Photo: Yad Ben-Zvi Archives, Israeli delegation at the VI World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow, 1957

Summary. Seventy years ago, an organization known today as "Nativ" was established under the Office of the Prime Minister of Israel. Its cadre reserve was "Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet", a branch of the Jewish Agency that facilitated the illegal immigration of European Jews to Mandatory Palestine before, during, and immediately after World War II. Its primary objective became the development of ties between the Jewish state and the Jewish populations of the Communist bloc countries, as well as the coordination of efforts by Israeli and international organizations in the struggle for the repatriation and emigration of Soviet Jewry. While the official and code names of the organization, as well as its methods and operational directions, changed repeatedly, its core purpose remained constant for decades. With the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Israel and the countries of the former USSR and Eastern Europe, the principal function of "Nativ" shifted to consular work and cultural activities, which in turn serves as an important link in the bilateral relations between Jerusalem and the states of Eastern Europe, and in the development of organized Jewish life in the post-Soviet space.

For many years, the State of Israel's struggle on behalf of Soviet and Eastern European Jewry was not only kept out of the public eye but was, to a certain extent, actively concealed. As a consequence, despite several detailed publications that have appeared in the three decades since the collapse of the USSR, the general public remains largely unaware of Israel's actual role.

Speaking in 2021 at an online conference dedicated to the British group of activists fighting for Soviet Jewry, "The 35," with a lecture on Israel's role in its creation, the author of this article heard a telling remark from one of the listeners: "I do not understand how Israel has any relation to this struggle! Everyone knows that it all started in the USA!" But was that indeed the case?

Nechemia Levanon, who headed the Israeli leadership's department for relations and the struggle for the emigration of Soviet and Communist bloc Jews from 1970 to 1982, described this peculiar situation in his book published in the 1990s:[1] "We hid our activities so thoroughly that we managed to classify them not only from the authorities of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, but also from ourselves." Indeed, for many years, the State of Israel's struggle on behalf of Soviet and Eastern European Jewry was not only unpublicized but, to some extent, deliberately concealed. Consequently, despite certain detailed publications that have appeared over the three decades since the dissolution of the USSR, very little is still known to the wider public about Israel's role—even less so in the Russian language. Furthermore, today, many who joined the struggle for Soviet Jews well after its inception attempt to credit themselves not only with its success, but with the very fact of its initiation.

The Israeli Agency for the Protection of Jews

The late 1940s and early 1950s were marked by several severe events for the Jewish people: anti-Semitic demarches in Arab countries in retaliation for the defeat of Arab armies by the Jews in Israel's War of Independence, and a wave of anti-Semitic persecution in the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR. This included the campaign against "cosmopolitanism," the persecution of individual Jewish figures within Communist parties—the most famous of which was the Rudolf Slánský trial in Czechoslovakia, where, among others, two abducted Israelis, Mordechai Oren and Shimon Orenstein, stood trial. Both the general "spirit of the times" and this sequence of events, which profoundly impacted the Jewish world, raised serious concerns within the Israeli leadership regarding the safety of large Jewish communities in many countries, both in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

From the very inception of the State of Israel, the country's leadership consistently appealed to the Soviet Union—at all levels—requesting that Jews be permitted to depart for Israel. Similar steps were taken regarding other countries of the Eastern Bloc, where the process was significantly simpler. For instance, Jews were allowed to leave Romania and Poland relatively freely, in contrast to the USSR, which completely blocked any possibility of repatriation.[2]

Consequently, as early as the late 1940s—marking the end of the period frequently referred to in Israel as the "honeymoon" in relations between Israel and the USSR—the Israeli leadership gradually arrived at the decision to establish a structure dedicated to assisting Jews in countries where contact between the Jewish state and the local Jewish community was restricted. This concerned not only Eastern European states but also Arab nations—essentially, those regions from which Jews could not freely depart for Israel.

