In recent years, Azerbaijan has emerged as the closest partner of the Jewish state among all nations with a traditionally Muslim-majority population. Although the Republic of Azerbaijan is a secular state where religion is constitutionally separated from the government, it would be naive to assume that the Islamic factor plays no role in relations between Baku and Jerusalem. Nonetheless, for decades, relations between the two countries have remained stable and, in essence, free of crisis. 

This observation also directly applies to the highly prestigious standing of the Jewish community in Azerbaijan.  The author, who visited the Mountain and Ashkenazi communities of Baku during his missions on behalf of the Jewish Agency (Sokhnut) in the autumn of 2022 and early June 2025,  as well as the district center of Quba (Guba)—one of the most significant traditional settlement hubs of Mountain Jews—and the village of Privolnoye, inhabited by Russian-speaking Gerim and Karaite Subbotniks,  can confirm this conclusion based on personal experience.

The fact that Azerbaijan and Israel have cooperated closely for decades, not only in trade but also in security, is widely known. In recent years, Azerbaijan has become the closest partner of the Jewish state among all countries where the majority of the population traditionally adheres to Islam: according to official data, 96% of Azerbaijan's population practices this religion[1].

According to estimates, approximately three-quarters of them are Shiites, a group to which, at least nominally, the vast majority of ethnic Azerbaijanis, as well as the Iranian-speaking Talysh and Tats, belong. The remainder are Sunnis, which is how Lezgins and representatives of other Dagestani ethnic groups residing in the country (Avars, Akhvakhs, Buduchs, Khinalugs, Kryts, Tsakhurs), Meskhetian Turks, and Kurds generally identify. Notably, the author did not encounter any friction between the followers of these two branches of Islam in Azerbaijan.  Thus, the line of demarcation appears to run along ethnolinguistic rather than strictly sectarian lines.

Furthermore, characterizing Azerbaijan as an Islamic state would not be entirely accurate, as the Constitution defines the Republic of Azerbaijan as a secular state where religion is separated from the state. However, despite the strictly limited role of Islam in Azerbaijani politics, it would be naive to assume that the Islamic factor plays no role in bilateral relations, if only in the form of pressure from Azerbaijan's partners within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (internal pressure factors are more difficult to assess, given the limited scope for opposition media operations in the country). It is sufficient to note that Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Tel Aviv only in 2023, thirty years after Israel established its embassy in Baku.

Nevertheless, for decades, relations between the two countries have remained stable and essentially crisis-free, with the sole exception of the 2017 incident involving the arrest of Israeli blogger Alexander Lapshin by Azerbaijani authorities[3]. However, this arrest was in no way related to the Arab-Israeli conflict; rather, it was prompted by the fact that Alexander Lapshin, who also holds Russian citizenship, visited the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh and documented it in his blog. Moreover, in a certain sense, Israelis enjoy an advantage over citizens of most countries when entering Azerbaijan: in 2010, President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree terminating the automatic issuance of visas to foreigners upon arrival at Azerbaijani airports. This required them to obtain a visa in advance from Azerbaijani consulates. An exception was made solely for citizens of Turkey and Israel.

There is another important indicator. Given the aforementioned overwhelming majority of "ethnic Muslims" within the population of Azerbaijan, one might theoretically expect that peace and cooperation exist between the governments but not between the peoples—as is the case, for example, with Jordan and Egypt, with which Israel has long maintained diplomatic relations. However, the situation in Azerbaijan in this regard differs fundamentally from those two Arab nations. It could be said that it resembles the attitude toward Israelis in Turkey prior to the rise of the Islamist Justice and Development Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in the early 2000s.

The author visited Azerbaijan twice as part of his work for the Jewish Agency (Sokhnut) – first in the autumn of 2022, immediately after the mobilization announcement in the Russian Federation, and again in early June 2025. In addition to Baku, he visited the regional center of Quba (Guba) in northeastern Azerbaijan and the village of Privolnoye in the Jalilabad District in the southeast. In Israel, these localities, if known at all, are recognized strictly within a Jewish context. Quba is known as one of the key traditional centers of Mountain Jewish settlement, and Privolnoye as a village of Russian-speaking Gerim and Karaite Subbotniks, where Mountain Jewish families also resided. However, the actual situation on the ground is significantly different.

According to the 2020 census, the town of Quba itself had a population of 25.3 thousand, of which 85.5% were Azerbaijanis, 10.2% Lezgins, and 3.1% Russians. The Jewish population is concentrated in the administratively subordinate settlement of Krasnaya Sloboda (Qırmızı Qəsəbə), separated from Quba proper by the narrow Kudialchay River. The population of Krasnaya Sloboda (almost exclusively Mountain Jews) is estimated at 3.5 thousand. Thus, Jews represent a notable but by no means dominant ethnic element in Quba. As for Privolnoye, the Judaic population almost entirely left the village in the 1990s, with the majority emigrating to Russia, while a smaller portion repatriated to Israel or relocated to the Baku metropolitan area. According to the 2009 census, Privolnoye had 4,484 residents, almost exclusively Azerbaijanis. Only several dozen Gerim and Subbotniks remain. The history of the village is now preserved only by a large cemetery with inscriptions in Hebrew and Russian.

