Introduction

For historical reasons, modern Russian-speaking Jewry has formed predominantly in urban environments. The process of rapid urbanization of Soviet Jews occurred throughout the entire Soviet period and continued after the collapse of the USSR. In post-Soviet countries with a demographically significant Jewish population, there is a clear concentration of this population in major industrial and cultural centers. It was in these centers that the depopulation process, generally characteristic of post-Soviet Jewry, largely ceased by the mid-2000s, being replaced, however, by a resurgence of Jewish emigration in the second half of the following decade.

A similar trend is observed in countries that have received Jewish emigration in recent decades: almost everywhere, Russian-speaking Jews concentrate in a few large cities. Even in Germany, which in the 1990s pursued a policy of deliberate geographic dispersion of immigrants from the former USSR (both Jews and ethnic Germans), the majority of them live today in 4-5 of the largest metropolitan areas. A similar picture is seen in Israel, where in the early 1990s the government, aiming to strengthen the country's social and geographical periphery, attempted to direct the "Great Aliyah" from the USSR/CIS to the development towns of the Negev and Galilee (which, in a sense, was achieved). Nevertheless, approximately 60% of immigrants from the former USSR settled in the 14 largest cities (with 100,000 or more residents), primarily in the metropolitan areas of Tel Aviv and Haifa, as well as in Ashdod, Ashkelon, Jerusalem, and Beer Sheva. The "Russian" communities in these cities (not counting the second generation of repatriates) number between 30,000 and 60,000 people.  

Thus, according to data from the prominent demographer Mark Tolts, the share of the Jewish population living in the capital cities of the former USSR countries in 2010 remained virtually unchanged compared to the last Soviet census (1989). For example, the share of the Russian Jewish population living in Moscow and St. Petersburg combined was 50% in 1989 and 51% in 2010; more than half of the Jews of Moldova and Georgia lived in the capitals of these countries—Chisinau and Tbilisi—both in 1989 and 2010; respectively, 35% (in 1989) and 40% (in 2010) of the Jews of Belarus lived in Minsk, and about 80% (in 1989) and three-quarters (in 2010) of Baltic Jews lived in the capitals of those states.[1] Ukraine and Azerbaijan stood out from the general trend, as the share of the capital Jewish population had significantly decreased by 2010 compared to 1989—from 21% to 17% and from 80% to 67% of the total Jewish population of those countries, respectively. It is difficult to say to what extent the recent trend of general migration to the capitals in post-Soviet countries is also characteristic of local Jews.[2] Undoubtedly, however, capital Jewish communities play a special role demographically and culturally.

In absolute numbers, the most significant concentration of the Jewish population is registered in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the capital of Ukraine — Kyiv, and Belarus — Minsk. That is, in the leading cultural and business centers of national, and in the case of Moscow — global significance. Logically, the offices of major Jewish organizations, representative offices of Israeli and international Jewish structures are located in these centers, and a significant part of their activities is carried out there. Based on this, one should expect the formation of a specific type of Jewish communal subculture in capital cities — one that differs both from each other and from "provincial" Jewish communities. But does this actually occur?

There are known studies dedicated to the place of Jewish communities in post-Soviet urban space, such as the work of Elena Nosenko-Stein (who proposed the concept of "Jewish perception of the urban landscape")[3], and Vladimir Shapiro and his colleagues on the Jews of St. Petersburg in the 2000s.[4] There are also works that use these findings to describe Russian-speaking Jews who emigrated from the former USSR.[5]But even these, despite their unquestionable theoretical and practical importance, provide only a partial answer to our question regarding the cultural differences of Jews in post-Soviet capital centers. This article is an attempt to address this question, based on the results of a large-scale survey of the "extended Jewish population" aged 16 and older conducted in 2019 and early 2020 at the initiative of the EAJC and under the author's supervision, covering five countries of the former USSR — the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan.

The sample was formed based on respondents meeting the criteria of the Israeli Law of Return. The same criteria are used by Jewish communities in the former USSR to define the target group for their educational, cultural, and social projects. The study also interviewed representatives of the fourth generation of mixed marriages and other members of Jewish households who do not meet the criteria of the Law of Return but are involved in Jewish communal activities.

The total number of respondents surveyed through structured in-person interviews was over 2,400 people (2,362 of whom answered all 65 questions of the questionnaire). Of these, 360 were surveyed in Moscow, 200 in St. Petersburg, 301 in Kyiv, and 150 in Minsk. A random quota sample was designed in accordance with the demographic structure of the target population of this group. [6]

Jewish Identity  

The study showed that post-Soviet Jews maintain a fairly high level of national identity: 58% of all respondents reported an absolute Jewish identity, and another 23% stated that their Jewish consciousness emerges "in certain life situations." Only 10% of respondents noted the absence of any Jewish identification, and 9% admitted they had not thought about it or were unable to answer the question. 

The relatively large sample size allowed us to account for contributing factors as well. For instance, a stable Jewish identity was somewhat more frequently observed among residents of provincial cities than among Jews and their family members living in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of capital centers. Certain differences in this context were also recorded between Jewish communities in different countries. Indeed, such differences were first revealed by the initial study of the Jewish population of Moscow, Minsk, and Kyiv conducted in 1992 by Robert Brym and Rosalina Ryvkina,[7] and a large-scale study of Russian and Ukrainian Jews carried out in the late 1990s by Zvi Gitelman, Vladimir Chervyakov, and Vladimir Shapiro.[8]

The persistence of the same trend, with some reservations, 30 and 20 years later respectively, was confirmed by our 2019 study, with the differences between capital-city Jews of post-Soviet countries being the most prominent. For example, the share of those insisting on an absolute Jewish identity in Minsk and Kyiv turned out to be, respectively, one and a half and more than two times higher than in Moscow. This suggests a "distant echo" of the former Pale of Settlement of the Russian Empire, which included the territory of present-day Belarus and most of Ukraine. These are regions where, even a century after the abolition of the Pale, Jewish identity is sustained by the memory of Eastern European Jewish culture. Another possible explanation is that the Jewish population of the Russian capitals is three to four generations removed from the shtetls, whereas in Kyiv and Minsk, they are only one or two generations removed.