At the very end of 1951, Prime Minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: "Reuven Shiloah (the first head of Mossad, the foreign intelligence agency of the State of Israel) proposes the creation of a state structure whose purpose will be operations in Arab countries, assistance in the evacuation of Jews from Eastern Europe, and the gathering of information on the status of Jews in those countries where direct contact with Israel is impossible. It will also serve to rescue the property of Jews from the countries they have fled."

As early as the beginning of 1950, the senior leadership of Israel (initially in closed forums, and over time in public ones) began to articulate Israel's desire to maintain contact with the Jews of the USSR and Eastern European countries. This aspiration culminated in the creation of the "Nativ" organization, whose de facto motto was a phrase publicly delivered by D. Ben-Gurion in his speech on May 21, 1950, at the celebration of the 25th anniversary of Kibbutz Afikim (founded by immigrants from the Soviet Union, formerly named "Kibbutz Hashomer Hatzair from the USSR" — "Kibbutz of the Young Guard Movement from the Soviet Union"). It resonated as follows: "We have not abandoned, are not abandoning, and will never abandon our connection with the Jews of the Soviet Union, and we will always demand that the State of Israel and our brothers in the USSR maintain relations."

In parallel with the discussions on the status of Jews in Eastern Europe and the USSR, the process of establishing a structure for contact with the Jews of Arab states and other Eastern countries was underway. In other words, the diary entry of David Ben-Gurion from late January 1951, cited above, stands as the primary public evidence of the conclusion of an organizational creation process that was by no means simple.

Several individuals were simultaneously involved in the issue of establishing contacts and creating a special structure. Among them was Yeshayahu Trachtenberg (Shaike Dan), one of the leaders of the movement for clandestine immigration established in the mid-1930s—"Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet" ("unofficial" or "parallel" aliyah). He was renowned for having been parachuted into Europe by the British Army during World War II, subsequently helping Jews relocate to Israel after the war. Before, during, and especially after World War II, through the "Bricha" (Escape) project in European countries, "Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet" successfully coordinated the movement of tens and hundreds of thousands of Jews attempting to reach Mandatory Palestine legally and illegally.

An interesting fact: the Soviet leadership was aware of the activities of the "Bricha" movement in Eastern European countries. Since the early 2000s, several declassified Soviet documents have revealed that the leadership of the Soviet army in Eastern Europe was instructed to simply ignore the flow of departing Jews. However, this policy of turning a blind eye ceased abruptly once the activities of the "Bricha" organization crossed the Soviet border. Representatives of the organization operated within the USSR, primarily in regions annexed by the USSR in 1939–1940: in the Baltic states, chiefly Lithuania, as well as in the areas of Lviv and Chernivtsi, where organizational operatives guided Jews across the Polish and Romanian borders, thereby helping them escape the Soviet "paradise" to reach Eastern European countries, from where they could travel relatively freely to Palestine.

Following the establishment of the state, when Jews could migrate to Israel more freely, the need for "Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet" effectively ceased. Shaike Dan approached several statesmen with a proposal to reform the entity into a structure that would study the conditions of and facilitate the repatriation of Jews from Communist bloc countries to Israel.

One of his interlocutors was Reuven Shiloah, who was at that time engaged in establishing the Israeli foreign intelligence service, "Mossad." Parallel to Dan, a similar idea was voiced by Shiloah's assistant, Akiva Lewinsky (the future treasurer of the Jewish Agency "Sochnut"), who was then dealing with repatriation issues, particularly youth repatriation. Based on all the information received, Shiloah approached David Ben-Gurion, whose positive decision soon took practical shape: within a few months, the organization known today as "Nativ" emerged.

Another story is linked to the aforementioned diary entry of Ben-Gurion, which was highly indicative of the relationship model in the early years between the institutions of the young state and the older Jewish structures from the British Mandate era, such as the Jewish Agency "Sochnut." Regarded as an umbrella organization to which "Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet" had nominally been subordinate, Sochnut, unwilling to lose one of its levers of former influence, opposed the decision once it was made. For several months, negotiations ensued between Sochnut and representatives of the state apparatus regarding the subordination of the newly created structure. Ultimately, Ben-Gurion acted in his characteristic style: a letter was sent to the members of the ruling "MAPAI" party (Labor Party of Israel) within the leadership of the Jewish Agency, demanding they vote in accordance with party discipline based on the decision of a special consultative meeting led by the party leader, who was the Prime Minister. This decision mandated the transfer of the new structure, responsible for relations with Jews in countries where direct contact with Israeli representatives was problematic, exclusively to state jurisdiction. The disciplined party members had no choice, and in March 1952, an agreement was signed between the representatives of the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency, confirming this decision.

