Photo: Yossi Zeliger, Keren HaYesod

Over the past third of a century, the concept of "aliyah" has been clearly associated with the members of the "great aliyah" of Jews from the USSR and post-Soviet countries, who today constitute approximately 17% of the Jewish population and about 13% of the total population of Israel. Stereotypes associated with this group are both positive and negative, but overall there was a consensus in the country that "Russian-speaking" aliyah played a critical role in the economic, social, and cultural development of the local society. The new wave of repatriation from the former USSR, which arrived after the start of the war in Ukraine, was also generally well-received. However, in parallel, this group became the target of negative assessments and comments, including allegations that the majority of these people do not intend to reside permanently in Israel and contribute to the development of the Jewish state. There were also concerns that, due to a high proportion of individuals who do not meet the religious (halakhic) definition of Jewishness accepted in Israel, it could pose a challenge to the Jewish character of the State. Research shows that actual facts do not support any of these alarmist clichés.

The repatriation (aliyah) of diaspora Jews to their historical homeland in Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel)/Palestine has always been the primary mission of the Zionist movement and the State of Israel. In turn, the integration of repatriates (olim, i.e., "those who ascended") into local society was and remains a crucial element of nation-building and one of the key factors in the political, economic, social, and cultural development of the Jewish state.

In the last third of a century, the concept of "aliyah" was clearly associated with the "great aliyah" of Jews from the USSR and post-Soviet countries, whose total number from 1989 to the present has reached approximately 1.25 million people, constituting about three-quarters of all repatriates worldwide during the same period. It is logical that topics related to this group of immigrants, who, along with their children and grandchildren born in Israel, make up about 17% of the Jewish and around 13% of the country's total population, were and remain a prominent part of the national agenda. The stereotypes associated with them—both positive and negative—are an important element of the public consciousness. Nevertheless, despite all the traditional friction between long-time residents and newcomers, a general consensus existed in the country that "Russian-speaking" aliyah played a critical role in the Israeli "economic miracle" of the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as in strengthening the demographic balance of society, the country's defense capabilities, and the development of its culture.

“The War Aliyah” and Its Critics

By the same logic, the new wave of repatriation from the former USSR—totaling approximately 70,000 people who arrived in Israel after the armed invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops on February 24, 2022—should have been viewed in the same light. It was, in fact, a continuation of the so-called "Putin aliyah" of 2014–2021, during which around 130,000 repatriates arrived in the country, more than half of them from Russia and about 35% from Ukraine.

Indeed, there were many positive reactions to the appearance of this group of new citizens in the Israeli social landscape. However, concurrently, the public sphere was inundated with an unprecedented stream of negative assessments and comments regarding this group, voiced by a number of politicians, commentators, journalists, religious authorities, and other public figures, primarily from conservative and right-wing radical circles in Israel.   

Their main grievances against the members of the new wave of repatriation from Russia and other countries of the former USSR included, first, widely publicized assertions that the majority of these people are "fictitious repatriates," meaning they do not intend to live permanently in Israel and, consequently, do not plan to contribute to the development of the Jewish state. Instead, they are allegedly only interested in taking advantage of the state assistance package (including health insurance and social benefits) entitled to new citizens and obtaining an Israeli passport, which allows visa-free or simplified entry into most developed countries.   

The second theme is the conviction that there is a fundamental (substantive) challenge to the Jewish character of the State of Israel due to the high proportion of individuals within the "war" (as well as "Putin's") aliyah who do not meet the religious (halakhic) definition of Jewishness accepted in Israel, according to which a Jew is a person born to a Jewish mother or who converted to Judaism in accordance with a state-recognized procedure.

Regarding the inclination to leave, this topic, in the context of the supposedly weak integration of Russian-speaking Israelis, has been debated for at least two decades, occasionally reaching a high emotional pitch and creating an impression of an extremely widespread problem in the minds of average Israelis. In practice, the total share of immigrants from the former USSR who left the country over all the years of mass repatriation of this group is about 14%, which is less than among immigrants from any other country, with the exception of Ethiopia and, at certain times, France.

For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that the proportion of (re-)emigrants who returned to their country of origin or moved to third countries among members of the "Putin" and "war" aliyah was significantly higher, but even then, it did not exceed the proportion of such individuals among repatriates of recent years from almost any Western country. Moreover, flashy headlines like "30% of repatriates who came from Russia in 2022 left the country," which preface texts designed to support claims of a "passport aliyah from Russia," often contain obvious distortions that, upon closer inspection, have little in common with the actual data from the Israeli government agencies cited by the authors of such publications.

