Photo: Moshe Asman's Facebook Account

The Nazi slogans and salutes during public demonstrations in Kyiv’s Independence Square on June 21 are undoubtedly a marginal element of contemporary Ukrainian public discourse. Nonetheless, this incident has caused considerable concern in Israel and among a significant portion of Ukraine's Jewish population. Highly indicative was the intense debate that unfolded on social media regarding these events, as well as the subsequent statement by the Israeli Embassy and the meeting between Dmytro Korchynsky, head of the radical nationalist Ukrainian party "Bratstvo," and Moshe Asman, Chief Rabbi of Kyiv and Ukraine (representing the Chabad movement). The root cause of such conflicts, which have occurred repeatedly in the recent past and are likely to persist, is the acute clash between Jewish and Ukrainian ethno-national narratives.

In late June, the most intensely debated topic concerning Ukrainian Jewry was the meeting between Dmytro Korchynsky, leader of the radical nationalist Ukrainian party "Bratstvo," and Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Moshe Asman, who holds dual Ukrainian and Israeli citizenship. Following this meeting, the Rabbi issued a statement asserting that "Bratstvo" was not associated with the Nazi slogans and salutes observed during the public demonstrations in Kyiv's Independence Square on June 21. A photograph depicting a handshake between Dmytro Korchynsky and Moshe Asman was subsequently published.

Since the Embassy of the State of Israel had previously released an official statement regarding the event in Independence Square, expressing "deep concern over actions that desecrate the memory of the victims of Nazism" and calling on Ukrainian authorities to respond, Rabbi Moshe Asman conducted, in his words, a discussion with Israeli Ambassador Michael Brodsky to convey the perspective of the Ukrainian radicals. However, even if such a discussion took place, it did not alter Israel’s stance. It should be noted that while Dmytro Korchynsky deemed it necessary to meet with the Rabbi to address Israeli grievances against his party, official Ukrainian authorities abstained from any response to the aforementioned statement by the Embassy of the State of Israel.

Regardless of whose interpretation of the specific events on Independence Square on June 21, 2026, aligns with reality, the intense debate on social media surrounding them, the subsequent Israeli Embassy statement, and Dmytro Korchynsky’s meeting with Rabbi Moshe Asman remains highly indicative. On one hand, the Jewish state faced a wave of criticism—ranging from overtly antisemitic and anti-Zionist rhetoric to more moderate appeals to "refrain from interfering in Ukraine's internal affairs and mind one's own business." As is frequently the case in social media discourse, comments directed at Israel and Jewish people were incomparably harsher than those encountered in face-to-face interactions. During my numerous visits to Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, I have never encountered similar sentiments, either in university lecture halls or on public streets and transport hubs.

It is pertinent to recall that a similar Ukrainian reaction on social media followed the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statement of May 25, which expressed "regret over the decision to hold an official state reburial ceremony for OUN leader Andriy Melnyk, who collaborated with the Nazis." As anticipated, Russian-speaking Israeli social media users, including those of Ukrainian origin, actively supported the Israeli position in both instances. Many commentators expressed skepticism regarding the sincerity of Rabbi Moshe Asman's statement.

Even a superficial assessment of the authors of antisemitic and anti-Israeli comments in these debates reveals that in many (though far from all) instances, these accounts are bots. It can be assumed with a high degree of confidence that this is part of the hybrid warfare Russia wages against both Ukraine and Israel, as it stands as the clear beneficiary of deteriorating relations between them at both official and public levels. Given the latent antisemitic sentiments that are somewhat widespread among Ukrainians, exacerbated by the heightened national sensitivities of wartime, Russian efforts in this direction are yielding results. The collective historical memory of Jews regarding Ukrainian antisemitism also provides fertile ground for fueling anti-Ukrainian sentiments, even among those who unconditionally support Ukraine in its struggle against the Russian invasion. Considering that a decline in relations between Ukraine and Israel serves Russian interests, it is worth noting that Ukrainian journalists have previously accused Dmytro Korchynsky of having his projects "funded by Moscow"[1], a claim he has denied.

In any event, the fundamental cause of such conflicts, which have occurred repeatedly in the recent past and will likely continue, is an acute conflict of narratives. In this context, it is worth mentioning the emerging conflict between Ukraine and Poland regarding the decision by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (of Jewish descent, which is significant in this context) in May to award one of the elite units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine the honorary title of "Heroes of the UPA" (Ukrainian Insurgent Army—the military wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). Facing an existential threat to its independence and survival, Ukraine is actively constructing its national narrative, paying little heed to how the figures of this narrative are viewed by Poles and, even more so, by Jews. This is further influenced by the fact that relations with Poland are currently of immeasurably greater importance to Ukraine than relations with the Jewish state and the Jewish diaspora.

Beyond the glorification of historical figures highly negative within the Jewish national narrative—such as Ivan Gonta, Symon Petliura, Andriy Melnyk, and others—a significant source of potential conflict lies in the Holodomor, which was officially recognized by the Verkhovna Rada in 2006 during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency as a genocide of the Ukrainian people. Since the mass famine of 1932–1933 affected not only Ukraine but also Kazakhstan and several regions of the Russian SFSR (largely those populated by ethnic Ukrainians, such as the Kuban), and since the victims within the Ukrainian SSR itself included non-Ukrainians, including Jews, the classification of the Holodomor specifically as a genocide of the Ukrainian people faces certain objections. Notably, then-President Viktor Yanukovych explicitly opposed this definition in 2010 [2]. However, given that he was convicted of high treason by a Ukrainian court in 2019, and the Russian State Duma officially refused to recognize the Holodomor as genocide in 2008, denying this classification is unequivocally perceived in Ukraine as "Ukrainophobia" and an echo of Russian propaganda narratives.

