Photo: Yossi Zeliger, Keren HaYesod

This article summarizes the interim findings of a comprehensive study conducted by the Department for the Study of New Russian-Speaking Jewish Migration at the Institute for Euro-Asian Jewish Studies. These findings were partially presented by M. Men at a Bar-Ilan University roundtable in November 2025. The study analyzes the socio-demographic profile of the latest wave of repatriates, their motivations, integration challenges, and the dynamics of their emerging identity. Particular attention is paid to a comparative analysis with previous migration flows and the impact of the events of October 7, 2023, on adaptation processes. The conclusions presented are of significant relevance to the formation of Israel's contemporary integration policy.

Introduction

Every wave of Aliyah to Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel) and the State of Israel possesses its own unique characteristics. Equally distinct in the history of Israeli migration policy is the phenomenon of the "military Aliyah" from the former Soviet Union, which commenced in 2022. This cohort differs substantially from prior waves, both in terms of its social composition and its underlying motivations for relocation.

The purpose of this article is to present the results of an empirical analysis based on survey and focus group data, and to outline the key trends shaping the ongoing integration of Russian-speaking repatriates.

Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the New Aliyah

According to official data, approximately 60,500 repatriates arrived in Israel from the post-Soviet space between late February and late December 2022. Of these, 70% (over 42,000) originated from Russia; 24% (14,600) from Ukraine; 3.5% (around 2,000) from Belarus; and 2.5% (just over 1,500) from other post-Soviet states.

In the initial weeks following the outbreak of the war, Ukrainian Jewish emigration was primarily directed toward Israel, with nearly 6,000 arrivals in March 2022 alone—almost double the number of repatriates from Russia (fewer than 3,300) [1]. However, by April, this trajectory shifted significantly toward Europe (particularly Germany, as well as Austria and Poland), where local authorities and Jewish communities established large-scale assistance programs for Ukrainian refugees.

Jewish emigrants from Russia could not rely on similar reception programs in European countries, whose authorities maintained a highly cautious approach toward Russian citizens regardless of their ethnicity or political convictions. Meanwhile, Israel, which with rare exceptions immediately grants citizenship to diaspora Jews upon arrival, remains one of the few Western nations open to the immediate permanent relocation of Russian citizens meeting the criteria of the Law of Return [2]. Consequently, from 2023 to 2025, repatriates from the Russian Federation continued to constitute the vast majority (78–86.5%) of Aliyah from post-Soviet countries, as well as the majority of all immigrants to Israel during this period.

Another defining feature of the latest Aliyah wave from Russia and the former Soviet Union is that it unfolded against the backdrop of two concurrent conflicts: the war in Eastern Europe and the escalation in the Middle East. While the war in Ukraine served as the trigger for this mass Aliyah, the conflict in the Middle East did not halt it. In the twelve months following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, and the launch of Operation Iron Swords, over 28,000 Jews and their family members repatriated to Israel from various countries. More than 20,000 of them—nearly three-quarters—came from the former Soviet Union. Russian citizens continued to comprise the absolute majority of both post-Soviet Aliyah (83%) and overall Aliyah (61%). (Repatriates from the United States and France ranked second and third, while those from Ukraine and Belarus accounted for slightly over 3% and 2.5% of the global total, respectively).

The sharp, multi-fold decline in absolute Aliyah figures from the former Soviet Union in 2025 (half of the previous year's volume and nearly one-sixth of the peak in 2022) is also primarily associated with migration trends among Russian citizens of Jewish descent. This trend is likely driven by two key factors: residents of major Russian cities, where the Jewish population is concentrated, have gradually adapted to the status quo by the second and third years of the war, especially since the economic and cultural urban lifestyle remained largely unchanged. Additionally, the cancellation of the policy granting instant passports to new citizens upon arrival deterred those who sought the document as a contingency measure without intending to reside in Israel permanently.

The Profile of 2020s Aliyah

Regardless of these fluctuations, available data indicates that the majority of "military Aliyah" repatriates from Russia, Ukraine, and other post-Soviet states who obtained citizenship have remained in the country. This settled cohort is defining the character of the new wave, which exhibits several distinctive traits.

Much like the "Great Aliyah" of the early 1990s and the subsequent "Putin Aliyah" from Russia and "economic" Aliyah from Ukraine between 2014 and 2020, the post-2022 "military Aliyah" represents a comprehensive cross-section of the wider regional Jewish population, albeit on a larger scale. The vast majority originated from capital cities and major industrial, commercial, and cultural hubs, where the core ethnic Jewish population is significantly higher than the national average. (Correspondingly, in Israel, the bulk of these repatriates settled in major coastal cities such as Haifa, Netanya, Tel Aviv-Yafo, Bat Yam, and Rishon LeZion).

