Photo: Fred Romero

Historically, Poland played an important role in the history of the Jewish people. Prior to World War II, Jews constituted a highly visible segment of the country's population. According to the 1931 census, over 3 million of its citizens practiced Judaism, and 8.56% identified Yiddish as their mother tongue. The Holocaust and subsequent waves of mass emigration of surviving Polish Jews (primarily to Israel) have resulted in the Jewish community currently being a numerically insignificant and highly assimilated minority. Following the launch of the full-scale Russian armed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Poland became one of the most prominent destinations for Ukrainian emigration, including a relatively small but statistically notable Jewish component.  Experts estimate the total number of individuals of post-Soviet origin with Jewish roots currently residing in Poland to be between 5,000 and 10,000.

Interacting with numerous non-Jewish refugees from Ukraine living in Poland, the author could not help but notice a cautious, and sometimes openly hostile, attitude from nearly a majority of them toward Russians as such, regardless of their political views. However, within the Jewish environment, the attitude toward the small number of Jewish expatriates from Russia remains entirely tolerant. It can be argued that the Russian language serves as a unifying factor within the Jewish community of post-Soviet emigrants.

It is anticipated that the decision of the Polish authorities to terminate the special status of Ukrainian refugees by the spring of 2026, thereby aligning their status with that of other non-EU immigrants, will to some extent prompt those eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return to repatriate to Israel.

Since 2022, the author has had multiple opportunities to visit Poland, primarily serving as an emissary of the Jewish Agency. During these visits, I traveled to Warsaw, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, and Chełm. In 2022, immediately following the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, I communicated with hundreds of Ukrainian refugees for whom Poland served as a transit point on their journey to Israel. Later, I participated in Jewish Agency events attended by individuals of Jewish descent from Ukraine, Belarus, and other post-Soviet states who had settled in Poland. I also interacted with local Jews and Israelis living in Poland, including representatives of Jewish and Israeli organizations. This experience provided a clearer understanding of the overall state of contemporary Jewish life in Poland and the role of Russian-speaking Jews within it. Having also visited several other EU countries in recent years where Jewish emigrants from Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Federation have settled (primarily Germany, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania), as well as Ukraine, I believe I can offer a highly objective perspective on certain specific aspects of their situation in Poland.

Poland is renowned as a country that played a significant role in the history of the Jewish people. Prior to the Holocaust, Jews constituted a highly visible portion of the nation's population. It is sufficient to note that according to the 1931 census, 9.76% of Poland's inhabitants (over 3 million people) practiced Judaism, and 8.56% designated Yiddish as their mother tongue. In 1939, Jews represented 29.1% of the population of Warsaw. The Holocaust and subsequent waves of mass emigration of surviving Jews from Poland (mainly to Israel) have led to a situation where Jews today represent a numerically minor and heavily assimilated minority. Nonetheless, for historical reasons, Warsaw and other Polish cities feature numerous streets and landmarks named after prominent Jewish figures, memorial plaques with inscriptions in Yiddish and Hebrew, and similar heritage sites.

According to most estimates published from the 1970s to the present day, the number of Jews in Poland does not exceed 5,000. This figure is based on data from local secular and religious Jewish organizations in the country, primarily the Social and Cultural Association of Jews in Poland (TSKZ), founded in 1950,[1] and the Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Poland, founded in 1993. However, during the 2021 census—conducted just prior to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent influx of Ukrainian refugees, including Jews, into Poland—17,156 residents identified themselves as Jewish. This discrepancy is likely explained by the fact that the majority of Jews living in the country do not participate in the activities of Jewish organizations and do not maintain contact with them, or—which seems more probable—are not officially registered with them. I have also heard assertions that officially registered Jewish communities and organizations in Poland have long avoided attracting new members and even discouraged enrollment, as community membership carried certain rights regarding Jewish communal real estate.

Following the fall of the communist regime and the democratization of the country, a process of returning to Jewish roots began among some fully assimilated descendants of Jews (typically of mixed heritage) whose parents or even grandparents had identified or passed as Polish Christians. Since the early 2000s, this process has been actively supported by the Israeli organization Shavei Israel, which refers to them as the "hidden Jews of Poland"[2]. Estimates of the number of "hidden Jews"—that is, Poles with Jewish ancestry—range from 50,000 to 100,000 or even higher, though this remains a small fraction of Poland's total population (approx. 37 million). The reliability of these estimates is low, as "hidden Jews" in most cases lack documents confirming their connection to Jewish heritage. Nonetheless, there is a visible influx of these individuals returning to their roots (often through orthodox or reform conversion) and joining Jewish communities and organizations, where they may already constitute the majority of young activists. Additionally, several hundred Israelis reside in Poland—primarily in Warsaw—many of whom obtained Polish citizenship as descendants of former emigrants from the country.

