In the Jewish context, the concept of "dual loyalty"  implies that a Jew supports Israel regardless of their country of residence. Meanwhile, the Talmudic principle known as "the law of the land is the law" (Dina d'malkhuta dina) is often viewed as a requirement for a Jew to remain loyal to the state in which they live. The attempt by many Soviet Jews, at various stages of the country's post-war history, to combine patriotism toward their country of residence with  loyalty to Israel was perceived by the USSR authorities as a challenge and served as a pretext for repressive campaigns. The current situation  in post-Soviet countries is generally different and closer to the approach of modern democratic states, which recognize the phenomenon of  "poly-loyalty" and dual citizenship, as secured by intergovernmental agreements and programs for the development of cultural, scientific, business, and other ties.

The idea of dual loyalty (which, in practice, implies disloyalty or incomplete loyalty to the regimes and societies of host countries)—one of the most widespread modern antisemitic stereotypes—did not emerge today. Today, this idea implies that a Jew supports Israel, regardless of their actual country of residence. Periodic flare-ups of debate on this topic typically accompany a rise in antisemitic sentiment in countries with statistically significant Jewish communities, based on their role in the local economy, culture, and power structures, or on the place Jews occupy in the historical memory and contemporary public discourse of diaspora nations. Recently, high-profile incidents of this nature have been recorded even in places where they seemed entirely eradicated, such as the United States, home to the largest diaspora Jewish community, and in united Europe.

Indeed, a study conducted by the Anti-Defamation League in 19 such countries—two in the Americas (the US and Argentina), 13 in "Christian" Europe (Belgium, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Denmark, Italy, France, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Ukraine, Russia), and two Islamic countries (Turkey and Iran)—demonstrated that the false accusation of dual loyalty is the most widespread international antisemitic stereotype, shared by 44% of respondents in the surveyed countries. (The next most common claims identified by researchers were that "Jews have too much influence in business" and "talk too much about the Holocaust," with each statement shared by 38% of respondents). Extrapolating the study's data to the total population of these countries, the authors of the ADL report concluded that the number of individuals harboring antisemitic stereotypes could reach 220 million in these nations, and up to 1.7 billion worldwide.[1]

"This staggering figure provides fertile ground for many other antisemitic trends," notes Manfred Gerstenfeld, a prominent researcher of contemporary antisemitic trends in the Western world. "If Israel's interests conflict with those of the country where a Jew lives, an antisemite may accuse the Jewish citizen of supporting Israel's interests, effectively saying, 'you are not really one of us.' The most extreme form of the dual loyalty accusation amounts to a charge of treason."[2]

Notably, relationships with the authorities and communities of host countries as part of the broader issue of Jewish existence in the Galut (diaspora) is one of the most debated subjects—albeit in an entirely different context—in Jewish philosophical, political, literary, and strictly religious texts. For centuries, Jews lived among other nations and functioned within diverse legal systems. Thus, the Talmudic principle of "the law of the land is the law" (Dina d'malkhuta dina) has remained a subject of extensive discussion, from the Talmudic sage Shmuel to the present day.[3]

The principle in question generally did not mean that Jews must remain loyal to their country of residence under any circumstances, regardless of how that state treated them. According to many commentators, this principle applies within strict limitations: the laws in such a state must be universal (applicable to both Jews and non-Jews), concern legitimate state interests, and apply only to Jewish property. The authority of a king can also be fundamentally challenged if viewed (as did my late teacher, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, of blessed memory) only under the condition of adhering to the procedure for appointing a king described in the Torah,[4] i.e., with the participation of the Great Sanhedrin. These norms do not apply to the appointment of foreign kings; therefore, under this concept, Jews are not obligated to submit to the will and laws of foreign monarchs. In other respects, according to the norms of traditional Jewish law, non-Jewish state authorities must recognize the autonomy of Jewish law regarding Jews.

Outside of Jewish communities, an extensive body of journalistic, religious-philosophical, legal, and academic literature is dedicated to the same topic, often containing pronounced antisemitic undertones; this has been and continues to be discussed publicly. Clearly, the conclusions drawn from these discussions by the nations surrounding Jews and their leaders were rarely limited to abstract debate and were repeatedly translated into practical steps and actions, which carried highly diverse consequences for Jewish communities.

