The ongoing debate in Russia regarding the dissolution of several "subsidized" national autonomies through their merger with economically and fiscally stronger neighboring regions directly concerns potential changes to the status of the Jewish Autonomous Region (JAR), established in May 1934. Although the motivations behind this measure are predominantly financial and economic, stripping the JAR of its status—as the world's sole remaining, albeit declarative, realization of the "territorialist" model of Jewish national self-determination—would inflict significant symbolic and substantive damage upon both the Russian Jewish community and the nation as a whole. This is particularly critical given the revival of Jewish cultural life in the region over recent decades, and the long-term potential of the JAR brand itself to prove economically viable.

Several years ago, the late Russian orientalist and politician E.M. Primakov described the existence of the Jewish Autonomous Region of the Russian Federation as a "political anachronism." He asserted that Jews constituted no more than 1% of its population and argued that the region should be merged with a neighboring territory.[1] Predictably, this statement provoked public outrage within the region, both because of the highly contentious nature of consolidating federal subjects and, perhaps more significantly, because it concerned far more than the fate of a single national autonomy. It threatened a long-standing symbol, inherited by post-Soviet Russia, of the Soviet national-territorial solution to the "Jewish question"—essentially the only successfully implemented project of the "territorialist" model of Jewish national self-determination globally.

The Jewish Autonomous Region was established during the creation of national-territorial Jewish autonomies in the USSR. In 2018, the JAR marked 90 years since the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR enacted legislation allocating land, upon the petition of the Committee for the Settlement of Jewish Toilers on the Land (KomZET), "for the continuous settlement of Jewish workers on vacant lands in the Amur strip of the Far Eastern Territory." This initiated the resettlement of Jewish populations to the territory of the future JAR.[2] In May 1928, the first trains carrying settlers (including the author's grandfather) arrived at Tikhonkaya Station, which later became the city of Birobidzhan. The promotional and recruitment campaigns organized by KomZET and the Society for the Settlement of Jewish Toilers on the Land (OZET) under the slogan "To the Jewish Country!" mobilized thousands of Jews from shtetls and cities within the USSR. It also attracted over 1,500 Jewish immigrants from 14 foreign nations, including the United States, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Argentina. Among them were Jewish emigrants from British Mandate Palestine, drawn by the prospect of building a Jewish socialist statehood within the Soviet Union. The Birobidzhan project received financial and political support from foreign Jewish organizations, notably ICOR, Ambidjan, ORT, and various international branches of OZET.

In 1930, the Biro-Bidzhan Jewish Autonomous District was officially established, which was subsequently reorganized into the Jewish Autonomous Region on May 7, 1934. By 1937, the Jewish population in the JAR reached 18,000 (23.8% of the total population). The long-term plan, contingent on resettling at least 100,000 Jews, was to establish a fully-fledged subject of the USSR—the Jewish Republic. However, the Stalinist purges of 1936–1938 and the subsequent anti-Semitic campaigns of 1948–1953 dealt a devastating blow to the region. In this relatively small territory, nearly 7,000 people were repressed, and more than a thousand were executed. These actions permanently shattered faith in the possibility of creating a self-governing Jewish territory "national in form and socialist in content," halted Jewish resettlement to the JAR, and conversely triggered an exodus of the Jewish population alongside the assimilation of those who remained.[3]

In subsequent years, the authorities reduced the region to an almost purely propagandistic showcase for the resolution of the national question in the USSR. Only with Gorbachev's Perestroika did a gradual process of recovery and secondary legalization of the unique local Jewish identity and historical memory begin. Reconnecting with their roots involved a desire to pass down to the children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren of the pioneering Jewish settlers the principles and symbols that guided their ancestors who arrived to cultivate this new "Promised Land."

It was for this reason that Professor Mikhail Chlenov, Secretary General of the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, responded almost immediately to the academician's statement. In his firm view, "the disappearance... of the Jewish Autonomous Region would represent an irreparable loss for both the Russian Jewish community and our multi-ethnic country," making Primakov's statement itself a "political anachronism"[4]—to say nothing of how the dismantling of the JAR, so symbolic to Jewish public life in Russia, would be perceived globally. Consequently, Chlenov argued, the country's Jewish community "expects the Russian authorities, on the contrary, to assist the region in preserving its uniqueness and in developing and strengthening its national culture."

