The origins of Jewish communities in Central Asia remain shrouded in mystery. Some indigenous Jews of the region (Bukharans) claim descent from exiles from Assyria or Babylon, while others exhibit proximity to Persian Jewry as speakers of the Tajik-Jewish (Bukharan) language, which is based on Farsi. The oldest artifacts indicate a Jewish presence in Central Asia dating back to the 9th or 10th century CE, suggesting that Jews likely settled here before the Muslim conquests. The Bukharan Jewish community is a unique and cohesive group that has absorbed many regional customs while preserving ancient Jewish traditions. In the second half of the 19th century, following the Russian conquest of Central Asia, the first Ashkenazi Jews began to arrive in the region. This period marked the establishment of ties between the Jews of Central Asia and the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe and Israel. Consequently, local Jews began immigrating to Eretz Israel, and by the end of the 19th century, they established a separate quarter in Jerusalem—Shkhunat ha-Bukharim[1].

The Bolshevik Revolution disrupted the traditional way of life of the peoples of Central Asia, leading to the emigration of the wealthier classes. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet regime sought to detach various ethnic groups from their cultural and religious heritage, promoting separate national activities. During this period, the Jews of Central Asia, as an indigenous group, were granted the right to national self-determination and access to educational and cultural services in their native language. In addition, the central government planned to establish a separate autonomous region for the Jews of Central Asia, but this plan was postponed in the late 1930s and ultimately never realized.

At the same time, during this period, the regime succeeded in shaping a distinct cultural identity for the Jews of Central Asia, distinguishing them both from the other peoples of the region and from other Jewish groups in the USSR. In parallel with this process and the economic development of Central Asia, the migration of a skilled workforce to the region continued, with Ashkenazi Jews constituting a significant portion of this influx. Between the world wars, the number of Ashkenazim in Central Asia became equal to that of Bukharan Jews,[2] with each group numbering approximately 50,000.

During World War II, the vast territory of Central Asia became a critical destination for refugees arriving independently and evacuees sent to the rear by the Soviet authorities. Precise data on the number of Jews who found refuge in the Central Asian republics is unavailable, but researchers estimate the figure to be between half a million and 800,000[3]. Most Jews departed the region after the war (and some, such as the "Tehran children," left during World War II), but a portion remained, helping to sustain Jewish life as far as was possible under Soviet conditions. During the communist era, the region remained a distant Soviet periphery subject to less stringent oversight, which allowed Jewish life to persist and even develop. This was further facilitated by the fact that traditional Jewish quarters in major Central Asian cities were not destroyed, unlike the Jewish centers in Eastern Europe. Although the authorities attempted to suppress religious institutions—closing many synagogues and prosecuting religious activists—opportunities for official religious activity remained. For instance, in the 1960s, Ashkenazi Jews purchased a private house on the outskirts of Frunze (now Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan) to open a synagogue, and in the 1970s, a new Ashkenazi synagogue was opened in a private house in the center of Tashkent, even receiving official operating permission[4].

On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Jewish population in the Muslim republics of Central Asia was estimated at 150,000. Following the dissolution of the USSR, the region experienced significant economic and social instability, and in Tajikistan, political volatility escalated into a bloody civil war. The opening of free emigration, combined with political and economic instability, prompted the departure of the majority of the Jewish population. With the exception of the Jews of Tajikistan, who were evacuated during the civil war with the assistance of the State of Israel and Jewish organizations[5], most of the emigrants departed voluntarily.

Consequently, in the second decade of the new century, the Jews of Central Asia are scattered across three continents. While the majority immigrated to Israel, a significant number settled in the United States, Canada, European countries, and Russia, where Bukharan Jews established separate, independent organizations and structures to support the distinct communal and cultural life of this sub-ethnic group[6]. In Central Asia itself, only a few thousand Jews remain (primarily in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). A number of synagogues that survived the communist era and were used by communities after the collapse of the USSR have closed due to a lack of congregants, while the remaining ones—even central ones—struggle to assemble a regular minyan. If the current rate of emigration persists in the coming years, the Jews as a community will cease to be a part of the Central Asian landscape.

This article outlines the organizational activities of local communities over the three decades since independence. This activity is reflected, for example, in the establishment of Jewish schools, viewed against the backdrop of the attitudes of various Central Asian regimes toward the Jewish community in general, and its cultural, religious, and national activities in particular.

