Instrumentalist theories on the politicization of ethnicity are fully applicable to Russian Jewry. Analytical evidence also indicates the necessity of distinguishing between the concepts of "politicization of ethnicity" and "ethnopolitical mobilization": the latter implies political goal-setting, which is largely absent in the Russian context. Interviews permit the conclusion that Judaism plays a dual role in the politicization of the Russian Jewish community. On one hand, as a strictly religious practice, it is relatively insignificant due to the lingering effects of the Soviet secular project; on the other hand, it was religious organizations that served as the structural framework for the communal life resurrected in the 1990s, providing a resource both for potential political consolidation and for non-political encapsulation and a form of "inner emigration." The role of the State of Israel is equally dual: while serving, alongside religious practices, as a unifying factor providing ideological and financial resources and an "illusion of security" to sustain active ethnic consciousness, Israel naturally draws potentially politically active Jews away from Russia by encouraging repatriation. Experts view the very necessity and possibility of politicizing Jewish ethnicity in Russia with considerable skepticism, generally sharing the thesis that politicization forces the active segment of the community to choose between the components of Albert Hirschman’s classic triad: in the light of recent events, this segment of Jewry increasingly prefers "exit" over "voice" and "loyalty."

Introduction

As early as the 1970s, ethnic identity, which had initially been the exclusive domain of anthropology, entered the purview of political science, giving rise to terms such as "ethnic politics" and "the politicization of ethnicity."[1]

The politicization of ethnicity aims to endow phenomena implicitly understood as "ethnic" with political meaning in order to influence decision-making processes. In diasporic communities, ethnopolitical mobilization possesses specific characteristics—particularly within political systems that do not accommodate the functioning of ethnic and diasporic political parties. It appears that existing theories on the politicization of ethnicity are equally applicable to the world of Russian-speaking Jewry.

Ethnic Politics Online

Jewish ethnicity can become politicized through reliance on factors such as religion, culture, and attitudes toward Israel. While an overview of collective ethnically motivated political behavior must encompass numerous aspects, this initial section limits its focus to public expressions of ethnicity within the online space. For studying Russian-speaking communities, the social media platform "VKontakte" is the most suitable: in 2021, it had approximately 72 million registered users in Russia, compared to only 8.9 million on Facebook. For this brief study, we selected the public page "Shakhar – Israel on Your Page": with approximately 52,300 followers, it is the largest open online community on "VK" (by comparison, the official Russian-language page of the "Jewish Agency for Israel" on the same network has only about 29,900 followers). The page administrators declare a right-liberal and secular-Zionist orientation, and it is also closely linked to "Betar" and the "Likud" party. Thus, one can already assume at this stage the direction in which ethnicity might be politicized here; the question is by what means. Since "Shakhar" is not a state institution, it possesses only discursive means of politicizing ethnicity, while administrative means are unavailable. Consequently, our focus remains on discourse.

Alongside posts dedicated to Jewish holidays, welcoming the Sabbath, old and new photographs of Israeli city streets and the country's landscapes (comments under such posts are often disabled), the page also features photographs of celebrities of Jewish descent (for example, Albert Einstein or Golda Meir) or attractive young women in IDF uniforms. Additionally, the community covers certain news items—primarily reposting or translating reports from Russian and Israeli news resources such as "Vesti" or "9 Channel." An example of such a message is a post dedicated to the new amendment of the citizenship law, which limits the family reunification of Palestinian Arabs, published on March 12, 2022.[2] Of the 24 comments under this post, 10 contained a positive assessment of the document (proposed in its current form by the right-wing parties "Yamina" and "Otzma Yehudit"), 7 were negative, and 7 were neutral (including one likely auto-generated comment about the "suffering of the children of Donbas"). The news from March 9, 2022, regarding the establishment of a special permanent UN Human Rights Council commission to investigate accusations against Israel[3] received 9 responses; 8 assessed the UN's position negatively, and 1 was presumably auto-generated in support of Ukraine. Since the beginning of 2020, many publications have focused on the Covid-19 pandemic and the measures taken by the Israeli government in response. Furthermore, a small but relatively constant share of posts (approximately 1-2 per month, in addition to texts on religious holidays) is dedicated to religious life in Israel: the reform of religious councils, kosher certification issues, etc.

