Summary. The Jewish issue occupies a prominent place in two recent large-scale armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space – the new round of confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020 and 2022, and the war in Ukraine that began on February 24, 2022. However, its manifestations are not identical. While the Russian leadership attempts to justify its actions by the necessity of fighting a "radical-nationalist, fascist, and antisemitic regime that has seized power in Kyiv," Ukrainian leaders widely employ the narrative of "Russian aggression as a 'new Holocaust.'" Furthermore, while Jewish communities in Ukraine have mobilized almost totally in support of the country's military and political leadership, Russian leaders, at least for now, are satisfied with a minimalist option – a formal display of loyalty by the official leadership of Jewish organizations in the Russian Federation. The situation looks different in the South Caucasus, where in the political discourse of both opposing states, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Jewish theme is driven almost entirely by external stakeholders, among whom the radical Islamist Iranian regime plays a leading role, and bears a pronounced antisemitic character.

Among the many aspects of the two recent large-scale armed conflicts in the post-Soviet space – the new round of confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020 and 2022, and the war in Ukraine, which began following the invasion of the Russian army on February 24, 2022 – the Jewish theme occupies a significant place. Although in all cases the appeal to this topic by both the authorities of these countries and the external actors involved in these conflicts is of a moderate or pronounced "instrumental" nature, its manifestations, however, are not identical.

Jews and Israel as a Factor in Post-Soviet Wars

The Russian leadership is trying to use the Jewish card as part of its ideological justification for the invasion of Ukraine, presenting it as a struggle against a "radical-nationalist, fascist, and antisemitic regime that has seized power in Kyiv." In Ukraine, where individuals with Jewish roots are disproportionately represented in the leadership (including the country's president, the minister of defense, the mayor of the capital, and several other key figures), the opposite is true: the narrative of Russian aggression as a "new Holocaust" is widely used to influence international, especially Jewish, public opinion, and to compel Israel to become a de facto participant in the armed confrontation with Russia. In turn, Moscow, at the very least, expects that Israel, given the priorities of its security interests in the Middle East region where it is located and where the Russian Federation still plays a significant role, will not go beyond its current policy of providing large-scale humanitarian, diplomatic, and material aid to Ukraine. Moscow also expects Israel to refrain from supplying the Armed Forces of Ukraine with weapons that would fundamentally change the balance of power on the battlefield, and to officially decline to join Western economic sanctions against Russia (while in practice refraining from actions that would help bypass these sanctions).

The line pursued by official Kyiv, as far as can be judged, finds complete understanding within the country's Jewish community, which has mobilized almost entirely in support of the country's military and political leadership. Meanwhile, Russian leaders, at least for now, are satisfied with a formal display of loyalty from the official leadership of Jewish organizations in the Russian Federation. These organizations continue to maintain proper relations with their counterparts in Ukraine – both bilaterally and within the framework of international Jewish organizations. At the same time, they are forced to take into account the position of the country's Jewish community, which numbers more than half a million (according to the Law of Return criteria) and remains, in a sense, a "hostage" to the goodwill of Russian leaders.

The most recent message of this kind occurred in early December of this year when, according to Israel's Kan 11 TV channel, Kremlin representatives made it clear to Jerusalem that "Russia's defeat in the war with Ukraine would immediately lead to a wave of antisemitism (a search for a 'scapegoat') which is currently only being suppressed by Vladimir Putin." Consequently, according to the Russian side, "Israel should not obstruct the withdrawal of Russian weapons from Syria to be deployed in other areas needed by the Russian army."[1] (A similar dynamic in relations between the authorities and a small but still third-largest Jewish community among the former Soviet republics is also observed in Belarus, which is a de facto ally of Russia in this war).

