Introduction

For centuries, assimilation — the loss of Jewish identity by descendants of mixed marriages and the erosion of cultural identification among ethnic Jews — has been, and continues to be, viewed as one of the primary challenges facing Jewry in the Diaspora. The scale of this rapidly progressing process, particularly in modern times, is more conspicuous today than ever before. For instance, the share of intermarried American Jews, according to the authoritative Pew Research Center, has been rising from generation to generation.

According to the study, among those who married before 1970, this share stands at 17%; in the 1970s, it exceeded one-third, in the 1980s it reached 40%, and in the early 21st century, 58% of families established by Jews were mixed[1]. Notably, this concerns the largest Jewish community in the world. According to recent data from the same center, among individuals with Jewish roots who married in recent years, 61% of respondents already had non-Jewish spouses (compared to 18% of those who established families before the 1980s). Overall, 42% of married Jews are currently in ethnically heterogeneous marriages, a figure that rises to 47% among followers of non-Orthodox streams of Judaism. This trend is even more pronounced among respondents of mixed parentage: 82% of those surveyed with only one Jewish parent had non-Jewish spouses (compared to 34% among "full" Jews) [2].

In Europe, a recent study by the London-based Institute for Jewish Policy Research showed that the rate of mixed marriages currently stands at 35-45% in Germany, Italy, and Spain, and exceeds 30% among Jews in Austria and France (where secular trends are strong). Conversely, in the United Kingdom and Belgium — countries with a high proportion of Orthodox Jews within their Jewish communities — the rate of mixed marriages is lower, at 24% and 14%, respectively[3]. According to the same data, among Jews from the former socialist bloc countries, this level exceeds 50%. In the post-Soviet space, according to estimates by Mark Tolts, a leading expert on Russian-Jewish demography, the share of mixed marriages had already reached 75-85% by the turn of the century, remaining equally high in subsequent years [4].

Unsurprisingly, the impact of this phenomenon on the ethnic, communal, and religious-cultural identification of Jews has become the subject of numerous academic and applied studies. This phenomenon has been repeatedly analyzed from the perspectives of sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, public administration, pedagogy, and other scientific disciplines[5]. At the same time, researchers have not overlooked the counter-trend of post-assimilation in its various manifestations, including the tendency toward the (re-)integration of individuals of mixed and non-Jewish origin into the "core" of the Jewish collective. Such reintegration can be achieved through the formal procedure of Giyur — conversion to Judaism (which, according to tradition, implies joining Jewry in an ethnic sense as well), but far more frequently, individuals utilize other avenues to declare their Jewish affiliation[6].

The process of post-assimilation — the strengthening and reclamation of lost Jewish identity or its acquisition by the descendants of mixed marriages over the past 30 years — is also noticeable in the post-Soviet space and in the communities of the "new Russian-Jewish diaspora" that emerged as a result of mass emigration from the former USSR. It is no secret that under the socio-economic and political conditions of Eastern Europe, many individuals of mixed origin and non-Jewish family members of Jews prefer to interact with Jewish communities in one way or another, receiving their full range of services as well as social assistance[7].

It is worth noting that the sphere of attraction of post-Soviet Jewish communities, in addition to individuals with close or distant Jewish roots, also includes individuals of completely non-Jewish origin. For various reasons, these individuals became involved in the activities of Jewish organizations, gradually acquiring one model or another of Jewish identification — if not ethnic, then at least communal. Finally, a relatively new element on the Jewish landscape of post-Soviet Euro-Asia is the "new" or "self-declared Jews" — individuals who, for various reasons, insist on their Jewish origin and are engaged in searching for real or imagined Jewish roots[8].

From an academic standpoint, these groups have been studied unevenly and quite fragmentarily. While the descendants of mixed marriages have been the subject of fundamental publications,[9] the non-Jewish component of Jewish communities has been analyzed in only a very limited number of works[10] or has received isolated mentions in analyses of general processes in the post-Soviet space[11]. As for "self-declared Jews / new Judaizers," we are currently unaware of any comprehensive scientific works on the subject.