However, differences between the two Russian capitals—St. Petersburg and Moscow—were equally obvious. The share of respondents with an absolute Jewish identity in St. Petersburg was twice as high as among Moscow Jews (69% and 33%, respectively). Approximately 40% of respondents in Moscow declared an absence of Jewish identification or an inability to answer this question — twice as many as in St. Petersburg, 3.5 times more than in Kyiv, and more than 6 times more than in Minsk. (On the other hand, Minsk has the highest share of carriers of a "situational" Jewish identity among the four "Slavic" post-Soviet capitals).

The fact that historically St. Petersburg was the destination of mass Jewish migration of "Litvaks" from Belarus, and the majority of St. Petersburg Jews are direct descendants of these migrants, while the core of Moscow's Jewish population was formed by immigrants from Ukraine, explains little in light of these data.  Moreover, among immigrants from Ukraine, there are also many historical "Litvaks" whose ancestors moved to the territory of present-day Eastern and Southeastern Ukraine in the 19th century.

 Table 1. Jewish Identity of Residents of Capital Cities in the "Slavic" Countries of the Former USSR

What, then, can explain these differences? Studies from various years highlight the correlation between ethnic origin and the self-consciousness of members of the "extended Jewish population" of the former USSR. For example, surveys conducted at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s recorded differences between ethnic ("full-blooded") Jews with a relatively stable Jewish identity and descendants of mixed marriages, who more frequently declared a non-Jewish identity.[9] The development of these processes was reflected in a series of surveys and qualitative studies in the first decade of the 21st century. Thus, Elazar Leshem, Rosalina Ryvkina, and the present author independently arrived at a similar conclusion: Jewish identity depends on the homogeneity of the respondent's ethnic origin. This identity was demonstrated at the beginning of the century by more than 80% of ethnic ("full-blooded") Jews, about 50% of first-generation descendants of mixed marriages, and no more than 25% of third-generation mixed-family representatives and non-Jewish spouses of all three categories of Jews and their descendants. [10]

A similar pattern emerged in our 2019 study, where the criterion for the homogeneity/heterogeneity of Jewish origin was the number of Jewish grandparents the respondents had on both sides: 3-4 ("one hundred percent" or nearly "one hundred percent" Jews); 2 ("half-Jews"), 1 ("quarter-Jews"), and persons of non-Jewish or distant Jewish origin. Consequently, 85% of respondents of fully Jewish origin declared an absolute Jewish consciousness, as did over 60% of "halves," 38% of "quarter-Jews," and less than a third of those with no Jewish roots. Among "half-Jews" and "quarter-Jews," there were more individuals than in other groups (approximately and over a third, respectively) who noted that their Jewish identity manifests "only under certain circumstances." Finally, the relative majority of non-Jewish family members of Jews (31% — three times the sample average) stated they had no Jewish identity at all. This sub-group, along with "quarter-Jews," also had the highest proportion of those who had never thought about the question.[11]

In principle, a direct correlation between the homogeneity of Jewish origin and the stability of Jewish identity was also present among members of the "extended Jewish population" living in capital cities. However, a simple comparison of the situation in Moscow and St. Petersburg demonstrates a significant difference between the Jewish communities of these cities. Thus, the share of individuals with a stable Jewish identity in St. Petersburg among those of fully Jewish origin (89%) and "half-Jews" (59%) was significantly higher than in Moscow (49% and 17%, respectively). Conversely, "situational" Jewish identity among "full-blooded" respondents in Moscow was observed 1.5 times, and among "half-Jews" and "quarter-Jews" 2.5 times more frequently than among members of these categories of the "extended Jewish population" living in St. Petersburg.

The only exception to the general trend was St. Petersburg's twofold lead over Moscow (17% and 8%, respectively) in the proportion of individuals who do not feel Jewish at all within the sub-group of first-generation descendants of mixed marriages, who constitute a substantial category of the "extended Jewish population." On the contrary, those who had not thought about their Jewish identity or were unable to answer the question among "quarter-Jew" Muscovites was 1.5 times higher than among representatives of the same sub-group in St. Petersburg. This difference, in our view, is not accidental. St. Petersburg Jews in this regard likely resemble their counterparts in Kyiv and Minsk: Jewish identity (or its absence) is an active component of their group and individual worldview to a much greater extent than in Moscow.

The question of such a significant discrepancy in the national identity of Jews in Moscow and St. Petersburg warrants in-depth anthropological study. As a preliminary hypothesis, it can be suggested that in the 1920s and 1930s, the Jewish migration flows directed toward Moscow and Leningrad differed qualitatively. Representatives of educated and semi-educated families moved to Leningrad in search of qualified employment and higher education, as Valerii Dymshits suggests. Meanwhile, residents of small Ukrainian shtetls fled to Moscow to escape the horrors of the Civil War and the Holodomor (many Moscow Jews are descendants of Ukrainian Jews fleeing famine). From this, it may follow that while the former group demonstrated a national identity characteristic of an intellectual consciousness, the Jewish migrants in Moscow were predominantly carriers of a traditional concept of Jewishness, which underwent rapid erosion in the very next generation. Whether this is indeed the case remains a subject for further research. 

