely includes most of the 27 out of 180 Jewish communities in Ukraine that, according to the Federation of Jewish Communities of Ukraine (FJCU), came under Russian occupation[12].

Mariupol serves as the most striking example – a city of 430,000 people before the Russian invasion, including, by various estimates, between 3,000–4,000 and 16,000 Jews. The city endured a siege by Russian forces for over three months, suffering a catastrophic humanitarian crisis. Menachem-Mendel Cohen, the Chief Rabbi of Mariupol, described the situation at the time:

"Everyone is in cellars without any communication, neither by phone nor through other people, and there is no way to go and check if they are okay... We have an iron curtain around the city. Only a few can find a signal just to let us know they are still alive... people evacuated to Zaporizhzhia or Dnipro, but it was dangerous because convoys of cars were constantly targeted. Our community is dispersing. Some had to leave their relatives behind. This has torn families apart."[13]

The once-thriving 20,000-strong Jewish community of Kharkiv – Ukraine's most "Russian-speaking" city prior to the war – also falls into this category. In the opening days of the war, its primary symbol, the Choral Synagogue, the second-largest in Europe, was damaged by a Russian missile strike on an adjacent shopping center while over 100 Jews took shelter in its basement. Amid severe shortages of food and medicine and delivery hazards, staff and volunteers of the Chabad movement and the Jewish Federation of Ukraine – one of the umbrella bodies for local Jewish organizations – organized the mass evacuation of Jews (and many non-Jews) from Kharkiv. The current state of its communal institutions is reflected in the words of Grigory Shoikhet, director of Kharkiv Jewish School No. 170 and chairman of the regional unified Jewish community: "Out of 300 children, only 7 remain in Kharkiv. They have scattered across Europe, and a great many have left for Israel. I suspect many will not return"[14].

Joseph Axelrud, director of the Hillel-CASE student union and executive director of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress, presented a similar picture: "The most beautiful and largest Hillel in Ukraine – the one in Kharkiv – has been completely destroyed. This was a true tragedy for the youth; almost all Kharkiv students and volunteers have left – some abroad, others to different cities in Ukraine. Only two staff members remain. We maintain contact and help them as much as we can"[15].

The second category comprises the majority of peripheral Jewish communities in eastern and southern Ukraine, which are experiencing a progressive breakdown of communal infrastructure. This also includes several major Jewish communities in these regions (in Kyiv, Dnipro, Odessa, etc.), from which, by some accounts, half to two-thirds of the Jewish population had departed by April 2022 (according to Rabbi Meir Stambler, chairman of the FJCU board, 30,000 Jews were evacuated from these cities in the first month of the war alone. Furthermore, our sources noted a growing popularity among parents for various youth aliyah programs to Israel, such as "Kdam Naale"). The institutional clusters of these communities have largely been frozen or redirected toward more urgent relief efforts. As Joseph Axelrud notes, "the youth from Kharkiv and Odessa are performing serious and vital volunteer work in the center of the country as well. Consequently, Hillel's regular educational and recreational programs have been substantially minimized"[16].

This disruption affects not only large-scale communal projects, such as education systems, public celebrations, or social welfare institutions, but also basic services that had been taken for granted for decades.

"A concrete example," an observer noted in correspondence with the author, "is that this [2022] year [in Kyiv] it was much harder to obtain matzah (to obtain it at all, as I believe it wasn't sold commercially). Previously, the Kyiv matzah bakery supplied not only Ukraine but also several CIS countries [and occasionally even exported to Israel – Author], but this year it was replaced by matzah from Great Britain. We had enough, but it was a tense situation."

"I built a mikveh [ritual bath] in Kyiv where fifty men would come every morning, and when I recently visited the capital, I found it empty – not a single person," said Rabbi Hillel Cohen, head of Hatzalah Ukraine (the Ukrainian branch of the Israeli search and rescue organization Yhud Ha'atzala). "This is not just an empty mikveh; it is a symbol of war, a symbol of lifelessness"[17].