As a result, recent Aliyah is characterized by a high level of social capital, including stable social status, professional expertise, and middle-to-upper-middle-class income levels, alongside a high level of education. Indeed, among post-Soviet repatriates of working age arriving between 2022 and 2024, over 75% held a university degree or a professional college diploma.

These indicators align with the broader concept of value-driven migration, which is motivated by moral and political considerations rather than economic necessity. Our research shows that for a significant portion of the latest wave of post-Soviet repatriates—at least those who intended to and did settle in the country—the move to Israel was primarily a moral choice. Many respondents in our quantitative survey viewed Aliyah as a value-based decision rather than merely forced emigration.

The Initial Stage of Adaptation: Expectations and Reality

This value-driven orientation shapes both their expectations of the country and their sensitivity to the quality of public services. A study conducted by the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration in the spring of 2022, based on a program developed by Ze'ev Khanin, indicated a highly positive outlook toward integration into Israeli society among the early arrivals of this wave.

When asked about their most immediate priorities, three-quarters of the respondents identified "learning or improving Hebrew," while two-thirds emphasized finding suitable employment and securing permanent housing (either rented or purchased). Over half (57%) prioritized integrating their children into the education system, and 53% highlighted the need to understand the social norms and structure of Israeli society. Furthermore, over 40% considered the recognition of their professional credentials and licenses to be critical, a third sought professional retraining or advanced training, and 20% expressed a strong interest in relocating or establishing a business in Israel.

These figures reflect the transition from value-driven migration to a pragmatic phase of adaptation.

While some repatriates successfully met these objectives, the initial months in Israel posed major challenges for many. Despite their high social capital, a majority of immigrants faced barriers characteristic of "complex" integration, as demonstrated by the analytical reviews conducted by our department three and a half years after the onset of the "military Aliyah."

According to our data, the most frequently cited adaptation challenges remained consistent with those experienced at the start of their journey: language barriers hindering professional employment, bureaucratic unpredictability, lack of clear regulations, delays in processing, and a high financial and tax burden, especially when compared to alternative global migration hubs like Dubai or Cyprus. Additionally, many experienced psychological stress associated with the loss of professional status and a sense of competence.

A large-scale survey of approximately 2,000 respondents, conducted via Telegram and other social media platforms with the assistance of Leonid Goldenberg, revealed a significant disparity in how repatriates assess their standard of living. One-third of those who arrived between 2022 and 2025 expressed dissatisfaction with their financial situation, 45% were partially satisfied, 25% were generally satisfied, and only 5% were highly satisfied.

Approximately one-third of respondents were satisfied or highly satisfied with their employment conditions (with 20% dissatisfied). A similar proportion (30%) expressed satisfaction with their housing conditions, while 20% were dissatisfied. However, over half of the respondents remained optimistic about their long-term career prospects.

Israel as a Country of Belonging and as Home

Focus groups conducted in the autumn of 2025 revealed a clear divergence in life strategies: approximately half of the participants already feel integrated, while the other half maintain a sense of temporariness. One participant captured this sentiment well: "I would separate belonging to the country from the feeling of home. There is no feeling of home yet. But belonging to the country—yes, we received citizenship and medical support. I understand what the country provides."

Another participant shared a different perspective: "I simply accepted all the rules, let go of the rest, and decided: I have adapted." This approach reflects a key feature of the Israeli integration model, where high flexibility and the acceptance of uncertainty serve as essential prerequisites for successful adaptation.

Three years on, most repatriates recognize Israel as a country of belonging, though not necessarily as home. The concept of home implies emotional rootedness, which develops gradually and cannot be substituted by legal status. "There were three stages in realizing that Israel is my country," shared one respondent. "The first was when we decided to repatriate, and I began gathering cultural, historical, and religious background. Many of those aspects aligned well with my values. The second was being welcomed at the airport with the words 'Welcome home.' It was moving and had a profound impact."

Another respondent noted that his sense of belonging emerged almost immediately upon receiving his Teudat Zehut (identity card): "My son was born here shortly after, and I found work. Everything came together. Two and a half years in, I think we are doing well."

The study indicates that the tragedy of October 7 served as a defining turning point for many new citizens. They frequently highlight the solidarity of Israeli society, active public involvement in volunteer initiatives, and a shared sense of destiny with the country.

"We arrived ten days before October 7," one respondent recalled. "Seeing how people around us reacted to the crisis resonated deeply with my values. After February 24, 2022, in Russia, I didn't feel that unity—I decided to leave immediately. Here, even when the rockets started falling from Gaza, I never felt the urge to run."