Officially, the Holodomor has been recognized as a genocide of the Ukrainian people by 32 states. Israel is not among them. This serves as a pretext for criticism of the Jewish state, not only by radical nationalist Ukrainian politicians but also by ordinary Ukrainian social media users. The latter frequently ask: "Why should we recognize your Holocaust if you do not recognize our Holodomor?" Consequently, the Ukrainian national narrative developed in recent years appropriates the identity of a victim nation, which aligns naturally with the profound trauma inflicted upon Ukrainian society by years of war waged against Ukraine by Russia.

In 2006, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) published a list of individuals responsible, according to its records, for organizing the Holodomor. In 2010, the Kyiv Court of Appeal legally upheld the SBU's findings on the matter. In the list of officials published by the SBU, individuals of Jewish origin outnumbered ethnic Ukrainians. In response, the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, led by multimillionaire and Verkhovna Rada deputy Oleksandr Feldman, released a statement asserting that "the published list of party and Soviet leaders, executive staff of the OGPU and GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, as well as documents that served as the organizational and legal basis for the Holodomor-Genocide and repression in Ukraine, effectively places ethnic responsibility for the Holodomor tragedy on Jews and Latvians." According to Feldman, the lists were compiled with bias to shield the direct perpetrators of the Holodomor who were ethnic Ukrainians, including Hryhoriy Petrovsky, Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee; Vlas Chubar, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR; and Anton Prykhodko, Prosecutor General of the Ukrainian SSR.

The aforementioned lists remain accessible online, and for many ordinary Ukrainians, they serve as evidence of Jewish "guilt" toward Ukrainians, which seemingly negates Jewish grievances regarding the complicity of Ukrainian collaborators in the destruction of the Jewish population during the Holocaust. Occasionally, these sentiments manifest as seemingly well-intentioned proposals for "mutual repentance and forgiveness."

This is the socio-political and psychological background against which relations are currently shaped between the state of Ukraine and its Jewish ethnic minority. Although numerically diminished (estimated at fewer than 40,000 individuals), the minority is still perceived by Ukrainian society as an influential factor in various respects. Furthermore, contemporary Ukrainian Jewry lacks universally recognized representation. Since February 24, 2022, the influence of secular "umbrella" Jewish organizations has declined significantly. Major Ukrainian businessmen of Jewish origin who previously funded Jewish community activities are currently outside Ukraine, facing criminal charges. In the cases of Vadim Rabinovych and Ihor Kolomoisky, their possession of Israeli citizenship served as one of the pretests for prosecution (on June 18, 2025, the Verkhovna Rada passed a law on multiple citizenship, which includes a list of states whose passports Ukrainian citizens are permitted to hold, but Israel is excluded from this list). Jewish communal activity in present-day Ukraine is almost entirely concentrated around religious congregations and offices of international Jewish organizations.

At the same time, amid the ongoing four-and-a-half-year full-scale war, the formation of Ukrainian Jewry as a distinct group, separate from other Russian-speaking Jews and fully integrated into the Ukrainian civic nation, is accelerating. This is the perspective presented by certain Ukrainian public figures of Jewish origin, notably Josef Zisels, Executive Vice-President of the Congress of National Communities of Ukraine and Executive Co-President of the Vaad (Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities) of Ukraine. He and his supporters exclude hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian-born Jews living in Israel and Western countries from the definition of "Ukrainian Jews." In the value system of these figures, the Jewish narrative is entirely subordinate to the Ukrainian one. This tendency was clearly manifested in the controversy surrounding the memorialization of Babyn Yar [3].

The actual situation is significantly more complex than a binary opposition of narratives. On one hand, the Russian military invasion has resulted in the average resident of Ukraine, including Jews, harboring hostility toward Russians, regardless of their ethnic background. Meanwhile, in Israel and Western nations, Jewish immigrants from Ukraine are generally integrated into the same social and communal structures as those from Russia. The Russian language has been excluded from the official use of Ukrainian Jewish communities. Ukrainian is now required to be the language of all public addresses, publications (including translations of Jewish sacred texts), and instruction in Jewish schools. The sole Jewish literary almanac in Ukraine, "Yehupets," is now published exclusively in Ukrainian. Nevertheless, Russian remains the primary language of informal communication among Ukrainian Jews (as the largest Jewish communities are located in traditionally Russian-speaking cities such as Dnipro, Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa) and serves as the language of communication with the transnational Russian-speaking Jewish diaspora in Israel, the West, and post-Soviet states with which connections remain (primarily Moldova). A necessary condition for the existence of Jews in contemporary Ukraine is at least an outward acceptance of the Ukrainian narrative to avoid conflict with the authorities and the ethnic majority. However, this does not imply that the majority of Ukrainian Jews internalize this narrative as entirely their own, and in the event of a conflict of narratives, it is not certain that they would genuinely choose the Ukrainian ethno-national version.

[1] See, for example: "Sobolev: Korchynsky has always been linked to Medvedchuk – Svoboda Slova," ICTV Channel, 3.12.13: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=skbz95Bfkxc

[2] See: "Yanukovych does not consider the Holodomor a genocide," Channel 5, 27.4.10: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2WVqCQgFOss

[3] For more details, see: "Josef Zisels: The Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center is a paternalistic project," Istorychna Pravda, 13.7.17: https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2017/07/13/150044/ and "Josef Zisels once again accused the Babyn Yar Memorial Center of anti-Ukrainian activity," Lekhaim, 4.10.21: https://lechaim.ru/news/iosif-zisels-v-ocherednoj-raz-obvinil-memorialnyj-tsentr-babij-yar-v-antiukrainskoj-deyatelnosti/