Academician Primakov's statement also struck a nerve with many prominent regional figures, including the former head of the region, M.M. Kaufman. He provided me with a copy of a previously unpublished personal letter that he had co-authored with B.L. Korsunsky, former First Secretary of the CPSU Regional Committee, addressed to the then-governor of the Khabarovsk Territory, V.I. Ishaev.

Kaufman, who knew Primakov personally and could not fathom the rationale behind his remarks, understood the realities of the region intimately. Primakov's argument regarding the 1% Jewish population figure deeply offended him. The letter to Ishaev emphasized the inadequacy of official demographic assessments: "It is difficult to establish the true number of Jews residing in the region today, given the long-term processes of assimilation and mixed marriages... We can inform you that according to the records of the regional military commissariat, there are 7.5 thousand Jewish conscripts registered as of January 1, 1998. We believe you are capable of estimating the approximate number of Jewish residents in the region... without placing undue emphasis on the 2% figure."[5]

Incidentally, Mikhail Chlenov expressed a similar sentiment in response to Primakov's remarks: "Indeed, census data suggests that Jews constitute approximately one percent of the region's population—about 1,700 out of roughly 170,000 residents. However, it is self-evident that, as in other regions of the Russian Federation, citizens of Jewish origin do not always identify as such during censuses. Meanwhile, several demographic studies suggest that the number of individuals of Jewish descent in the JAR reaches approximately ten percent. By my estimates, a broader interpretation of the term 'Jewish'—one not restricted by census parameters—allows us to speak of seven or even ten thousand people. Such a high percentage of Jewish population is not found anywhere else in the diaspora (where it typically stands at 2-3 percent). The Jewish population in the communities of each of the Asia-Pacific countries represented in the EAJC is comparable to, or even smaller than, that of the JAR."

Nonetheless, it is doubtful that Primakov—who, notably, had never visited the region—considered the "Jewish" dimension of the issue when making his remarks, even if he had been familiar with the actual history of the JAR's formation and development. It appears highly likely that certain political structures raise this issue periodically to gauge public reaction to the consolidation of Russian federal subjects. A similar strategy was previously employed regarding the Koryak Autonomous Okrug, whose socio-economic conditions at the time were comparable to the current economic situation in the Jewish Autonomous Region. Following Oleg Kozhemyako's election as governor of the okrug in April 2005, Moscow political strategists conducted extensive organizational and public relations campaigns, culminating in the merger of the okrug into the Kamchatka Territory.

In other words, the motives of Primakov and his associates were not so much "national" as they were "administrative and operational," a point repeatedly highlighted in the Russian media. For instance, Alexander Zolotukhin, former regional prosecutor and subsequent Human Rights Commissioner for the JAR, noted in a recent interview with the online publication "Nabat" that the origins of the proposal to dissolve the region as a federal subject lie primarily in negative demographic and economic trends. These include population outflow and the resulting sharp decline in residential construction, utility infrastructure issues, stagnating small businesses, lack of agricultural development, and the failure to conduct a long-promised inventory of agricultural lands. "We have no real economic growth," Zolotukhin stated. "Virtually all manufacturing enterprises have closed down."[6] Even the operational Kimkano-Sutarsky Mining and Processing Plant, whose shareholders are based abroad and which is theoretically expected to generate revenue for the region, fails to do so. Its revenues are consumed by debt servicing and falling ore prices, meaning, in the words of the interviewee, "everything bypasses the local population."

The logical conclusion from such assessments is clear: "the question of merger is in the air; and the worse the economic and social conditions in the Jewish Autonomous Region become, the more frequently it will be raised." Indeed, discussions concerning integration with a neighboring region have persisted for years. Proposals have surfaced to merge the region with either the Khabarovsk Territory or the Amur Region, or even to incorporate all three territories into a hypothetical "Amur Province." The scenario of returning the JAR to the Khabarovsk Territory is considered the most probable. According to Zolotukhin and other observers, the administration of the Khabarovsk Territory is highly interested in the railway bridge to China currently under construction across the Amur River, and the merger will likely proceed once it is commissioned.

However, the economic and social utility of such a development is far from obvious to everyone. When the issue of regional consolidation was raised previously, V.I. Ishaev and the former governor of the region, N.M. Volkov, agreed during a joint official meeting that two independent regions would find it far easier to navigate Russia's economic landscape. In the aforementioned letter to V.I. Ishaev, which contains highly compelling facts and examples of the so-called "equal status of the region within the Khabarovsk Territory," Kaufman and Korsunsky clearly outlined political and economic arguments against such a merger.