The primary issue appears to be the deflation of the organized core of these urban communities due to the departure of observant, multi-child families who formed the backbone of the religious congregations (for instance, almost the entire Karlin-Stolin community of Kyiv, save for fewer than 20 people, relocated to Israel and Europe). Mikhail Gold, editor-in-chief of the Kyiv-based all-Ukrainian Jewish newspaper "Hadashot," who is conducting a major project recording the testimonies of Jewish refugees, cites several such families as typical examples. These include a Chabad family from Odessa with 13 children, and Talya Levitan from Kyiv, who has seven children (with one son already in Israel), alongside families with three children.

In principle, this phenomenon is entirely logical: in the 2019-2020 EAJC survey, the intensity of emigration intentions among the Jewish population of Ukraine, and the former USSR as a whole, was directly proportional to their level of religiosity. Among religious respondents, the proportion intending to emigrate was 1.5 to 2 times higher than in other groups; among non-religious respondents, the share of those with no intention of leaving was notably higher, while those unsure of their religiosity also showed higher rates of hesitation regarding emigration.

Based on the 2022 study by the Israeli Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, a similar correlation existed between the level of religiosity and actual emigration motives in practice. Non-religious respondents were significantly more likely to state that they had no initial desire to emigrate but were forced to do so by the war; among the partially religious or those unsure of their religious stance, a notably higher proportion hesitated but were "pushed to make a choice by the war." Conversely, among religious respondents in the 2022 aliyah wave, there was a higher concentration of individuals who were already planning to leave anyway, with 60% of them intending to move to Israel. However, their absolute share was significantly higher (by more than 9 percentage points) than the share of those unequivocally planning to leave among our religious respondents in the relatively peaceful Ukraine of 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic and the full-scale war. It appears that many religious individuals who were open to other options three years ago ultimately chose Israel.

Whether this was driven by regular, close interaction among people for whom emigration is a prominent theme, or by an elevated level of social anxiety characteristic of religious Jews in Eastern Europe, is difficult to determine. What remains a fact is that organized communities, particularly their religious segments, proved better prepared for the emergency than many other structures in the country. "The evacuation system for the families of community members and staff was developed long ago, virtually immediately after the outbreak of the war in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014," explained Rabbi Chaim Feigin, head of youth programs for the Litvak religious community established in Odessa over 30 years ago by Rabbi Shlomo Baksht. "Everything was prepared in advance: emergency stocks of food, medicine, clothing, equipment, and transport. On the morning of February 24, buses were already waiting at the synagogue, and the first group of community members departed for Romania, where a pre-arranged address was waiting. The rest joined us over the next few days"[18].

Similar, though not always as highly coordinated, processes took place in other Jewish communities across the country. "It was hard for them to pack up and leave," Gold noted, "but having left, they are unlikely to return."

Along with members of the organized religious segment, or shortly thereafter, many individuals affiliated with communal institutions left in the first (late February) and second (early March 2022) waves of emigration: students, parents, and teachers of Jewish schools; professional staff and activists of charitable, informational, and cultural community organizations. Through them, this trend likely swept up broader circles of the periphery ("visitors" and "interested parties") of the organizational infrastructure of Ukraine's Jewish community.

Clearly, this phenomenon is not limited to Israel. "These people, who are now scattered across the globe, did not just make up the core – they are the future of the community," Gold concluded. "They are leaving and, as a rule, intend to rebuild their lives in their new homes."

The third category includes Jewish communities in cities located in central and especially western regions of Ukraine that have been minimally affected by the war. These communities have not only preserved their institutional infrastructure but have also seen a significant influx into their organized cores.

"As a result of internal displacement, we are seeing not only the depopulation of Jewish communities in the east but also a certain revival of smaller communities in western Ukrainian cities such as Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, or Chernivtsi," noted Vyacheslav Likhachev, a publicist living in Ukraine. "The Chernivtsi rabbi remarks that he cannot remember the last time a minyan gathered in the synagogue more than once a week for Shabbat. Now, the synagogue hosts an entire community from Kharkiv, and religious life has intensified significantly"[19].