The most important secular institutions of Jewish culture in Poland are the POLIN Museum of the History of Polish Jews, opened in 2013 on the territory of the former Warsaw Ghetto and directly adjacent to the Monument to the Ghetto Heroes; the Ester Rachel and Ida Kaminska State Jewish Theater in Warsaw, founded in 1949[3]; the Emanuel Ringelblum Jewish Historical Institute (ZIH), founded in 1947[4]; and the monthly publication Słowo Żydowskie ("Jewish Word", featuring a Yiddish header "Dos Yiddishe Vort" on the right side), established by TSKZ in 1992[5]. The primary working language of these institutions, as well as of Jewish community events, is Polish. Yiddish has almost completely ceased to be a spoken language among Polish Jews. This latter circumstance is highly significant for the integration of post-Soviet emigrants into local Jewish communal life, as the vast majority of them do not speak Yiddish either. As a tribute to tradition, the Jewish monthly still features several pages in Yiddish; however, it is telling that from 2008 to 2018 these pages were edited by Israeli-born Kobi (Yaakov) Weitzner, and in recent years by Moscow-born US citizen Yuri Vedenyapin. At the same time, extensive work is being done in Poland to translate Jewish literature from Yiddish into Polish. From 2010 to 2014, the quarterly journal "Cwiszn"[6] (meaning "between" in Yiddish) was published in Warsaw in Polish, dedicated entirely to Jewish literature and culture, as well as the translation of Yiddish texts into Polish. Characteristically, the absolute majority of its contributors, as well as current actors at the Warsaw Jewish Theater and staff members at both the POLIN Museum and the Jewish Historical Institute, are non-Jewish.

In addition, Jewish Community Centers (JCCs) supported by the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) operate in Poland. In 2022, following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and the arrival of Jewish refugees from Ukraine in Poland, the Jewish Agency opened a representative office in Warsaw, primarily tasked with assisting the Russian-speaking population eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return.  The majority of this cohort did not remain in Poland long, and by 2022, or less frequently in 2023, had repatriated to Israel or (to a much lesser extent) emigrated to other EU nations.

Experts estimate the total number of individuals of post-Soviet origin with Jewish roots currently residing in Poland to be between 5,000 and 10,000. This wide range in estimates—similar to the case of the "hidden Jews of Poland"—is due to a lack of objective data. Not all individuals from the post-Soviet space who are eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return identify themselves as Jewish or manifest their Jewish identity in any formal way. Like Polish Jews, they reside primarily in Warsaw and its suburbs, though small groups are present in other Polish cities, spanning from Gdańsk in the north to Kraków in the south, and from Wrocław in the west to Przemyśl in the east. Nonetheless, given the highly limited human resources of Poland's current Jewish population, the addition of several thousand individuals from the post-Soviet space is highly significant. The total number of Russian speakers (not only refugees from Ukraine) who maintain contact in some form with local Jewish communities or the Jewish Agency is estimated at approximately 3,000 individuals.

The JDC-backed JCCs initially made targeted efforts to integrate Russian-speaking Jews into their programming. Currently, the need for such specialized integration has decreased significantly. The vast majority of post-Soviet emigrants have already acquired sufficient proficiency in Polish to participate in community activities. Since Polish is a Slavic language, mastering it at a conversational level presents no major difficulties for Russian speakers, particularly if they also speak Ukrainian or Belarusian, whose vocabulary shares far more similarities with Polish than Russian does (according to expert estimates, approximately 70% of post-Soviet emigrants eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return are Ukrainian citizens, and another quarter are citizens of Belarus). Nevertheless, Russian remains the preferred language of communication for the majority of this population (although I have met individual Jewish refugees from Ukraine who prefer to speak Ukrainian). The representative office of the Jewish Agency in Warsaw conducts its events predominantly in Russian. Undoubtedly, a key factor in attracting a substantial group of post-Soviet emigrants to the Reform congregation in Warsaw has been the fact that its leader, Rabbi Stas Wojciechowicz—an Israeli born in Uzbekistan—is fluent in Russian.

Interacting with numerous non-Jewish Ukrainian refugees living in Poland, I could not help but notice a cautious, and sometimes openly hostile, attitude from nearly a majority of them toward Russians as such, regardless of the latter's political stances. However, within the Jewish environment, the attitude toward the small number of Jewish expatriates from Russia remains completely tolerant. It is evident that the Russian language serves as a consolidating factor within the Jewish community of post-Soviet emigrants.