During its first few months, the new organization, which did not yet have a name, was coordinated by Shaike Dan. However, in early 1953, when the structure corresponding to what "Nativ" subsequently became was finalized, it was headed by the advisor to the Prime Minister (in his capacity as Minister of Defense), Shaul Avigur—a legendary figure in Israeli history. He had been one of the leaders of the "Haganah"—the underground Jewish military organization in Mandatory Palestine—and had even fought alongside Trumpeldor in the famous battle at the Tel Hai settlement. Later, he became the founder and long-term head of the aforementioned "Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet."

One of the names that should be mentioned foremost is Moshe Carmil (Chervinsky), who, alongside Avigur and the previously mentioned Shaike Dan, formed the governing triangle of the young organization. Because it was somewhat naively assumed that transferring operations outside of Israel would make it difficult for the Soviet Union to discover who was establishing contact with the Jews of the Eastern Bloc, Shaul Avigur operated in Zurich, the forward headquarters under Shaike Dan was located in Vienna at the intersection of the Western and Eastern Blocs, and the rear headquarters was situated in Tel Aviv, headed by Moshe Carmil.

What is in Your Name?

The name of Shaul Avigur was also associated with one of the first designations of the organization for relations and protection of Jews who found themselves behind the "Iron Curtain." On the whole, there were many such names in different eras, each reflecting specific aspects of the activities of what is now classified as "Nativ." In its early years of operation, it was commonly referred to by its staff as what Soviet intelligence records termed "Shaul's Department," meaning "Shaul Avigur's Department," in Hebrew "Ha-Mossad shel Shaul." The employees were referred to as "Shaul's people" — "Anshei Shaul."

However, "Nativ" evidently required some distinctive name of its own. Thus, the founders of the organization decided to proceed on the principle of utilizing code words that, at first glance, would mean nothing to the uninitiated. Those who were aware of the operations, however, immediately understood that this referred to "Shaul's Department." The primary criterion was that the name should indirectly reflect a connection to Jews and assistance in repatriation. Around 1953, the acronym "Bilu" appeared and was used for several years, in honor of the early Zionist organization founded in the late 19th century, whose name was based on the biblical phrase from the Book of Isaiah ("Beit Ya'akov Lechu Venedcha" — "House of Jacob, come, let us go"). In 1954, a new name appeared, initially reflecting "Nativ's" activities in Eastern Europe—"Melet" (literally, cement), sharing a root with the Hebrew word "milut" (escape/rescue). This name was used for about a year. In January 1955, another name began to be used, which eventually gave the entire organization its name—"Nativ," meaning "Path."

As can be observed, all of these names—"Bilu," "Melet," and "Nativ"—align with the primary naming principle of Shaul Avigur's department, which reflects its function without disclosing its nature.

The second name, which also reflected one aspect of "Nativ's" operations, was "Bar." In mid-1955, when "Nativ's" focus of interest shifted exclusively to the Jews of Eastern Europe and the USSR, while its other structures and activities were transferred to other state organizations, a decision was made to initiate operations not only in Eastern Europe but also in Western countries. Israel recognized that it could not wage a struggle against a superpower of the Soviet Union's magnitude alone, and required the assistance of both global Jewish communities and non-Jews alike.