In other words, both Kyiv and Moscow view local Jews and the wider Jewish world as a positive asset for achieving operational and strategic goals. Of course, "latent" or everyday antisemitism did not disappear in either country with the end of state antisemitism in the USSR on the eve of its collapse; it occasionally surfaces as rare hate crimes, more frequently as hate speech, and especially often as antisemitic proclamations on social media. After February 24, 2022, such occurrences in Russia and Ukraine were recorded following antisemitic remarks by Russian politicians (such as the controversial statement by Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov about Hitler, who supposedly "also had Jewish blood," and that "the most ardent antisemites are usually Jews themselves"[2]). They also appeared as reactions to critical – and, it must be admitted, not always appropriate – statements about Israel by Ukrainian public figures, and discussions regarding Ukraine's support for clearly anti-Israel resolutions at the UN.

The scale of this phenomenon, however, should not be exaggerated, nor is there any basis at this stage to speak of systemic instrumental-political antisemitism by the authorities in Russia, let alone in Ukraine.

In the South Caucasus, the situation in this regard looks fundamentally different: in the political discourse of both opposing states, Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Jewish theme sounds quite clearly, but it is driven almost entirely by external stakeholders, among whom the radical Islamist Iranian regime plays a leading role.

As is well known, the declared goal of the Ayatollah regime is to "wipe Israel off the political map," as they view it as one of the main obstacles to expanding the radical Shia "Islamic revolution" and establishing Iranian hegemony in the "Greater Middle East" region. Therefore, it is not surprising that antisemitism traditionally constitutes a significant component of the ideological justification for this strategy. However, while in the past official Iranian propaganda mainly operated within the frameworks of "new antisemitism," including criticism of "Zionism as an instrument for oppressing Muslims" and Holocaust denial, in recent years classic antisemitic clichés ("Jews rule the world," etc.) have clearly begun to emerge. One need only look, for example, at a recent tweet from the Iranian Embassy in Australia, which claims that Jews control and have controlled the US government under various presidential administrations[3], or the publication of over 1,000 antisemitic materials by the Iranian Jewish Studies Center[4].

Such narratives, which have already proven their relative effectiveness[5] in advancing the interests of Iranian Islamists in several Arab and Muslim countries, have become part of the propaganda efforts accompanying Iran's geopolitical activity in the South Caucasus as well. Tehran's interest in this region lies, on the one hand, in minimizing the strength of a close ally of the Jewish state – Azerbaijan, a leading supplier of oil to Israel and a major buyer of Israeli military and civilian technologies. On the other hand, it seeks to strengthen the dependence of its own strategic partner, Armenia, on Iran (the opportunities for which are expanding in light of the sharp decline of the Russian presence in the South Caucasus),[6] including the torpedoing of plans for the Zangezur transport corridor, designed to connect Azerbaijan with Turkey through the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan, which borders Iran and is surrounded to the north and east by Armenian territory.

Clearly, antisemitism, in one form or another, was bound to become part of the efforts by Iranian intelligence services to destabilize Azerbaijan[7] by inciting ethnic and religious-sectarian separatism. However, Tehran likely understood the limited prospects of promoting "classic" antisemitic slogans in a country that traditionally demonstrates a high level of tolerance toward Jews. Consequently, the Iranians had to limit themselves to attempts to delegitimize the "Zionist regime of President Aliyev" (including under the banner of ostensibly human rights organizations of a Khomeinist persuasion). Nonetheless, against the backdrop of the explosive growth in Azerbaijani society of Israel's popularity as a reliable ally playing a critical role in the security and technological development of this Caucasian republic, the effect of these efforts by Tehran was minimal.

The Armenian Scenario

Parallel to the wave of anti-Israel propaganda directed at Baku, which, as we noted earlier, accompanied the maneuvers of Iranian troops near Azerbaijan's borders and the activation of Tehran's subversive cells in that country, a significant escalation of antisemitic rhetoric has also been observed in Armenia. The virtually perfect timing of these two trends, including the sharp increase in the prominence of antisemitic and anti-Zionist[8] topics appearing in online and other Armenian media – which had previously discussed these topics much more sluggishly – strongly suggests a significant role played by Iran in this case as well.

It also appears that, unlike in Azerbaijan, agents of Iranian influence see no issue in utilizing not only anti-Zionist clichés but the entire spectrum of antisemitic narratives. The belief that such messages might find a receptive audience in Armenia is, at first glance, supported by two frequently cited studies: the 2014 World Antisemitism Index by the influential transnational Jewish organization, the Anti-Defamation League, and a study conducted two years later by the reputable Washington-based Pew Research Center on the level of antisemitism in 18 European countries, including Armenia.

