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The distinctiveness of the Jewish community of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which unites three sub-ethnic groups (Mountain, Georgian, and Ashkenazi), lies in its unique identity. The specific nature of this identity is defined by a close relationship with the country of birth, manifested not only in language proficiency but also in a strong sense of involvement in political processes within and around the state, as well as integration into its history. This is emphasized both by the community representatives themselves and at the official level. Furthermore, Azerbaijani Jewry represents a model of peaceful coexistence of a Jewish population not just within a multicultural society, but in a nation with a predominantly Muslim population. All of this creates favorable conditions for the further development of Jewish communal life in the country and helps to foster closer relations between Jerusalem and Baku.
In the context of research on the Jewish population of the Euro-Asian region, there is a growing need to analyze the experiences of communities in former Soviet republics to identify the specific features of their sub-ethnic identity in comparison with the collective perceptions of Russian-speaking Jewry in the former USSR as a whole. Focus on Azerbaijan is prompted by various factors, including the significant number of emigrants from the republic now living in Israel who maintain strong ties to their country of birth, expressed through language and cultural characteristics, as well as support for the state during the escalation of the conflict with Armenia. The prominence of the Armenian-Azerbaijani issue plays a particularly significant role as it directly affects the status of the Jewish population in two Euro-Asian communities simultaneously.
A Multicultural Community
Multiculturalism is a cornerstone of Azerbaijan's state policy, distinguishing it from many former Soviet republics that prioritised national ideologies in state-building after gaining independence. This has defined the position of the Jewish population in the country, which serves as an example of the absence of discrimination based on ethnicity or religion. Furthermore, despite its officially secular nature, Azerbaijan is a nation with a predominantly Muslim population. This allows the republic to demonstrate that the principle of peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Jews has been successfully realized within its territory. Indeed, this often refers not merely to neighbors, but to members of the same family.
It is traditionally emphasized that Jews took an active part in the processes of establishing and developing independent Azerbaijan after the collapse of the USSR, as well as in defending its territorial integrity. For instance, during the events of "Black January" in 1990—mass opposition protests suppressed by Soviet central forces—six of the approximately 170 casualties were Jewish, despite the Jewish population representing less than 1% of the total population[1]. Moreover, unlike Jews in Latvia, for example, Jews in Azerbaijan do not need to prove their involvement in key events of the country's history, as the state's foundational principle of multiculturalism prevents this from being disputed.
Quantitative data on the Jewish population of Azerbaijan varies significantly. Both Israeli and Azerbaijani sources often cite a figure of 30,000 people[2]. The World Jewish Congress, based on research by demographer S. Della Pergola from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, estimates the population at between 7,800 and 16,000[3]. Shneor Segal, the Ashkenazi Rabbi of Baku, refers to 15,000–20,000 in the Azerbaijani capital alone. This discrepancy is common across the post-Soviet space, where data from communal organizations often differs markedly from official census figures. In the former case, estimates are typically based on the average attendance at community events. Additionally, an individual’s awareness of their roots and self-identification play a crucial role. As noted above, the high rate of intermarriage means that families or individual representatives may return to Jewish traditions several generations later.
The largest ethno-linguistic group is the Mountain Jews, who first settled in the territory of modern Azerbaijan over 2,000 years ago. In the 19th century, Azerbaijan saw a growth in the Ashkenazi Jewish population, which now represents the second-largest sub-ethnic group, numbering several thousand. Finally, Georgian Jews, first recorded in the region in the 18th century, currently number around 700. Organisationally, these sub-ethnic groups form distinct structures that maintain friendly relations. At the same time, representatives of different communities often attend shared holiday celebrations or youth programs. Thus, in Baku, despite a predominantly Mountain Jewish population, events are typically organized by the Ashkenazi community.
A significant trend in Azerbaijani Jewish life is the high level of engagement among children, adolescents, and young adults, for whom dedicated weekly programs are organized. Rabbi Segal noted that this year, despite the challenges of the coronavirus pandemic and other difficulties, approximately 90 individuals applied to participate in the youth center's programs for the 18–28 age group. The average regular audience exceeds 200 people.