The main obstacle to mobilizing this essential support was the global public's disbelief that Jews in the Soviet Union were actually subjected to such severe persecution. It was therefore decided to conduct an informational campaign to explain the true state of affairs. This concept of "explanation" ("hasbara" in Hebrew) served as the basis for the name "Bar," initially assigned to the project and later to an entire department of the organization tasked with disseminating information about Soviet Jews, among other activities in Western countries. This interpretation was maintained by the first head of "Bar," Binyamin Eliav. However, another version exists: some department staff claim that the word "Bar" represents the first two letters of the Hebrew phrase "Brit HaMoatzot" (Soviet Union).

Finally, the third name, which became highly renowned, was the "Liaison Bureau" (Lishkat Ha-Kesher). While "Nativ" and "Bar" were code names that were never published, the "Liaison Bureau" became known both in Western countries and behind the "Iron Curtain," serving effectively as a cover for the operations of "Nativ" and "Bar."

Two stories are also connected to this name. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs relocated from the "Hakirya" government quarter in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 1953, several vacated rooms were occupied by "Nativ" staff, and one of these rooms was the communications room used for transmitting messages. In Hebrew, it came to be called "Lishkat Ha-Kesher" (literally "Liaison Bureau") as yet another code name for the organization. Gradually, however, this designation began to be used as a somewhat coded yet public name for the entire organization. The second version of the name's origin also pertains to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: since "Nativ" was based in Tel Aviv, it assisted the Israeli Foreign Ministry and served as a representative office in central Israel, primarily for receiving and forwarding correspondence to the Ministry's main office. Consequently, addressing "Nativ" was very frequently termed: "To the Liaison Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."

Just as there were several names on the Israeli side—"Nativ," "Bar," "Liaison Bureau"—the Soviet side also operated with several concepts. Curiously, the Soviet security services did not use the word "Nativ." Rather, they used the distorted feminine form "Netiva." Most likely, someone overheard the genitive case of the word "Nativ" without fully understanding its meaning, and it entered official parlance and documents in this form. In open publications, this term first appeared on May 30, 1970, in the newspaper Izvestia, which mentioned, among other things, Israeli tourists backed by the "Netiva" organization, headed by "Colonel Nechemia Levanon." Interestingly, Nechemia Levanon had become the head of "Nativ" only four weeks prior—on March 1, 1970. Thus, this was a form of "greeting" to the new leadership. In books published after the collapse of the USSR dedicated to Israeli intelligence services, this name was also initially used, indicating that individuals from the Soviet security services were behind these publications.

Simultaneously, the KGB used the designation "Russian Department" of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, likely referring to the "Liaison Bureau." For reasons unclear, the KGB distinguished between these two names. For instance, during preparations for the 1980 Moscow Olympics, a document signed by KGB Chairman Andropov noted that "the Russian department of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs is preparing a provocation." When publications about the "Russian Department" standing apart from "Netiva" began to appear in the post-Soviet era, it also became clear that they were authored by former Soviet intelligence officers.

The KGB closely monitored not only "Nativ" representatives but also ordinary Israelis, as indeed they did all foreigners, who were perceived as potential spies. Any meeting with an Israeli required the supervision of a KGB agent, and the agent could be either a staff officer of the Committee or an external informant. Among such agents, according to KGB archives opened in Ukraine, were many Jews and even relatives of the Israelis themselves. Information from such an agent, for example, is contained in a file from 1954 or 1955, when a merchant vessel carrying citrus fruit arrived in the USSR from Israel. Among other arriving Israelis, according to the report of the Soviet agent who interacted with him, was Ariel Sharon's father, Shmuel (Samuil Mordekhaevich) Scheinerman.

There is another interesting and even amusing story regarding the KGB's attitude toward Israelis. In Israel during those years, there was a rule requiring any senior official to Hebraize their surname. Consequently, Shaul Meirov became Shaul Avigur, Yeshayahu Trachtenberg became Yeshayahu Dan, and Moshe Chervinsky became Moshe Carmil. The notorious Isser Halperin became Isser Harel. Similarly, Moshe Chertok became Moshe Sharett. Furthermore, while the Hebraization of surnames within Israel was relatively voluntary, any representative of Israel traveling abroad was required to adopt a Hebrew surname. The Soviet authorities, owing to pervasive suspicion, interpreted this process of changing names not as an assertion of national identity, but as the deployment of operational aliases.