Indeed, according to the ADL study, certain antisemitic stereotypes were held by more than half (58%) of the adult population of Armenia. At the time, 72% of respondents believed, or did not rule out, that "Jews have too much power in the business world," and 68% agreed to some extent that "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country in which they live."

The most egregious antisemitic stereotypes – that "Jews themselves are to blame for antisemitism" and that "Jews always consider themselves better than others" – were shared by 63% (nearly two-thirds) and more than half (53%) of respondents respectively, while 45% believed that "Jews talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust." Finally, traditional accusations that Jews "control the US government" and have "too much influence on international affairs" resonated with more than half (51% each) of the surveyed citizens, while 38% believed that "Jews are responsible for all wars in the world." [9]

In turn, 32% of Armenian respondents who participated in the Pew Research Center study in 2015-2016 admitted that they would be unwilling to accept Jews as citizens of their country (the highest percentage among respondents surveyed across 18 European countries at the time), and only 18% were willing to accept Jews as family members through marriage. (However, even fewer – 7% of respondents in Armenia – were willing to accept Muslims in this capacity). [10]

Nevertheless, leaders and activists of the tiny local Jewish community (no more than 280 families) both then and now insist that perceptions of Armenian antisemitism are greatly exaggerated. In their view, these are latent sentiments that rarely enter an active phase, primarily fueled by Armenia's irritation over the defense partnership between Jerusalem and Baku, as well as the perceived unwillingness of Israel to recognize the 1915-16 Ottoman massacres of Armenians as a phenomenon equivalent to the Holocaust of the Jews.[11]

From Israel's perspective, these grievances are unjustified. This is not only because Israel's official adoption of the formulation of the Armenian genocide preferred by Yerevan would trigger a negative reaction not only in Turkey but also in Azerbaijan – which ranks first among Muslim countries in trade volume with Israel, has effectively replaced Turkey as Israel's main strategic ally in the Turkic world, and shares the Jewish state's concerns regarding the Iranian threat. Meanwhile, Armenia (with which Israel's trade volume is very small) is, as stated, a close strategic partner of Iran.

This is not due to political cynicism on the part of the Israeli government, nor is it because Israelis do not care about the historical memory and national tragedies of other peoples (the exact opposite is true).[12] Rather, it stems from a conscious or unconscious objection within Israeli society to a phenomenon referred to as the "trivialization of the Holocaust of European Jewry," especially when it involves instrumental attempts – those pursuing political and ideological goals – to "mirror" the Jewish tragedy. To put it simply, few in Israel are willing to equate the Armenian tragedy with the Holocaust. For instance, the Turks massacred Armenians on the territory they occupied during military operations – for which there is, and can be, no justification – but it is highly unlikely that their systematic goal was to exterminate every Armenian in the world, in the way the Hitler regime targeted the Jews.

In turn, among Armenian leaders and public figures today, there are those who recognize the very limited diplomatic and geopolitical utility of endlessly dwelling on the topic of "non-recognition of the Armenian tragedy by Israel and Jews." They are prepared to acknowledge that a more productive narrative exists in the market of historical memory – that of "two brotherly peoples united by centuries of cooperation, a similar national tragedy, and comparable starting conditions for national state-building."[13] However, while such a shift could offer a way out of the ideological "deadlock" hindering the development of bilateral relations, today it is rejected not only by radical nationalists but also by the mainstream Armenian political and cultural establishment. This, in turn, is easily transmitted to the broader public in the country, opening up wide opportunities for Iranian propagandists and the pro-Iranian lobby, both within Armenia itself and in diaspora Armenian communities in countries such as France[14] and the US.[15]

In the current situation, this becomes particularly important for Tehran, which seeks to consolidate its status as Armenia's sole patron. Consequently, it spares no effort to damage Armenia's reputation in the West and to stifle the still tentative signs of rapprochement between Yerevan and Jerusalem. Furthermore, against the backdrop of Armenia and Turkey's attempts to resolve their long-standing differences – which trouble Iranian leaders – Tehran aims to prevent Armenia from aligning with the Israeli-Azerbaijani-Turkish vector of mutual understanding and interest, which is being cautiously constructed at Aliyev's initiative and could severely damage Iran's regional ambitions and interests.

