Anxiety regarding a civilizational choice in favor of Pan-Turkism or Islamic values has ceased to be a significant factor in the foreign policy of Central Asian states. It has been replaced by pure pragmatism. The region's political elites are primarily interested in the structural transformation of their economies, securing investments—especially in technology—and developing human capital. Recognizing that Islamic countries have little to offer in these areas, they seek to distance themselves from the Middle East and its conflicts.

Discussions surrounding the geopolitical rivalry of Russia, China, and the West in Central Asia have become so commonplace that they have nearly obscured the reality that, historically and culturally, this region gravitates toward an entirely different part of the world—the Middle East. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the "Islamic revival" emerged as a central theme in the public life of Central Asia, forcing the leaders of newly independent states to formulate a new Muslim agenda.

During that period, Arab religious foundations began actively operating in the region, promoting the "unity of the Ummah" and seeking to extend their influence over local believers through a network of madrasas and Quranic instruction modeled after Arab theologians. Another influential concept was Pan-Turkism, championed by Turkey, which stood ready to unite the Turkic population of Central Asia under its leadership. However, no profound integration between Central Asia and the Middle East ever materialized—with one notable exception. Paradoxically, Israel emerged as Central Asia's most attractive partner in the Middle East, transforming the region into the most pro-Israel segment of the Islamic world.

Illiquid Solidarity

Central Asian countries quickly grew disillusioned with the prospects of cooperation with the Muslim Middle East. Having only recently liberated themselves from the influence of one "elder brother" in the form of the USSR, the young states had no desire to fall into dependence on another—this time in the form of Islamic fundamentalists from Arab countries. Central Asian regimes strove to swiftly persuade their foreign partners to abandon their patronizing tone, demanding instead a dialogue between equals.

It soon became apparent that, from the perspective of state development, the Middle East had very little to offer Central Asia. While the states of both regions share many common features, this constitutes a commonality of problems rather than a commonality of interests.

Both the Middle East and Central Asia experience an uncontrolled and conflict-prone influx of populations from impoverished rural areas into major cities. Furthermore, both regions face a constant threat of food insecurity due to the inefficient use of transboundary rivers and the depletion of water resources, yet neither side has been able to devise an effective solution to these issues.

Another significant similarity between the Middle East and Central Asia is the pivotal role played by the military and security services in ensuring regime stability. In both regions, prominent politicians and ruling elites are largely drawn from the intelligence and security apparatus, and it is they who establish the rules of engagement in domestic political and economic life. However, despite these structural similarities, such regimes are typically uninterested in fostering ties with their neighbors and view any external contacts with deep suspicion.

Finally, the Arab nations themselves proved unprepared to project soft power in Central Asia. This is most clearly demonstrated by the weak presence of Arab (and Persian) media in the region. The Central Asian audience of the Qatari television network Al-Jazeera, an influential proponent of the pro-Islamic perspective, is virtually negligible; the channel does not broadcast in Russian or any local languages. Those Central Asian residents who read news in English do not necessarily turn to it for information.

Consequently, by the mid-2000s, Central Asia's approach to the Middle Eastern agenda had shifted dramatically. Uzbekistan grew disillusioned with both Pan-Turkism and reliance on the religious component in international relations. Tashkent began aggressively curtailing the activities of Arab religious foundations and closing madrasas. Eventually, Uzbekistan ceased sending local clerics to study at Middle Eastern religious institutions, effectively returning to the Soviet practice of training imams domestically.

Kazakhstan, buoyed by rising energy prices and the general strengthening of its national economy, has long had no need for mentors and pursues an active foreign policy of its own. In Tajikistan, a protracted civil war alienated both the authorities and a significant portion of society from Islamic ideology. In Turkmenistan, the absolute personality cult of Niyazov left no room for independent religious life. The political leadership of Central Asian states realized that rhetoric concerning solidarity with the Ummah was illiquid and devoid of substance beyond emotion, and that the countries of the Arab Middle East were unprepared to back that emotional sentiment with tangible cooperation.

The "Arab Spring" and Its Aftermath

One of the primary distinctions between the two regions lies in the fact that while the secular state system integrated with Ba'athist-style Arab nationalism collapsed almost everywhere in the Middle East, secular nationalism is currently on the rise in Central Asia. This divergence became particularly pronounced after the "Arab Spring" of 2011. The fall of secular regimes in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, the outbreak of civil war in Syria, and the rise of radical Islamists in the Middle East served as a stark negative example for Central Asian states, demonstrating that political instability inflicts immense suffering on ordinary citizens. A consensus emerged that such a scenario must be avoided at all costs.

Since then, security services and state-aligned propagandists, when addressing domestic issues, have consistently cited the Middle East as a cautionary tale. They present it as clear evidence that high expectations for improved living standards and democratic reforms are counterproductive, arguing that ordinary citizens should endure existing hardships, whereas excessive demands and protests lead to social chaos. The popularity of Russian media in Central Asia, which consistently promotes these identical themes, only reinforces this perception among the urban population of Central Asian countries.