Crucially, many of these communities have vastly increased their organizational and social relevance, serving as hubs for humanitarian, volunteer, and informational activities, providing services to Jews and non-Jews alike. The Jewish community of Moldova – a country that received an enormous number of refugees from neighboring Ukraine relative to its size and population – can also be associated with this type, despite previously being demographically weak and fractured by internal conflicts. The religious Jewish community of the Sennaia Synagogue (Agudath Israel) led by Rabbi Pinchas Salzman, the United Jewish Community, and the Jewish Congress of Moldova, presided over by Alexander Bilinkis, responded rapidly and effectively, establishing 11 refugee reception and support centers across the country, raising funds, and mobilizing volunteers and material resources[20].

As our respondent observed, "The events mobilized the citizens of the Republic of Moldova. A massive number of refugees needed help, including members of Ukraine's Jewish community, which is enormous compared to Moldova's. Faced with the common challenge of aiding Jewish refugees first and foremost, all Jewish organizations united. In this situation, there was no room for old grievances or disputes. In my view, they accomplished several times more than what seemed possible"[21]. A notable "byproduct" of this phenomenon has been a significant increase in the number of members of the extended Jewish population in Moldova who, by participating in refugee relief efforts, have begun to view themselves as affiliated with the organized Moldovan Jewish community, with which they previously had little connection.

Another variation of this model is represented by groups of Jewish volunteers operating either in coordination with formal community organizations or as independent, informal initiatives. For example, student activists from Hillel Ukraine – the majority of whom, according to their director, remained in the country – actively collect and distribute humanitarian aid, receive refugees, and assist with civilian evacuations in other regions. "The youth help refugees pass the time and distract themselves from the grim reality by organizing various educational activities and hosting Shabbat gatherings," noted Hillel Ukraine director J. Axelrud.

He cited Lviv as an example, where a large portion of the Kharkiv Hillel staff relocated at the start of the war to work alongside Lviv Hillel in receiving and supporting internally displaced persons. (At the time of his interview in April 2022, there were over 200,000 displaced persons in the city, and more than a million used it as a transit point to the Polish border). Their activities remained equally extensive eight months later[22] – with the difference, we might add, that the reduced flow of departures to the EU was now accompanied by a noticeable stream of people returning to Ukraine.

The fourth model is characterized by attempts to reconstruct the "organized core" of Ukrainian (and other) Jewish communities in new locations, including abroad. One such example involves the followers of the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine (Chabad) and head of the All-Ukrainian Congress of Hasidic Jewish Religious Communities, Moshe Reuven Azman, who settled relatively compactly in Cyprus and Israel, where they reportedly maintain community ties. A similar operational pattern is observed among the leaders of Ukraine's largest Progressive Jewish communities in Kyiv and Odessa. According to Alex Dukhovny, the Chief Rabbi of this movement in Ukraine, about half of the Kyiv congregation remained, while the rest mostly relocated to Israel, where Dukhovny is attempting to establish a new Reform congregation of former Kyiv residents in Haifa. Similarly, Rabbi Julia Gris of the Odessa Progressive Jewish community is currently active in Germany, having gathered around her approximately 40 individuals from Kyiv and Odessa.

Meanwhile, the Chief Rabbi of the Dnipro Jewish community, Shmuel Kaminezki, managed to relocate his yeshiva to Düsseldorf, Germany, while some of his congregants attempted to reconstruct their community in Vienna, gathering refugees from Dnipro and other Ukrainian cities who had arrived there[23]. (The emergence in Vienna of a Ukrainian Jewish community, which presented an integration challenge for the local Jewish federation[24], alongside the self-organization of Russian Jewish emigrants in Armenia, represents one of the few known instances of forming "branches" of ethno-civic communities of "Russian" and "Ukrainian" Jews parallel to long-established local Jewish and Russian-Jewish communities).