The "Russian-Language Connection"

Therefore, it appears that the motivation of several Armenian publications, which have simultaneously raised the level of antisemitism in their numerous articles as if on cue, is heavily fueled by external sources. Online publications and social networks (especially Telegram channels, which have seen a massive influx of Armenian residents migrating from VKontakte and Facebook) have, since approximately October of this year (parallel to the Iranian army maneuvers and intelligence activities on the border with Azerbaijan), become literally saturated with declarations, forum discussions, and (pseudo-)analytical materials. These contain calls for a joint struggle with Iran or the Palestinians against the Jews and Israel, while extolling Iran's role as the sole hope for Armenian statehood. Notably, these narratives have largely pushed aside the previously marginal discussions regarding "the Jews stealing the Holocaust from the Armenians," other expressions of everyday antisemitism, and praise for Garegin Nzhdeh and other sympathizers of the Nazi regime.

It is also difficult to ignore that the lion's share of this material is supplied by Russian-language channels, as well as bilingual publications that publish a large amount of text in Russian. One such source is the Telegram channel "SpitakArch," which as of November 2022 had about 10,000 subscribers – a significant number for a country with an official population of less than 3 million (https://t.me/archiuja/). Active users and initiators of these discussions do not hide their sentiments and thought processes. For instance, in just one discussion thread dedicated to Yerevan's friends and enemies, there were 1,064 messages of this nature containing the slur "Yid."

"I am a fascist, an antisemite, and I see the salvation of Armenians in the complete extermination of Turks and Yids," one participant states without any hesitation (https://t.me/c/1283571554/918737). "Hitler did nothing wrong to the Armenians. Except for the fact that he did a poor job of destroying the Yids; the Mountain [Jews], for example, survived," another participant chimes in. "Of course, I am Armenian – any normal Armenian has an aversion to Yids" (https://t.me/c/1283571554/913956). "Their (the Iranians') headache is the Turks and the Yids, and both of these scumbags are our common enemies with the Persians," a third chat participant summarized. "And generally, I believe that Iran should become one of our key allies." (https://t.me/c/1283571554/829885)

Similar or identical content is also widely featured on the ARMENIAN RADICAL channel (https://t.me/ARMENISCH88) with nearly 20,000 subscribers; the sentiments of its users can be judged by statements such as "I agree with Iran that Yid-rael (as written in the text – sic!) must be wiped off the face of the earth" (https://t.me/ARMENISCH88/37200). Also in this category is the Armenian Life channel (https://t.me/Armenian_Life) with nearly 11,000 subscribers; the forum of fascist elements "Descendants of Nzhdeh" (over 7,000 subscribers), and many other projects of varying reach and influence.

Why is all this antisemitic nonsense often written in Russian, and frequently in quite high-quality Russian? The reasons for this may include a desire to influence the Russian-speaking audience outside Armenia (including pro-Russian separatists in northern Azerbaijan), as well as Russian emigrants within Armenia itself, whose numbers have exceeded 100,000 in recent months.

Many of them relocated to Armenia, often with their businesses, after the start of the war in Ukraine and the mobilization announced in Russia. The result of this migration flow, which included a large number of IT specialists, has been the stabilization of the Armenian economy and a sharp increase in its GDP. (According to Russian media, based on recent forecasts by the Armenian government, GDP growth in the country is breaking all records, with a sharp jump from 1.6% to 13% expected in 2022. This was the result of "the influx of highly educated specialists with professional skills who are opening new companies, purchasing real estate, and indirectly influencing economic growth in the country... What is being observed today is something mythical and unrealistic, straight out of a 'dreams come true' scenario").[16]

Assuming that a significant portion of these people will likely remain in Armenia and join the local business and, inevitably, political elite integrated into global business, financial, and diplomatic markets, Tehran's focus on these individuals could be strategically calculated.