Organizational Activity and the Establishment of Jewish Schools

In parallel with the acceleration of repatriation and Jewish emigration, the 1990s saw a counter-process of reviving local Jewish life through the establishment of Jewish communities. This process of self-organization began around synagogues in major cities, but simultaneously, structures of a communal and cultural, rather than religious, nature emerged. During the same period, major international Jewish organizations, including Chabad, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), the Jewish Agency for Israel (Sokhnut), and others, began operating in Central Asia. These organizations often pursued different and sometimes conflicting goals. Chabad, for instance, aimed to revive religious Jewish life and, to this end, re-established religious communities (both Ashkenazi and Bukharan), strongly supporting the Jewish presence in the region. Similarly, the JDC's activities focused on reviving Jewish identity, helping local Jews perceive themselves as a national and cultural community, rather than solely a religious one. Conversely, emissaries from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Jewish Agency actively encouraged mass immigration, which consequently dismantled the communities established by Chabad, the JDC, and local organizations. Most Jewish structures operating in Central Asia in the 1990s represented external forces for whom this region was a post-Soviet space of secondary importance, which influenced their approach to the issue[7].

Furthermore, communal organizations were predominantly local and city-based, with activities rarely extending beyond the municipal level. Nevertheless, structures representing various Jewish communities emerged in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, though they did not become self-sufficient and remained dependent on external support, such as that of the JDC[8].

The majority of these organizations supported informal educational projects as part of their activities. This was reflected in the creation of youth clubs, Sunday schools, and various interest groups. At the same time, one of the key initiatives requiring cooperation between local and international Jewish organizations and the authorities was the establishment of Jewish day schools. The first private Jewish school in Central Asia opened in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, in 1993. In its first year, it enrolled approximately 120 students in grades 1 through 9. The opening of the school was made possible by a donation from a Polish-born Belgian Jew who had found refuge in Bishkek (then Frunze) and survived the Holocaust as a result. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, he returned to the region to support Jewish education. Although the school was established as a private institution with a religious orientation, the founders sought to ensure that graduates would also receive a state-recognized diploma, leading the school to transition into a private-public partnership[9].

Since then, the school has taught all subjects required to obtain a high school diploma from the Ministry of Education of Kyrgyzstan, while simultaneously offering courses in Jewish subjects. Since 1996, the school has been included in the "Heftziba" project of the Ministry of Education of Israel, which aims to strengthen Zionist identity and connection to the State of Israel among young Jews in the post-Soviet space[10].

As part of the project, the school received educational materials and textbooks from Israel, and Israeli teachers taught classes there. Since 2004, the school in Bishkek has been integrated into the projects of the World ORT organization.

At the end of 1994, the opening of another Jewish school in Central Asia was announced. This was State School No. 36, located in the Jewish quarter of Bukhara. Given that the majority of its students were residents of the quarter, it was practically a Jewish school even before receiving that official status. Although the school remained a state institution, its new status allowed the administration to establish cooperation with "Midrash Sephardi," a religious charitable organization from Israel. This organization aimed to develop Jewish education and sent teachers and textbooks to Bukhara, in addition to providing financial support to the school[11]. By the late 1990s, approximately 300 students were enrolled there[12].

In Tashkent—the largest city in Central Asia (which also hosts the region's largest Jewish community)—Municipal School No. 321 became a Jewish educational institution in 1996. This was the result of efforts by Jewish religious activists, specifically Rabbi Gurevich, the Chabad representative in Tashkent, who succeeded in engaging Lev Leviev in the project. Leviev was already supporting educational networks both in Israel ("Yad Chana") and in the former Soviet Union ("Or Avner"). The school followed the general state curriculum, allowing graduates to receive a state diploma, while also offering a range of Jewish subjects during an extended school day. By the late 1990s, the school had approximately 350 students. During this period, the institution joined the "Heftziba" project, under which Israeli teachers were employed[13].

A year after the opening of the school in Tashkent, a Jewish school was established in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan at the time. It operated on the same model as the Tashkent school—managed by the local Chabad and funded by Lev Leviev. Over time, Arcadi Gaydamak joined the initiative, and the school was renamed "Or Avner - Gershuni." In 2003, another Jewish school opened in Kazakhstan—this time in the city of Karaganda[14].