The most "radical" (or "isolationist") version of "Ukrainian Jewish communities in exile" is being built through the efforts of Rabbi Yaakov Dov Bleich, head of a segment of the fractured Kyiv Karlin-Stolin community, and Rabbi Shlomo Baksht, head of the Odessa Litvak community.

The former succeeded in partially recreating his community in Budapest, Hungary, and in Irshava in the Ukrainian Transcarpathia. In both locations, traditional religious life was restored (with the Budapest municipality granting the community use of a synagogue that had stood vacant for decades). Their leaders have worked to secure decent living conditions and employment opportunities for the core congregants, as well as for refugees from Kyiv and other cities who joined them and had previously been minimally connected to organized religious life.

Shlomo Baksht succeeded in relocating the organized core of his religious community to Romania (staff, formal members, regular participants in community events, and aid recipients – totaling some 30-35 families), along with its immediate periphery: students of community schools and their parents, Jewish University students, as well as general education teachers and support staff of both Jewish and non-Jewish origin. This group of approximately 800 people settled in three rented adjacent 5-story hotels within a gated resort near Mangalia on Romania's Black Sea coast. With the help of foreign donors, they established a synagogue and a full cycle of Jewish education, including a kindergarten, a general education school, a cheder for boys, a Beit Yaakov religious school for girls, and a kollel (religious courses for adult men). They also opened a kosher shop and café, and addressed basic living requirements (meals, pocket money for recreation, transportation, and other operational needs) for community members and their families.

Currently, the majority of this new association consists of the "core" and immediate periphery of Baksht's Odessa community, with another 40% comprised of former occasional visitors to community events, participants in youth and student programs, and other Odessa Jews of Jewish or mixed origin who joined them at various stages. Observers note that this latter group is actively integrating into the observant majority.

The vast majority of social interactions for members of both communities remain within these organized frameworks, and the issue of integration into local societies is not currently being pursued. Since such a situation cannot continue indefinitely, views on the future of these structures diverge. According to Shalom Kaplan, Baksht and his associates were actively searching for a small provincial town in Romania where they could settle compactly and establish a regular lifestyle alongside their traditional Jewish way of life[25]. Other reports suggest that Baksht's community members intend to stay in Romania for a relatively short period, planning to return to Odessa if the situation in Ukraine stabilizes, or otherwise relocate to another European country better suited to their long-term plans, without ruling out collective repatriation to Israel. In all cases, the primary criterion remains preserving the unity and lifestyle of the community built over the years.

Finally, there are reports of community projects being implemented in a much more integrative manner. In Israel, the new wave of emigration from the former USSR has revitalized landsmanshaftn (mutual aid societies) of emigrants from specific cities and regions, which played a significant role in integrating repatriates during the first decade of the "Great Aliyah" of the 1990s. (For example, the need to establish an Association of Organizations and Communities of New Repatriates and "Veterans" from the former USSR in Jerusalem was formulated during an August 2022 meeting in Jerusalem of volunteer and professional associations assisting the latest wave of repatriates and refugees)[26]. Similar developments may be anticipated in Europe.

Nevertheless, the critical question today is whether these and other leaders will be able and willing to "repatriate" their communities to their original locations and, more importantly, rebuild the institutional infrastructure around them once the active phase of military operations concludes. The answer is not obvious, either for those who, like Azman, maintained and strengthened their authority during the crisis, or for those who chose to leave their cities (such as certain Kharkiv rabbis who assisted in evacuations and aid collection from afar).

An equally important aspect of this issue is the prospect of mobilizing the necessary financial and other resources, especially if an impending financial crisis deprives many traditional donors among wealthy Ukrainian Jews of the ability to continue their support. In July 2022, this issue gained fresh urgency following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's unexpected decision to strip three of Ukraine's wealthiest and most influential Jews – Ihor Kolomoisky, Hennadiy Korban, and Vadim Rabinovych – of their Ukrainian citizenship. The former two were prominent funders of Jewish institutional infrastructure; Rabinovych, also a major businessman, was the head of the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress and a leader of the parliamentary opposition.