This is particularly evident in Soviet documents from the 1950s: when referring to Avigur or Carmil, they were called Meirov or Chervinsky, and never by their Hebraized surnames. Unfamiliarity with Hebrew realities occasionally led to comical situations. For example, Soviet documents contain references to Grisha (Tzvi) Schenkman, a former employee of Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet who commanded the port of Haifa during the War of Independence and worked alongside Shaike Dan in Vienna in the 1950s, helping Jews emigrate to Israel. Grisha Schenkman refused to Hebraize his surname permanently. However, for travel abroad, he agreed to use the Hebrew surname Segev. In Soviet documents, this surname, perceived as an operational alias, was recorded as Sergeev. In other words, a Soviet official failed to comprehend the name Segev and thus adapted the Hebrew surname to fit his Soviet perception, turning it into the typical Russian surname Sergeev. In reports from the 1960s and 1970s, the surname Sergeev continued to appear, but the two extra letters were crossed out by hand.

In other words, the Israelis, whether intentionally or not, managed to thoroughly confuse the Soviet authorities without even realizing it.

Struggle, Barter, and Other Methods

In many Eastern European countries, Israel was able to reach agreements with local authorities, rendering clandestine operations unnecessary by the mid-1950s: during those years, agreements were concluded with various Eastern European regimes that permitted Jews to legally emigrate to Israel for permanent residence. Thus, for example, a legal channel emerged from Poland, utilized by tens of thousands of Jews who returned under the repatriation scheme of the late 1950s from the USSR. Some of them had been Polish citizens prior to 1939, while others managed to depart using forged documents. The majority ultimately arrived in Israel. There was also a Romanian channel for the departure of former subjects of Bucharest residing in Bukovina, which had been annexed by the USSR in 1939–1940. However, the Romanian case was even more intriguing. From the late 1950s, a "ransom" option was applied to Romanian Jews, initially in the form of a "barter deal." According to some indirect evidence, this was concluded after Nikita Khrushchev told his Romanian counterparts: "Under no circumstances accept cash; instead, conclude barter deals, as they are far more difficult to prove."

Indeed, on several occasions, Arab countries accused Romania, and the USSR as well, of permitting Jews to depart for Israel. The Romanian side demanded evidence—which the Arabs could not provide, as the contacts with Israel were strictly commercial. As a result of this "trade," in the early 1960s, Romanian foreign intelligence, which oversaw the "Jewish" contacts with Israel, became the country's most powerful entity involved in the export of poultry. The reason was simple: it was produced on poultry farms constructed with the assistance of the Jewish state as part of the "barter" agreements.

From the second half of the 1960s, when Khrushchev was no longer in power and Nicolae Ceaușescu led Romania, he decided to terminate the barter system, and within a few years, the arrangement transitioned to full cash ransoms. In addition to payments from Israel, the Romanian side received funds directly from the departing Jews: the assets and property of those leaving were confiscated as a condition for departure from Romania.

The natural question arises: why did the Soviet leadership not agree to barter relations similar to the Romanians? There is as yet no definitive answer to this question. Today, with a portion of Soviet documents published[3], it is clear that although the topic was discussed at the highest level of Soviet leadership, the majority of the party leadership and the security services were resolutely opposed. From the Soviet perspective, the mass departure of citizens of any nationality from the USSR would merely create unwanted excitement, demonstrating that the Soviet system was not the best that a citizen of the USSR could aspire to.

In other words, while the interest of the authorities in Poland or Romania in Jewish emigration lay in the opportunity to generate revenue, acquire advanced technology, or, in the case of the former, common anti-Semitism, in the USSR the departure of any individual from the country was perceived as a failure of the Soviet system. The country of victorious socialism, "marching with giant strides toward communism," could not permit such an admission.