The situation is somewhat more complex with the second declaration made by critics of the "Russian" aliyah. The percentage of "non-Jews according to Halakha" among Russian-speaking applicants for Israeli citizenship based on the Law of Return has indeed gradually increased, from 12–20% in the early 1990s to about 55–60% among those who arrived in Israel in the second decade of this century. Overall, the number of individuals registered as "non-Jews" admitted during the first 30 years of the "great aliyah" from the former USSR (1989–2019) was slightly over 300,000 people—just over 30% of all repatriates of this period, forming a highly controversial socio-legal category within local society. The Israeli Ministry of Interior registered them as non-Jews or individuals "without ethno-confessional affiliation," while the Central Bureau of Statistics continued to count them under the category of "Jews and others," thereby including them in the country's "extended Jewish population."

By and large, this is a natural situation reflecting a long-standing and far-reaching process of assimilation of Diaspora Jews, which is why virtually every Jewish community in the world today, in varying proportions, includes both an ethnic "core" (persons of homogeneous Jewish origin, typically possessing a strong Jewish self-consciousness) and a "cloud" (descendants of mixed marriages and non-Jewish members of Jewish households) of the Jewish population. Practice shows that while in "quiet times" the share of ethnic and Halakhic Jews moving to Israel is significantly higher than their share in the Jewish (in the broad sense of the word) community in the country of origin, in dramatic circumstances—wars, political upheavals, a sharp rise in social tension, outbreaks of antisemitism, and other social (as well as anthropogenic and natural) disasters act as triggers for mass migration, the Jewish segment of which most often represents a representative cross-section of the "extended Jewish population" of a specific country. This was precisely the picture presented by the first, relatively largest segment of the "great Aliyah" from the (former) USSR in the first half of the 1990s, and the current "war aliyah" from Russia and Ukraine, as well as from France in 2012–2016, when a sharp rise in antisemitism in that country, according to some views, called into question "the very existence of local Jewish communities."

In other words, aliyah to Israel in such cases is a reflection of what the Jewish Diaspora is. This, however, proved to be a weak argument for those in Israel who, since the late 1990s, have expressed concern over the growing number of new citizens who are weakly connected to Jewish culture and civilization. The validity of such concerns is not always obvious. By focusing exclusively on religious-legal (i.e., Halakhic) definitions of Jewishness, this approach ignores other existing approaches to the definition and self-determination of Jewishness in the modern world, including ethnicity, culture, ancestry, parentage, family and group heritage, and others.

As has been repeatedly proven, the identity of Russian-speaking Jewish communities is primarily ethnic rather than religious, and this holds true for both the core of the "extended Jewish population" of the former USSR and persons of mixed origin. It should be added that, as experience shows, moving to Israel and integrating into the culture of its Jewish majority typically activates a powerful post-assimilation mechanism. Most children and grandchildren of Jews acquire or strengthen their Jewish identity and Israeli civic identification within a relatively short period after moving. It is also indicative that, according to a study conducted in April and May 2022 by the Israeli Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, two-thirds of the surveyed repatriates from the period of the military conflict considered the Jewish state "their country" to a very large or simply large extent, just weeks or a few months after arrival.

The (Ethno-)Political Context

Nevertheless, alarmist discussions surrounding the "unprecedentedly high" proportion of halakhic non-Jews in the aliyah from Russia and Ukraine over the last 9–10 years have periodically flared up with renewed vigor. Along with them have come demands to amend the Law of Return, stripping certain categories of descendants of mixed marriages and their family members of the right to repatriate (and, consequently, of the right to participate in Jewish events and receive services from community organizations in the Diaspora). While previously such demands circulated mainly as abstract ideas, the years 2020 and 2021 saw the first, at the time unsuccessful, attempts to formulate them into previously unthinkable legislative initiatives. With the formation of a new ruling coalition after the Knesset elections in November 2022, in which the tone on civil issues was set by ultra-Orthodox religious parties ("Haredim") and the most conservative factions of religious Zionists (the so-called "Hardal") who adopted their agenda in this area, such initiatives moved into the practical sphere.

The explanation for this turn of events, which shocked many, from the historically established understanding of aliyah as an absolute good for Israel regardless of the motives of specific new citizens, is, like much else in Israel, primarily political. For many decades, the main political divide in Israeli politics was the Arab-Israeli conflict, which dictated the division of society into "right" and "left" (under the models of "peace for peace" and "peace for land," respectively). In recent years, however, this topic has begun to recede to the periphery of the national agenda. This shift was driven by the "Abraham Accords" (the normalization of Israel's relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, in addition to existing peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, with the prospect of other Arab nations joining the process) and the marginalization of the Palestinian Arab issue in regional geopolitical discourse.

Against this backdrop, civil issues have come to the fore, primarily the relevance to modern realities of the entire complex of norms, rules, and understandings operating within the framework of the so-called secular-religious status quo (i.e., the agreed-upon and accepted norms of relations between state and religion) established at the dawn of Israeli statehood. More broadly, it concerns the understanding of the meaning—ethno-national or religious—attributed by supporters of various approaches to the idea of the Jewish democratic character of the State of Israel seven and a half decades after its proclamation.