Table 2. Jewish Identity of Residents of Capital Cities in the RF in Accordance with the Ethnic Origin of Respondents

Obviously, the significant, and in some cases fundamental, differences in the sociocultural landscapes of these cities also shape the differences in the immediate social circle and interests of citizens of various origins, including Jews. Indeed, only 9% of Moscow respondents admitted that the majority of their close friends are Jewish (among Minsk residents, this figure is 1.5 times higher, in St. Petersburg — twice as high, and in Kyiv — nearly three times as high). Conversely, members of the "extended Jewish population" in Moscow reported significantly more often than in other cities that their close friends are predominantly non-Jewish; they also had the highest share of those who "do not know the ethnic origin of their friends, as they have never been interested in their nationality." We note that in St. Petersburg, the share of such respondents was lower than in other cities — only 9%, which is 1.5 times lower than in Kyiv and half of that in Minsk and Moscow. 

Table 3. Ethnic Circle of Communication of Members of the "Extended Jewish Population" of Capital Cities

The social circle inevitably affects the stability of the sense of belonging to the Jewish collective and other parameters of forming a stable national identity. It is no coincidence that Moscow respondents had the smallest share (18%) of those stating that their "Jewish consciousness" emerged thanks to their surroundings, friends, and social sphere — compared to an average of 24% across the sample.

What did respondents mean when noting the presence or absence of a Jewish identity? It is believed that different types of modern Jewish identity in the Diaspora boil down to three main models: ethnic, religious, and "Israel-oriented" (the so-called "Diaspora Zionism"), and our and other studies have shown that the same three frameworks are characteristic of the post-Soviet Jewish space as well.[12] 

In the countries of the former USSR, Jewish identity is dominated by the first, ethnic model, which for historical reasons was established on a secular basis.[13] Despite the suppression of outward expressions of Jewish self-identification and the mass acculturation of Soviet Jews into the Russian environment, a special type of Soviet Jewish identity emerged, which continued in the post-Soviet era both within the regions of the former USSR and in the countries of the "new Russian-Jewish Diaspora." All of the above is also applicable to that part of the "Jewish community" of the CIS which consists of individuals of mixed origin.[14]

The Religious Factor

Other identity models, such as religious identity, occupy a very modest place in the collective identification of Soviet and post-Soviet Jewry, lagging significantly behind the ethno-national dimensions of this phenomenon.[15] (An exception is the relatively small sub-ethnic groups of Georgian, Bukharian, and, to a lesser extent, Mountain Jews). Of course, one cannot speak of the complete disappearance of Judaism from the sociocultural landscape of Soviet Jewry: religion remained a positive, though not actively practiced, symbol in everyday life. A Jewish intellectual in a metropolis "while remaining essentially a materialistic atheist, simultaneously showed respect for the believer without joining any religious teachings" (M. Chlenov).[16] It was in the capitals that the trend of reviving interest in religion during the Perestroika and early post-Soviet years, which also swept up Jews, was most pronounced. The latter also became the object of active "missionary work" by foreign Jewish religious organizations and their attempts to instill a view of Jewishness primarily as a confessional community, typical of Western Jewish communities.      

As a result, today religious identity constitutes a significant (and, by some observations, even growing) component of Russian-Jewish identification. However, it still falls far behind the ethno-national component in terms of influence,[17] and covers peripheral zones of the collective self-consciousness of post-Soviet Jewish communities. This fact was confirmed by the 2019 survey: only 27% of respondents declared themselves religious, 48% — "secular," and a quarter were unable to answer. Notably, 15 years ago, during our previous study in Russia and Ukraine, these response options were chosen by 23%, 46.5%, and just over 30% of respondents, respectively, meaning the situation has remained virtually unchanged.

Both then and now, the differences in the stability of Jewish identity between the categories of "firmly religious," "secular," and those doubting their religiosity are not significant enough to classify the level of religiosity as one of the main factors shaping the respondents' Jewish self-awareness. Rather, the reverse process is at play: the stability of Jewish or other identity in an atmosphere of ideological search prompted many Jews to fill this niche, including with a religious component. "Geographical" differences between residents of post-Soviet capitals are obvious on this point as well: Muscovites demonstrated the highest level of religiosity (34%), followed by Kyiv residents (29%), and then residents of St. Petersburg and Minsk (21% and 18%, respectively). At the same time, St. Petersburg residents showed the lowest level of religiosity among the Jews of post-Soviet capitals, while in Kyiv and Minsk, a significant portion of respondents found it difficult to answer this question.     

Table 4. Religious Identity of Members of the "Extended Jewish Population" in Capital Cities of "Slavic" Countries of the Former USSR, 2019

It must also be kept in mind that when speaking of their religiosity, respondents do not always mean Judaism. Thus, two-thirds of the religious participants in the 2019 survey named Judaism as their religion, a quarter named Christianity, and another 1% named "another religion." Among those who found it difficult to define their attitude to religion, "Jews" and "Christians" accounted for a share that was 1.5 times (44%) and twice (12%) smaller. However, this same category contained a relative majority (24% compared to 10% among the religious and 12% among the secular) of those who named both religions as their own. In the segment of non-religious respondents, nearly a third consider Judaism their religion and 14% consider Christianity, but the largest share in this subgroup belonged to "consistent atheists" (38%).

Table 5. Religiosity and Religious-Cultural Choice

It can be hypothesized that for religious respondents, the choice of "their" religion is equivalent to declaring their actual faith; for secular individuals, it is rather the choice of a national-cultural model; and for those finding it hard to answer, it represents a symbiosis of both factors.[18] This, apparently, explains the twice higher share in Kyiv and almost three times higher share in Minsk (compared to St. Petersburg and Moscow, respectively) of respondents who found it difficult to define their level of religiosity (these are cities in the historical zone of Jewish settlement, where remnants of traditional Jewish identity have been preserved to a greater extent). 