Therefore, regarding the Jews of the USSR, Israel waged a full-scale struggle for emigration, which included, among other things, the search for communication channels in which "Nativ" played a leading role. A prime example is the summer of 1957, when, during the World Festival of Youth and Students in Moscow, meetings between Israelis and Soviet Jews took place behind the scenes. The Israeli delegation was substantial—approximately 200 people—but it was internally divided. Around one hundred delegates represented the Communist Party, and they refused to cooperate with the so-called "Zionist" delegation. Conversely, the Zionist delegation included several Arabs who also assisted in communicating with Soviet Jews. Every evening, the Israeli members of the delegation gathered to converse and exchange information regarding their contacts with Soviet Jews. Naturally, many Soviet Jews attempted to pass notes to their relatives, acquaintances, and friends with whom contact had been lost.

According to some estimates, approximately 200,000 Soviet Jews interacted with Israelis in one way or another. This was not a public manifestation of "entrenched Zionism" (to use Soviet terminology), but simply an opportunity to learn about Israel and Israeli culture: ensembles, dancers, singers, artists, and athletes performed at the festival. Hundreds and thousands of Jews from all corners of the USSR attended each such event.

Understandably, the Soviet authorities attempted to obstruct this. Published KGB documents reveal how they attempted to do so: performances by Israeli delegates were rescheduled without prior notice from one venue to another, sometimes to the opposite end of the city. Often, Jews would arrive at the initially scheduled location only to find that nothing was taking place. Even en route to Moscow, the train carrying the Israeli delegation was subjected to various "disruptions." Stops typically occurred either at night or at supposedly deserted stations. However, Soviet Jews—through their own internal communication channels—managed to ascertain the train's route and assembled at the stations regardless. Photographs exist showing hundreds of people gathered together, dancing, singing, and embracing.

The same occurred during the festival: Jewish youth (and others) constantly interacted with the Israelis. The Zionist delegation consisted primarily of socialists. The Israelis frequently visited the Moscow Choral Synagogue. This was recorded both by Israelis and in Soviet newsreels, which were later used for Soviet anti-Israeli propaganda films. Thousands of people surrounded the synagogue, crowding around the Israelis, attempting to speak in Russian, Hebrew, or Yiddish. Ultimately, upon the Israeli delegation's return, not only were memoirs published, but an entire album of photographs and artifacts received from Soviet Jews was released.

The Situation After Israel's Victory in the Six-Day War

In any event, until 1967, the activities of Israeli representatives in Eastern European countries were conducted openly, and Israelis were permanently stationed in the region. Nativ staff operated directly in Eastern European countries. In June 1967, following the decisive victory of the Israel Defense Forces over the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and their supporters Iraq and Algeria in the Six-Day War, the situation changed dramatically: with the exception of Romania, all Eastern Bloc countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel.

The Romanians, however, continued to conduct business. They recognized that, on the one hand, they would serve as a liaison between the Eastern Bloc and Israel. On the other hand, they deemed it important to demonstrate a degree of independence from Moscow. Thirdly, financial considerations were paramount—no one wished to forgo future financial inflows, particularly as the process of transitioning from barter to cash payments was underway at that time.

In other countries, however, Israelis were no longer present, and contacts with the Jewish populations were severed. This, I suspect, was precisely what the Soviet leadership had anticipated. Indeed, even in earlier times, Israelis had been cautioned that their highly active liaison work with Jews was not viewed favorably by the authorities, despite the fact that, by all international standards, such contacts were not prohibited.

Consequently, when direct communication was disrupted, Israel began to seek alternative methods to maintain contact. The period following the Six-Day War was marked by a surge in Jewish national consciousness, including within the Soviet Union. Not only did small Zionist groups emerge, but a major movement developed, necessitating a means of communicating with the Jewish population. Naturally, they utilized the technologies of the era. Telephone links with Jews in the USSR were established from both Israel and Western Europe. A significant volume of information concerning Jews was transmitted precisely by telephone. Clearly, this method had its advantages and disadvantages. Whenever the Soviet leadership chose, such connections could be blocked entirely. Therefore, at a certain stage, the concept of visiting the USSR as tourists arose.