An analysis of the establishment of Jewish schools in Central Asia reveals a consistent model: new educational institutions were created on the basis of state schools and their curricula by adding a Jewish national-religious component. Supplementary funding allowed Jewish schools to recruit highly qualified teachers, equip computer labs (which was an inaccessible luxury for most local state schools at the time), provide hot meals to students, arrange bus transportation, and sponsor extracurricular activities. This made these schools highly attractive, particularly against the backdrop of the deteriorating local state education system. Consequently, many parents who had not originally intended to give their children a Jewish religious education sought to enroll them in these schools. It must also be considered that during the 1990s, the standard of secondary education in Central Asia continued to decline, and Jewish schools stood out favorably, prompting parents with no connection to Judaism to enroll their children.

Comparing these schools with Jewish educational institutions in other countries reveals differences across several parameters. First, although these schools were generally managed and funded by representatives of orthodox Jewish organizations, the Jewish public in those cities did not always share this worldview. Second, the co-founders and sponsors of these schools did not always hold identical values; for example, in Tashkent in 2002, a conflict arose between Chabad and the Israeli Center, which ultimately led to a split and the establishment of another Jewish school in the city[15]. Third, parents did not contribute to the funding of operating expenses and did not play an active role in curriculum development.

Finally, and most importantly, local authorities permitted the operation of Jewish schools, even though in some instances, teaching religion in a state school conflicted with local legislation. For example, when schools of the "Hizmet" movement and institutions associated with Fethullah Gülen were closed in Uzbekistan in 2001, Jewish schools continued to operate without hindrance[16]. Years later, when Jewish schools began to close (only the school in Bishkek remains today), this was not due to pressure from the authorities, but rather a lack of students and reduced funding following the 2008 economic crisis.

Central Asian Regimes, Jews, and the State of Israel

In general, the Jewish revival in the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Central Asia did not pose a threat to local regimes. Furthermore, the community itself was perceived by the authorities not as a threat, but as a valuable asset. An analysis of several events and factors supports this conclusion.

In late July 2020, information appeared on social media, later cited by several news websites, regarding a group of real estate developers in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, who intended to demolish the city's only Ashkenazi synagogue[17]. The developers filed a lawsuit against the organization managing the synagogue, claiming that the defendants had rejected alternative options and proposed compensation. However, to general surprise, the developers withdrew their lawsuit a few days later during a court hearing and abandoned their plans to demolish the synagogue. The plaintiffs did not explain the reasons for their decision, but it appears they were advised that it would be unwise to proceed with the case[18].

On August 10 of the same year, a major convention of Chabad Hasidim took place in the Kazakh city of Almaty to mark the 76th anniversary of the death of Rabbi Levi Yitzchak Schneerson (the father of the Seventh Lubavitcher Rebbe), who was exiled to Almaty by the communists in 1939 and passed away there. To coincide with this event, the government of Kazakhstan announced the inclusion of Schneerson's gravestone in the list of Kazakhstan's national heritage sites[19]. These two facts are unrelated, but both illustrate the respect shown by the authorities toward the remnants of Jewish communities, reflecting the role that Jews continue to play in the politics of the Muslim republics of Central Asia, despite their extremely small numbers.

Despite the decline of Jewish communities, local authorities remain interested in preserving "Jewish heritage" or, at least, ensuring the rights of the Jewish minority. For instance, in Semey (Semipalatinsk) in northern Kazakhstan, the administration offered to return an old synagogue confiscated during the Soviet era to the Jewish community, but received no response.

When the decision was made in the late 1990s to relocate the capital of Kazakhstan north to Akmola (subsequently Astana, now Nur-Sultan), it was proposed to build a central synagogue fitting for a capital city, even though there had previously been neither a synagogue nor a Jewish community in the city. Chabad emissaries responded to the initiative, and in 2004, a new synagogue (the largest in Central Asia) was opened in the presence of President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

