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Euro-Asian Jewish (EAJ) Policy Papers, No. 26 (Sept 16, 2019)
This is an automated translation and may contain inaccuracies. For citation purposes, please refer to the original Russian version.
On July 19, 2018, the Knesset passed the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. Since then, an ongoing debate has persisted in the country regarding its symbolic significance, practical consequences, and the legitimacy of the terminology used in this law. The most prominent issue in this debate has been the long-standing question of whether the Supreme Court possesses the authority to review the constitutionality of a Basic Law and invalidate it or its parts. The primary interpretation of the law's specific provisions must become the subject of a broad public dialogue involving both Israelis and the Diaspora.
The fact that Israel is the state of the Jewish people seems, at first glance, indisputable. It was precisely to address the "Jewish question"—to provide this people with a "secured haven" and to realize their inalienable right to national self-determination—that Israel received recognition from the United Nations in November 1947. These exact ideas were formulated as the declared mission statement of the new state at the moment of its declaration of independence in May 1948. However, over the next 70 years, the Jewish character of Israel was maintained on the level of general consensus, administrative practice, and specific, partial statutes (such as the Law of Return), rather than codified as a constitutional norm.
Political Context
On July 19, 2018, the Knesset finally enacted the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People. Since then, the country has witnessed a continuous discussion regarding the symbolic meaning and practical consequences of this legislative step, as well as the legitimacy of the wording employed in the statute.
In fact, the formal start of this discussion dates back to May 1, 2014, when the incumbent Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited Independence Hall in Tel Aviv—the building where David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. It was there that Netanyahu directed the cabinet to draft the "Nation-State Bill."
The draft presented at a government meeting on November 23, 2014, legally defined Israel as "the national home of the Jewish people with a democratic system of government," guaranteeing full individual and collective civil rights to members of all ethnic and religious groups, while reserving the right to national self-determination in this state exclusively for the Jewish people.
Following intense deliberation and debate, the bill secured the support of 15 out of 22 ministers. (Ministers from the ruling center-right Likud party, the secular-right Yisrael Beiteinu party, and the right-wing religious-Zionist Jewish Home bloc voted in favor, while ministers from two center-left parties, Yesh Atid and Hatnuah, voted against). The ministers who opposed the bill argued that it contradicted democratic norms, served the political interests of B. Netanyahu and his Likud party colleagues ahead of upcoming primary elections, and threatened to disrupt the delicate status quo by granting greater weight to Halachic norms at the expense of universal values. Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein also advised the ministers against voting for the proposed version of the law.
It is widely believed that the disagreements over this bill were, among other things, a key factor behind the government crisis, the dissolution of the Knesset, and the subsequent 2015 election campaign, which froze any further progress on the bill until a new coalition government was formed. The issue was revisited only in 2017, and, as noted, on July 19, 2018, the bill was passed by the Knesset, gaining the status of a Basic Law (i.e., constitutional)[1]. However, the public debate on the matter is far from over, and its latest iteration is unfolding within the current election campaign for the 22nd Knesset. An additional catalyst was the decision made on August 15 by the Minister of Education to make the study of this law mandatory in all Israeli schools and to include questions on the topic in matriculation exams.
The Substance and Meaning of the Law
The laws enacted by the Knesset in 1992—the "Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty" and the "Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation" (re-examined and re-approved in a new version in 1994)—focused almost exclusively on civil rights and, in particular, the relationship between state and religion. Notably, the final version of the "Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation" refers to the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel for the first time in Israeli legislative history, thereby granting it a new normative status: "Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free. These rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel."
Prior to the enactment of this law, the concept of "complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex" had never been codified in any act passed by the Israeli parliament.
Like these prior basic laws, the Nation-State Law is constitutional in nature and, consequently, cannot be amended or repealed except by another Basic Law. However, unlike the previous two, it introduces a significant legal and legislative precedent for the first time in the country’s history: a declaration of Israel's status as the nation-state of the Jewish people. This incorporates into its legislative corpus the international legal norm established by the UN resolution of 1948—the exclusive right of the Jewish people to national self-determination in this state.
To implement this declaration practically, the Law:
– Emphasizes the Jewish character of the state’s symbols: its name, flag, emblem, and anthem;
– Proclaims Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel;
– Designates Hebrew as the sole state language, while preserving the practical status currently enjoyed by the Arabic language;
– Obligates the state to ensure the safety of Jewish people and Israeli citizens "who are in distress or in captivity due to their Jewishness or their citizenship";
– Declares that Israel will be open to Jewish immigration (Aliyah) from all countries of the Diaspora;
– States that the state will work to preserve the affinity between Israel and the Jewish people in the Diaspora, as well as preserve the cultural, historic, and religious heritage of the Jewish people among the Diaspora;
– Declares Jewish settlement (the development of Jewish settlement) as a national value, committing the state to encourage, promote, and establish such settlements;
– Grants equal official status to the Hebrew calendar and the Gregorian calendar;
– Designates Shabbat and the Jewish holidays as official days of rest in Israel, while non-Jews maintain the right to observe their own days of rest.
The legislative codification of this interpretation of the national character of the State of Israel faced significant opposition. A petition against the Law was filed with the Supreme Court of Israel (which, acting as the High Court of Justice, is responsible for reviewing whether laws passed by the Government and the Knesset align with accepted constitutional principles).
It is worth noting that the very acceptance of this petition for review was met with mixed reactions, both from supporters of the law and some of its opponents. The most critical issue in this debate was the long-standing question of whether the High Court fundamentally has the authority to review the validity of a Basic Law and to declare such a law or parts of it unconstitutional. Opponents of judicial intervention argue that as long as there are no clear, universally accepted criteria across all branches of power for the court to evaluate or invalidate laws, the judiciary should not interfere with the decisions of the legislature.
