The scale and dynamics of Aliyah from the diaspora to Israel are the result of many, and perhaps primarily, “push factors.” The so-called “Putin” wave of Aliyah from the former Soviet Union during the second half of this decade is no exception, much like the new, let us call it, “Corona” wave of Aliyah currently beginning.  New wave repatriates are likely to share more common ground with those who arrived in the 1990s than with those who opted not to repatriate in the 2010s. Criteria for selecting real estate, attitudes toward work, approaches to children's education, and investment strategies are set to shift.

Since its establishment, Israel has been perceived by the diaspora as a sanctuary state. When survival—physical or economic—becomes paramount, the number of repatriates increases. As long as conditions in the country of origin remain stable, interest in returning to the historic homeland remains low. This rule is clearly demonstrated by observing the waves of Jewish repatriation to Israel from the post-Soviet space.

The 1990s: The Exodus

In the early 1990s, the process of departing the USSR for Israel was significantly simplified. The country of origin—in the form it had existed for 70 years—was collapsing. Yet, among those eligible for repatriation, few seriously entertained the possibility that the ideological and political structure known as the “Soviet Union” would cease to exist within three years. Consequently, a vast number of people rushed to seize the opportunity to secure an acceptable standard of living for themselves and their children, even at the cost of their citizenship and assets in their home country. Repatriation took place in an information vacuum, lacking widespread experience of foreign travel. Nonetheless, according to the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, over 820,000 individuals exercised their right to return over a 10-year period. Our family was among them.

The 2000s: From Israel to Russia

During the first decade of the new century, a significant decline in Aliyah occurred, particularly following the onset of a new wave of Arab terror between 2001 and 2004. According to the same data, just over 160,000 people arrived from the former USSR during that decade. Concurrently, a reverse process emerged: in the early 2000s, many “new Israelis” (estimated between 45,000 and 70,000) returned to Russia, where they became highly sought-after expatriates. They possessed Western education, strong English language skills, and a completely non-Soviet culture of communication. However, Russian remained their native tongue rather than Hebrew. The opportunity to build a career in their native language made offers in Moscow highly attractive to young, ambitious repatriates who had not yet fully integrated into Israeli reality.

To counter this “brain drain,” I proposed a comprehensive set of measures to the then (and current) Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu aimed at bringing young specialists back to Israel. He did not, however, believe such a program could succeed. Time proved that my assessment was correct. Less than ten years later, the flow reversed. This was further driven by the political and economic context: businesses in Russia were increasingly shifting away from progressive Western practices, and career advancement became heavily dependent on political loyalty. Israel, conversely, demonstrated consistent growth in high-tech and knowledge-intensive sectors, with companies emerging that were entirely focused on Western markets. This orientation was particularly evident in the adoption of Western corporate models and the transition of internal operations to English. Consequently, those who had maintained their professional standards over the decade returned to Israel and secured prominent roles in the new digital economy.

The 2010s: Geopolitics

While trends in the 2000s and early 2010s were shaped by political economy, geopolitics began to dictate terms from 2013 onward. Prior to the well-known events which, on one hand, had no direct relation to Israel, but on the other, heavily influenced repatriation, the waiting period for an interview at the Israeli Consulate in Moscow was two to three weeks. By the summer of 2014, the wait time had extended to five months. We coined the term “Putin's Aliyah” to describe the 2014 wave. We now stand on the threshold of a new wave of Aliyah; though yet unnamed, it may well be termed the “Corona Aliyah,” as its emergence is driven by the responses of various states, including those in the post-Soviet space, to the challenges of the coronavirus pandemic.

Repatriates of the 2010s and 2020s: Key Differences

“Putin's” Aliyah

As previously noted, my family relocated (meaning we permanently shifted the center of our lives) from the USSR to Israel in 1990. Following this, we did not visit the post-Soviet space for many years. This was primarily due to fewer available flights and significantly higher travel costs. For us, it was effectively a “one-way ticket.” Those who obtained citizenship between 2014 and 2019 viewed Israel differently. While Israel was our primary place of residence, for the new repatriates of “Putin's Aliyah,” relocation was not a single event, but a process. Experience showed that some moved gradually, methodically transferring assets, while others did not relocate at all, limiting their actions to obtaining a Darkon (Israeli passport), purchasing real estate, or occasionally investing in high-tech. It is also necessary to mention those who, under the pressure of circumstances, were forced to move to Israel for permanent residency much sooner than initially planned.