Significantly, of the numerous posts published after the outbreak of the full-scale armed conflict in Ukraine, only a few referenced it directly or indirectly. These texts addressed 1) Ukrainian refugees in Israel (neutral), 2) the evacuation of children from a Jewish orphanage in Ukraine (positive), 3) photographs of Russian journalist and political figure Ksenia Sobchak at Ben Gurion Airport (neutral, but with a sarcastic tone), 4) attempts to find non-existent "Jewish roots" for the purpose of emigrating from a rapidly militarizing Russia (negative), 5) Prime Minister Naftali Bennett's meeting with the Russian President (neutral), 6) the Prime Minister's request to cabinet members to refrain from public commentary on the war in Ukraine (neutral), and 7) mass repatriation from Ukraine (neutral).

In brief, the community politicizes Jewish ethnicity primarily by equating it with Israeli identity. This is evidenced by the name of the public page itself: it is called not simply "Shakhar," but "Shakhar – Israel on Your Page." Jews are viewed as part of the Israeli narrative, regardless of their actual place of residence. The page's followers are predominantly a moderate right-wing Russian-speaking audience, and the tendency to securitize the "Arab presence" in Israel, as well as a general negative assessment of non-Jewish activities in the country, are evident. In constructing its ethnopolitical narrative, the page aligns with the strategy of official Israeli discourse, namely by merging religious and secular symbolism. In the case of Russian Jews, this often concerns a "secular religion," meaning a "set of symbols and values, both religious and secular, to which members of the community attach great importance."[4] Such "secular Judaism" implies respectful attention to objects such as the Torah, Shabbat, religious holidays, etc., which, alongside purely religious connotations, acquire symbolic and ethnic significance. Thus, in the case of "Shakhar," all three non-institutional discursive strategies for the politicization of Jewish ethnicity are present: the ethnicization of religion, the politicization of culture, and the activation of the "triadic configuration" (the relations in the "triangle" formed, according to Rogers Brubaker, by 1. the "nationalizing state," 2. the ethnic minority residing within it, and 3. the "external national homeland" of that minority).

The page administration does not pay significant attention to Russian politics—either domestic or foreign; unless political events in the Russian Federation directly affect the life of the Jewish community, they do not interest the moderators and content creators. Nevertheless, some commentators and subscribers are clearly more concerned with events in their own countries of residence, and frequently, as far as we can determine, their comments are not deleted.

Of the many questions that might hypothetically be raised in discussions of this topic, we will attempt to address the two most obvious. First, if the focus is so heavily on Israel, why do we continue to speak of the politicization of Jewish identity specifically, rather than Israeli identity? Indeed, the focus remains on Jewish identity, since politicization in this instance is directed at Russian-speaking Jewry, regardless of their country of residence. In the discourse of "Shakhar," Jewish ethnic identity is inseparable from Israeli national-state identity. This discourse is comparable, for example, to the activities of online communities representing the Armenian, Estonian, or Polish diasporas: they also employ a narrative of an unbreakable bond between, on one hand, individual members of the ethnic group abroad and, on the other hand, the (often idealized) homeland. It is also worth noting that "Shakhar" operates not only online but also offline, physically based in Russia and organizing various events (meetings, lectures, holiday celebrations, training sessions) aimed at promoting Jewish culture and Israel in Moscow and other major Russian cities.

Another possible question is whether the strategy described here can be characterized as ethnopolitical mobilization. The answer is negative. The terms "politicization of ethnicity" and "ethnopolitical mobilization" are indeed often very close in practical content, but not in all situations. If the politicization of ethnicity is aimed not at prompting individuals or a group to take specific collective action, but merely at maintaining and developing their identity as a collective political subject, it cannot be termed "mobilization." Rather, in such cases, we are speaking of the activation of ethnic identity (even if it occurs in a political context)—as ethnicity represents only one of the nested layers of identity and may remain in a "dormant" state for the time being.

Interview Results

To verify our observations summarized above, we conducted eight semi-structured interviews (in oral and written form) with experts in the field of Jewish ethnic activism in the post-Soviet space. The informants included six representatives of the academic community and two public figures. Given the specifics of the domestic political situation in the Russian Federation, we maintain the anonymity of the experts; thus, they are cited here as "Expert 1," "Expert 2," etc. We asked them to answer the following questions:

1. What is the role of Judaism in the politicization of the ethnicity of Russian Jewry?

2. What is the role of Israel in the hypothetical transformation of Russian Jewish communities into a political community?