Moreover, the secular nationalist agenda is gradually displacing the religious one. The Arab Middle East is increasingly viewed in Central Asia as a source of radical Islamism that must be contained. Leaders of Central Asian countries publicly criticize strict Muslim practices, such as the mandatory wearing of the hijab and niqab by women, arguing that these customs do not align with local national traditions. For instance, during a meeting with intellectuals, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated: "I have always been opposed to headscarves and burqas. Our women have never worn them or hidden their faces. In schools and universities, young people are beginning to wear hijabs and burqas. I have always opposed this. We respect all representatives of Islam, but we have our own path"[1].

Similar sentiments were expressed by former Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev. Under the pretext of preserving national culture and language, he went as far as to allocate state funds for a promotional campaign advocating traditional national attire and headscarves as alternatives to Islamic garments. "Let us not confuse Arab, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and other cultures with Kyrgyz culture. We have our own clothing and language. Why use the Arabic word 'halal' instead of the Kyrgyz 'adal' (pure, permitted by Sharia)? I have read the Quran repeatedly; there is no need to impose a foreign culture and language upon us"[2].

We Have No Antisemitism

Central Asian leaders are well aware that their authoritarian regimes do not enjoy particular favor in Western nations. At the same time, they depend on Western investments, grants, and financial institutions, while their own children and those of their immediate circles acquire real estate and hold assets in the West. This reality compels the region's political elites to offer the Western world a constructive agenda to mitigate criticism. One of the few genuinely positive aspects of life in Central Asian countries is their tolerance toward national and religious minorities. Central Asian leaders actively leverage this theme to project a favorable image on the international stage. Every nation in the region regularly emphasizes that inter-ethnic harmony and religious tolerance prevail within its borders. A particular emphasis is invariably placed on the absence of antisemitic sentiment and the prosperity of their small Jewish communities, which is a rarity among Muslim-majority nations.

The Jews of Central Asia

The contemporary Jewish population of the region consists of Bukharan Jews (predominantly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) and Ashkenazi Jews. Historically, Bukharan Jews were one of the indigenous peoples of Central Asia, although until the late 19th century, local khans and emirs subjected them to severe repressive policies; during the Soviet and post-Soviet eras, the attitude toward them has remained tolerant, if not friendly. Bukharan Jews have contributed significantly to the cultural and economic life of the region, and even today, following the migration of the majority to the United States and Israel, they continue to promote the cultural heritage of Tajiks and Uzbeks. Bukharan Jews actively advocate for the development of cultural and economic relations with Central Asian countries.

Ashkenazi Jews began settling in Central Asia following the Russian Empire's conquest of the region. Statistics from the 1860s to the 1910s indicate that just over 5,000 Russian Jews resided in Turkestan (approximately 2% of the total European population of the territory). Of these, about 2,500 lived in the Samarkand region, approximately 1,500 in the Fergana region, and 350–400 in Tashkent. Following the 1863 uprising in Poland, many Polish and Galician Jews arrived in the region. During World War II, the number of Ashkenazi Jews increased due to evacuees from the western territories of the USSR. Members of this community made immense contributions to the development of the region's theater, education, industry, and cinematography.

While the European parts of the USSR actively implemented discriminatory policies against Jews during the Soviet era, the Central Asian republics pursued a more lenient approach. As noted by Nazar Suyunov, former First Deputy Prime Minister of Turkmenistan, in an interview with Arkady Dubnov, during the late Soviet period, Niyazov (the first President of Turkmenistan) sought to prevent Jews from leaving the country.

"If they left—and they represented the elite segment of our professional cadres—where would we find replacements? The head of the State Construction Committee was Jewish, the director of the design institute was Jewish, the deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee was Jewish, the minister of trade was Jewish, the deputy minister of consumer services was Jewish... In other words, everyone who managed concrete economic affairs. Unlike in other republics of the Union, Jews in our country were not afraid to state their nationality as Jewish in their passports; most there sought to write 'Russian' or 'Ukrainian' in the fifth column, but not 'Jewish.' Representatives from Israel even visited me after the collapse of the Union, asking me to suggest to Karimov in Uzbekistan that he ensure better treatment for Bukharan Jews there..."[3].

The late President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, and the former President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, repeatedly emphasized during their visits to Israel that antisemitism had never existed in their countries. The authorities of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have assumed responsibility for the maintenance of Bukharan Jewish cemeteries, restored historic synagogue buildings confiscated during the Soviet era to Jewish congregations, and actively cultivate ties with Israeli entrepreneurs and American business figures of Jewish descent. Even without state protection, there have been no recorded incidents of vandalism at Jewish cemeteries or synagogues in the region. While there were once approximately 13 synagogues in the old city of Bukhara, only two remain active today.