Indeed, the consolidation of territories is a highly complex issue. Experts from the Institute of Contemporary Development previously concluded that the campaign to consolidate federal subjects, intended to project the strength of the federal center, instead demonstrated a lack of administrative competence and expertise. In any event, there are no guarantees that a simple administrative merger will resolve systemic issues. The JAR is currently a subsidized region, but the majority of subjects in the Russian Federation share this status; currently, no more than ten regions in Russia are self-sustaining. For the region to reach this level of viability, local efforts alone are clearly insufficient. The federal government must fundamentally revise its economic and social development strategy for the Far East to attract investment and establish modern manufacturing clusters capable of utilizing the region's vast natural resources. This would generate employment and improve the demographic situation in a region currently facing a shortage of qualified specialists.

Is the JAR truly the only autonomous region in Russia whose dissolution as an independent subject would resolve the challenges of the Far East? At first glance, both proponents of preserving the region's current status and opponents of the idea, who are equally concerned with the region's economic survival, view the region's name as nothing more than a symbol—a tribute to outdated traditions and the unrealized hopes of the past. It is highly regrettable that such views persist. The name "Jewish Region" is, in itself, a highly valuable brand.

The Jewish Autonomous Region exists today as more than just a geographic designation on the map of Russia. Regardless of public debate or administrative decisions, the region, with its remarkable history, has secured its place in national and world history as a territory where one of the most ambitious projects of the "romantic" post-revolutionary era was realized. The core concept of the project was to provide Russian Jews with land and the right to their own national-territorial self-determination, even if that vision was subsequently distorted and hollowed out by the Soviet authorities. It remains a distinct territory, yet it is not isolated from the wider world. It possesses a unique social microclimate free from national discrimination, where, much like in an old Jewish shtetl, residents know one another personally.

The region is recognized and remembered abroad as a territory where a Jewish district was deliberately established. Admittedly, the majority of "Birobidzhan Jews" now reside abroad, primarily in Israel. However, this does not diminish the significance of those who remain in Birobidzhan, particularly if one recalls the truth behind the well-known jest: "no matter how many leave, there are always more remaining than there were initially." "The region has clearly demonstrated its capacity to serve as a center of Jewish culture, particularly within the Far East and, more broadly, the Asian part of Russia," Mikhail Chlenov noted. "The leadership of the JAR... makes significant efforts to develop Jewish culture and religion, both within the region and across the Far East. ...A Jewish National-Cultural Autonomy has been established in the regional capital. All of these factors, along with many others, clearly demonstrate that active Jewish life continues in the region."

In any event, eighty-five years have passed since the founding of the region, and interest in it remains strong. Even setting aside the highly questionable economic benefits of reorganization (for who stands to gain from a neglected periphery?), will future generations understand if, by dissolving into another federal subject, the region fails to realize its considerable economic potential and leaves a void in the historical memory and traditions of Russian and global Jewry?

It is highly fitting to recall the wisdom of Ecclesiastes: "There is no remembrance of former things, nor will there be any remembrance of things that are to come by those who will come after."

[1] See: "Academician Yevgeny Primakov proposed merging the JAR: Will the Jewish Autonomous Region be merged with the Amur Region to form the Amur Territory?", Moskovskij Komsomolets, 18.01.2015.
[2] Committee for the Settlement of Jewish Toilers on the Land under the Presidium of the Council of Nationalities of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. The committee was established in 1924.
[3] For a detailed history of the JAR, see: Henry Felix Srebrnik, Jerusalem on the Amur, McGill-Queen’s Press, 2008.
[4] Quoted in: "At the request of the newspaper 'Birobidzhaner Shtern', the Secretary General of the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress (EAJC), Prof. Mikhail Chlenov, commented on Academician Primakov's statement regarding the Jewish Autonomous Region as a 'political anachronism'", http://ami.spb.ru/A551/pages/A551-082.html
[5] Quoted in: Joseph Brener: "Arguments 'Against' the Merger of the JAR with Any Other Territory", Birobidzhaner Shtern No. 06(14425), 18.02.2015.
[6] Quoted in: Former Prosecutor of the JAR Alexander Zolotukhin: "Until criminal cases are initiated, there will be no order in the housing and public utilities sector", http://nabat.news/2018/12/17/eks-prokuror-eao-aleksandr-zolotuhin-poka-ne-nachnut-vozbuzhdat-ugolovnye-dela-poryadka-v-sfere-zhkh-ne-budet/