Photo: Hillel Case

Until recently, virtual projects remained, in most cases, an important but ultimately auxiliary—or, more precisely, accompanying—element of in-person meetings, conferences, religious gatherings, educational projects, and other events of the Euro-Asian Jewish communities. Today, however, it is reasonable to assume that the sharp reduction in direct physical interaction dictated by the global pandemic will act—and, in fact, is already acting—as a trigger to elevate this virtualization process to a qualitatively new level. Studies indicate that several key communal structures effectively function as network communities, which aligns closely with the strengthening "transnational" model of identity among post-Soviet Jewry. Finally, "virtual communal reality" could offer a solution for categories such as "middle age – middle class" who, due to busy schedules, are otherwise excluded from in-person communal activities.

The noticeable virtualization of public space over the past decade and a half has affected Jewish organizations alongside other third-sector structures (NGOs), including the communal networks and institutions of the Euro-Asian region and the Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora. Until recently, virtual projects in most cases remained an important, yet auxiliary—or, more precisely, accompanying—element of in-person meetings, conferences, religious gatherings, educational projects, and other communal events.

Today, however, there is every reason to believe that the current situation imposed by the global pandemic, which has demanded a sharp reduction in direct physical interaction, will act—and is indeed already acting—as a trigger for transitioning this virtualization process to a qualitatively new level. It is to be expected that Euro-Asian Jewish communities and their umbrella organizations, primarily the EAJC, will be able to secure the necessary financial and organizational resources for this. But are there sociological grounds for such a decisive step?

The Network Community

According to estimates by the leading Israeli demographer Prof. Sergio DellaPergola, the face of Jewish communities in post-Soviet Eurasia continues to be defined by negative demographic factors, emigration, and assimilation. Nevertheless, the size of the "extended Jewish population" in this region, excluding the Baltic states, still stands at 880,000–900,000 people, representing a potential base both for Jewish emigration and Jewish communal activity. [i]

Table 1. The Jewish Population of Post-Soviet Eurasia

In our view, the social infrastructure of both the "ethnic core" and a significant portion of the "cloud" of this population can already be regarded as a kind of "network" community. We present several arguments in support of this hypothesis.

1. The phenomenon of what we may call "stable extraterritorial interaction." According to the authoritative opinion of Dr. Mark Tolts, the vast majority (at least 80%) of post-Soviet Jews and their family members are concentrated in capitals and other major industrial and cultural centers.[ii] They are, we should add, simultaneously scattered across various neighborhoods, micro-districts, and satellite towns of these agglomerations. However, this generally does not prevent local Jews from maintaining close ties at a personal level.

This conclusion is also supported by data from a large-scale study of the Jewish population in the former Soviet Union conducted under the author's supervision by the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies (IEAJC) at the initiative of the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress in late 2018 and early 2019. The study demonstrated that the stronger a respondent's Jewish identity, the higher the proportion of representatives of the same ethnic group in their circle of friends. Consequently, 16% of our respondents reported that Jews make up the majority of their close friends; about half stated that Jews and non-Jews are roughly equally represented in their immediate circle; and a third indicated that their circle consists primarily of non-Jews or found it difficult to define the ethnicity of their friends. Notably, the phenomenon of closer interaction with members of one's own ethno-communal group was more pronounced in megacities and major urban centers.

1. The presence of closely related or identical phenomena in other Russian-speaking Jewish communities, which demonstrates the stable, long-term nature of the socio-behavioral patterns of post-Soviet Jewry. For instance, nearly 60% of immigrants from the former Soviet Union who settled in Israel's capital, Jerusalem, and were surveyed in our large-scale, relatively recent study of Israel's Russian-speaking community (conducted under the author's direction), noted that according to their subjective estimation, Russian-speaking Israelis make up significantly less than half or an absolute minority of the residents in their micro-district. (The average for the sample was nearly twice as low). Nevertheless, two-thirds of "Russian Jerusalemites" (compared to approximately half nationwide) socialize closely primarily with members of their own community.

Thus, the observed socio-behavioral patterns of post-Soviet Jewry clearly exhibit a stable, long-term character, representing one of the defining features of the "transnational" Russian-speaking Jewish community.

1. The phenomenon of the "transnational" Russian-speaking Jewish community. Our research, along with other studies, reveals two concurrent processes within the Jewish environment of the former Soviet Union: on the one hand, the dilution of the post-Soviet Jewish collective that existed at the turn of the millennium, alongside the strengthening of a localized Jewish identity (Moldovan-Jewish, Russian-Jewish, Ukrainian-Jewish, etc.) that takes precedence over a universal one. On the other hand, there is a noticeable identification of post-Soviet Jewry with a supranational community of immigrants from the former Soviet Union centered in the State of Israel.