Azerbaijan is known not only for the cohabitation of diverse ethnic groups. In the Quba District in the north of the country lies the settlement of Krasnaya Sloboda (Qırmızı Qəsəbə). It is famous as one of only two locations outside of Israel with a predominantly Jewish population, currently home to approximately 3,000–3,500 Mountain Jews. Another significant location is Privolnoye in the Jalilabad District in the southeast, notable for its concentrated population of Gery and Subbotniks.
Jews and the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict
The escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in July and September 2020, which became the most intense since the signing of the Bishkek Protocol in 1994, has impacted various aspects of regional and global politics. However, the most critical aspect remains the vulnerability of individuals during active hostilities—in this context, the Jewish communities of the Euro-Asian region.
The history of Azerbaijani Jews is an integral part of the nation's history; thus, the conflict is viewed by them as a significant expression of patriotism and concern for their country of birth, forming a key component of their identity. Albert Agarunov, a volunteer tank commander who fought in the Karabakh War and was born to a Jewish family in the settlement of Amirjan, is recognized as a National Hero of Azerbaijan. In an interview given shortly before his death near Shusha in 1992, when asked by a journalist about the motives prompting "a Jew to defend Azerbaijani land," he replied: "I was born here, I live on this land, nothing else compels me"[4]. In November 2019, a monument to the National Hero of Azerbaijan was unveiled in Baku, following the release of a documentary film about his life two years prior.
It is important to emphasize that this stance is not unique to direct participants in the conflict. Similar sentiments—expressing that Azerbaijan is their birthplace and that they are prepared to share both its triumphs and its grief—are voiced by rabbis, public figures, and ordinary citizens. Consequently, this represents an identity-driven perception of the conflict as a shared national tragedy, rather than an attitude imposed by public figures.
In addition to identity, evaluating the security threat posed to the Jewish population of the Euro-Asian region by the escalation of violence is crucial. While this issue is frequently raised in Yerevan, it is met with skepticism by the Azerbaijani side. This skepticism stems from the belief that initial reports highlighting violence against ethnic groups in Nagorno-Karabakh, including Jews, were intended to attract international attention, particularly from the United States through Armenian and Jewish lobbying efforts[5]. Conversely, political analyst M. Akhmedoglu, head of the Center for Political Innovations and Technologies, asserted that "Jews have never lived in Karabakh"[6].
An alternative perspective is presented by Turkish political scientist S. Laciner, who suggests that the majority of Jews left Karabakh in the 1970s due to Armenian pressure. Those who remained—estimated by the expert to be no more than 30 individuals—reportedly continued to face harassment. According to Laciner, anti-Semitic sentiment was driven by Armenian dissatisfaction with Israel's cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey, leading to the Jewish population being perceived as hostile, alongside efforts to make Karabakh ethnically homogeneous[7].
Naturally, these perspectives are heavily influenced by the geopolitical positions of the respective countries. However, it remains a fact that Armenia continues to criticize Israel for its cooperation with Azerbaijan, even though the broader geopolitical landscape has shifted significantly since the 1990s. This is particularly evident in the relations between Jerusalem and Ankara. The bilateral Azerbaijani-Israeli track has taken precedence, supported by the Jewish community in Azerbaijan and the emigrant community in Israel. Lacking such leverage, Armenia emphasizes historical commonalities instead. The Armenian Jewish community remains extremely small, though there are indications of a modest trend of Jewish individuals returning to the republic.
Relations with Israel and Aliyah
The migration of Azerbaijani Jews to Israel has also been influenced by the conflict. The peak of repatriation occurred in the early 1990s, when political and economic instability following the collapse of the USSR, combined with the escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh, led to between 2,000 and 7,000 Jews leaving Azerbaijan annually. By the 2000s, the number of emigrants to Israel had stabilized at approximately 200 per year.