We shall attempt, at least in a first approximation, to fill this gap using data from a large-scale sociological study of the Jewish (in the broad sense of the term) population of the former USSR, conducted under the leadership of Ze'ev Khanin and at the initiative of the EAJC in 2019 in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, as well as in early 2020 in Kazakhstan. The survey was conducted using the method of structured face-to-face interviews; the sample size in the European countries of the former USSR was approximately 2,400 respondents (2,362 answered all 65 questions of the survey questionnaire), including 890 in Russia, 880 in Ukraine, 262 in Belarus, 185 in Moldova, and 250 in Kazakhstan.

The random quota sample was structured in accordance with data on the demographic structure of the target population group. Questionnaires collected in each of the post-Soviet countries were proportionally factored into the final sample in accordance with their share in the Jewish population of the region. Since we lack precise data on the age structure of the studied group, the age quotas of the sample were determined with a slight reduction in the average age for the "extended Jewish population" of the CIS countries compared to recent calculations by minimalist demographers regarding the structure of the core Jewish population[12].

Post-Assimilation and the "Lost Tribes"

As ethnographer V. Chernin notes, numerous groups currently claim affiliation with the Jewish people. Their primary arguments are either the adoption of Judaism by their ancestors in the past (as in the case of Subbotnik Jews in Russia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine) or references to Jewish ancestry[13]. In the latter case, some groups claim to be descendants of the "Ten Lost Tribes of Israel," but the most common version is descent from Spanish and Portuguese Jews ("Marranos"), who were forcibly or out of necessity converted to Christianity in the late 15th and early 16th centuries (their real or imagined descendants live today mainly in Spain, Portugal, Mexico, and Brazil). One might recall the Falash Mura in Ethiopia — members of a social-caste group widely considered relatives of Ethiopian Jews ("Beta Israel") who were forcibly converted to Christianity several generations ago. In the same category are the Bnei Menashe in India, the Bnei Moshe (Inca Jews) in Peru, and the "Amazonian Jews" (descendants of Moroccan Jewish immigrants who intermarried with the local population but partially retained their national-religious identity) in Brazil and Peru. Separately, we should mention the "lost Jews" of Poland (assimilated descendants of mixed marriages) and the Kaifeng Jews in China[14].

On the whole, Chernin argues that under modern conditions, the term "lost tribes" is interpreted very broadly: "all members of the extended Jewish family, and individuals seeking to renew or rediscover their connection with the people of Israel." This interpretation encompasses not only representatives of "exotic communities" but also individuals of Jewish or mixed origin who, for various reasons, have partially or completely lost their Jewish identification. Indeed, the aforementioned 2013 survey of the US Jewish population conducted by the Pew Research Center showed an increase in the proportion of descendants of mixed marriages who identify as Jews. For instance, among respondents aged 65+ with only one Jewish parent, 25% identified as Jewish, whereas in the same category under the age of 30, 59% of respondents identified as Jews. According to researchers, this significantly expands the circle of individuals incorporated into the Jewish collective in the full sense of the word[15]. The same trend was documented in 2019-2020: survey participants aged 18-49 with one Jewish parent identified as Jewish significantly more often than respondents aged 50+ [16].

Commenting on the 2013 data, the prominent Israeli demographer Prof. Sergio Della Pergola noted the existence of "two opposing processes in the contemporary Jewish environment." The first involves distancing from Judaism and a loss of relevance of the very concept of Jewishness for members of the far periphery and individuals of partial Jewish origin. On the other hand, unlike in the past, when assimilation meant the complete loss of Jewish identification, the situation today is not so binary. Affiliation with the Jewish people, cultural interests, or the level of participation in Jewish activities may not be explicitly pronounced, but they are far from entirely absent. "Even complete immersion in American culture today is not a one-way street," Prof. Della Pergola concludes. "Many of these people remain affiliated with communal institutions to some degree, occasionally attend synagogue, fast on Yom Kippur, and participate in the Passover Seder"[17].