3. In general, which strategies of ethnic politicization can be considered most effective in the case of Russian Jewry?

The answers to the first question proved highly diverse but allowed us to identify two main trends—both in the actual role of religion in Russian Jewish life and in the assessment of this role by the expert community. On one hand, experts tend to attribute very little influence of "real" Judaism on contemporary Jewish ethnicity, which is linked to its suppression in Soviet Jewish discourse: indeed, "Soviet Jews, due to state atheism, were predominantly an ethnic rather than a religious group (which is, in fact, nonsense)" (Expert 1). It is also worth considering that Judaism currently must compete globally for loyalty with models of territorial and political nationhood, and that only a minority of Russian Jews actually adhere to the faith of their ancestors (13-20%, according to Expert 4's estimate). On the other hand, it was Judaism that "became the ideological basis for the restoration of Jewish identity destroyed during the Soviet period"; Jewish tradition began to be used "as a unifying, identifying, and de-assimilating factor" (Expert 5). Specifically, "Jewish communities as institutions, particularly regarding umbrella structures, regardless of the involvement of ordinary community members, became participants in the political process of their countries" (Expert 3). Expert 8 added an important nuance to this: today, Judaism can be perceived either within the framework of the "Russian Empire model," contributing to the voluntary encapsulation of communities into "cultural ghettos," or within the "USSR model," serving as a symbol of dissent against the dominant state discourse (the latter trend may be activated by the dynamics of 2022).

The answers to the second question were divided based on the perception of Israel either as an active subject or as a contextual factor. In the first instance, Israel is primarily viewed as an actor that "draws" politically active Jews away from their country of residence (Expert 3). All of Israel's actions must be viewed through the prism of potential Aliyah, and the State is not interested in fostering political participation in the Diaspora—unless we consider repatriation as a "political act that creates a 'meaningful absence'" (Expert 6). Nonetheless, alongside encouraging repatriation, Israel "sustains the existence of Jewish organizations both financially and ideologically," thereby simultaneously promoting the maintenance of ethnic consciousness, without which repatriation is unlikely to occur (Expert 5). If respondents view Israel as a background, contextual factor, the Soviet "legacy" is recalled once again: "in the past, the Land of Israel played a huge role in Jewish tradition, but in the USSR (...) this tradition was severely disrupted" (Expert 4). Nevertheless, in the post-Soviet years, Israel "created an illusion of protection and security for Russian Jews" (Expert 5), and they were often viewed by external observers as a "local appendage of Israel" (Expert 3). The reasons for post-Soviet Aliyah were in most cases either ideological-Zionist or economic. This picture has been changing rapidly since 2014; notably, the 2022 campaign against the "Jewish Agency" appears symbolic: "we have returned to the Soviet era, when Aliyah was a demonstrative political act" (Expert 8).

The third question was intentionally formulated in broad terms to ascertain what respondents thought about the politicization of Jewish ethnicity "in general." The inevitable ambiguity in defining politicization itself also played a role here. Experts were cautious in assessing the very possibility and necessity of politicizing Russian Jewry—despite the fact that the first two questions raised no such doubts. To quote several responses: "In contrast to the beginning of the 20th century, Russian-speaking Jewry currently lacks actors of politicization" (Expert 1). "Where the politicization of the ethnicity of Russian-speaking Jews begins, their 'shelf life' in the post-Soviet space ends, and repatriation begins (...). Jews do not form an influential political force in the post-Soviet space. With the growth of ethnic and political consciousness, they simply leave. The remaining portion turns once again into the 'Jews of silence' of the Soviet era" (Expert 6). "I would ask the question—why is the politicization of the ethnic identity of Russian-speaking Jews even desirable? I would rather suggest the opposite strategy—the 'derussification' of post-Soviet Jews, with their crystallization as local ethno-cultural groups within the liberal zones of local political spectrums (...). At the same time, the creation of separate Jewish political organizations is neither possible nor desirable" (Expert 3).

Alongside expressing doubts regarding the necessity of politicizing ethnicity (doubts that were, however, partly caused by conflating this term with ethnopolitical mobilization), the experts suggested paying closer attention to nuances. "Everything depends on the goals of the specific actor" (Expert 2). "The strategic choice depends on the balance between centrifugal and centripetal vectors. You either identify with the liberal camp and attempt to leave the country or establish some sort of modus vivendi for survival (...). Or you retreat into 'inner emigration,' cocoon yourself in religion and culture, and quietly accept what is happening in the country" (Expert 8).