In 2008, the authorities in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, demolished the old building that served as the city's synagogue to clear land for the construction of a presidential palace complex. In return, they constructed a much larger and more modern synagogue, despite the fact that the community could rarely gather a minyan, leaving the building vacant for most of the year[20]. In recent decades, the few remaining active synagogues have undergone major renovations. The most recent of these was the synagogue in Bishkek, renovated in 2015 (with a large community center opened next to it a year later). The renovation work was funded not by the local community members, but through generous donations from benefactors in other cities and countries (with Leviev and Mashkevich leading the list), as well as contributions from Jews who had left Central Asia. The renovation of synagogues does not necessarily indicate active religious life; often, it serves as a way to memorialize what has been lost. A prominent example of local cohesion is the Jewish community of Yoloten in Turkmenistan, from which all Jews emigrated in the early 1990s (the last Jew left in 2001), yet the expatriate community continues to maintain the old cemetery, employing a watchman to guard it. In this way, they have not only preserved the cemetery but also erected a "matzeva" in memory of the community that once existed. Yoloten is not an exception; similar initiatives have been recorded in almost all major cities.

The strict adherence of Central Asian authorities to the rights of the Jewish minority (and even "positive discrimination" in the context of school education) is driven by several internal and external factors. Above all, demonstrating care for Jewish heritage allows these regimes to present their treatment of the Jewish minority as an example of religious tolerance. This is particularly significant given that Jews are loyal to the central government and pose no political or social threat, in contrast to various Muslim activists whose activities are perceived as a real threat to secular regimes. Consequently, it often appears that in Central Asian countries, where Muslims constitute the vast majority of the population, leading a Jewish lifestyle is easier than engaging in Muslim religious activities. In 2017, the authorities in Tajikistan closed approximately 2,000 mosques, claiming they were unregistered[21].

All of these republics have enacted legislation to regulate and monitor religious activities and institutions. Within this framework, Jewish institutions likely enjoy greater freedom compared to Muslim and Christian ones. Another aspect influencing this favorable attitude relates to international relations and the perception that global Jewish organizations and the State of Israel, with which all these republics have established diplomatic relations, can help promote the interests of these regimes and their leaders in the Western world, particularly in the United States. Conversely, these same entities could exert pressure on regimes that violate the rights of the Jewish population.

Thus, a combination of internal and external factors allows rulers to present their support for the Jewish minority as the protection of religious minorities, while simultaneously combating Islamist groups entering their territory from Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, and other Middle Eastern nations. The protection of Jewish heritage is driven by local interests, independent of the actual size or physical presence of the Jewish population in these republics.

Recently, however, less positive developments have been observed. For instance, during the IDF's counter-terrorism operation against the radical Islamist regime in the Gaza Strip, "Guardian of the Walls" (May 2021), the ministries of foreign affairs of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan expressed "concern over the situation" in their official statements. Although these statements did not explicitly condemn Israel, they set a precedent in the foreign policy of the region's countries and triggered reactions on social media from users influenced by anti-Israel propaganda. Among others, the voice of the prominent Uzbek singer Yulduz Usmonova was particularly prominent (prompting protests from Bukharan Jews in Israel and the US—Ed.). In her video, Usmonova referred to Israel as an occupier and expressed her readiness to "fight for Palestine." These statements were met with surprise and strong condemnation by various Jewish organizations in Central Asia, though not by the authorities[22].

It is likely that these events point to a concerning shift in trend, where Central Asian countries are increasingly falling under the geopolitical influence of Turkey. This shift may ultimately affect the attitude toward the Jewish communities remaining in the region.

1 |  זאב לוין (עורך) קהילות ישראל במזרח במאות ה-19 וה-20, יהודי מרכז אסיה: בוכרה ואפגניסטן. ירושלים, מכון יד יצחק בן-צבי, 2018

(“The Jews of Central Asia: Bukhara and Afghanistan”, Jewish Communities of the East in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Ed. Z. Levin. — Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 2018, in Hebrew)

2 |  Zeev Levin, Collectivization and Social Engineering, Soviet Administration and the Jews of Uzbekistan, 1917-1939 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2015)

3 |  Rebecca Manley, To the Tashkent Station (Ithaka and New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 2009); S. Shveibish, “Evacuation and Soviet Jews during the Holocaust”, Bulletin of the Jewish University in Moscow, No. 2 (9) (1995) 36-55. Albert Kaganovich, “Jewish Refugees and Soviet Authorities during World War II”, Yad VaShem Studies 38 (2) 2010, pp. 85-210