At the same time, 60% of surveyed Kyiv residents (which is 1.5 times more than in St. Petersburg, twice as much as in Minsk, and three times as much as in Moscow) named Judaism as their religion. And it was there that 22% of respondents — twice as many as in Minsk (11%) and three and four times as many as in St. Petersburg and Moscow, respectively — stated they acquired their "Jewish identity" "in the synagogue, and through introduction to Judaism and religious ceremonies." In Minsk, however, where the overall Jewish population and the concentration of religious-cultural institutions are smaller than in Kyiv, respondents were three times more likely than in other capitals to call both Judaism and Christianity equally "their" religion.       

Table 6. Religious-Cultural Choice of Capital-City Jews of the Former USSR

Moreover, differences between St. Petersburg and Moscow residents are also noticeable and, in many cases, statistically significant. Thus, while the relative majority of religious and undecided members of the "extended Jewish population" in St. Petersburg named Judaism as "their" religion (46% and 43%), in Moscow, respectively, more than half and over 40% of representatives of these two categories turned out to be Christian in a religious and/or cultural sense. However, the relative majority of non-religious respondents in both cases (48% and 43%) stated they do not consider any religion to be "their own."

Table 7. Comparative Data on Religiosity and Religious-Cultural Identity of Respondents in St. Petersburg and Moscow

The shares of respondents of (almost) fully Jewish origin who named Judaism as "their" religion in Moscow and St. Petersburg were roughly equal (54% and 58%). At the same time, the share of Muscovites from the category of (almost) "one hundred percent" Jews who chose Christianity (or Judaism and Christianity simultaneously) as "their" religion was 10% and 13% respectively, while among St. Petersburg residents the percentage of those sharing such views was negligible. Among "half-Jews," the share of adherents of Judaism in the two cities was again equal, but the followers of Christianity in St. Petersburg in this category were already twice fewer than in Moscow, and "quarter-Jews" who identified Judaism as "their" religion in St. Petersburg were nearly three times as many as in the capital of the RF.  

Table 8. Religious-Cultural Identity of Respondents in St. Petersburg and Moscow Depending on the Homogeneity of Their Origin

One of the most important manifestations of religious-cultural identity is considered to be synagogue attendance — and our 2019 survey revealed that only 15% of respondents do this more or less regularly. Kyiv turned out to be the most "Jewish" city in a religious sense, while the lowest activity of this kind was observed in Minsk and Moscow. We note, however, that the share of respondents actively (constantly or on Shabbat) attending synagogue was four times lower than the share of those declaring an "absolute" Jewish identification. This once again confirms that the core of post-Soviet Jewish identity remains not religious-behavioral, but other sociocultural factors.

Data on respondents' participation in Jewish ceremonies and adherence to Jewish religious (by origin) rituals lead us to a similar conclusion. Thus, 70% of those surveyed in four European countries of the former USSR (the RF, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) always or frequently celebrate Jewish holidays, and the same percentage buy matzah for Passover (one of the few elements of tradition preserved in many Jewish families during Soviet times). Always or sometimes participating in the Hanukkah candle-lighting ceremony is reported by 54% of respondents, and in the Passover Seder — by 52%. At the same time, always or sometimes building or visiting a sukkah during Sukkot is reported by 37%; lighting Shabbat candles — by 42%; fully or partially observing Shabbat — by 38%; fasting on Yom Kippur — by 35%; and observing kashrut — by 29% of survey participants. In other words, respondents are much more active in public ceremonies than in observing Jewish traditions related to personal space.

Thus, public worship, including synagogue attendance, remains a factor of communal socialization rather than a criterion of religiosity. It is no coincidence that out of the four capital cities of the former USSR, this behavior model was most actively demonstrated by the Jews of Kyiv and St. Petersburg, where the highest level of participation in the activities of Jewish organizations was also recorded.   

Table 9. Adherence to Customs and Traditions of Jewish Life by Members of the "Extended Jewish Population" in Capital Centers of the Former USSR

Ethnicity and Value-Behavioral Models

In our 2019 study, selecting no more than 3-4 parameters from 14 proposed in the scale of value priorities, respondents placed ethno-cultural values related to national identity in the first three positions. These included "a sense of belonging to the people" (72%), "pride in Jewish culture" (58%), and "the need to adhere to Jewish traditions, customs, and culture" (38%). In fourth place on the list was also an ethnic, in this case ethno-genetic, aspect: "having Jewish parents" (believed by 33% of respondents).

At the same time, such a factor as marriage to a Jewish partner occupied only 12th place in the ranking in 2019, and the share of those noting it among the leading priorities had decreased 2.5 times compared to our study fifteen years ago.[19] Only 16% in 2005 and 13% in 2019 believed that being Jewish means "observing mitzvot (religious commandments), attending synagogue" and "striving to receive and give children a Jewish education." Knowledge of Hebrew occupied 11th place in this scale, and Yiddish or other languages of the Jewish Diaspora occupied the 14th (last) place in the ranking.

We note that no significant difference was observed between age categories on these issues — except that respondents older than 61 years more frequently highlighted ethno-genetic factors, while younger ones highlighted ethno-cultural ones. This point was more clearly manifested in the geographical context: the weight of ethno-cultural values in the Jewish worldview of residents of Kyiv, Minsk, and St. Petersburg was significantly higher than among the Jews of Moscow, which is logical in light of the presented data.