The explanations for this decision circulated in the public space – ranging from the formal pretext of their dual citizenship, including Israeli (a widespread phenomenon in Ukraine that authorities had overlooked for 30 years), to allegations of involvement in large-scale corruption – failed to convince everyone. Fewer still accepted the narrative that this action was part of a broader campaign against actual or potential agents of Russian influence in Ukraine. Many believed the move was less about ideology and more about a power struggle among rival factions within Ukraine's business and political elites.

Consequently, as JTA political analyst Cnaan Liphshiz concluded, "Whatever Zelensky's motivation, his actions could have serious consequences for efforts to revive Jewish communities in Ukraine, if it raises the question of whether such wealthy Jews will remain in Ukraine at all"[27].

A similar challenge is emerging in Russia, where the funding of the extensive Jewish communal system, alongside contributions from Israeli and international Jewish organizations and Western private donors, had become increasingly dependent on wealthy Russian philanthropists, primarily Russian-Jewish oligarchs. However, after many of these oligarchs were targeted by strict Western sanctions, accessing their assets in Western financial institutions became highly problematic.

Consequently, prominent Russian-Jewish entrepreneurs such as Roman Abramovich (a key sponsor of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia), God Nisanov, Viktor Vekselberg, Moshe Kantor, and other high-level business and public figures (many with roots in Ukraine) withdrew from public and philanthropic activities in Russia, as well as abroad, including in Israel. US and EU sanctions against the founders and main donors of the Genesis Philanthropy Group (GPG), Mikhail Fridman and Petr Aven, who are also board members and donors of the Russian Jewish Congress (RJC), led to a sharp decline in funding, threatening the gradual wind-down of one of the major sponsors of large-scale projects in the Russian-Jewish world.

Furthermore, sanctions targeting major sponsors of Jewish communal institutions have severely restricted the international activities and representative functions of many post-Soviet Jewish communities and their umbrella organizations. (Nisanov was removed from his position as Vice President of the World Jewish Congress; Vyacheslav Moshe Kantor was removed as President of the European Jewish Congress and stripped of his positions within the World Jewish Congress and Yad Vashem, etc.). It remains to be seen whether this situation will change in the near future, and if not, to what extent Israel and the wider Jewish world can fill the vacuum in both Russia and Ukraine, as well as in other post-Soviet states[28].

Regarding the potential for demographic recovery within Ukraine's Jewish communities after the active phase of the war, its primary driver is expected to be the return of internally displaced persons, as well as Jews and their families currently residing in transit countries (Poland, Romania, Moldova, etc.) who, for various reasons, have refrained from migrating further to Western Europe, North America, or Israel. (According to eyewitnesses, these individuals dominated the population, including Jews, who began returning to Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities as early as late April).

While the likelihood of return for Jewish emigrants who have already settled in Israel or Western countries is currently estimated to be low, some restructuring of organized Jewish life after the war remains possible. If so, the Ukrainian Jewish community, though reduced in size, will still require a full spectrum of social, educational, religious, and cultural services, the resources for which will likely be found in the Jewish world. Furthermore, it will undoubtedly remain an important component and symbol of the Ukrainian civic nation, with political lobbying needs and capabilities corresponding to this status.

A somewhat different picture is emerging in Russia. If Israel is taken as an indicator, where the vast majority of Jewish emigrants from Russia have relocated since the start of the war, the majority (83%) currently intend to remain there, mirroring the sentiment of Ukrainian repatriates. Those with a strong Jewish identity declared this intention noticeably more actively than immigrants of mixed or non-Jewish identity. Nevertheless, the proportion of Jewish emigrants relative to the overall demographic potential of the Russian Jewish community is significantly smaller than in other post-Soviet states. Consequently, a critical decline in the Jewish population of Russia's major cultural and industrial-business centers, or a complete collapse of local communities, is unlikely – unless the authorities deem it expedient to resort to overt or informal political antisemitism for internal stabilization. While such a scenario appeared improbable in 2022 and early 2023, events in late 2023 and 2024 require a more cautious assessment[29].