This topic acquired particular resonance in the interval between the Knesset elections in April and September 2019, in the form of a public debate on the political status of religious communities and the fair distribution of the "civic and economic burden." This included the fate of the draft law on the conscription of ultra-Orthodox youth into the IDF, from which they are automatically exempt as long as they are enrolled in religious schools (yeshivas and kollels), officially dedicating all their time to the study of religious texts without the right to employment—which annually deprives the national economy of tens of thousands of much-needed workers. Soon, the debate expanded to the entire complex of norms, rules, and understandings related to personal and civil status (marriages and divorces, the definition of Jewishness, the rights of various religious communities to conduct the conversion process, etc.), the regulation of necessary work, and the operations of service and entertainment businesses on Shabbat, among others.

The community of immigrants from the former USSR became, in many ways, a symbol of this confrontation. Its members, in their mass, share right-wing ideology but are simultaneously almost completely aligned with the idea of Israel's Jewish identity in its ethno-national sense, and the civic agenda resulting from this approach. This naturally drew resentment from circles that share a completely different understanding of the Jewish character of Israel.

The negative clichés put forward at the time by politicians and public figures of that camp against immigrants from the former USSR, depicting them as "non-Jews and haters of religion," coupled with claims that politicians representing the community allegedly "encourage the immigration of such persons to Israel," had very little to do with reality. Nevertheless, they partially took root in public discourse, extending far beyond the traditional grievances of "long-time residents" toward "new Israelis" who allegedly are slow to adopt an Israeli identity and absorb the spirit of local culture.

While the critics from the conservative bloc can do very little at this stage with the "veteran core" of Israel's Russian-speaking community, it may seem logical to them—cynical as it may sound—at least not to increase its potential. This likely explains the powerful propaganda campaign currently underway in the media, social networks, and corridors of power, with the clear objective of achieving public legitimacy for changing the parameters of the Law of Return. To begin with, this involves repealing the clause that allows the autonomous repatriation of "grandchildren" of Halakhic Jews—without whom, presumably, many of their relatives of "half-Jewish" and fully Jewish origin would also hesitate to come. To achieve this, there are attempts to present members of the new Russian-speaking wave as "opportunists devoid of Jewish roots" who seek to exploit the opportunities Israel offers "without having any emotional connection to it." This includes highlighting and generalizing marginal phenomena in this milieu that are indeed real and irritating to Israelis, including Russian-speakers themselves.    

Concurrently, public opinion poll data are periodically introduced into the media space, which at first glance confirm the readiness of the majority of Israelis to accept the proposed legislative changes. Among the recent "salvos" of such materials, eagerly published in the media, were the results of studies conducted at the request or on the initiative of the "Chotam" organization, which declares its goal to be "the preservation and development of the Jewish character of the State of Israel" in the understanding of the most conservative wing of the ultra-Orthodox national camp (Hardal).

According to one such study published on June 26, 2023, by the website of the Arutz 7 radio station close to this camp, "the majority of Israelis are concerned about the immigration of Goyim (non-Jews) to Israel and, consequently, the decline in the share of the country's Jewish population." As a result, 59% of respondents deemed it correct to amend the Law of Return so that people who are not Halakhic Jews (meaning representatives of not only the third but also the second generation of mixed marriages) could not repatriate to Israel and obtain Israeli citizenship. Notably, this opinion was held by 88% of "religious" respondents (without specifying the proportion of Haredim and religious Zionists), 64% of "traditionalists," and 43% of secular Israelis surveyed in this study.

It is worth noting that the data presented in the publication diverge significantly from other credible studies on the same topic known to us. For instance, according to a representative survey of over a thousand respondents conducted in September 2022 on behalf of the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, only a third of the surveyed Israeli Jews supported the idea of restricting the right to repatriation and immediate citizenship of the Jewish state solely to "Halakhic Jews" (among secular Israelis, only 17% held this view). Another 6.5% were willing to revoke the right to repatriation only for "grandchildren" of Halakhic Jews while keeping it for their "children"; a third of Israelis at the time believed that the Law of Return should not be changed, and about 20% of respondents stated that the country should be open to anyone who feels Jewish. (This very principle was embedded in the original 1950 version of the Law of Return, according to which a person who comes to Israel and sincerely declares their Jewishness should have the right to repatriate and receive immediate citizenship). A similar distribution of opinions was shown in a study commissioned by the Israeli Immigration Policy Center in May of the same year.

Do Israelis Need Aliyah from the Former USSR?