Table 10.  Parameters of Belonging to the Jewish People: Comparison of Members of Capital Jewish Communities in "Slavic" Countries of the Former USSR

At the same time, it was in Moscow that the share of those who defined belonging to Jewry through knowledge of Yiddish, Bukharian, or Mountain Jewish languages was 2.5 to 3 times higher than in other capital cities. This may be due to a higher level of preservation of ethnic traits in the process of forming the Jewish population of Moscow (compared to Leningrad).

According to Prof. Valerii Dymshits, the explanation for this phenomenon is as follows. Having become the capital of the USSR, Moscow grew rapidly and experienced a severe housing crisis. Therefore, masses of Jewish migrants, unable to settle within the city, created several compact, ethnically homogeneous settlements on the outskirts and in the suburbs. In these "ghettos," Yiddish was preserved as the language of family and street communication up until the 1970s. In Leningrad, which experienced depopulation during the Civil War, the situation was different. New arrivals, including Jews, settled freely throughout the city among the Russian population, so acculturation proceeded at a faster pace there than in Moscow. Characteristically, the State Jewish Theater (GOSET) had a stable audience in Moscow right up until its closure in 1949, while three attempts to create a Jewish theater in Leningrad failed due to a lack of audience interest. In any case, the disappearance of Yiddish as a living language of communication in Moscow occurred only recently, and this language is still perceived by Moscow Jews as a marker of Jewish identity.

A situation similar to the mass migration of Ashkenazim from Ukraine to Moscow in the 1920s and 1930s has been repeated in the current century with Mountain Jews, Dymshits believes. In recent decades, Mountain Jews from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan began to resettle in Moscow. Currently, approximately 25,000 Mountain Jews live in the capital of the RF, making up about 10% of the city's Jewish population. Most of them are speakers of the Mountain Jewish language (Juhuri), which represents an important identity factor.

The presence in Moscow of a large number of migrants who have preserved elements of traditional culture is probably also related to the somewhat higher share, compared to other cities, of those who believed that "being Jewish means having Jewish parents." In addition, Moscow (as well as Kyiv) has a four-to-five times higher share of those who named knowledge of Hebrew as a factor of Jewish belonging.

The latter circumstance is likely due to a much higher concentration in Kyiv and Moscow, compared to other cities of the former USSR, of regional and international umbrella Jewish organizations, in whose projects the teaching of Hebrew occupies a significant, and sometimes central, place. One must also take into account the significant number of Hebrew-speaking emissaries from Israel living in these cities.

Admittedly, this explanation is suitable mainly for Kyiv, which, along with St. Petersburg, is characterized by a relatively high level of participation of local Jews in communal life. Almost half of the surveyed Kyiv Jews declared their active participation in Jewish communal activities, and another quarter reported that they participate in such activities "from time to time." In Moscow, the share of those participating in Jewish activities constantly or "from time to time" turned out to be three and two times lower, respectively, than in Kyiv. At the same time, 28% of Muscovites — 14 (!) times more than in Kyiv, and 4 times more than in St. Petersburg and Minsk, stated that they do not participate in communal events and do not intend to do so.

Moscow Jews also stood out sharply against the background of other capital cities with a high share (22%) of respondents who erroneously claimed that no such events are held in their city, or who were completely unaware of the existence of the Jewish community and the activities of Jewish organizations.

Table 11. Participation in the Activities of Local Communities and Foreign Organizations of Capital Jews of the Former USSR

It is no coincidence that only 8% of members of Moscow's "extended Jewish population" noted that their "Jewish consciousness" came to them at the events of Jewish communities and organizations. Among those surveyed in Kyiv and Minsk, there were two and a half times more such respondents, and in St. Petersburg — twice as many.  In addition, the share of Kyiv residents who explained their acquisition of Jewish identity by attending Jewish schools (day and Sunday schools) was twice as high as the sample average. Conversely, the percentage of such responses in Moscow — the city with the most extensive multi-level system of Jewish education in all of Euro-Asia — was on the verge of statistical error.     

Table 12. Circumstances of Acquiring a Jewish Identity Depending on Respondents' Place of Residence

Against this background, the explanation for the interest of Moscow Jews in Hebrew should apparently be sought in other circumstances. For example, in the residence of tens of thousands of Israeli passport holders in the capital of the RF, including re-immigrants who returned after some period of living in Israel and "shuttle" migrants living in two (or more) countries. But particularly striking is the disproportionate number, compared to other cities, of individuals who have received Israeli citizenship but do not live in Israel. It is clear that for many Muscovites, especially of mixed and non-Jewish origin, whose Jewishness was on the far periphery of their self-consciousness and became active only after receiving an Israeli passport, Israel-related attributes such as Hebrew often play a paramount role.[20]

Another "Israeli indicator" of the ethnic and sociocultural self-consciousness of Jews of the former USSR in general, and capital residents in particular, is their attitude to Israel as a Jewish state. An interesting marker in this regard was the response to a hypothetical question about the possibility of Israel abandoning its Jewish character. Such an abandonment was supported in our 2019 study by only 9% of respondents, and another 7% stated that they were not interested in this issue. At the same time, 41% believe that Israel must remain a Jewish state, and 27% advocate for Israel to maintain its Jewish status but at the same time "understand those who agree to transform this country into a 'state of all its citizens'."

Responses to this question vary greatly depending on the respondent's place of residence. Thus, the share of Moscow Jews who spoke out decisively against Israel abandoning its Jewish identity was 1.5 times lower than among St. Petersburg residents and, respectively, 5% and 8% lower than among Kyiv and Minsk residents. On the other hand, in Moscow (compared to other capitals), the share of those believing that "the era of nation-states has (allegedly) passed" is 2.5 to 3 times higher, and the share of those to whom this topic is not interesting at all is three times larger.  