Consequently, the author interacted with Azerbaijanis not only in the capital but also in the aforementioned provincial localities. Throughout these visits, he never encountered any manifestations of hostility toward himself as a Jew or an Israeli. On the contrary, many Azerbaijanis expressed affinity for Israelis and the State of Israel, emphasizing the critical importance of Azerbaijan's cooperation with the Jewish state in securing victory in the Second Karabakh War of 2020. This war resulted in the Azerbaijani army reclaiming most of the territory previously controlled by the forces of the Republic of Artsakh, while the remaining territory of the unrecognized state was blockaded by Azerbaijani forces.

Regarding the hospitality of the people of Azerbaijan, it should be noted that the author interacted not only with acquaintances or those connected to him through work, but also with completely random individuals. It must be emphasized that the default language of the streets in Azerbaijan is now Azerbaijani, including in Baku, which until the late 1980s was a multi-ethnic metropolis where Russian served as the lingua franca. Many middle-aged and younger Azerbaijanis do not speak Russian at all. The author knows several dozen phrases in Turkish, which he utilized when interlocutors had no command of Russian. In any case, there was never any doubt that he was a foreigner, and when asked where he was from, the author always replied that he was from Israel. The only exception was during the days following the start of the IDF operation against Iran, when all Israelis abroad, particularly in Azerbaijan, which borders Iran directly, were advised to maintain a low profile.

The transition of the Iran-Israel confrontation into an open, full-scale conflict occurred while the author was in Baku, undoubtedly adding gravity to his observations during the second trip. On June 13, 2025, with the launch of Operation "People Like a Lion," the situation shifted dramatically. Notably, heavily armed security personnel immediately appeared at Baku synagogues, a measure not previously observed. However, this and other security measures implemented at the time were not prompted by any hostility toward Israelis or Jews from the local population, but rather by apprehensions that Iranian agents might execute acts of terror against them on Azerbaijani territory. Such a scenario was deemed highly plausible, given that Azerbaijani security services had foiled an attempted terror attack against the Israeli embassy in Baku by Iranian operatives in November 2023 [3].

The author had occasions to encounter Iranians in Baku. During his trip in the autumn of 2022, he stayed in a hotel where a significant portion of the guests were Iranian tourists. Some of them were aware that there were Israelis among the guests. While the Iranian tourists did not actively seek contact with Israelis, they exhibited no hostility. It was evident that they had traveled to escape the strict restrictions imposed by the Islamic regime in Iran, particularly the prohibition on alcohol for Muslims. In Azerbaijan, alcohol is widely available.  Nevertheless, the presence of a substantial number of Iranians in Baku, many of whom are ethnic Azerbaijanis, naturally creates an environment where Iranian intelligence operatives can easily blend in.

In conclusion, a few observations regarding the attitude of Azerbaijanis toward the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In private conversations in 2022—prior to the deterioration of Azerbaijani-Russian relations in the winter of 2024/2025, caused by the Russian air defense shoot-down of an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft on December 25, 2024—the majority of Azerbaijanis met by the author sympathized with Ukraine, though generally in a passive manner. There were also those who sympathized with Russia; they were few, but they did not conceal their views. Interestingly, Azerbaijanis who condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine pointed out that many supporters of Russia were "Russian-speaking" (including Russian-speaking ethnic Azerbaijanis who watch Russian television) and "Lezgins who have relatives in Russia." In any case, it is reasonable to assume that currently, as the Azerbaijani authorities have adopted a more distinct pro-Ukrainian stance and implemented measures to restrict Russian propaganda (such as closing the Russian House in Baku), these steps have influenced the public sentiment on the Azerbaijani streets regarding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

[1] Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Presidential Library, P. 2: https://www.webcitation.org/616xyRI4u?url=http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_en/atr_din.pdf

[2] On this case, see: “European Rights Court finds Baku Authorities Guilty of trying to kill blogger”, Radio Liberty, 21.5.2021: https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-guilty-killing-blogger-lapshin-european-rights-court/31266991.html

[3]  Itamar Eichner, "Attack on Israel Embassy in Azerbaijan Thwarted. First Publication" (איתמר אייכנר, “סוכל פיגוע נגד שגרירות ישראל באזרבייג’ן. פירסום ראשון”), Ynet, 17.11.23