Despite the severance of relations, the USSR did not prevent the arrival of Israelis, nor did Israel obstruct the entry of Soviet citizens, who could, for example, visit Israel as part of a special delegation on May 9. This delegation invariably included war veterans and, without fail, a representative of "trustworthy" ("trained," to paraphrase a well-known joke) Soviet Jews.

Similarly, Israelis occasionally visited the Soviet Union as tourists using Israeli passports, and sometimes under the citizenship of Western countries. The concept of the "tourist" movement visiting the USSR belonged to a man named Aryeh Kroll, who received the Israel Prize in 2000. Kroll, a native of the USSR, had been brought to Palestine as a young boy. In the 1960s, he succeeded in establishing contact with his family remaining in the USSR.

Aryeh was a representative of "Religious Zionism." Upon visiting the Soviet Union, he realized that in a matter of seconds, he had become a source of information about Israel for Soviet Jews. Being acquainted with both the leadership of the Religious Zionists and Ben-Gurion, he approached them with the idea of sending young people to the USSR to speak about Israel. At a certain point, Kroll was introduced to Shaul Avigur, who favored the idea. The first such group of "young Zionists" departed in 1966. However, in 1967, relations were severed, and Israelis could no longer easily visit the USSR as ordinary tourists. Consequently, Aryeh Kroll turned to Religious Zionists in other countries, and this "tourist movement" gradually established a link between Israel and Soviet Jewry.

The Return of Legality

In the summer of 1988, for the first time in 21 years, an official Israeli delegation returned to the USSR. It operated under the auspices of the Embassy of the Netherlands, which represented Israeli interests in the USSR (while Finland represented Soviet interests in Israel), and its staff included "Nativ" officers who officially began establishing contacts with Soviet Jews. Following the dissolution of the USSR, when the necessity for a struggle on behalf of Jews ceased because they were free to emigrate to Israel or any other country, "Nativ's" operations began to evolve.

In practice, over decades of operation, "Nativ" succeeded in developing a specialization in representing Israel through various channels—at cultural and civic levels—and facilitating bilateral relations. In the early 1990s, Israeli Cultural Centers were established in the countries of the former USSR, which remain active to this day and allow citizens of the former Soviet Union to access information about the State of Israel, its culture, education, history, and to study Hebrew. In other words, they provide an opportunity to become acquainted with Israel as a country open to communication. As noted by the Head of "Nativ," Neta Briskin-Peleg, the "Nativ" cultural centers are institutions designed to strengthen and expand connections with the culture and traditions of the Jewish state. The cultural ties promoted by "Nativ" in the countries of the former USSR in recent decades have become an important link in Israel's bilateral relations with the states of Eastern Europe.

[1] Nechemia Levanon, Ha-kod – «Nativ» (The Code – «Nativ»). Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1995 (in Hebrew)

[2] For further details, see: Yakov Livne, "The Jewish Theme in Relations between Jerusalem and Moscow, 1948-1954, based on materials from the Russian-Israeli Archival Project" // Jews of Europe and Asia: State, Heritage, and Prospects. EAJC Yearbook, Vol. 2 (2019-2020/5780) / Chernin, V. and Khanin, V. (Z.), eds. – Jerusalem and Herzliya: The Institute for the Study of Jewish Communities of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies, 2020, pp. 332 – 349

[3] See Boris Morozov, Documents on Soviet Jewish Emigration (Frank Cass, 1999); Vladimir Khanin, Documents on Ukrainian Jewish Identity and Emigration, 1944-1990 (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Ziva Galili and Boris Morozov, Exiled to Palestine: The Emigration of Soviet Zionist Convicts, 1924-1934 (London: Routledge, 2007); Ze'ev Khanin and Boris Morozov, “Traitors to the Motherland”: Jewish Emigration through the Eyes of the Soviet Authorities [Bogdim beMoledet: Hahagira hayehudit beeynei hashilton haSovieti] (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 2005, in Hebrew); Boris Morozov, Jewish Emigration in Light of New Documents (Moscow: Ivrus, 1998);