Yet, the most massive example of assimilation of various groups on the periphery of the Jewish collective is found in Israel, despite the zigzags of its policy toward those same Subbotniks. Particularly impressive is the process of (re-)integration into the Jewish people of those arriving in the Country under the Law of Return — non-Jewish family members of Jews, as well as individuals of Jewish and mixed origin who had partially or completely lost their Jewish identification in the diaspora[18].

In the last three decades, part of this process has involved immigrants from the USSR and post-Soviet countries, whose number in 2020 reached approximately 1.12 million. As is well known, the Israeli Law of Return (Law of Return) grants the right to immigration not only to Jews but also to their descendants in the second ("children of Jews") and third ("grandchildren of Jews") generations, as well as to the non-Jewish spouses of all these categories. Consequently, within the "Great Aliyah," according to data from the Liaison Bureau for East European Jewry ("Nativ"), almost 340,000 individuals were not registered as Jews in accordance with the norms of traditional Jewish law (Halakha) accepted in Israel. (Of these, about 55% are children and grandchildren of Halakhic Jews, while the rest are spouses of Jews and the fourth generation of mixed marriages).

In this regard, representatives of Jewish Ultra-Orthodoxy and certain factions of the Israeli political and media establishment occasionally express concern that "non-Jewish Aliyah" could damage the Jewish character of the state[19]. However, at present, such fears appear highly exaggerated. Surveys conducted in Israel over various years document a rapid adoption of Israeli civic identity by individuals of non-Jewish and mixed origin (as well as by Halakhic Jews), demonstrating various models of integration into the Israeli Jewish collective [20].

As an example, let us look at a representative quantitative study of the "Russian street" in Israel, conducted by the Tel Aviv PORI Institute using Z. Khanin's methodology in March 2017[21]. According to this survey, some model of Jewish self-awareness was held by 90% of respondents of fully Jewish origin, nearly 80% of "Jews by mother," over 70% of "Jews by father," almost 60% of "one-quarter Jews," and 42% of family members of non-Jewish origin. Only about 10% and slightly over 7% of respondents in the last two subgroups, respectively, declared their Russian or other non-Jewish ethnic identity (in the other subgroups, the share of such respondents varied from 0.8% to 3.3%). Notably, within these two categories, the replacement of Russian ethnic self-awareness with Israeli civic identity in its national-cultural aspect was particularly prominent. It is no coincidence that "grandchildren of Jews" and "non-Jews" who did not consider themselves Jewish most frequently defined themselves as "simply a human being, regardless of nationality" (this answer was given by 30.5% and 50.5% of respondents in these subgroups, respectively).

Comparing attitudes toward the Jewish collective with a similar study of Russian-speaking Israelis in 2013, one can observe that for "official"/Halakhic Jews, Jewishness is primarily about family-ethnic origin, along with the associated social environment and life experience. For "non-Jewish" immigrants, it is about entering a Jewish family and the influence of Israeli Hebrew-language culture and the local social environment ("social Giyur," as Asher Cohen defined this process)[22]. Finally, "declarative" Jews (individuals of homogeneous Jewish or mixed origin who possess a stable Jewish identity but are not officially recognized as Jews in Israel) naturally occupy an intermediate position between the two previous groups across these and other parameters. All three of these ethno-status categories derive their Jewish identification to an equal, and highly significant, degree from the fact of residing in the Jewish state — Israel[23].