“Putin's Aliyah” utilized Israeli banks primarily as a “contingency plan.” Many repatriates of this wave also had a specific approach to real estate: they sought seaside “holiday homes” for personal use, rather than for investment. The primary purchasing criterion was proximity to the beach. These residential properties were typically used by their owners for only a few weeks (or occasionally months) a year. For the remainder of the year, these properties hosted friends and relatives vacationing in Israel, or were occasionally rented out. Consequently, infrastructure, proximity to schools, and distance from commercial or entertainment centers were of little interest to buyers from “Putin's Aliyah.”

Regarding investments, few could afford them; however, those who did choose to invest in the Israeli economy played at a high level. One of the primary sectors of interest for these new repatriates was the high-tech industry. This investment sector demands significant commitment from newcomers, both in terms of initial capital and specialized knowledge. The cost of error in this market is exceptionally high. Having worked in this field for many years, we can confirm that investing in Israeli startups was the exception rather than the rule. Reports of Roman Abramovich investing tens of millions of dollars, including in Israeli high-tech, are accurate. However, investors of this caliber are exceedingly rare. Mention should also be made of Igor Ryabenky, who attracted and continues to attract investments into Israeli high-tech via AltaClub, which is also true, but such investors are likely even fewer in number than billionaires prepared to make high-risk investments.

The second investment avenue for “Putin's Aliyah” was real estate. However, this did not involve “holiday homes.” The selection of properties in this case had no relation to the personal tastes of the investors. The logic of this market aligns with that of the stock market: if you invest in stocks, you do not need to like them; they simply must be in demand and yield a return. Similarly, when purchasing real estate as an investment rather than a holiday home, personal preference is irrelevant; one must approach this objectively, focusing on two factors: rental yield and capital appreciation.

The next issue is employment. By no means did all representatives of “Putin's Aliyah” work in Israel. This group of repatriates included many high-level professionals, both entrepreneurs and corporate employees. However, their skills and networks were primarily in demand in their countries of origin. They were accustomed to a specific standard of living. Post-2014, their incomes in USD decreased significantly, while in RUB they rose slightly. It remained easier for them to maintain their standard of living within the ruble zone. In other words, living in Russia remained more financially advantageous for these individuals, although, unfortunately, it came with risks. To illustrate: in one of the cases we managed, it was necessary to compare average life expectancy in Russia and Israel, revealing a delta of nearly 20 years for men (55 and 76 years, respectively). Repatriates from “Putin's Aliyah” understood that in Israel, without the language, local education, and knowledge of local realities, the chances of finding high-level employment were very low. This is an optimistic assessment. Consequently, they were in no rush to resign from their positions in Russia. Currently in Israel, even locals face challenges finding employment, with unemployment reaching record figures.

Another aspect is the approach to education. The vast majority of our clients who relocated to Israel or sent their children here to study selected private American schools, where tuition costs approximately $35,000 per year, excluding additional expenses that often exceed this amount. Thus, representatives of “Putin's Aliyah” and their children had far less contact with the domestic Israeli education system than their predecessors.

The Corona Aliyah

Different nations have responded in various ways to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. At one end of the spectrum are countries that chose to ignore the situation, while at the other are those that swiftly implemented decisive measures. Israel aligned more with the latter group. Consequently, the mortality rate in Israel remained relatively low. Although the actions of Israeli regulatory bodies were not entirely consistent, Israel maintains its reputation as a leader in technological solutions in this area. Nonetheless, for those within the country, recovering from the crisis will be a complex process. The damage to the Israeli economy is estimated to exceed one hundred billion shekels and continues to grow. Similar to Russia, Israel is not rushing to inject capital into the economy. The state's approach prioritizes supporting the most vulnerable segments of the population, meaning successful pre-pandemic businesses should not expect substantial state aid. The state operates on the assumption that individuals with entrepreneurial talent and resources will navigate these difficult conditions independently. This approach serves to preserve public funds.

Russia's response to the coronavirus has been distinctive. The imposed restrictions were relatively short-lived. Today, businesses that survived the period of “voluntary self-isolation” are gradually recovering. However, for many, the state's opaque approach to resolving citizens' issues during the crisis became a decisive factor in their decision to repatriate to Israel. According to research conducted by the Israeli Ministry of Aliyah and Integration and the Jewish Agency for Israel (Sohnut), an increase in interest in Israeli citizenship was already anticipated this year. The situation, however, is not limited to the pandemic; the political climate in the post-Soviet space remains highly unstable.