According to our 2019 study, nearly 60% of Jews and their family members in post-Soviet Eurasia believe in the existence of this phenomenon in the long or medium term; no significant differences were observed across age groups or between individuals of homogenous, mixed, or non-Jewish origin. Its practical manifestation can be seen in the maintenance of intensive, and—crucially—mostly virtual contact with the numerous friends and relatives of respondents living outside their country of residence.

Thus, only 14% of our respondents stated that they have no close friends or relatives (Jews and their family members) outside their country of residence. More than a quarter of those surveyed have such connections in one country, nearly 40% in two to three countries, and one-fifth in four or more countries. Regular or occasional in-person meetings with them are maintained by 12% and less than one-fifth of respondents, respectively, while half of the total number of respondents (nearly 60% of those who have friends and relatives abroad) reported that they "meet with them infrequently, but maintain constant contact by phone, mail, email, and through social networks."

1. Aligning the infrastructure of the organized Jewish movement in the post-Soviet space with the parameters of a "network" community. The primary model for Jewish communal organizations today is a collection of "service-providing" institutions offering specific (social, educational, cultural, religious, legal, advocacy, etc.) services to the Jewish population, as well as the system of vertical and horizontal connections arising from this interaction. The vast majority of municipal Jewish communities and territorial Jewish national-cultural autonomies operate on these principles, with their projects and events serving as a platform for occasional interaction among the local Jewish population in the broadest sense. Furthermore, the center of gravity and coordination for these networks has perceptibly shifted in recent years toward regional and supra-regional ("continental") umbrella organizations. [iii]

Thus, a step forward toward the "virtualization" of communal educational, organizational, informational, memorial, and other projects has a clear socio-cultural foundation and will certainly not be perceived as an incomprehensible novelty. But the main question remains:

Is it worth the potential effort?

A large-scale study of the Jewish population in the former Soviet Union, conducted by the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies (IEAJC) at the initiative of the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress in late 2018 and early 2019, demonstrated a sustained interest in Jewish activity among a significant number of individuals of Jewish, mixed, and non-Jewish descent. While participation in Jewish communal activity is proportional to the homogeneity of the respondent's ethnic origin, individuals of mixed descent, according to our data, remain an important resource for such engagement. In other words, communal projects not only appeal to individuals with an established Jewish identity but also act as catalysts for shaping such identity in those who previously lacked it or possessed an unstable sense of Jewish belonging, effectively outlining the boundaries of the Jewish collective.

The significance of this factor is underscored by numerous academic publications indicating that in Russian-speaking Jewish communities outside Israel, the family, while remaining an important factor in fostering Jewish consciousness, increasingly fails to function as a channel for transmitting Jewish ethno-cultural practices, yielding in importance to Jewish education systems and communal activism. Indeed, between a quarter and nearly a third of respondents in our study of the Jewish population in the former Soviet countries—Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—noted that their "Jewish feeling" emerged during events organized by local and foreign Jewish organizations, as well as through interest in Jewish history, tradition, and culture (both parameters ranked second and third in the hierarchy of Jewish identity factors, following "family tradition and atmosphere").

The study also revealed that young people and retirees exhibit higher levels of engagement compared to other socio-demographic and age cohorts, while the "middle age – middle class" category devotes less time to such events for obvious reasons. However, within this very cohort, there is a high proportion of those who are willing to "consider it if invited." Consequently, it is entirely possible that a "virtual communal reality" could offer an appropriate venue for realizing these intentions.

It is indicative that within the younger segment of this cohort (ages 26–40), the proportion of those who attributed their "Jewish feeling" specifically to participation in events organized by local and foreign Jewish organizations was equal to the share of young people aged 16–25 who selected the same option. In other words, representatives of this highly desired age category are often former young "interested participants" and activists who, due to life circumstances, are unable to dedicate sufficient time to communal activities. Therefore, a "virtual communal reality" may well offer a solution to this issue and a viable means of fulfilling these intentions.

[i] Sergio DellaPergola. “World Jewish Population, 2018”, in Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin (Editors) The American Jewish Year Book, 2018, Volume 118 (2018) (Dordrecht: Springer), pp. 361-452.

[ii] Mark Tolts, “A Half Century of Jewish Emigration from the Former Soviet Union”, in Denisenko et al. (eds.), Migration from the Newly Independent States (Basel: Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2020), pp. 321-342.

[iii] See Zeev Khanin, "In Search of Community: Models of the Revival of Organized Jewish Life in the Late USSR and Post-Soviet Countries." Diasporas (Moscow), 2011, No. 2, pp. 64-79.