Significantly, the new Russian-speaking Aliyah remained highly active, spearheading several major volunteer projects and demonstrating a strong sense of civic responsibility. A 2025 survey conducted by Dr. Elina Bardach-Yalov revealed that the ongoing conflict has had minimal impact on the long-term plans of both the "Crimean Aliyah" and the "military Aliyah" cohorts. Approximately half of the respondents stated they had no intention of leaving Israel either before or after the outbreak of hostilities; a quarter planned to leave regardless, while only about a fifth began considering emigration specifically as a result of the events of October 7.

Interaction Between "Old" and New Aliyah: Dispelling Stereotypes

Our findings do not support the common stereotype of friction between different waves of Aliyah. Despite cultural differences, interactions are constructive in the vast majority of cases. However, it is important to recognize that the 1990s wave often views success through the lens of survival during a period of severe social crisis, whereas the new wave arrived from urban environments characterized by advanced digitalization, high service standards, and entrepreneurial ecosystems comparable to Western Europe. This contrast was frequently highlighted by focus group participants discussing their experiences with Israeli public services.

"I would describe it as a classic generational gap," explained one participant. "The people who arrived in the 1990s left a country in economic ruin. They remember that reality. Consequently, their definition of success is very different from ours, as they had to struggle significantly to establish themselves." In her view, the defining feature of the post-2022 wave is that it consists largely of educated, established professionals who expect a standard of living comparable to what they left behind—a standard that earlier immigrants often spent decades of hard labor to achieve in Israel.

Nevertheless, these mutual misunderstandings are gradually resolving. Furthermore, new repatriates recognize the core advantage of their relocation: "We arrived in the Jewish state," noted another participant. "This is a major advantage because it is highly unlikely that you could feel so naturally accepted in any other country. Anywhere else I might have moved, I would have faced far more friction from the local population."

The Challenge of Halakhic Status: Implications for Integration Policy

The situation of repatriates who are not recognized as Jewish according to Halakha remains one of the most pressing challenges. As one participant remarked: "I was an outsider my whole life, and now it turns out that here, too, I am not considered Jewish." This statement highlights a growing divergence between legal integration and the emotional experience of identity. In the long term, the issue of Halakhic status could become a critical challenge requiring the modernization of existing integration mechanisms.

However, the data suggests grounds for optimism: the vast majority of new arrivals view themselves as part of the Israeli Jewish collective. In 2022, despite the fact that less than half of those surveyed held Halakhic Jewish status, approximately 75% identified either as "simply Jewish" or as "Jews of their country of origin," while less than a quarter maintained a mixed or non-Jewish identity.

Three years later, focus group participants overwhelmingly reported feeling more Jewish in Israel than in their countries of origin. One respondent noted: "One hundred percent more. My son wears a kippah on Shabbat, even though his passport officially lists him as Russian."

This indicates that a solid foundation for addressing this challenge already exists within the community.

Conclusion

The "Aliyah of 2022 and beyond" is a highly unique phenomenon. The analysis presented here characterizes it as a wave of high human capital and value-driven choice, serving as a source of renewal for Israeli society with the potential to make significant economic, innovative, and cultural contributions.

The Aliyah of the past decade is morally motivated and highly compatible with the globalized, highly educated segments of Israeli society that transformed a resource-poor nation into a technological and military superpower. As the country navigates its next phase of development, the role of both established and new repatriates remains indispensable.

The key question remains: has the State of Israel fully utilized this potential? The interim findings of this study suggest that, at least for now, the response is largely negative. A significant portion of the skills, entrepreneurial drive, and professional expertise of this wave remains underutilized within key social and economic sectors.

Our research indicates that:

• Israel has successfully become a country of belonging and a new symbolic home for the majority;

• integration barriers remain significant but surmountable;

• the events of October 7 accelerated the process of social rooting;

• the issue of Halakhic status requires a systemic, policy-level solution;

• the potential of the new Aliyah remains largely untapped.

Originating from the same region that produced the founders of the modern Jewish state over a century ago, this new wave of repatriation represents a vital resource for Israel's future. An effective, forward-looking integration policy can transform this potential into a lasting contribution to the nation's economy, culture, and civil society.

[1]

Unless otherwise specified, statistical data is sourced from the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration and the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.

[2]

For further discussion, see Vladimir (Ze'ev) Khanin, "The 'Military Aliyah' of Russian-Speaking Jews to Israel: Past Experience and New Surprises," Riddle, August 3, 2023, https://ridl.io/ru/voennaya-aliya-russkoyazychnyh-evreev-v-izrail-proshlyj-opyt-i-novye-syurprizy/