Similar, though much more modest in dynamics and scale, processes are occurring in the post-Soviet space, which, despite ongoing emigration, assimilation, and low birth rates, still retains a significant Jewish population. According to the most conservative estimates by Israeli demographers, between 220,000 and 250,000 representatives of the ethnic "core" of the Jewish population (individuals of homogeneous Jewish origin and descendants of mixed marriages with a stable Jewish identity) reside in the countries of the former USSR. The total number of members of the "extended Jewish population" and other individuals of mixed and non-Jewish origin who meet the criteria of the Law of Return was estimated at 850,000 — 890,000 as of 2020[24].

The groups within this community exhibit a shifting balance of identification between their country of residence and the "transnational Russian-Jewish diaspora," whose members today live in dozens of countries worldwide. This diaspora represents a broad spectrum of overlapping models of Jewish, dual, and non-Jewish ethnic, religious, and cultural identity[25]. Similarly, the "extended Jewish population" in the countries of the former USSR serves as a platform both for the assimilation of Jews into non-Jewish environments and for the phenomenon of post-assimilation (ethnic consolidation) within local Jewish communities.

Among the agents of the second process, two factors play a leading role. The first is internal migration and the concentration of the post-Soviet Jewish (in the broad sense of the word) population in 8-12 capital and other large metropolitan areas. These are cities with an extensive network of Jewish cultural, educational, and other communal institutions, whose structure-building role has largely replaced the family as a channel for transmitting Jewish ethnocultural practices[26]. The second factor is the Israeli Law of Return, the parameters of which currently define both the boundaries of the extended Jewish collective in diaspora countries and the criteria for participating in communal organizations and accessing their services. This is not to mention that the very possibility of moving to the Jewish state is, at least in the eyes of others, an indicator of belonging to the Jewish community.

Today, these defined boundaries of organized Jewish life include, alongside the "ethnic core" of the extended Jewish population, groups of individuals of various origins belonging to the near and far periphery of the community. Nor should we forget those who do not fit within the formal framework of the Law of Return but participate in Jewish communal projects and, as observations show, exhibit a clear interest in exploring their potential (real or imagined) Jewish roots[27].

Potential and Platforms for Joining
the Jewish Collective

In any case, the total population and relative weight of individuals who have or claim Jewish ancestry are currently subjects of lively debate. Leaders of Jewish umbrella and regional associations, heads, and top managers of Jewish communities in the countries of the former USSR operate with various, usually highly speculative, figures. In Russia, estimates range from 600,000 — 700,000 to more than a million "Halakhic Jews, people of mixed parentage, others eligible under the Law of Return, and those who feel Jewish," including half a million such individuals in Moscow alone. In addition, the Jewish population (in the broadest sense) numbers between 60,000 and 150,000 in Belarus, nearly 30,000 in Moldova, and between 300,000 and 400,000 in Ukraine[28]. As can be seen, all of these figures are at least four times larger than the "core" calculated by demographers, and two to three times larger than the "cloud" of the extended Jewish population.

According to proponents of maximalist estimates, in addition to members of the "ethnic core" and Jewish households of mixed and non-Jewish origin who were "missed" in post-Soviet censuses, one should also include groups that do not fit the definition of the "extended Jewish population" but are capable of becoming a new target audience for organized communal work. According to Kyiv-based social psychologist Albert Feldman, while those qualifying under the Law of Return barely number 250,000 across Ukraine, individuals "sympathizing" with Jews are "many times greater. Very often they form the periphery of Jewish communities where Jews no longer live" [29].

This situation is not unique: for example, respondents in the Pew Center's 2019-2020 "Jewish" study included individuals with no Jewish parents, no Jewish upbringing, and who do not practice Judaism, yet define themselves as Jewish (either because they are married to Jews or, as Christians, acknowledge the Jewish origin of the founder of their religion)[30].

How legitimate is this approach in the context of the countries of the former USSR, and how many such people actually exist? The first, most "natural" category in this context consists of individuals with weakened or completely non-Jewish identities among those meeting the criteria of the Law of Return — "full" Jews, "half" Jews, "one-quarter" Jews, and their non-Jewish spouses. Recently, this category has also come to include the fourth generation of ethnically heterogeneous families, who can move to Israel with their parents before reaching adulthood, and are therefore considered a "legitimate" target for youth communal programs.