However, if these fears do not materialize, and particularly if the Russian Federation is not sealed behind a new "Iron Curtain," we should anticipate a significant increase in the already substantial number of Israeli citizens permanently residing in the country[30]. This could occur as members of the mass aliyah wave who arrived in Israel in the initial months of the war in Ukraine, having obtained Israeli citizenship, returned almost immediately to Russia. (According to available data, this group constituted roughly 17-18% of the nearly 100,000 repatriates who arrived in Israel from the former USSR in 2022 and 2023, the vast majority being from Russia). It may also include those currently settled in Israel (or who, having obtained Israeli citizenship, have established themselves in Prague, Berlin, etc.) but would be prepared to return if conditions improve. Consequently, some Jewish communities in major Russian metropolises may gradually take on the characteristics of "expat communities," similar to those in Japan or the UAE.

It is possible that the organizational vacuum created by the departure of the leadership of certain umbrella structures – such as Boris Lozhkin, President of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine, and its CEO, or Yuri Kanner and Anna Bokshitskaya, President and CEO of the RJC, respectively – or their withdrawal from activity for the reasons described above (such as Pinchas Goldschmidt, Ihor Kolomoisky, and Vadim Rabinovych, presidents of the KEROOR, the United Jewish Community of Ukraine, and the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress, respectively) may prompt individual Jewish figures to establish alternative umbrella organizations. One such attempt was made by the Rabbi of Kryvyi Rih, Liron Edri, who announced the creation of the Association of Jewish Communities of Ukraine in April 2022. Something similar could occur in Russia, perhaps less through the creation of new associations and more through the emergence of new figures and a realignment of positions between "loyalist" and "autonomist" factions within existing structures.

In any event, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions; the actual situation will become clearer only after the conflict ends.

Preliminary Conclusions

What, then, are the prospects for the continued existence and development of organized Jewish movement structures in the two largest communities of the former USSR, into which local Jewish activists and the global Jewish community have invested so much effort, energy, ideas, and resources since the late 1980s?

Opinions among Jewish leaders differ. Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, President of the Conference of European Rabbis and former Chief Rabbi of Moscow, who refused to cooperate with the authorities and left Russia, argued that regardless of the war's outcome, both Ukraine and Russia face massive changes. In his view, "Ukraine is already largely destroyed. And even if it wins (this war), many of its Jews who left the country will not return. The same applies to many Jews who left Russia. While the reconstruction of Ukraine is on the agenda, the parameters of relations with Russia remain uncertain. It is too early to predict anything. But today we can say with certainty that both communities, in Russia and in Ukraine, will be more fragile, numerically smaller, and poorer"[31].

A more optimistic view was shared by Yuri Kanner, President of the Russian Jewish Congress, and Boris Lozhkin, President of the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine. In conversations with the author (Jerusalem, June 2023), both leaders, who were living outside their respective countries at the time, asserted that at the very least, umbrella Jewish organizations continue to function and, though not at previous volumes, continue to support Jewish community projects.

In any case, at this stage and likely in the longer term, there is no question of organized Jewish life disappearing from these countries. Nevertheless, the current military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine – regardless of how it ends – will require a substantial revision of several fundamental strategic principles of the global Jewish community, particularly of transnational Jewish organizations and regional umbrella structures such as the WJC and the EAJC, regarding post-Soviet Jewish communities.

Beyond their immediate task of facilitating the local integration of immigrants and assisting the return of those who wish to do so, these organizations will need to devise creative solutions to other challenges as the situation stabilizes. Specifically, they will need to address community development tasks, including the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure on a scale comparable to the "formative" stage of the 1990s – a period when organized Jewish life in the late USSR and post-Soviet states was built virtually from scratch.