A mass emigration of Bukharan Jews began in the 1970s, peaking in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Bukhara alone, the Jewish community once numbered 35,500 people; today, that figure barely reaches 420. Data from 2013 indicates that the Jewish population in modern Uzbekistan is estimated at approximately 9,000 people, with no more than 3,000 of them being Bukharan Jews. The U.S. Embassy in Uzbekistan notes that the country's Jewish community consists of approximately 6,000 Ashkenazi Jews and fewer than 2,000 Bukharan Jews, residing primarily in Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and the Fergana Valley[4]. The largest community (around 5,000 people) is located in the capital, Tashkent. As Anastasia Ilyina observes, the majority of Jews in Tashkent are Ashkenazi, whereas Bukharan Jews predominate in Bukhara, and the community in Samarkand is divided roughly equally[5].

While approximately 15,000 Jews lived in Tajikistan according to the 1989 census, only about 200 remain today. The primary catalyst for the departure of Bukharan Jews from the country was the civil war of 1992–1997. Two of the three active synagogues were closed in the years following the collapse of the USSR due to the emigration of congregants. Following the departure of the rabbi from the country in 2013, the sole remaining synagogue in the old part of Dushanbe faced a situation where congregants were unable to read sacred scriptures in Hebrew, resulting in the suspension of traditional Sabbath services for nearly a year.

Aligning with Israel

Central Asian countries possess limited lobbying capabilities in places like the United States, and therefore seek to build strong relationships with the Bukharan-Jewish diaspora. Their efforts are facilitated by the fact that the Central Asian Jewish community departed the region due to socio-economic factors rather than state-sponsored antisemitic policies. Discrimination against Bukharan Jews was largely driven not by local authorities, but by the central Soviet government, which restricted their freedom to travel abroad and imposed university admission quotas based on the "fifth column" in passports.

For Israel, friendly relations with Central Asian states also play an important role. Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, sought to strengthen ties with non-Arab Muslim nations to prevent the formation of a unified anti-Israel alliance. Adhering to this strategy, Israel successfully cooperated with Turkey, Iran (prior to 1979), and India (which has a substantial Muslim population). This allowed Israeli policymakers to argue that their actions regarding the Palestinians were directed against radical elements rather than Islam itself. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of Central Asia, along with Azerbaijan—with which Tel Aviv established close military-technical cooperation—entered Israel's sphere of a "friendly periphery." Associates of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasize that these nations are strategic allies[6].

Today, Israel enjoys broad support among secular and nationalist forces in Central Asian countries. They view it as an exemplar of a highly developed state that, despite a hostile environment and challenging climatic conditions, succeeded in building an efficient economy and achieving impressive technological advancement. Whenever food or water resource challenges intensify in the Central Asian region, reference is invariably made to the Israeli experience.

Recognizing this, the Jewish state seeks to showcase its achievements through agricultural development programs and by providing Central Asian residents with free specialized medical surgeries under the Tikkun Olam initiative. In return, the countries of the region strive to maintain good relations with Israel, often to the detriment of their ties with the Arab world. They rarely issue even routine statements of solidarity with the Palestinians, and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan established their embassies in Tel Aviv regardless of criticism from other Middle Eastern nations. Even in the conflict between Turkey and Israel, the sympathies of many in Central Asia lean toward Tel Aviv. President Erdogan is criticized for primarily supporting Arab interests rather than ethnically close Turkic populations whose rights are violated in Crimea, Iran, and China.

In general, anxieties regarding a civilizational choice in favor of Pan-Turkism or Islamic values have ceased to be a significant factor in Central Asian policy toward the Middle East. It has been replaced by pure pragmatism. The region's political elites are primarily interested in the structural reorganization of their economies, securing foreign investment—particularly in technology—and developing human capital. Understanding that Arab nations can offer little assistance in these areas, they seek to distance themselves from the Middle East and its conflicts.

The concepts of Pan-Turkism and Islamic revival are gradually being supplanted by state nationalism, and Central Asia's political elites prefer to align themselves not with a global Ummah, but with regional cooperation and investment from economically and technologically advanced nations.

[1] Cited in: "Nazarbayev spoke out against the hijab and burqa," March 11, 2011, Tengrinews.kz: https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nazarbaev-vyiskazalsya-protiv-hidjaba-i-parandji-180922/
[2] Cited in: "Atambayev: Our women never wore sacks on their heads. They were queens," July 21, 2017, Kaktus.media: https://kaktus.media/doc/360656_atambaev:_nashi_jenshiny_nikogda_ne_nosili_meshki_na_golove._oni_byli_caricami.html
[3] Cited in: "'I announced to the people that we could be a second Kuwait'—former Deputy Prime Minister of Turkmenistan Nazar Suyunov on the clan war and relations with Gazprom," November 6, 2016, Republic (Moscow): https://republic.ru/posts/75707
[4] https://uz.usembassy.gov/ru/2017-report-on-international-religious-freedom-ru/
[5] Anastasia Ilyina: "Jewish Communities and Synagogues: Tashkent — Bishkek," November 30, 2013, mytashkent.uz: https://mytashkent.uz/2013/11/30/evrejskie-obshhiny-i-sinagogi-tashkent-bishkek/
[6] Cited in: "Spokesperson for Benjamin Netanyahu: 'I will share a secret, my father was born in Baku,'" April 16, 2018, vzglyad.az: http://vzglyad.az/news/107409