In our study, the proportion of respondents who declared their absolute Jewish, conditional (or situational) Jewish, and non-Jewish identity (or had not thought about it) was 58%, 23%, and 19%, respectively. Extrapolating these data to the estimated number of individuals living in the CIS and Baltics who qualify under the Law of Return (874,000),[31] one can assume that the number of carriers of "conditional" Jewish identity is around 190,000-200,000 people.

The second category includes individuals whose Jewish roots lie outside the Law of Return: adult (and consequently, those who lose the right to permanent residency in Israel) descendants of the fourth generation of mixed marriages; individuals with more distant Jewish roots, or none at all, who are searching for evidence of a real or mythical connection to the Jewish people. This search is often explained by the fact that, upon becoming part of cultural, educational, academic, and other Jewish projects, these (typically young) people acquire some form of (quasi-)Jewish or "Zionist" identity.

One variation of this is the model of "Jewish activity of non-Jews" (the non-Jewish component of Kabbalah study groups, "Judeo-Christians," etc.) which flourished in the 2010s and persists in some places today. This trend is also partially reflected by the "Noahides" ("communities of the descendants of Noah") — associations of non-Jews who voluntarily observe a set of basic Jewish commandments, studying their content and meaning under the guidance of rabbis. Such associations have been established and are actively working in several cities in Ukraine (for example, in Dnipro, where the "Tent of Abraham" community operates), and to a lesser extent — in Russia, where small similar groups exist, including one in Moscow at the Maryina Roshcha synagogue[32].

Another instrument for "drawing" the non-Jewish component into Jewish life has been academic Jewish programs, which involve thousands of young men and women in the CIS and Baltic countries. Some of them, through participation in scientific events (conferences, seminars, student schools, educational trips to Israel, etc.), have immersed themselves so deeply in the Jewish environment that they have gradually begun to feel part of the Jewish community to some degree [33].

An interesting example of this phenomenon is the informal community of "non-Jewish Zionists" described by I. Baulina, which formed around the "Sefer" Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization. Similar informal circles also emerged in several higher education institutions — the Jewish University in Moscow (JUM), the Maimonides State Classical Academy (since 2019 — an institute within the Kosygin Russian State University), the Center for Jewish Civilization at the Institute of Asian and African Studies of Moscow State University, the Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH) in Moscow, the St. Petersburg Institute of Jewish Studies, the Department of Jewish Culture at St. Petersburg State University, the "Petersburg Judaica" Center at the European University, and the Master's program in Jewish Studies at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Faculty and staff at these universities introduce students to the traditions and sources of Judaism; some visit synagogues and community centers, and hold meetings with religious and community leaders, as well as Israeli diplomats.

The essence of this phenomenon was described by one of the graduates of a Jewish program at a capital university interviewed by Irina. According to her, their group, which included only two ethnic Jews, possessed its own unique identity. "To the rest of the university, we were all 'Jews,' and we liked that. It was incredibly exciting to live that way, to tell others about what we knew. We became unique mediators between two cultural worlds. I think it's wonderful!"[34]. It is no surprise that today this young woman, along with her husband — who is also ethnically Russian and an expert in Jewish studies — participates in Jewish holidays and memorial ceremonies, observes several elements of Jewish tradition, and sends their child to a Jewish kindergarten. Graduates of such academic programs often seek to apply their professional skills in Israeli structures, as well as within Jewish communal institutions.

