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In the contemporary world, there exists a range of entities and movements whose ideological frameworks serve as a foundation for various forms of antisemitism, including right-wing antisemitism, left-wing antisemitism, and Islamism—or, in other words, Islamic radicalism. This third component of modern antisemitism is widespread in Europe due to the activities of Salafist Islamic organizations and those ideologically aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, which exert control over religious institutions and the Islamic educational system. These same organizations are gradually establishing their infrastructural presence across the post-Soviet space, increasingly attracting adherents there through social networks. Today, radical Sunni Islam, alongside Shiite pro-Iranian antisemitic propaganda, which also maintains an active presence in Eurasia, constitutes a growing strategic threat to local Jewish communities. The leadership of these communities and the host country authorities must pay the closest attention to this development, both in terms of organizing effective security systems for Jewish institutions and studying and analyzing the underlying social processes.
Over the past decade, we have witnessed a resurgence of antisemitism globally. Its manifestations can be traced to varying degrees in almost every country, particularly in Europe. In 2018, a series of closed-door conferences took place across several European nations on the subject of security and antisemitism. These conferences brought together experts in public safety and counter-terrorism, representatives from European intelligence agencies and European Union bodies, politicians, and representatives of European Jewish communities seeking to assess the scale of the threat posed to them by various antisemitic groups, factions, movements, and organizations, both within and outside Europe.
If one attempts to classify the organizations that propagate antisemitism as a core tenet of their ideology, they can be divided into three main components: right-wing antisemitism, left-wing antisemitism, and Islamism—or, in other words, Islamic radicalism.
Right-wing antisemitism is well known to the general public, and its core tenets are clear: it refers to fascist, neo-fascist, or neo-Nazi movements that have revived mid-20th-century radical nationalism, including the concept of Aryan racial purity or national purity—be it Hungarian, German, or simply "white supremacy" in the United States.
Left-wing liberal antisemitism has recently received extensive media coverage, particularly in connection with the spread of the pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement. This movement advocates for the economic, political, and cultural boycott of Israel, its diplomatic isolation, and the imposition of sanctions, using these and other methods of economic, political, and academic pressure to undermine the stability of the Jewish state or achieve other stated objectives.
Leaving aside a detailed examination of these two phenomena, which undoubtedly merit separate and rigorous analysis, this article focuses on the third component of contemporary antisemitism: Islamism.
The European Foothold
Islamism, or Islamic radicalism, is sometimes mistakenly referred to as the "political branch of Islam." However, by no means does every radical Islamic movement pursue political goals; indeed, some actively avoid them. In their view, politics and democracy in the Western sense constitute a forbidden innovation ("bid'ah") and run contrary to Islamic law, which places divine law above "man-made laws," as many Salafist religious authorities state and write. Which specific Islamic movements are currently most prevalent in Eurasia and indeed present a threat to Jewish communities in the region?
To understand this, it is instructive to look at Europe as a parallel case, where the processes of Muslim radicalization and rising antisemitism are running several decades ahead of the post-Soviet space.
Today, more than 45 million Muslims reside in the European Union. While precise figures are unavailable for several reasons, the Pew Forum estimated that as early as 2010, there were over 44 million Muslims in Europe, excluding Turkey, accounting for 6% of the European population. Approximately 20 million of them reside within the European Union, representing about 4% of the EU population. Based on demographic research, the Pew Research Center considers Islam to be the fastest-growing religion in Europe and the world.[i]
Europe's Muslim population is divided into Sunnis (90%) and Shiites (5%), alongside other branches such as the Ahmadiyya. Currently, the majority of Sunnis in Europe identify with a moderate form of Islam that has nothing in common with fundamentalism. However, nearly all Muslim educational institutions in Europe are controlled by Salafists and organizations ideologically linked to the radical Muslim Brotherhood movement, which consistently leads to the radicalization of younger generations. The Muslim Brotherhood, operating under various umbrella organizations in Europe—such as the UOIF (Union des organisations islamiques de France) in France, the MCB (Muslim Council of Britain) in the UK, or the UCOII (Unione delle Comunità e Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia) in Italy—has direct ties to the terrorist organization Hamas, which is at war with Israel and stands behind many active BDS organizations.