The Soviet Legacy

The Jews of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet countries were no exception to this rule. Perhaps the most striking and tragic example of this phenomenon is the fate of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (JAC), established in late 1941 to early 1942 on the initiative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) as a propaganda organ. The JAC's task was to shape favorable public opinion toward the USSR in Allied countries and to organize fundraising campaigns within Western Jewish communities for the needs of the Red Army. The committee's success in achieving these goals and its emphasized loyalty to the Soviet authorities did not prevent the destruction of most JAC members during one of the first post-war antisemitic campaigns carried out by the NKVD under Stalin's orders.

According to researchers, the "trigger" for these campaigns was the wave of enthusiasm that swept Soviet Jewry following the creation of the State of Israel, while the immediate pretext was the mass demonstrations of solidarity sparked by the visits of Israel's first ambassador, Golda Meir, to the Moscow Choral Synagogue.[5] This fell upon soil already well-prepared by the regime's developing, repressive anti-Jewish policy, which, according to the findings of A.D. Epstein, "began long before G. Meir's visit to the synagogue."[6]

Suspicions and accusations of "dual loyalty" (or direct disloyalty to the Soviet Union) aimed at Soviet Jews, in light of "Zionist sentiments prevailing among some of them," served as the backdrop for daily and state antisemitism (professional bans, travel restrictions, discrimination in university admissions) nearly until the very end of the Soviet era. Such clichés remained a staple of official propaganda until the beginning of Perestroika, despite the realization by more rational Soviet leaders that such a policy was counterproductive. (A near-grotesque illustration of this situation was the activities of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public, headed by the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General D. Dragunsky).

The Current Situation in Russia

At first glance, the current situation in Russia differs radically from that of the past. Back in 2004, the then-president of the Russian Jewish Congress, E. Ya. Satanovsky, pointed out the contemporary Russian reality in which Jews in the upper echelons of power express their "pro-Israel component." In his view, "dual loyalty" is tolerated well in contemporary Russian society, and the structure of the modern Jewish community in Russia closely resembles that of the American one. From this, Satanovsky concludes, follows the attitude toward "dual loyalty," which in post-Soviet Russia also mirrors the situation in the US.

According to some Jewish leaders, such changes expand the legitimate space for local Jewish communities to support the State of Israel. Thus, the President of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR), Alexander Boroda, commenting on the forms of this activity in the Jewish communities of Russia and Ukraine, notes: "Of course, a demonstration (in support of Jerusalem) in Kyiv is wonderful, but one would think you primarily need change in Russian and Ukrainian policy toward Israel rather than rallies. This is more significant, and we are working precisely in this direction. It is no secret that the Russian leadership's attitude toward the Jewish state is ambiguous. On the one hand, there is sympathy for a country where over a million Russian-speakers live, which fights terrorism, etc. On the other hand, Israel, being a US ally, is perceived as a player from the other side [sic]. Therefore, we strive in every possible way to facilitate a rapprochement between Russia and Israel, and we have already managed to achieve a great deal along this path."[7]

In the quoted interview, the FEOR President, one of the most active leaders of the contemporary Russian Jewish community, does not conceal his sympathy for the State of Israel and believes it is entirely acceptable to influence Russian policy to promote rapprochement with Israel. Furthermore, the organization's leader highlights the need to influence state leaders and calls for a strategy of active engagement to shape reality.

A different view is held by another prominent member of the Russian Jewish community, Alexander Malis, head of the Euroset company, who defined the dilemma of dual citizenship when the interests of two countries conflict as follows:

"I cannot imagine such a situation," Malis stated in an interview. "One must understand well how a Jew is permitted to behave in Israel versus any other country. We must maintain a specific attitude toward the host country, as prescribed in the Talmud: 'complete and unconditional loyalty!' If I express my political opinion publicly in Israel, I will not do so in Russia. Because I do not have one! In Russia, I should not have a political opinion at all. It is not just that I should not voice it—I should not have it... Because in Russia, a Jew is obligated to be loyal to the existing government. If you don't like it, get on a plane and leave. Thank the Creator, this is possible. A Jew has no right to influence the domestic policy of any country other than Israel in any way."[8]

Prominent representatives of the Jewish community, discussing the relationship of Jewry to current political debates, touch upon the topic of "dual loyalty." Yuri Kanner, President of the Russian Jewish Congress (REC), notes: "I am often asked about the participation of Jews in Russian politics. Our people are everywhere, on all sides of the barricades. For instance, in United Russia, we have REC board members Iosif Kobzon and Vladimir Resin. There are also many Jewish names within the opposition. It has always been this way.