Timeline: While many of our clients during “Putin's Aliyah” considered relocation as a long-term prospect, repatriates of the “Corona Aliyah” are planning their moves today, intending to execute them as soon as technical opportunities arise and the situation in Israel stabilizes.
Banking: Repatriates of the “Corona Aliyah” are preparing to establish long-term relationships with Israeli banks, which will likely serve as the primary operators of their financial flows. The rules governing these relationships are straightforward: funds can only be transferred to Israel from the country of your tax residency. It is also preferable to initiate transfers from the city of your tax residency. For example, if you are a resident of Moscow, it will be difficult to explain to an Israeli bank why your funds are held in a bank in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. It is advisable that the sending bank rank within the national top 10. The lower a bank's national rating, the more inquiries you are likely to face in Israel.

From the perspective of Israeli financial compliance, an individual would not risk their savings by placing them in banks with questionable reputations without specific reasons. Naturally, institutions will seek to understand why you preferred a lower-tier bank over a top-ten institution. Only after these requirements are satisfied will banks begin to inquire regarding the source of funds and tax compliance. If the responses are deemed unsatisfactory by compliance officers, the transfer of funds will be blocked. For further details on navigating the Israeli banking system, please refer to our article: “The Specifics of Middle Eastern Banking.”
Real Estate: Repatriates of the “Corona Aliyah” will adopt a fundamentally different approach to selecting real estate. They will focus on purchasing apartments suitable for immediate residency and raising children. We have developed a framework we refer to as the “Gerwitz Triangle”: purchasing property in Israel requires balancing three parameters. First is the proximity to Israel's “golden mile”—the front line of the Tel Aviv promenade. Second is the quality of the property, including its size, construction standards, and whether the building is new or established. Third, naturally, is the budget. Once proximity to the sea ceases to be the overriding criterion, the search parameters within a given budget expand significantly.

Investment: Investments from “Corona Aliyah” repatriates will generally not scale to tens of millions of dollars. For some, they will represent hundreds of thousands; for others, several million. Furthermore, these will not be entirely passive investments. We anticipate that “Corona Aliyah” repatriates will seek to enter businesses as minority partners, contributing both capital and professional expertise. A professional from the construction sector in Russia understands building processes as well as their Israeli counterparts, despite differences in local standards and regulations. While active participation in smaller construction projects as a minority partner was previously rare, we expect such arrangements to increase significantly. Amid the economic challenges resulting from pandemic measures, small and medium-sized enterprises in Israel will likely be receptive to securing new investment through minority partnerships.

Employment and Education: As repatriates establish themselves physically in Israel, away from their Russian networks, they will need to engage actively with the local job market. Given that Israel is currently experiencing historically high unemployment rates, many new repatriates will need to establish their own businesses. To be realistic: unless one is an exceptional software engineer, securing employment in Israel equivalent in status to one's previous position in Russia will prove highly challenging.

The approach to children's education will also change. If relocating to Israel permanently, ensuring children acquire Hebrew is essential. This requires enrollment in standard Israeli schools, which differ significantly from their Russian counterparts: students in Israel do not systematically stand when a teacher enters; they speak when they choose rather than when permitted; and the sixth-grade mathematics curriculum covers material that Russian schools complete by the third grade. However, despite these differences, Israel successfully launches more startups on the Nasdaq than significantly larger nations like Canada or China. It is highly probable that the acceptance of failure and the encouragement of individual initiative constitute the core strengths of the Israeli educational approach.

Conclusion

The average repatriates of the 2020s will share more characteristics with those of the 1990s than with the cohorts of the 2000s and 2010s. The primary reason is their faster transition of the center of life to Israel. Consequently, they will face a demanding assessment of their skills and adaptability in one of the world's smallest and most competitive labor markets. Maintaining their previous standard of consumption will not be possible for all. They will experience the challenge of adjusting to a reality vastly different from what they knew. Israel is a sanctuary state, but those capable of working must be prepared to do so across various sectors. For the sanctuary to support the elderly and children, it must be protected, constructed, and maintained. Some, as in the 1990s, may ultimately opt for English-speaking countries. However, those who remain have the opportunity to integrate fully into Israeli society, which represents a highly positive outcome.