Furthermore, experience shows that crisis situations heighten the risk of scapegoating, with ethnic minorities frequently targeted. While it remains unclear whether Jews will become the primary target of such sentiments in Russia, Belarus, or (least likely) Ukraine, the potential for a rise in antisemitic and anti-Israel rhetoric cannot be ruled out. Consequently, the organized Jewish world must be prepared to rapidly mobilize its political, diplomatic, informational, and lobbying resources to safeguard the well-being and security of the Jewish populations and communal structures in these countries.

Additionally, the socio-demographic weakening of the Euro-Asian segment of the transnational Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora in favor of centers in Israel and the EU will likely require a reassessment of the mandate of major Euro-Asian umbrella associations – primarily the EAJC, the Russian Jewish Congress (RJC), the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine, and others. In the current environment, they may need to shift away from a strictly regional-geographical focus and place greater emphasis on working with emigrant communities from the former USSR residing outside post-Soviet Eurasia. Particular attention must be paid to Europe, where research indicates that for the first, 1.5, and often second generations of immigrants with post-Soviet roots, the alternative to preserving a specific Russian-speaking Jewish identity is often the adoption of non-Jewish civic identities rather than local Jewish ones (e.g., German-Jewish, Austrian-Jewish, Belgian-Jewish).

Clearly, the situation will continue to evolve rapidly, requiring regular adjustments to both strategy and operational policies. This, in turn, demands continuous monitoring of these communities to collect data and formulate appropriate recommendations. In this context, the role of professional academic research structures capable of providing such analysis cannot be overstated.

[1]  |   DellaPergola S. and Staetsky D. Jews in Europe at the turn of the Millennium. Population trends and estimates. London: The European Demography Unit, The Institute for Jewish Policy Research, October 2020; DellaPergola S. “World Jewish Population, 2022”.  American Jewish Year Book 2022, Volume 122. Ed. by Dashefsky A. and Sheskin I. M. Dordrecht: Springer, 2022, pp. 291 – 402.

[2]  |   The study was initiated by the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress and conducted under the direction of Ze'ev Khanin. The sample structure and methodology are presented in detail in: Khanin V. (Z). The Jews of Contemporary Post-Soviet States: Sociological Insights from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2023, pp. 9 – 14

[3]  |   The study was initiated by the Israeli Ministry of Aliyah and Integration and conducted in two rounds, in April-May (1,090 respondents, of whom 54.3% were from Ukraine, 43.2% from Russia, 1.7% from Belarus, and 0.7% from other FSU countries) and in late June (298 respondents) of 2022. Data collection and primary processing were carried out by the TalDor Sociological Institute (Holon, Israel).

[4]  |   Della Pergola, “World Jewish Population, 2022”, pp. 373 – 374

[5]  |   Here and below, data from the Israeli Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, unless otherwise specified.

[6]  |   For more on the migration motives of FSU Jews in those years, see: Khanin, The Jews of Contemporary Post-Soviet States, pp. 222 – 236

[7]  |    “Ukrainian Refugees in the Jewish Communities in Germany: Brief Summary of the Situational Analyses, April 2023”, Berlin: Central Council of Jews in Germany, May 2023, p. 1. (Information received by the author via email on June 15, 2023)

[8]  |   Information from Dr. David Gidron (JDC), received by the author via email in March 2023.

[9]  |   In 2030, we will number 30 million. Professor Ella Libanova explains how the war and evacuation will reduce Ukraine's population. Novoye Vremya (Kyiv), June 7, 2022 https://life.nv.ua/socium/voyna-v-ukraine-i-evakuaciya-zhiteley-sokratit-naselenie-do-30-mln-novosti-ukrainy-50247390.html

[10]  |   Sapritsky M. “Germany Wants Jews”. Tablet, April 27, 2022, https://www.tabletmag.com/tags/germany

[11]  |   Estimate by Prof. Sergio DellaPergola provided to the author via email.