Table 13. Opinions of Residents of Capital Cities in the Former USSR on the Prospects of Israel Abandoning Its Jewish Character

All the above once again confirms the conclusion about the differing influence of the urban atmosphere on Jewish communities: the socio-cultural attitudes of Jews in Moscow, a multicultural global-level metropolis, differ significantly from the trends in the "nationally-minded" Jewish community of St. Petersburg and the communities of Kyiv and Minsk. Consequently, although Israel remains the most important factor in the national identity of the main body of Jews in the countries of the former USSR, the local urban atmosphere exerts a significant influence on the specific parameters of expressing pro-Israel sentiment in each of the capitals. This is particularly clear when comparing responses in Kyiv — the capital of a country undergoing a period of active search for national-civil identity — with the position of respondents in Moscow — the city symbolizing the "imperial" ambitions of post-Soviet elites. 

Kyiv respondents were twice as likely as Muscovites (as well as Jewish residents of other capital cities) to state that "being Jewish means being a patriot of the Jewish state." Accordingly, they were twice and two and a half times more likely than Muscovites to admit that "their Jewish identity emerged thanks to a trip to Israel" and "interest in Israel and events surrounding it." Furthermore, the share of Kyiv residents experiencing a sense of solidarity with Israel turned out to be 1.5 times higher than that of respondents in the capital of the RF. Finally, members of the "extended Jewish population" in the capital of Ukraine were, respectively, nearly four and five times more likely than those surveyed in Moscow to report that they always or from time to time participate in solidarity actions with Israel, and "consider Israel, or both Israel and their country of residence, to be 'their' country."    

Table 14. Parameters of Pro-Israel Orientation of Jews in Capital Cities of the "Slavic" Republics of the Former USSR

Models of Ethnic Identity

Our and other studies demonstrate that the "ethnic core" and ethnically mixed representatives of the "extended Jewish community" in the CIS (and, partly, in the "new Russian-Jewish Diaspora" beyond its borders) exist in a complex relationship, and ethno-cultural and identity boundaries run within, rather than between, these communities. It is obvious that the consolidation of traditional models and the formation of new models of Jewish identity occur within the framework of a division between "cultural-identity communities," covering all parts of the "extended Jewish population" of post-Soviet countries. Such an understanding allowed us in the past to identify four cultural-identity groups within the sphere of attraction of the local "organized Jewish community" (in the broadest sense of the word) and its near and far periphery[21]:

1. "Universalist Jews" — carriers of a "pan-Jewish" identity with a strong national component, generally believing that "Jews worldwide are one people."

2. "Ethnic Jews" — carriers of a new ethno-civil Jewish identity, defining themselves as "Russian (or Ukrainian, Belarusian, etc.) Jews," among whom many believe that "a Russian (Ukrainian) Jew has more in common with Russians or Ukrainians than with Jews living in other countries."

3. Carriers of a dual identity, defining themselves simultaneously as both Russian (Ukrainian, Belarusian, etc.) and Jewish: a phenomenon perceived as an oxymoron in Soviet times, but established in the postmodernist atmosphere of post-Soviet societies.

4. "Non-Jews" — non-Jewish spouses of Jews and assimilated descendants of Jews — carriers of some non-Jewish identity who, however, by virtue of origin, sometimes become the focus of attention from Jewish organizations, and therefore realize their belonging, if not to the Jewish ethnic group, then to the organized Jewish community.

Representatives of all categories are clearly distributed on sequential steps of sociological scales, on at least two parameters. First, from category to category, the share of those agreeing with the statement that "all the world's Jews are one people" consistently decreases (this was believed by 77% of "universalist Jews" and only 32% of "non-Jews"). In parallel, the share of supporters of the thesis "a Ukrainian, Russian, etc. Jew has more in common with an ethnic Ukrainian, Russian, etc. than with Jews living in other countries" increased (from 8% to 29%), as did the share of those who found it difficult to answer this question (from 13% to 35%).  

Second, as seen from the table below, there is a correlation between belonging to one of the cultural-identity categories and the degree of respondents' Jewish identification.  Thus, almost all "universalist Jews" and three-quarters of "ethno-civil Jews" defined their Jewish identification as "absolute." Conversely, the relative majority of the other two groups — about half of the "postmodernists" (that is, carriers of a dual Jewish-non-Jewish identity) and a third of the "cosmopolitans" — stated that their Jewish identification is conditional and situational. Logically, the share of those who had never thought about their Jewish identification among "cosmopolitans" was 2.5 to 8 times higher than in any other category (there were none at all among universalist Jews). Finally, 77% (7.5-8 times more than the sample average) of respondents who felt they belonged to some non-Jewish ethnic group declared a complete absence of Jewish identity.  

Third, there is a direct link between belonging to cultural-identity groups and the ethnic origin of respondents. In our 2019 study, nearly equal shares of individuals of homogeneous Jewish origin called themselves "universalist Jews" and "ethno-civil Jews." The relative majority of "halves" also preferred a new ethno-civil Jewish identity, but among them, the share of carriers of a dual Jewish-non-Jewish identity is also relatively high. A similar pattern, but with a significantly lower share of ethno-civil "Jews of the countries of residence," is characteristic of "quarter-Jews." Among respondents without Jewish roots, those indicating the absence of any Jewish identity still dominated.