Conclusions

The primary conclusion drawn from this brief overview study is that the core theories of politicization can be applied with relative ease to the ethnopolitical dynamics of Russian Jewry. Ethnicity, defined as a set of cultural characteristics perceived as inherited, can be politicized by employing a limited set of strategies, and the uniqueness of the "Jewish case" should not be overstated. Diasporic identity generally implies that the respective ethnic group can be situated within Rogers Brubaker's "triadic configuration"—which, in the case of Jews, became possible with the creation of the State of Israel. Today, Jews are frequently viewed as carriers of both Jewish and Israeli identities, even if they reside in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, or Moldova. Religion, which for centuries was the primary defining factor of Jewishness, has lost its significance for many as a purely spiritual practice, yet it continues to represent an important resource for symbolic politics and identity construction. Administrative politicization of ethnicity is currently not on the agenda in any of the countries with large Russian-speaking Jewish communities (with the possible exception of inertial-symbolic politicization in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, where the Jewish presence is negligible), nor is the creation of "Jewish" political parties. Thus, in the case under consideration, the politicization of ethnicity can only be discursive and non-institutional, occurring through relatively traditional channels—such as the ethnicization of religion, the politicization of culture, and the activation of the "triadic configuration."

The case of the "Shakhar" online community described here demonstrates the practical applicability of the theoretical constructs outlined above, and also confirms that in the case of Russian-speaking Jewry we can hardly speak of "ethnopolitical mobilization." Currently, in post-Soviet countries, with the exception of Ukraine, there are no specific goals for which Jewish ethnicity could be "mobilized" (although during periods of major political transformation, such as the 1917 revolution or the collapse of the USSR, this did occur, so the possibility remains hypothetically viable). Rather, we can speak of the (re)activation of Jewish ethnicity, the awakening of a "sleeping beauty" (or maintaining it in an active state).

Semi-structured expert interviews also partially confirm the above. Experts point to the dual role of Judaism, consisting, on one hand, of its minor significance as a religious practice (for Russian Jews), but on the other hand, of its great potential both for politicization (as a unifying symbolic structure) and for depoliticization (as a channel for "self-encapsulation" and "inner emigration"). The role of the State of Israel in the politicization of ethnicity is equally ambiguous: on one hand, Israel provides diaspora communities with a sense of belonging and security, as well as resources for financial and ideological survival. On the other hand, the primary objective of Israeli policy regarding the diaspora is to attract active Jews to their historical homeland, which implies the depoliticization of communities in the Galut. The concept of politicization and/or ethnopolitical mobilization itself is evaluated in the same vein: experts doubt the necessity of politicizing ethnicity in diasporic Jewish communities, given that many politically active Jews are forced to choose the option of "exit" from Albert Hirschman’s classic triad "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty"[5] and leave for Israel.

What can Israel do under these circumstances? The practice established over recent decades—supporting ethno-cultural non-political self-organization and encouraging repatriation—has already yielded results and, it is hoped, will continue to do so. The events of 2022 demonstrated with utmost clarity that Israeli policy toward Russian Jewry must be guided by the Hippocratic principle of "do no harm." Therefore, any activity that could hypothetically be characterized as "political" should be excluded from the agenda—lest Israel and the Russian segment of the diaspora find themselves separated once again by an iron curtain. However, the boundaries of the "political" in contemporary Russian practice have become extremely blurred, and previously "untouchable" non-political organizations such as the "Jewish Agency" have come under fire. It appears that in such a situation, another principle also applies—"hope for the best, prepare for the worst," and the paramount task remains the preservation of existing repatriation mechanisms amidst potential risks and the increased burden on the relevant state authorities.

[1] Among the most significant academic works on ethnic politics published in the 1960s-1980s are, for example: Raymond E. Wolfinger, “The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting”, American Political Science Review, 1965, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 896-908; Don Handelman, “The Organization of Ethnicity”, Ethnic Groups, 1977, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 187-200; Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

[2] https://vk.com/wall-23953205_1229677

[3] https://vk.com/wall-23953205_1229190

[4] Elena Nosenko-Stein, “Inventing a ‘New Jew’: The Transformation of Jewish Identity in Post-Soviet Russia”, in Zvi Gitelman (Ed.) The New Jewish Diaspora: Russian-Speaking Immigrants in the United States, Israel, and Germany (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2016), p. 206.

[5] See: Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).