Photo: Haim Tzach / GPO

The events of recent months and the resulting geopolitical shifts in Eurasia have laid the groundwork for the formation and formalization of new strategic alliances, including the increasingly considered option of returning to a bloc of Turkic states. These trends also present an opportunity for Israel to improve relations with the countries of this macro-ethnic group, which could strengthen the status of local Jewish communities, expand the horizons of relations with moderate Muslim nations, and assist Israel in its confrontation with Iran. Regional and other umbrella Jewish organizations could serve as key instruments in realizing and developing these latest promising prospects.

Significant geopolitical changes, initiated by the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine, have led to the formation of new or the revival of old international alliances. Among these is the re-emergence of the concept of a union of states where members of the multi-ethnic Turkic group—residing across a vast territory from China to the Balkans—are numerically dominant and culturally prominent. Should such a union be established—comprising countries that have never in the past, even during the Ottoman Empire, formed a stable bloc—former Soviet republics like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, whose collective Turkic-speaking population totals 80 million, would naturally serve as its critical core.

Geopolitical Alignment within the Turkic World

The struggle for dominance within such a potential bloc is essentially underway. Russia, historically a major actor in the Caucasus and Central Asia, has seen its influence in the region diminish as it remains mired in Ukraine. China, another active player in Central Asia, views the region primarily as a source of raw materials for its economy (modeled on the Afghan resource agreements signed immediately after the US withdrawal) and as a transit hub to Western markets under the Beijing-led "Belt and Road Initiative." Furthermore, due to its ongoing conflict with the Uyghur Turkic population in its Xinjiang province, China remains highly wary of Turkic nationalism and, more so, Pan-Turkism. Consequently, China is unlikely to be a candidate capable of significantly influencing, let alone leading, this process.

The Arab Muslim world, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, views the largely secular and non-Arab Turkic and other ethnic Muslim regions of the former USSR as secondary, also focusing primarily on their resources and political support (such as UN voting) while offering little in return. The transactional attitude of Iran toward these countries is also evident, particularly toward oil-and-gas-rich Azerbaijan, inhabited by Shia Muslims, and sparsely populated Kazakhstan, which holds the world's richest uranium deposits (41% of global reserves). Finally, for the United States and the European Union, whose influence on regional alliances shaping the global agenda is usually significant, the Turkic belt remains, for obvious reasons, on the periphery of policy attention.

In this environment of newly emergent and largely unexpected geopolitical detachment by global and supra-regional powers, the leadership of this region—where nations are engaged in a search for identity initiated after the collapse of the Soviet Union—appears to be defined by a competitive partnership among the Turkic regimes themselves, specifically Ankara, Baku, and to a lesser extent, Astana.   Turkey, maintaining close partnerships with both Baku and Astana, currently leads this triad.  The failure of the "Neo-Ottoman doctrine" (Ankara's bid for dominance in regions formerly under Ottoman rule, primarily Arab and Balkan, in contrast to its previous path toward EU integration) promoted by R.T. Erdogan and M. Cavusoglu shortly after their Justice and Development Party came to power in the early 2000s, forced Turkey to reconcile, or at least lower tensions, with nations that this doctrine had turned from partners into adversaries, and to redirect its interests eastward. Lacking the financial capacity of China or the Gulf States, Turkey is nonetheless capable of offering potential bloc partners a unique value proposition. This includes its status as a major geopolitical actor, strengthened by operations in Syria, military assistance to Azerbaijan, and its role as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. It also offers potential security guarantees to Central Asia and Azerbaijan, with whom Ankara has established fraternal relations, supporting it during conflicts with Armenia, which relied on Russia and Iran. Finally, Turkey, possessing a population belonging to the same macro-ethnic community as the aforementioned Turkic nations, does not need to exploit their natural resources. Rather, it seeks to create an international platform and economic bloc that may demonstrate that its proposed framework for collective security, unity, and stability among Turkic peoples is more than just rhetoric.

The Israeli and Jewish Factor

How will these developments affect the remaining Jewish populations of post-Soviet and other Turkic states, as well as their relations with the State of Israel?

For three decades following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Jews, despite their modest demographic weight (and perhaps partly because of it), have been a visible element in the state-building narratives of post-Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan. As Zeev Levin correctly notes, the Jewish revival and organized Jewish communities in these republics posed no threat to local regimes; on the contrary, they were viewed by authorities as a valuable asset. [1] This is reinforced by the fact that, compared to other Muslim populations, ex-Soviet Turkic peoples exhibit significantly lower levels of antisemitism. Certain concerning trends, such as expressions of "concern over the situation" in statements by the ministries of foreign affairs of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan during the IDF's counter-terrorism operation "Guardian of the Walls" (May 2021)—which triggered antisemitic reactions on social media by users influenced by anti-Israel Iranian and Turkish propaganda—can currently be considered unfortunate and atypical exceptions to this rule.