[12]  |   Cited in: Jewish victims of the war in Ukraine: dozens dead, hundreds wounded, thousands homeless. Vesty-Ynet, 24/08/2022 https://www.vesty.co.il/main/article/bkvhpt71j

[13]  |   Cited in: Gryvnyak N. “Rabbi reveals devastating impact of Russian bombardment of Mariupol”. Jewish News, 18 March 2022, https://www.jewishnews.co.uk/mariupol-rabbi-reveals-devastating-impact-of-russian-bombardment

[14]  |   Interview of Shoikhet by Pavel Zhuravlev, May 26, 2022, forwarded to the author via email.

[15]  |   “We have no time – we need to save people”: Jewish community of Ukraine – about the humanitarian crisis. Euro-Asian Jewish Congress (EAJC), 10.04.2022, https://eajc.org/en/jewish-community-of-ukraine-about-the-humanitarian-crisis/

[16]  |   Cited in: Goldman D. "The Russian-Ukrainian War through Jewish Eyes," Channel 9, April 13, 2022 https://www.9tv.co.il/item/43102

[17]  |   Cited in: Kotlyarsky M. Rabbi of the Ukrainian Army: "I remember when I suddenly felt very afraid." Detaly, 18.07.2022 https://detaly.co.il/glavnyj-ravvin-armii-ukrainy-pomnyu-gdye-mnye-vdrug-stalo-ochyen-strashno/

[18]  |   Telephone interview by the author with Rabbi Chaim Feigin, Jerusalem-Mangalia, August 23, 2022.

[19]  |   Likhachev V. “Fluchtpunkt Czernowitz: Der Krieg mobilisiert die Gemeinden im Land und macht sie starker”. Jüdische Allgemeine, 27.08.2022, https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/juedische-welt/fluchtpunkt-czernowitz

[20]  |   The situation was described during our conversation on 23/08/2022 by Rabbi Shalom Kaplan, representative of the Conference of European Rabbis in Moldova. See also: Israeli medics assist Ukrainian refugees in Chisinau. IPN Press Agency (Kishinev), 11.03.2022 https://www.ipn.md/ru/izrailskie-mediki-okazyvayut-pomoshch-ukrainskim-bezhentsam-v-kishineve-7967_1088427.html.

[21]  |   Opinion received via email on June 12, 2022.

[22]  |   Goldman D. "We do not recommend people return just yet": how Ukrainian Jews live. ITV Channel 9, December 20, 2022 https://www.9tv.co.il/item/52672

[23]  |   Testimony of Mikhail Gold, editor-in-chief of the all-Ukrainian Jewish newspaper "Hadashot" (Kyiv), April 2022.

[24]  |   Testimony of Chaim Ben-Yakov, Director General of the EAJC, September 06, 2022.

[25]  |   Interview of Shalom Kaplan by the author, Jerusalem, 23/08/22.

[26]  |   Observations of the author, Jerusalem, August 22, 2022.

[27]  |   Liphshitz C. “Zelensky reportedly strips three Jewish oligarchs of citizenship”. Jerusalem Post, July 28, 2022

[28]  |   Liphshitz C. “Ukraine invasion puts Chabad of Russia ‘between a rock and a hard place’,” The Times of Israel, 3 April 2022, https://www.timesofisrael.com/ukraine-invasion-puts-chabad-of-russia-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/

[29]  |   Kazantsev-Vaisman A. and Khanin V. (Z). “Dagestan and Northern Caucasus – the first Anti-Semitic pogroms in Post-Soviet Russian History”, PSCRP-BESA Reports No 13. November 1, 2023 https://besacenter.org/dagestan-and-northern-caucasus-the-first-anti-semitic-pogroms-in-post-soviet-russian-history/

[30]  |   For more details on this phenomenon, see: Khanin V. (Z). From Russia to Israel… And Back? Contemporary Transnational Russian Israeli Diaspora. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter Oldenburg, 2022

[31]  |  Cited in: Bou S. & Vapné L. “Russian and Ukrainian Jews in the war. Interview with Pinchas Goldschmidt, former Chief Rabbi of Moscow”, https://k-larevue.com/en/ 27 October 2022