Their opponents contend that no such issue exists, as the High Court only intervenes in matters regarding the balance between the Jewish and democratic components of the state's character when a specific issue remains unregulated by legislation, forcing judicial authorities to rule. Thus, the review of the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People is drawing close attention from scholars and practicing politicians alike, and the court’s decision is expected to address issues left unresolved by statutory law.
Arguments of Opponents and Supporters
Regardless, both sides have put forward arguments that define the framework of this debate. Critics of the Law highlight the absence in its final version of any reference to the Declaration of Independence, which proclaims "complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants and the development of the country for the benefit of all its people." Based on this omission, they argue that the law is discriminatory toward national minorities (particularly the Druze community) and non-Jewish immigrants from the former USSR under Jewish religious law (Halakha). To support this view, some commentators have argued that the authors of the Declaration, when referencing values based "on the precepts of the prophets of Israel," meant universal rather than strictly national interpretations of these principles[2].
In turn, supporters of the law point to the critical need to balance the democratic component of the state's character and the principle of "equality for all citizens"—already enshrined in the 1992 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty[3] and reinforced by various High Court rulings, thus requiring no repetition—with the state's Jewish character. Supporters also see no contradiction with the spirit and intentions of the authors of the Declaration of Independence, who adopted Israel’s emblem, flag, anthem, and Shabbat as a national day of rest without prior coordination with non-Jewish residents, who have never identified with these state symbols.
In other words, proponents of this approach view the term "Jewish state" from the Declaration of Independence and "nation-state of the Jewish people" from the new law as entirely identical principles, arguing that this was precisely how they were understood at the Zionist Congresses and in the Balfour Declaration. In this context, they also point to the international experience of national minorities living within nation-states, showing that Israel's case is by no means unique.
This is supported by the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, developed by the Council of Europe, adopted in 1994, and entering into force on February 1, 1998. The document outlines principles and objectives that signatory states must observe to protect individuals belonging to national minorities while respecting the territorial integrity and political independence of states[4]. It emphasizes that the principles formulated in the Framework Convention are to be implemented through national legislation and appropriate state policies, as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements.
In other words, the norms accepted by the international community do not require nation-states to abandon their national identity, but rather demand that they provide national minorities with reasonable opportunities to preserve and develop their collective identity through language study, access to religious services, and guaranteed cultural autonomy. It is evident that these very principles have been implemented in the State of Israel since its founding, and maintaining these practices in the future requires the state to sustain a wide range of democratic institutions and a robust civil society.
The Diaspora Factor
The question remains how the enactment of the law and the controversy surrounding it will affect relations between the Jewish state and Jewish communities in the Diaspora. In this regard, it is important to emphasize the intent of the law's sponsors to continue and strengthen the principle, already established in the "Law of Return," of Israel's openness to Aliyah from all countries, alongside the obligation to protect Israelis "who are in distress or in captivity due to their Jewishness or their citizenship." This reinforces the principle of the unity of the Jewish people and the critical link between the Jewish population in Israel and those living abroad.
Undoubtedly, the views of Diaspora Jewry must also be considered regarding an issue as vital to the entire Jewish world as the status of Israel. This applies first and foremost to Jews from Eurasian countries, from which approximately 1.1 million immigrants have arrived in Israel over the last 30 years, accounting for more than three-quarters of all Aliyah during that period. Some insight is provided by a comprehensive study of the Jewish population in the former Soviet Union, conducted under the direction of Ze'ev Khanin and commissioned by the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress in late 2018 and early 2019. According to the study, which surveyed over 2,000 respondents meeting the criteria of Israel's Law of Return across four post-Soviet European countries via personal interviews, one-third of Ukrainian Jews and about 40% of Jews in Belarus and Russia strongly support the Jewish character of Israel, seeing it as the state’s core purpose. This indicates agreement with the proponents of the Nation-State Law in its current version.
Another third of respondents appear receptive to the arguments of those who support the Law but request amendments that more explicitly safeguard the rights of national minorities. The option selected by these respondents states: "I support Israel remaining a Jewish state, but I understand those who demand a change in its status." Less than one-fifth of respondents in Russia and approximately one-tenth or fewer in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova declared that they favor a "state of all its citizens," arguing that the era of nation-states has passed or that they are indifferent to the issue. If living in Israel, this segment would likely align with those who opposed the enactment of the law entirely.
It must be noted, of course, that Jewish communities in the former Soviet Union (including active members of local Jewish organizations and institutions) largely consist of individuals of mixed heritage and family members of non-Jewish origin (spouses). Naturally, opinions on the national character of Israel differ between these individuals and those of homogeneous Jewish descent. For instance, in Ukraine, the proportion of those firmly opposing Israel's Jewish character among "quarter-Jews" (grandchildren of Jews) and those with no Jewish roots was 1.5 to 2 times higher than among individuals of homogeneous Jewish origin and "half-Jews" (children of Jews). A similar distribution was observed among those who found the question difficult to answer. However, no significant differences among these subgroups were found regarding the "compromise" option or opposition to Israel's Jewish character.
In conclusion, from a public perspective, the enactment of the Nation-State Law aligns with the goals and needs of the state, but the primary interpretation of its specific clauses must remain the subject of a broad public dialogue involving both Israelis and the Diaspora.
[1]http://knesset.gov.il/laws/ru/yesodru16.pdf
[2]The arguments against the Nation-State Law are comprehensively presented in an article by the publisher of Haaretz daily, Amos Schocken, "Chok Lo Chukati" ("An Unconstitutional Law"). See Haaretz, 29.3.19.
The views expressed by the experts do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies or the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress.