When rabbis express the opinion that Jews should not rock the boat and should be grateful to the authorities, the question is—who are they addressing? Yes, the government will hear them. But if they are addressing opposition figures, those are not Jewish community leaders. These individuals are deeply integrated into the Russian political system and consider themselves Russian. Russian issues interest them far more than Jewish ones. When Viktor Shenderovich speaks, he is, of course, a figure of Russian culture. I do not know if the head of the 'City Without Drugs' foundation, Evgeny Roizman, attends synagogue. But Vitya Shenderovich, a very witty man, used to attend Russian Jewish Congress events, but has now stopped, saying, 'I don't want to compromise you.'

They are Russian public figures. They are not at all concerned with how the next administration will treat synagogues and Jewish communities. For them, that is of minor importance. It was the same in the past. Those who led the revolution, like Trotsky or Kaganovich—did they think about the Jewish people?! Or another example: US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said, 'Even if Jews are sent to gas chambers in the USSR, it will not be an American problem'—though he later apologized for those words. I recently met with two Jewish US senators and saw that they are American politicians, and the 'Jewish question' only interests them in relation to their constituents. I want to emphasize that the Russian Jewish Congress distances itself from politics entirely. For example, we opened a monument to Red Army soldiers in Netanya."[9]

The President of the Russian Jewish Congress emphasizes that dual loyalty does not exist in the modern world, and all Jewish activism is carried out by individuals acting as public and political figures of their country of residence, driven by non-sectarian considerations.

Significant data was obtained through a large-scale survey of the Jewish population in four countries of the former USSR (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova), organized by the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress under the direction of Prof. Ze'ev Khanin, Chairman of the International Academic Advisory Board of the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies. Based on the material compiled at the time of writing, the following picture emerges: 61% of respondents in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where approximately half of Russia's Jews reside, declared feelings of solidarity with the State of Israel. An identical result (60%) was obtained in Odesa, a major Ukrainian city with a rich Jewish history and a highly developed Jewish community infrastructure, which makes its situation indicative of other Ukrainian cities where the vast majority of the country's Jews reside.

It is also revealing that nearly half (46%) of Jews living in major Russian cities and 53% of Odesa respondents stated that Jews today can, or even should, "be patriots of both their country and Israel." Furthermore, nearly a fifth of respondents in Moscow and St. Petersburg and 10% of those surveyed in Odesa were even willing to agree that "the interests of Israel must always come first for a Jew." Meanwhile, only 6.6% of respondents in Moscow and St. Petersburg and 28% in Odesa considered Israel to be "their country in the fullest sense," whereas 83.4% and 66% respectively identified the country where they lived at the time of the survey as such.

It appears that Jews in the former USSR today face almost no dilemma of "dual loyalty," which aligns with the conclusions of Ze'ev Khanin's previous work.[10] According to his analysis, with the abolition of state antisemitism (which in Soviet times included official "anti-Zionism") and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the USSR (and its successor states) and the State of Israel, the former dilemma of Soviet Jewry—solidarity with the Jewish state (which meant disloyalty to official state policy) versus declared anti-Zionism or non-Zionism—has lost its relevance. It seems to us that the choice between local national patriotism and pro-Israel sentiments, which was still relevant 15-20 years ago, has become equally obsolete today: there is virtually no conflict between these elements of identity for post-Soviet Jews. Post-Soviet Jews are patriots of their countries of permanent residence while simultaneously demonstrating solidarity with the Jewish state.

Conclusions

Despite the fierce struggle of the Soviet authorities against the Zionist movement and their actions against virtually all manifestations of national political and cultural activity, Soviet Jews demonstrated solidarity with the Jewish state en masse. This occurred both during periods of active diplomatic relations and when these relations were severed. Support for the State of Israel has become an important, shared component of Jewish identity for post-war Jewry living in the former Soviet Union. This reality is recognized and, on the whole, positively accepted by the authorities of most post-communist states.

However, we should not become overly complacent just yet. Judging by public opinion monitoring data from the Levada Analytical Center, the belief that Jews lack "Russian patriotism" and seek personal gain instead of serving their country's interests remains deeply rooted in the minds of some Russians. According to the center, the share of individuals holding such beliefs rose from just over 40% in 1997 to nearly 50% in 2015, largely due to respondents who previously held no opinion on the matter. Furthermore, the less educated and older the respondents were, the more likely they were to believe this.