Differences between the groups on issues of identity, value orientations, as well as sociocultural and political identification, are due to the influence of the social environment, family atmosphere, communal structures, and, not least, the context of the city, region, and country of residence. Thus, in Kyiv, the number of owners of a "universal" Jewish identity turned out to be 1.5 to 2 times higher than among Jews in other cities, but even in the Ukrainian capital, they made up only slightly more than a fifth. In St. Petersburg, Kyiv, and Minsk, respondents who chose an ethno-civil Jewish identity clearly dominated, identifying respectively as "Russian (RF)," "Ukrainian," and "Belarusian" Jews.   

In Moscow, where 2.5 times fewer respondents called themselves "Russian Jews" than in St. Petersburg, nearly a third (just as in Minsk, the capital of a country which, given the role and significance of the Russian language and diverse cultural ties, often looks like the cultural periphery of Russia) claimed they consider themselves "ethnic Russian and Jewish simultaneously." But the largest faction among Moscow Jews (42%) consisted of those insisting on a completely non-Jewish ethnic or "universal human" identity, whereas in other cities, this sub-group accounted for between a fifth and less than a quarter of those surveyed.     

Table 15.  Models of Ethnic Identification of Members of the "Extended Jewish Population" in Capital Cities of the Former USSR      

Notably, differences in respondents' choice of ethnic identification models in Moscow and St. Petersburg are visible not only between sub-groups ranked by the degree of homogeneity of Jewish origin, but also within these sub-groups — between Muscovites and St. Petersburg residents.  Thus, while the share of "one hundred percent Jews" in Moscow who consider themselves "only Jews" was noticeably higher than in the same sub-group in St. Petersburg, among respondents of mixed origin, the correlation on this point was reversed. The share of carriers of an ethno-civil identity ("Russian Jews") among all sub-categories of St. Petersburg residents was higher than among Muscovites, while in Moscow, a much higher share of respondents with a mixed (Jewish-non-Jewish) identity was recorded in all sub-categories. 

Table 16.  Models of Ethnic Identification of Respondents in Moscow and St. Petersburg, in Accordance with Their Ethnic Origin

We are talking about a significant structuring within the Jewish communities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kyiv, and Minsk. These communities are very close to each other from the point of view of cultural-linguistic appearance, and the differences between them are reduced mainly to their civil and political loyalty and the correlation of global and local Jewish and non-Jewish worldview. The collected data convince us that the new Jewish ethno-civil groups emerging in the countries of the former USSR are, first of all, part of the Jewish people, entering it either directly or (which is more often) through one of its segments, in this case — Russian-Jewish.

Today, in place of the rapidly eroding community of "Soviet Jews," a new international community has practically formed – a sub-ethnic group of Russian-speaking Jews, whose members live in some fifty countries on five continents. Moreover, nearly 60% of Jews in post-Soviet Euro-Asia, including 62% of Jews in St. Petersburg, 61% of Jews in Moscow, 52% of Kyivans, and 66% of Jewish residents of Minsk, believe in the viability of this phenomenon in the long or medium term, according to our 2019 surveys. Their point of view is shared by 67% of members of the "extended Jewish population" of Almaty (Kazakhstan) and 73% of Jews in the capital of Moldova — Chisinau.  

To summarize, it seems obvious that the Jews of the three countries examined in the article, from the point of view of their identification and socio-cultural stereotypes, are a product of post-Soviet experience at least as much as, and on a number of parameters more than, of Soviet heritage. It is clear that the difficult process of building new Eastern European civil nations, where the ethnic component plays a large role, has its connotation in the Jewish environment of these countries as well, especially in the capitals, which are the focus of ideological and cultural debate. The result, as follows from the presented data, is, on the one hand, the formation and strengthening of new ethno-civil Jewish groups, and on the other — the preservation of a stable specific identity, differing from that accepted in Israel and the Jewish communities of the West. It appears that in the modern postmodernist atmosphere and multicultural practice of capital cities and other major industrial and cultural centers, where the majority of local Jews are concentrated, this circumstance is one of the few alternatives to their assimilation into a non-Jewish environment.

As far as can be judged, these processes have gone furthest in Ukraine and Kyiv, but the same trend is characteristic of other post-Soviet countries and their capitals. In Russia, this role is played by St. Petersburg, at least in the Jewish context. Moscow, meanwhile, remains a multicultural supranational imperial center with far-reaching regional and global ambitions, and a corresponding public atmosphere. This cannot but affect the attitudes, identification, and behavioral models of local ethnic communities, including the Jewish one. It seems that this conclusion is one of the most important results of our study, which, in addition to academic significance, is also relevant for adequate planning of the activities of Jewish organizations in the countries of the former USSR.   

[1] See Mark Tolts, “Post-Soviet Jewish Demographic Dynamics: An Analysis of Recent Data”, in Sergio Della Pergola and Uzi Rebhun (eds.), Jewish Population and Identity: Concept and Reality (Dordrecht: Springer, 2018), p. 216, 218.

[2] Such a point of view is quite popular among Jewish leaders and communal professionals in post-Soviet countries. However, we do not yet have demographic calculations capable of confirming or refuting this hypothesis.

[3] See: Nosenko-Stein E., “'Ours' and 'Theirs' in the Modern Russian City: Jewish Sacred Geography.” Anthropological Forum, No. 23, pp. 123-139; Nosenko-Stein E., “Sacred and Profane Space in the Perception of Modern Russian Jews.” Sacred Geography in Slavic and Jewish Cultural Traditions. Ed. O. V. Belova. Moscow: Institute of Slavic Studies RAS, 2008, pp. 345-364.

[4] Shapiro V., Gerasimova M., Nizovtseva I., Syonova N., “Jews of St. Petersburg: Ethnic Self-Identification and Participation in Communal Life.” Diasporas / Diaspory. 2006. No. 3, pp. 95-149.