As of today, it is obvious that the Jewish community in Russia remains the only statistically significant resource for large-scale repatriation to Israel—though not everyone in Israel's political leadership seems enthusiastic about this prospect. Much will also depend on the opinions of native Israelis and veteran residents, including those repatriates from the USSR and post-Soviet countries who have lived in Israel for decades, regarding their attitude toward the very idea of repatriation from Russia and other post-Soviet countries. In practical terms, are Israelis ready to demand that the government encourage repatriation from the former USSR by allocating substantial resources to it?

The answer to this question appears to be ambivalent. The most negative stance on this point—"definitely not"—was expressed during the aforementioned Ministry of Aliyah survey in September 2023 by Haredi Jews and Jews who observe religious and cultural traditions to a greater or lesser extent (a quarter and a third of those surveyed, respectively). The lowest proportion of "negativists" toward the "Russian" aliyah was among secular Israelis, while religious Zionists occupied an intermediate position on this issue. However, the share of those who believed that repatriation from the former USSR should be encouraged to a large or even very large extent was higher among Haredim than in any other group—over 62%, compared to nearly 55% among secular Israelis, almost 47% among religious Zionists, and 35.5% among traditionalists.

Communal and ethnic origin also introduced differences. Ashkenazi Jews and immigrants from Western countries—Europe, North and South America—were significantly more in favor of actively encouraging aliyah from the former USSR than Sephardic Jews, immigrants from Asian and African countries, and descendants of native Israelis. Among the surveyed repatriates from the former USSR themselves, the share of those sharing the opinion that repatriation from their countries of origin should be encouraged (68.5%) was higher than in any other group, and 1.5 times higher than the sample average.

Overall, nearly half of the respondents in the sample were in favor of stimulating aliyah from Russia, Ukraine, and other post-Soviet countries to a "large" or "very large extent" and investing resources in their integration in Israel. Another quarter of those surveyed were willing to do so to a "moderate extent," and only slightly over 20% believed that only limited resources should be invested in such projects, or none at all.

Is Conversion a Panacea?

Nonetheless, completely ignoring the presence within the Israeli Jewish collective of a significant group of people with an undefined ethno-legal status does not seem right to the majority of Israelis either. The solution to the problem is seen in giyur—conversion to Judaism, which, from the perspective of Jewish tradition, means joining the Jewish collective in both a religious and ethnic sense.

On this point, too, the signals sent by Israeli society are contradictory. On one hand, as shown by a study commissioned by the Ministry of Absorption (Aliyah and Integration) in 2008 in connection with a large-scale conversion program for repatriates, 74% of secular Israeli Jews believed that the conversion of repatriates of non-Jewish and mixed origin was necessary, even if the latter "are not thrilled with the idea." This was because, in the respondents' view, the mass immigration of non-Jews could lead to negative processes in Israel. On the other hand, the share of native Israelis and long-time residents who are confident that conversion is not a critical condition for integration into Israeli society also consistently exceeds 60% of those surveyed.

Roughly the same trends were documented in a study of Jewish identity and culture in Israel conducted in 2009 by the Guttman Center at the Israel Democracy Institute. There was a broad consensus among those surveyed that one can be a "good Jew" without observing religious rituals (93% answered in the affirmative). Concurrently, however, the majority of Israeli Jews (73%) believed that the optimal path "into Jewishness" is Orthodox conversion—even if the person does not subsequently adhere to an Orthodox lifestyle. (48% of respondents were willing to accept non-Orthodox conversion).

A study by the same institute conducted in January 2022 showed that the proportion of those who saw the solution to the problem in encouraging repatriates who are not "Halakhic Jews" to formalize their Jewish status through a simplified conversion procedure had decreased over the past 13 years, but still constituted more than half (54%) of the surveyed Jews. Among secular Jews and traditionalists, this figure was 76.5% and 56% respectively—in contrast to 35% among religious Orthodox Jews.   

At the same time, the vast majority of those surveyed (87%) in the 2009 IDI study supported free repatriation and the practice of immediate citizenship for any Diaspora Jew, while 53% and 43%, respectively, agreed to preserve the same rights for non-Jewish spouses and the third generation of mixed families. In a study conducted in September 2022, commissioned by the Israeli Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, the majority of respondents believed it was correct either to leave unchanged or even to expand the category of persons entitled to repatriation and immediate citizenship of the Jewish state under the Law of Return. The idea of restricting this right only to "Halakhic Jews" was supported by a third of those surveyed, while 6.5% were ready to revoke the right to repatriation only for "grandchildren of Jews." A similar distribution of opinions was shown in a study commissioned by the Israeli Immigration Policy Center in May of the same year.

In any event, if the data from these and other similar studies are to be believed, the bulk of Israel's Jewish community remains committed to the Zionist idea of Kibbutz Galuyot (the ingathering of exiles) as the declared goal of the Jewish state. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.