Thus, antisemitism remains a key element of the foreign policy of Iran's Islamist regime, including its geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus, where the current rapidly changing environment creates both new challenges and new opportunities for local and external players. It is there that the Iranians are trying to mobilize their agents of influence – both through anti-Zionist rhetoric targeting pro-Iranian Islamist circles in Azerbaijan, and in Armenia, where the combination of classic and new antisemitic propaganda schemes promoted by interested parties and everyday antisemites finds a limited but nonetheless noticeable audience.

[1] Gili Cohen, "The unusual Russian appeal to Israel: Moscow wanted to ensure that Israel would not interfere with the transfer of defense equipment from Syria to the Ukrainian front line," Kan 11, December 4, 2022, https://www.kan.org.il/item/?itemid=139599

[2] "The Kremlin Deploys Antisemitism to Vilify Ukraine," US Department of State, July 11, 2022.

 https://www.state.gov/the-kremlin-deploys-antisemitism-to-vilify-ukraine/

[3] https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=208859041524477&set=a.110323094711406

[4] https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-708487 (Benjamin Weinthal, “Iran regime’s ‘Jewish Studies Center’ published over 1,000 antisemitic articles“, Jerusalem Post, June 3, 2022)

[5] Ksenya Svetlova, “Iran Drives Antisemitism in the Muslim World,” The Medialine, 01/20/2022,  https://themedialine.org/by-region/iran-drives-antisemitism-in-the-muslim-world/, https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-723869

[6] For more details see Ze’ev Khanin, “Russia’s War in Ukraine Shifts Dynamics in the Israel-Iran-Azerbaijan Triangle”, The Wilson Center, November 3, 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-war-ukraine-shifts-dynamics-israel-iran-azerbaijan-triangle

[7] https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/middle-east/iran-eastern-states/1669135848-weaponized-antisemitism-of-the-iranian-regime

[8] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/10/05/razvedbazy-izrailya-v-azerbaydzhane-sereznaya-ugroza-dlya-irana-i-armenii-ekspert

[9] See the full ADL research data at https://global100.adl.org/country/armenia/2014

[10] “In some countries in Central and Eastern Europe, roughly one-in-five adults or more say they would not accept Jews as fellow citizens”, Pew Research Center, 27 March 2018, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/28/most-poles-accept-jews-as-fellow-citizens-and-neighbors-but-a-minority-do-not/ft_18-03-26_polandholocaustlaws_map/

[11] Larry Luxner, “Armenia has had few Jews and a poor relationship with Israel. That could be changing,” JTA, 17 October 2022,  https://www.jta.org/2022/10/17/global/armenia-has-had-few-jews-and-a-poor-relationship-with-israel-that-could-be-changing

[12] Israel’s Foreign Ministry statement of April 2021: “Jerusalem recognizes ‘terrible suffering’ of Armenians in early 20th century killings by Ottomans, says nations of world must ‘ensure events like this do not again occur’”. (Quoted in: “After Biden acknowledges Armenian genocide, Israel stops short of doing the same”, The Times of Israel, 25 April 2021) https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-recognizes-terrible-suffering-of-armenians-doesnt-use-term-genocide/

[13] See for example: “Armenians Must Awake from Delusional Comfort and Build a Mini-Israel,” Arshavir Gundjian, Armenian Mirror-Spectator, November 22, 2022, https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/11/22/armenians-must-awake-from-delusional-comfort-and-build-a-mini-israel/

[14] https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2022/12/01/France-pro-Armenian-resolution/2763120

[15] Milich Yevdayev, “Armenian protest in Los Angeles equates Israel to Nazi Germany,” Jewish Journal (Los Angeles) October 22, 2020, https://jewishjournal.com/commentary/blogs/323425/armenian-protest-in-los-angeles-equates-israel-to-nazi-germany/

[16] Oxana Orlova, “Russian emigrants became the 'locomotive' of growth for the Armenian economy,” International Wealth, 22 November 2022, https://internationalwealth.info/immigration-and-emigration-offshore/rossijskie-jemigranty-stali-lokomotivom-rosta-dlja-armjanskoj-jekonomiki/