Economic factors are widely considered the primary driver of migration, both during the early stages of independence and today. Notably, Aryeh Levin, Israel’s first ambassador to Moscow, who worked to establish diplomatic relations with the post-Soviet republics, did not cite the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a direct threat to Jewish lives influencing the decision to emigrate. In his memoirs, he noted that Russia, dealing with a large influx of refugees from conflict zones including the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, was more interested in Israeli integration models to assist its own citizens[8].
These trends persist today. The average number of Azerbaijani Jews making Aliyah remains around 200 per year.[*] As in the past, decisions are largely driven by economic considerations. Azerbaijani Jewish community organizations and diaspora groups in Israel agree that a significant surge in repatriation due to recent escalations is unlikely.
Azerbaijan does not anticipate a decline in community life due to emigration, owing to two main factors. Firstly, a significant number of Jews return to Azerbaijan after living in Israel. Secondly, as previously mentioned, communities continue to welcome new members who were either unaware of their Jewish roots or previously chose not to participate in communal life.
Notably, the diaspora community in Israel mirrors many of the trends observed in Azerbaijan, particularly the high level of youth engagement. Proficiency in the Azerbaijani language helps maintain ties with the country of origin, often spanning multiple generations. This is a distinctive feature compared to Jewish communities from other post-Soviet states, which predominantly rely on Russian rather than titular national languages. This continuity reflects the cultural cooperation envisioned by Azerbaijani authorities during the early years of bilateral relations. Ambassador Levin recalled his meeting with the Minister of Culture, Polad Bulbuloglu, who was "completely free of prejudice" and advocated for cultural contacts and youth exchanges to foster public "goodwill ambassadors"[9]. By contrast, during similar discussions in Armenia, cultural cooperation was deprioritized, with President Levon Ter-Petrosyan emphasizing the immediate need for Israeli investment instead[10].
In conclusion, Jews originating from Azerbaijan, regardless of their current country of residence, maintain a strong Azerbaijani identity. This is demonstrated by their perspective on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and their shared commitment to multiculturalism. These elements, combined with strong ties between the local community and emigrants in Israel, continue to support the long-term development of bilateral relations between Jerusalem and Baku.
[*] Editor's note: According to the Israeli Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, a total of 36,332 Jews and their family members emigrated from Azerbaijan to Israel between 1989 and May 2020. The average annual Aliyah over this period was approximately 1,350 individuals; since 2015, it has averaged 136 individuals per year. In 2020 (as of September), fewer than 50 individuals arrived from the country.
[1] Staub D. “Jews in Azerbaijan,” in Encyclopedia of The Jewish Diaspora. Origins, experiences and culture. Ed. Ehrlich M.A. (S.B.: ABC Clio, 2009), p. 1116
[2] URL: https://www.inn.co.il/news/395320 ן’גבאזרбיי היהודית הקהילה של סיפורה .ב חזקי
[3] Demography. Azerbaijan // World Jewish Congress. URL: https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/about/communities/AZ
[4] ŞƏHİD: Albert Aqarunovla Mir Şahinin müsahibəsi (May 1992) URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jV59Q1a3z4g&t=
[5] Babayeva-Birer S. Albert Aqarunov: “Mən müsahibə verə bilmirəm…” // 1905.az URL: https://1905.az/albert-aqarunov-mən-musahibə-verə-bilmirəm/
[6] “Dağlıq Qarabağda heç vaxt yəhudi yaşamayıb“ // Az.News. 08.05.2013. URL: https://www.aznews.az/news/cemiyyet/23098.html
[7] Laçiner S. “Armenia’s Jewish Sceptism and its impact on Armenia-Israel Relations,” Institute for Armenian Research. URL: http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=en&Page=YayinIcerik&IcerikNo=63
[8] Levin A. Envoy to Moscow. Pp. 268-269.
[9] Ibid. P. 361.
[10] Ibid. P. 368.
The views expressed by the experts do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies or the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress.