4 |  Yaacov Ro’i., “The Religious Life of the Bukharan Jewish Community in Soviet Central Asia after World War II”, Jews in Russia and Eastern Europe, No 2, 2003, pp. 31-55

5 |  Idan A., “Operation to Rescue the Jews of Tajikistan during the Civil War of 1992-1993” (“אבינועם עידן, “מיבצע הצלת יהודי טג’יקיסטן במלחמת האזרחים 1993-1992). Jewish Communities of the East in the 19th and 20th Centuries, pp. 72-76 (in Hebrew)

6 |  Andrew Roth, “Last Jews of Bukhara fear their community will fade away”, The Guardian (24.12.2019) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/24/jews-bukhara-uzbekistanfear-community-will-fade-away.

7 |  Kedmi Ya., Hopeless Wars. — M.: "Eksmo", 2016;  Ben-Zvi I. "Ok–Yul" (White Road): A Journey through Central Asia (יהשוע בן-ציון, אוק-יול (דרך לבנה): מסע במרכז אסיה). — Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1996 (in Hebrew)

יעקוב קדמי, מלחמות עבודות (תל-אביב, 2011). יהושוע בן-ציון, אוק-יול (דרך לבנה): מסע במרכז אסיה (תל-אביב, 1996)

8 |  Zeev Levin, “From local to global: transformations of Bukharan Jewish community organization in the twentieth century”, Nationalities Papers, 42 (2), 2014, pp. 321-335

9 |  Aleksandr Yarkov. Jews in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 2000

10 |  The "Heftziba" program was established by the Ministry of Education in cooperation with the Liaison Bureau ("Nativ") in 1990. In 1990-2002, the program operated through "Nativ" and was funded by the Ministry of Education. Since 2003, "Heftziba" has worked in partnership with the Jewish Agency ("Sokhnut"). http://cms.education.gov.il/EducationCMS/Units/Heftziba/OdotHeftziba/. See also the article by Khanin and Chernin "Jewish Education and the Jewish Future of Post-Soviet Euro-Asia: Challenges and Opportunities" in this volume

11 |  http://www.chaiami.co.il/PAGE1.asp

12 |  http://www.bjc–bukhara.com/#!—/c4hn

13 |  Vladimir Berman. “The Shofar Sounds at the School Assembly — Report from Tashkent”. AEN (23.09.2003): http://www.aen.ru/index.php?page=article&category=education&article_id=63

14 |  Interview with Rabbi Meir Scheiner, director of the Jewish school in Karaganda (Bnei Brak, 23.02.2016)

15 |  Bayram Mushfig, “Uzbekistan: Last Passover in Tashkent for Chief Rabbi”, Forum 18 News Service, 1 May 2008. http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1124; Olim Tukhtaev, “Let's Live in Peace!” // Gorizont, 26.03.2010. http://www.gorizont.uz/cgi-bin/main.cgi?raz=1&id=757

16 |  Bayram Balci, “Fethullah Gu¨len’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam”, Religion, State and Society 31 (2), pp. 151-177

17 |  https://www.jta.org/quick-reads/uzbekistan-jews-fight-to-save-124-year-old-synagogue-from-demolition

18 |  Cnaan Liphshiz, “Construction firm withdraws lawsuit to evict synagogue in Uzbekistan,” JTA, 7.8.2020, https://www.jta.org/quick-reads/construction-firm-withdraws-lawsuit-to-evict-synagogue-in-uzbekistan

19 |  Cnaan Liphshiz, “Kazakhstan adds Chabad leader’s grave to its list of national heritage sites”, JTA (10.8.2020) https://www.jta.org/quick-reads/kazakhstan-adds-chabad-leaders-grave-to-its-list-of-national-heritage-sites

20 |  Rasul-zade T., “On the Way Out: Only 50 Congregants Remain in the Last Synagogue of Tajikistan”, Ferghana, 07.01.2020. https://fergana.media/articles/113338

21 |  Forum 18: “Tajikistan. Almost 2,000 Mosques Closed in 2017”, Radioi Ozodi, 28.2.2019. https://www.ozodi.org/a/29803022.html

22 |  Khurmat Babadzhanov, “Bukharan Jews Accuse Singer Yulduz Usmonova of Antisemitism”, Ozodlik, 15.5.2021, https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/31256206.html