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the language issue is entirely absent. While the language barrier does not present a serious obstacle to integration into local Jewish communities, the situation is different regarding professional career advancement. Securing almost any highly qualified and, consequently, well-paying position requires, among other things, a high level of proficiency in the Polish language. At present, most adult emigrants from the post-Soviet space do not possess advanced Polish language skills and are employed in unskilled or low-skilled jobs. The exception is a small number of employees of multinational corporations who speak English and use it in their work. Nonetheless, it can be assumed with a high degree of confidence that over time, a portion of the newcomers from the post-Soviet space will master Polish sufficiently to pursue qualified employment aligned with the professional training received in their countries of origin. Today, children and youth are generally fluent in Polish, studying in local schools and universities, and will undoubtedly integrate successfully in Poland should they choose to remain in the country.

Poland is also convenient for emigrants from Ukraine and Belarus due to its geographical proximity to their countries of origin, where they still have relatives, property, and other ties. However, while many Ukrainian citizens residing in Poland (excluding men of military age) visit Ukraine periodically or even regularly, the situation for Belarusian citizens is different. Most of them left their country of origin following the suppression of mass protests against the regime of Alexander Lukashenko in late 2020 and early 2021. For them, visiting their home country is highly unsafe, and they generally refrain from such trips.

This situation is directly linked to the difficulties faced by Belarusian citizens residing in Poland who are eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return and wish to repatriate to Israel. As a condition for issuing visas, Israeli consular offices require them to present documents that can only be obtained by traveling to Belarus, as the Belarusian Embassy in Poland does not issue them. For many of them, traveling to Belarus is, as noted, highly dangerous. This constitutes a significant barrier to the repatriation of Belarusian citizens living in Poland to Israel.

According to estimates from the staff of the Warsaw office of the Jewish Agency, emigrants from Belarus constitute approximately half of all repatriates currently arriving in Israel from Poland, despite the fact that their total number in the country is nearly three times smaller than that of emigrants from Ukraine. The heightened interest in repatriation among individuals of Jewish origin from Belarus is related to the specifics of their legal status in Poland. While Ukrainian refugees were granted a preferential status by the Polish authorities, commonly referred to as "temporary protection," Belarusian citizens reside in Poland "on general terms" like immigrants from other non-EU countries, and often face a highly cautious attitude from the Polish authorities, who view Belarus as a hostile state closely allied with Russia.

Currently, among Ukrainian refugees, there is active discussion regarding the decision of the Polish authorities to terminate the preferential "protection" status in the spring of 2026 and align their status with that of other non-EU immigrants. It is anticipated that this measure will encourage those eligible for Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return to repatriate to Israel.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that Israeli state institutions do not make any significant efforts to encourage the repatriation of post-Soviet Jewish emigrants residing in Poland. In addition to the aforementioned documentation issue affecting Belarusian citizens, there is also the problem of rare visits by Israeli consular staff to Warsaw. As an alternative, potential repatriates are encouraged to visit Nativ offices in Riga or Chișinău. However, a trip from Poland to Riga for an entire family for a consular interview (sometimes required more than once) entails substantial expenses (tickets, lodging, lost working days). In the case of Chișinău, this is further complicated by the necessity of traveling outside the EU, which in certain situations could negatively impact the legal status of potential repatriates from the perspective of Polish authorities.

The Jewish Agency representative office in Warsaw remains the most important institution working with Russian-speaking potential repatriates (and potential repatriates in general), but it lacks sufficient resources. According to expert estimates, aliyah from Poland currently stands at approximately 10 repatriates (mostly Russian-speaking) per month, which is significantly below the actual aliyah potential from the country.

[1] See the TSKZ website: https://tskz.pl/en/home-en

[2] See, for example: Shimon Cohen, "Madrich le-Shavuot la-Yehudim nistarim she-be-Polin," Arutz 7, 18.5.10: https://www.inn.co.il/news/204484

[3] Regarding the Warsaw Jewish Theater, see the interview with its director Gołda Tencer: "Cultural Space: Jewish Theater in Warsaw Celebrates its 75th Anniversary," Polish Radio in Russian, 8.8.25: https://www.polskieradio.pl/397/7838/Artykul/3561646,-75

[4] See the website of the institute: https://www.jhi.pl/

[5] See the online version of this publication: https://slowozydowskie.pl/

[6] Selected issues of "Cwiszn" are available online: http://cwiszn.pl/en/pages/show/about