A 2018 survey of Russian Jews' perceptions of antisemitism in the country, conducted by the Levada Center, revealed that in the 12 months preceding the survey, 40% of respondents had to hear with varying frequency that "the interests of Jews in Russia are very different from the interests of the rest of the population," and a fifth had heard that "Jews are unable to integrate into Russian society." Observers suggest that such opinions should cause particular concern against the backdrop of a lack of notable success in constructing a civic Russian nation and certain shifts in the ideological sentiments of many Russians. In recent years, ethnic (Russian) nationalism has practically disappeared from the political agenda and party struggles, and positive attitudes toward slogans like "Russia for (ethnic) Russians" reached record lows in 2017. However, a July 2018 poll indicated a rise in support for this idea, primarily due to those who believed it was "high time to implement it" (doubling from 10% in 2017 to 19% in 2018), alongside a decrease in respondents who found the topic irrelevant. [11]

Part of the same process is a phenomenon relatively new to the post-Soviet space, though rooted in the official antisemitic propaganda of the Soviet political leadership: denying the Jewish state the right to exist and self-defense, and justifying acts of terror directed against Jews and Israelis. According to Ze'ev Khanin, this is not so much about attempts to mask intrinsic Judeophobic attitudes with "rejection of Zionism, unrelated to Jewishness" (though that also occurs), as it is about the reverse process: using anti-Israel slogans to activate "dormant" antisemitic stereotypes that are currently less tolerated in the Russian public space.[12]

Thus, the issue under review provides insight into the understanding of the essence of democracy, as well as the boundaries and norms of freedoms accepted in modern democratic states. In modern democracies, a citizen's loyalty to two states simultaneously is entirely permissible, a concept supported and guaranteed by the option of dual citizenship, intergovernmental agreements, and active programs for the development of cultural, scientific, business, and other ties. The active discussion surrounding these issues today remains far from purely theoretical, requiring the attention of not only historians and researchers of communal life but also active community leaders.

[1] ADL Global 100 – Index of Antisemitism (updated 2015), http://global100.adl.org/public/ADL-Global-100-Executive-Summary2015.pdf

[2] Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Jewish Dual Loyalty: The Classic Anti-Semitic Stereotype”, BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,018, November 28, 2018

[3] This principle is cited in the Babylonian Talmud on behalf of the sage Shmuel in several places and contexts: tractate Gittin (Divorce) 10b, tractate Nedarim (Vows) 28a, tractate Bava Kamma (First Gate) 113a-b, tractate Bava Batra (Last Gate) 54b-55a.

[4] See Devarim – Deuteronomy 17:14-20: "When you enter the land the Lord your God is giving you and have taken possession of it and settled in it, and you say, 'Let us set a king over us like all the nations around us,' be sure to appoint over you a king the Lord your God chooses..."

[5] Yaacov Ro’i, The Struggle for Soviet Jewish Emigration, 1948–1967, p. 33 and I.B. Schechtman, "Soviet Russia, Zionism and Israel" // "The Book of Russian Jewry, 1917–1967" (New York: Union of Russian Jews, 1968), p. 343

[6] "Moscow Choral Synagogue. 100 Years. Scientific Readings," ed. A.E. Lokshin (Moscow: "Dom Evreyskoy Knigi", 2006), pp. 202–203

[7] "Alexander Boroda: Being a Jew in Russia is Prestigious...". Russky Bazar, No. 6 (929) http://russian-bazaar.com/ru/content/141394.htm

[8] Alexander Malis: "A Jew has no right to influence the domestic policy of any country other than Israel in any way" 19.02.2016 Interview on the Stmegi Foundation website

[9] See interview by Sh. Briman (2012) http://9tv.co.il/news/2012/02/02/119538.html

[10] Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin, “Between Eurasia and Europe: Jewish Community and Identities in Contemporary Russia and Ukraine,” in Julius H. Schoeps and Olaf Glukner (eds.) A Road to Nowhere?: Jewish Experiences in the Unifying Europe (Laden: Brill, 2011), pp. 63-89

[11] See: Pipiya K.D. "Toward understanding a xenophobic slogan 'Russia for Russians'", Bulletin of Public Opinion. No. 3–4 (July-December, 2017), pp. 159 – 171

[12] Vladimir (Ze'ev) Khanin, Antisemitism and Philosemitism in Russia and Ukraine: From Evolution to Revolution. Tel Aviv: Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies and the Goldstein-Goren Diaspora Research Center at Tel Aviv University. Series of Scientific and Analytical Reports, Issue No. 1 (March 2019). – p. 33