[5] See, for example, Larisa Fialkova and Maria Yelenevskaya, “Immigrants in the city: from exploration to domestication”, Israel Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 2011, 142-163.

[6] Mark Tolts, “Post-Soviet Jewish Demographic Dynamics: An Analysis of Recent Data”. Paper presented at the 16th World Congress of Jewish Studies (Jerusalem, July 28 — August 1, 2013) [Revised as of October 9, 2018]. Sergio Della Pergola. “World Jewish Population, 2018”, in Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin (Editors) The American Jewish Year Book, 2018, Volume 118 (2018) (Dordrecht: Springer), p. 361-452.

[7] See Robert Brym (with the assistance of R. Ryvkina), Jews of Moscow, Kiev and Minsk: Identity, Antisemitism, Emigration (New York: State University Press, 1994).

[8] Zvi Gitelman, “Thinking about Being Jewish in Russia and Ukraine”, in: Zvi Gitelman, Musya Glants and Marshall I. Goldman (eds.), Jewish Life after the USSR (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003); Gitelman Z., Chervyakov V. and Shapiro V., “National Self-Consciousness of Russian Jews. Materials of a Sociological Study 1997 — 1998”, Diasporas / Diaspory, 2000, No. 4, pp. 52-86; 2001, No. 1, pp. 210-244.

[9] Zvi Gitelman, “The evolution of Jewish culture and identity in the Soviet Union”, in Ya’acov Ro’i and Avi Bekker (Eds.), Jewish Culture and Identity in the Soviet Union (New York: Univ. press, 1991), pp. 3-24; Mordechai Altshuler, Soviet Jewry since the Second World War. Population and Social Structure (New York et al.: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 236; and Robert J. Brym, The Jews of Moscow, Kiev and Minsk, pp. 16-19.

[10] Leshem E., Survey of participants in the project “Jewish Self-Identification — First Stage” in the CIS, Jerusalem, Jewish Agency for Israel, August 2002 (in Hebrew); Ryvkina R., How Jews Live in Russia. A Sociological Analysis of Changes. — Moscow: IV RAN, 2005. — pp. 65, 69-70; Khanin V. and Pisarevskaya D., “Jewish Youth in Modern Russia: Ethno-National and Confessional Identity”, Bulletin of the Jewish University, 2013, No. 15, pp. 169-197.

[11] Khanin V. and Chernin V., Jewish Identity in the Former USSR: Parameters, Models and Challenges. Tel Aviv and Herzliya: Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies and Diaspora Research Center of Tel Aviv University, March 2020, p. 41.

[12] Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin, “Between Eurasia and Europe: Jewish Community and Identities in Contemporary Russia and Ukraine,” in Julius H. Schoeps and Olaf Glöckner (eds.) A Road to Nowhere? Jewish Experiences in the Unifying Europe (Leiden: Brill, 2011), pp. 63-89.

[13] Osovtsov A., Yakovenko I., The Jewish People in Russia: Who, How and Why Relates to It. — Moscow: Dom Evreyskoy Knigi, 2011; Zvi Gitelman, Jewish Identities in Postcommunist Russia and Ukraine: An Uncertain Ethnicity (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012); Khanin V. and Pisarevskaya D., “Jewish Youth in Modern Russia: Ethno-National and Confessional Identity”, Bulletin of the Jewish University (Jerusalem — Moscow), 2014, No. 15, pp. 169-200.

[14] Nosenko E., To Be or to Feel? Main Aspects of the Formation of Jewish Self-Identification among Descendants of Mixed Marriages in Modern Russia. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies RAS — “Kraft+”, 2004.

[15] Gitelman Z., Chervyakov V., Shapiro V., “Judaism in the National Self-Consciousness of Russian Jews”. Bulletin of the Jewish University in Moscow. 1994. No. 3(7), pp. 121-144; Khanin V., “Religious Identity of Immigrants from the Former USSR in Israel”, State, Religion, Church in Russia and Abroad, 2015, No. 3 (33), pp. 255-290; Nosenko E., “Judaism, Orthodoxy or 'Secular Religion'? The Choice of Russian Jews”, Diasporas, No. 2 (2009), pp. 6-40.

[16] Chlenov M., “The Relationship of Confessional and Ethnic Identification in Jewish Self-Consciousness”, in Problems of Existence in the Diaspora, pp. 28-65, quoted fragments on pp. 44-47 and 53-56.

[17] Nosenko-Stein E., “Tell This to Your Children, and Let Their Children Tell the Next Generation”, 2013; Nosenko-Stein E., “Introduction” // Remembering the Past for the Sake of the Future: Jewish Identity and Collective Memory / T. Karasova, E. Nosenko-Stein, eds. — Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, 2014; Vladimir Khanin, “Social Consciousness and Identity of Ukrainian Jewry: the Case of the Dniepr Region”, Contemporary Jewry, New York, 1998, Vol. 19.

[18] Khanin V., “Ashkenazi Jews of the Former USSR: Religious Identity and Religious-Cultural Tradition”, The Russian Public Opinion Herald (Moscow), No. 1-2 (129) January-June, 2020, pp. 85-93.

[19] Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin and Velvl Chernin, Identity, Assimilation and Revival: Ethnic Social Processes among the Jewish Population of the Former Soviet Union (Ramat-Gan: the Rappaport Center for Assimilation Studies and Strengthening of Jewish Vitality, 2007).

[20] For more details on this phenomenon: Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin, From Russia to Israel — and Back? Transnational Russian Israeli Diaspora (Munich & Boston: De Gruyter, 2021), forthcoming.

[21] Vladimir Khanin and Velvl Chernin, Identity, Assimilation and Revival, pp. 78-80.