At first glance, this might appear unrelated to antisemitism, seeming to be purely political opposition to Israel, i.e., anti-Zionism. The problem is that grievances directed at Israel rapidly transform into grievances against Jewish people in other countries, as is clearly evident among Muslims in France today. A new generation, raised on the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood and its anti-Israel ideology—which equates Zionism with Judaism—has internalized the demonization of Jews and, over the past decade, has translated this hatred into everyday hostility. Attacks on Jews are becoming more frequent in Germany, France, the UK, and other European countries, and the spread of Muslim Brotherhood ideology is accelerating the rise of antisemitism in these nations.
The second stream of radical Islam widely present in Europe is Salafism. "Salafiyyah" (derived from the Arabic for "return to the ancestors") represents fundamentalism in its purest form. Salafists believe that to achieve harmony in the world, one must return to the origins—specifically, to the lifestyle of the era of the Prophet Muhammad (7th century), including outward attire and daily routines governed by Sharia law. Salafists are divided into three distinct groups: quietist Salafism, whose adherents focus on dogma and do not actively promote violent jihad; political Salafism, which seeks to establish Islamic rule through electoral processes initially and then maintain it by force; and militant Salafism, which advocates for jihad (Salafi-Jihadism). Salafi-Jihadism is the movement that gave rise to Al-Qaeda, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and ISIS, representing the most radical faction of fundamentalist Islam.
Eurasian Developments
All the aforementioned organizations and movements operate within the post-Soviet space—the Muslim Brotherhood to a lesser extent, and Salafists to a greater extent. Following the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, attempts were made to establish local Salafist organizations in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and former Soviet Muslim republics such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Furthermore, organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir conducted active propaganda campaigns in the Caucasus, the Urals, and the Volga region, drawing the attention of state authorities. This resulted in the near-total dismantling of local cells in the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, Islamic radicalism—specifically Salafism—did not disappear from Eurasia; rather, it transitioned into a different phase.
With the advent of social media, Salafism has increasingly attracted followers within the post-Soviet space. It is no coincidence that the highest percentage of foreign fighters in the ranks of ISIS came from Central Asia and the Russian Federation, rather than Europe or America (where the proportion was much lower). Furthermore, it is notable that among the top five leaders of ISIS, two were former citizens of the USSR. One of them, Abu Omar al-Shishani, became the military minister under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS who declared himself the Caliph of the 21st century.
Salafist propaganda in Europe and Eurasia is identical. This outreach is known as Dawah (the invitation to Islam) and is carried out by various organizations in a virtually uniform manner, utilizing the same rhetorical devices. Salafist Dawah almost invariably incorporates antisemitic rhetoric and defines Jews as "enemies of Allah." This propaganda relies on descriptions of Jews in the Quran and Hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), where they are depicted as betrayers of Allah and killers of His prophets. Moreover, like the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists view Jews in Europe and Asia as Zionists who "trample upon the rights of their Palestinian brothers," and openly conduct propaganda inciting violence against them.
The war in Syria has largely concluded, and fighters are gradually returning home, including to Eurasia. The propaganda of Salafi-Jihadism continues unabated in multiple languages, including Russian, Chechen, Turkish, Arabic, and English. The level of antisemitism is rising. Today, radical Islam represents a growing strategic threat to Jewish communities in Eurasia, just as it already does in Europe. Additionally, Shiite pro-Iranian antisemitic propaganda maintains a significant presence in Eurasia, including in Moscow. This subject warrants a dedicated strategic study.
As part of a strategy to secure Jewish communities in Eurasia, the European experience (and the mistakes of European communities) can serve as a guide. Today, while many European Jewish communities are forced to physically defend themselves against antisemitic attacks, Eurasian communities can take proactive strategic measures. For instance, they can identify which movements are likely to threaten the security of Jewish communities on a political, ideological, or daily level in the near future. To this end, research by specialists in security, antisemitism, and Islamic studies should be initiated. It is also crucial to establish and maintain relations with local law enforcement agencies and lobby key institutions regarding the security of Jewish communities. Organizing a conference on strategic threats to Jewish communities in Eurasia could serve as an initial step toward ensuring a more secure future for the region's Jewish population in the years ahead.
[i] http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/
The views expressed by the experts do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies or the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress.