The boom in Hebrew language courses (ulpanim) and Yiddish courses has also become an interesting phenomenon. In Moscow alone, there are several dozen such groups. Most of them are private and operate on a self-sustaining basis, but there are also groups organized by the Jewish Agency, as well as those operating under the auspices of Israeli Culture Centers and the "Nativ" Bureau, communal structures, etc. Unlike the JA "Sochnut" (totaling about 80 classes, with around 6,000 students[35]), which primarily serves individuals eligible for repatriation, other ulpanim host students without any Jewish roots. In recent years, new textbooks and manuals for learning Hebrew have been actively published in the CIS countries [36]. The very fact of their distribution through commercial book networks is an objective indicator of interest in the language. At the presentation of one such textbook, published with the support of the Russian Jewish Congress, speakers included the director of the Institute of Asian and African Studies (IAAS) at MSU, Professor I.I. Abylgaziev, IAAS President Professor M.S. Meyer, and others. The second part of the textbook was published in early 2021 by the "Knizhniki" Publishing House (the first part was released in 2014 and went through five editions).

Jewish schools (primary and secondary) are designed for a broader audience, and it was through them, in many ways, that the "Jewish communal revival" began in the late USSR. Such schools exist today in virtually all cities of the former USSR with any significant Jewish population, and their total number, according to the data we collected[37], exceeds 70 (31 in Russia, 35 in Ukraine, and one or two each in Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia). Many of these schools — particularly in major regional centers — are considered highly prestigious educational institutions, where high-quality education is combined with an exceptionally comfortable atmosphere. Unsurprisingly, they also attract children of non-Jewish origin — in this regard, the most prominent examples are Kazan (Russia), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Baku (Azerbaijan), and Dnipro (Ukraine). In such cities, notes Semyon Dovzhik, former press secretary and repatriation envoy for JA "Sochnut" in Moscow, "representatives of the local administration... court the head of the Jewish community in every way to enroll their children in the Jewish school, which is rightfully considered the best in the city"[38].

It is also worth mentioning Sunday schools, which operate alongside daily schools, as well as in cities where there are no secondary Jewish schools. (Not all parents are ready to send their child to a daily Jewish school, but they agree to lessons at a weekend school)[39].

In many cities of the former USSR, the Jewish school, regardless of its formal status — state, municipal, or private — is an important institution of local Jewish communities, as well as a hub for the Jewish socialization of the pupils' parents who participate in the life of the educational institution (with teachers and principals acting as facilitators of communal programs). Logically, the families of non-Jewish pupils also become part of this process, for whom the "Jewish component" of these schools' curricula, combined with the atmosphere created by emissaries from Israel, often acts as an appealing values-based motivator.

Jewish youth clubs (such as "Hillel") and Jewish student associations have become a common platform, with doors open not only to Jews but also to their friends and anyone interested. Observations show that many such "guests" become imbued with the specific ethnocultural atmosphere, showing a tendency to seek spouses from the "extended Jewish population," and in some cases — a readiness to undergo Giyur. This opportunity is provided by Rabbinical courts operating in the CIS, whose requirement is the systematic study of Jewish religious tradition. Because of this, the complex process of Giyur is generally accessible in cities with large Jewish communities.

In our 2019-2020 sample, within the subgroup of individuals without Jewish roots, there was a statistically significant number of respondents who were unmarried (15%) or married to non-Jews (18%) but considered themselves part of the "Jewish community." Within this rather heterogeneous community (around 5.5% of the overall sample), various categories are present. Some of the respondents are widowed spouses of Jews or their descendants, who possess the right to repatriate to Israel, and in this capacity — to receive the services of Jewish communities.

Even more common, apparently, are descendants of the fourth generation of mixed marriages ("great-grandchildren of Jews"), who can migrate to Israel before reaching adulthood (with the right to a step-by-step citizenship procedure) along with their parents who meet the criteria of the Law of Return. It is difficult to say what the actual weight of this subgroup is, given that the sample quota was not pre-set, and almost all of these individuals were surveyed among "affiliated" respondents (the share of the latter in the sample was no more than 35%).