There is no reason to believe that the political and diplomatic convergence of Turkic countries will alter this dynamic. In fact, the opposite is likely, given that Jews and their status in these countries are perceived largely through the lens of the Jewish State.  In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the USSR, the "Islamic awakening" was a central theme in Central Asian public life, and leaders of newly independent states had to formulate a new Islamic agenda. However, disillusionment with the broader Islamic Ummah, as well as the version of Pan-Turkism then promoted by Turkey, occurred rapidly, as noted by Rafael Sattarov. "Paradoxically, Israel emerged as the most attractive partner in the Middle East for Central Asia, resulting in the region becoming the most pro-Israel component of the Islamic world."[2]

The current redistribution of power in Eurasia opens new opportunities for Israel across various sectors. There are several reasons for this, one being that while the concept of building a new model of "equal relations" among Turkic states was initiated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the mediator of its implementation is likely to be a figure who understands the Soviet mentality well, allowing him to interact on equal terms with other Central Asian republics—Ilham Aliyev. This refers to the President of Azerbaijan, a country that is a strategic partner of the Jewish State. The 30-year alliance between Baku and Jerusalem has proven mutually beneficial: Israel receives energy resources and intelligence regarding Iran, while Azerbaijan receives military technology.

In fact, largely due to Aliyev's mediation, Turkey took steps to repair and restore political and diplomatic relations with Israel, which had been virtually frozen since 2011. The warming of relations and the subsequent return of ambassadors in August 2022 marked a new chapter in Israeli-Turkish relations, as did the meeting between Prime Minister Yair Lapid and President Erdogan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, and the visit of Defense Minister Benny Gantz to Turkey in October 2022. Developing relations with Central Asian Turkic countries is unlikely to pose a more difficult challenge for Azerbaijan than the reconciliation of Turkey and Israel, particularly since these relations already possess significant established potential. This vast market is poised to welcome Israeli high-tech to develop its industry and economy.

Furthermore, the emergence of a Turkic bloc presents a strategic challenge to Iran by creating a continuous security belt along its northern borders. The consolidation of Turkic forces in Eurasia remains a primary priority for Azerbaijan, which, like Israel, is an adversary of Iran. Tehran has openly threatened Azerbaijan with military action, as evidenced by a series of large-scale maneuvers on the border and subversive activities targeting Azerbaijani minorities. (In early November, a group of Iranian agents was arrested in Azerbaijan, one of whom was implicated in an attempted assassination of Israeli businessmen in Cyprus last year). By aligning efforts with the Arab Gulf States under Saudi leadership, a Turkic confederation could effectively isolate Iran and counter the destabilizing influence of the Ayatollah regime in the Middle East, forming a united front against Iranian aggression.

The Turkic bloc spans Iran's entire northern border, while the Gulf States border its southwest. It is worth noting that Israel stands behind Iran's adversaries, capable of providing, and already providing, military technology. Moreover, a significant portion of northern Iran is populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis—a Turkic population numbering over 20 million, which plays an active role in ongoing protests and harbors aspirations for independence in the region referred to as Southern Azerbaijan. The formation of a Turkic bloc could advance these aspirations and deliver a major blow to the Iranian regime.

There is little doubt that Israel will remain a key component of this geopolitical landscape. This, in turn, will allow Israel to enhance relations with the emerging Turkic bloc, reinforce the status of local Jewish communities, expand diplomatic horizons with moderate Muslim states, and assist Israel in countering Iran. Regional and other umbrella Jewish organizations can play an important role in facilitating and developing these promising prospects.

[1] Zeev Levin, "Jewish Education and Community Life of Central Asian Jews in the Context of Relations with Regional Authorities." Jews of Europe and Asia: State, Heritage, and Prospects. Vol. 3 (2020–2021/5781).  Jerusalem and Herzliya: Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies and the Institute of Jewish Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2021

[2] Rafael Sattarov, "Central Asia and its Jews between Israel and the Islamic Ummah," Euro-Asian Jewish (EAJ) Policy Papers, No. 3 (Dec 3, 2018), https://institute.eajc.org/eajpp-3/