To some extent, this group can be assessed based on data on repatriation to Israel between 2003 and 2019, where "great-grandchildren of Jews" accounted for 5.8%, with a trend toward further growth. Combined with young people without any Jewish roots who are involved in Jewish activities, it can be assumed that the total size of these two subgroups on the periphery of the organized post-Soviet Jewish community is between 55,000 and 70,000 people.

"Self-Declared Jews"

The number of individuals claiming to have Jewish roots that they are unable to document is not yet subject to statistical tracking. However, while a few years ago such a claim was viewed as a curiosity, today this phenomenon is discussed quite seriously, which allows us to estimate, at least, its scope.

For instance, only 5% of respondents in our 2019-2020 study in five countries of the former USSR believed that these were "urban legends" spread by interested parties, and another 14% knew nothing about such cases. At the same time, 31% of those surveyed believed that there are many people with such problems, even if they had not met them personally; 40% asserted that such people exist among their acquaintances. Finally, one in ten stated that searching for documentary proof of Jewish roots is also their own problem, which likely corresponds to the share of such individuals participating in communal activities. Notably, among respondents who declared having at least one Jewish ancestor ("grandchildren of Jews"), this share was half as much again as the sample average — 15%.

It is worth noting that the age of the respondents was directly proportional to the level of homogeneity of Jewish origin among the survey participants. Thus, "one-quarter Jews" made up over 40% of respondents under 25; a third of 26-40-year-olds; slightly over a quarter of middle-aged respondents (41-60); and only 10% of those in the 61+ age group. Conversely, the share of individuals searching for their Jewish roots turned out to be inversely proportional to the age of the respondents: among youth, they accounted for 13%; in the 26-40 age group, 12%; and 7% and 8%, respectively, in the two older age cohorts. This suggests the conclusion that the younger the respondents are, the greater their chances of participating in the aforementioned clubs, cultural events, structures of formal and informal Jewish education, and other communal and quasi-communal institutions.

Table 1. Attitudes of Respondents in the Former USSR toward the Phenomenon of "Lost Jews" / by Gender and Age

Another indicator is the fact that the share of individuals trying to prove their Jewish origin was significantly higher in large and capital cities. Apparently, this is a consequence of the relatively high concentration of communal programs in these locations. For example, in Ukraine's capital Kyiv, in two major cities, and in provincial cities of that country, this answer was given by 17%, 12%, and 5% of respondents, respectively; in Chișinău and the provincial communities of Moldova — 19% and 2%, respectively; in Minsk and provincial cities of Belarus — 10% and 4%. In Kazakhstan, this answer was given by 22% of respondents in Almaty, compared to 0 — 10% in provincial communities and 12% nationwide. In the Russian Federation, the difference between the capital and provincial centers was not as vast. However, this response option was chosen by 13% of respondents in St. Petersburg, and only 3% in Moscow. Given that relatively active participation in Jewish events was reported by 3.5 times more respondents in St. Petersburg than in Moscow (43% and 12%, respectively), it must be acknowledged that the Russian situation also fits the observed trend.

If this is the case, then among the motivating factors for "searching for roots," the communal activism factor likely outpaces incentives such as the opportunity to move to Israel or receive social assistance. However, this hypothesis naturally requires further verification.

Significantly, this issue is also discussed by immigrants from the former USSR in Israel. The only difference is that here the discussion concerns immigrants "not registered as Jews under Halakha in Israel, even though they are, but have simply lost the documents confirming this." As a "special" study led by Z. Khanin in 2013 showed, only 2% of respondents explicitly stated that they had personally faced the problem of documents confirming their Jewishness, but 17% asserted that such individuals existed within their immediate circle.

Thus, a fifth of Russian-speaking respondents in Israel are directly or indirectly related to the community whose members cannot document their Jewishness. Among "grandchildren of Jews" and family members of non-Jewish origin, this share was twice and one and a half times larger, respectively, than the sample average. Meanwhile, the relative majority of individuals of homogeneous Jewish origin (41%) chose the option "I have not met any personally, but I think there are many."