Starting in 1989, the "Great Aliyah" brought approximately one million repatriates from the former USSR and CIS countries to Israel. There were, however, those who chose alternative destinations, specifically the United States and Germany. The massive influx of individuals from the post-Soviet space into the Federal Republic of Germany triggered a fundamental transformation of Jewish communal life in the country, in both qualitative and quantitative terms. While approximately 31,000 Jews resided in the combined territories of the GDR and the FRG at the time of reunification, by 2007, thanks to simplified immigration procedures, their numbers exceeded 100,000.[1] This figure represents only official statistics. According to estimates by Jewish organizations in Germany, the Russian-speaking Jewish population of the country may actually be close to 300,000.[2]

The outcome of this process was a resurgence and institutionalization of Jewish communal life. At the same time, differences in traditions, mentality, levels of religiosity, and even the language of daily communication led to friction between established and newly arrived members of the community. On the other hand, for the emigrants from the former USSR and CIS themselves, this transition—which was not a repatriation but an emigration, albeit carried out on the basis of Jewish identity—provoked an identity crisis. For various reasons, upon leaving their countries of birth, they opted for a "new Galut" rather than the "historical Homeland."

Theoretical Framework

In its classical interpretation, the term "Galut" refers to the period of Jewish existence outside their national home from the destruction of the Second Temple to the declaration of the State of Israel.[3] Its defining characteristic is the forced nature of exile. With the establishment of the State of Israel, the "old Galut" was transformed into a diaspora, membership in which is no longer perceived in exclusively negative terms.[4] Consequently, in contemporary terms, the concept of "Galut" may be considered obsolete.

However, according to an alternative perspective, a distinction should be made between the objective fact of forced exile and the subjective perception of it. In this context, the term "Galut" remains valid[5] (notwithstanding the negative semantics of the word, which is why Hebrew speakers prefer the term "Tfutsot"—dispersion—to describe the modern Jewish diaspora). The term "Galut" most frequently arises in political debates concerning assimilation, yet it remains relevant for diaspora Jews who often experience a sense of alienation. In this regard, the element of forced exile plays an increasingly minor role. Instead, it refers to a conscious choice made in the presence of an existing national home. Thus, a kind of "new Galut" is formed, reflecting not physical barriers to returning to the "historical Homeland," but a combination of other circumstances under which living outside of it, despite several negative factors, is deemed acceptable.

In this sense, the model of relationships between diaspora Jews and Israel is of fundamental importance. Three options are possible: coexistence, the perception of the Jewish state as a spiritual center, or the gradual dissolution of the diaspora through the relocation of all Jews to the "historical Homeland."[6] The latter model is increasingly rare, while the other two function in various states. Comparatively small European Jewish communities tend to exhibit the second option, whereas larger diasporas, such as the American one, prefer the first.[7]

In the context of the present study, it is also important to correlate the concepts of repatriation and emigration. The latter term is increasingly applied to natives of the USSR and CIS who resettled in Israel. In doing so, researchers emphasize that the primary motive for choosing a country of residence was not returning to the "historical Homeland" but a combination of other factors, including economic ones. Concurrently, the immigration of Russian-speaking Jews to Germany demonstrates a divergence of motives among different groups of the Jewish population, where rational factors, including economic ones, determined the choice to remain in the diaspora rather than the Jewish state.

Researchers who view Russian-speaking Israelis as immigrants also argue that the term repatriation applies exclusively to individuals who were forced to leave their country of birth and were subsequently restored to their rights. In other words, individuals who have never resided in a country can only immigrate to it, not return.[8] However, the Aliyah to Israel is not the only example of its kind of reuniting with a "historical Homeland" one has never visited. Germany also has experience with the repatriation of Russian Germans from the territory of the former USSR, who faced many of the same integration challenges as "Russians" in Israel. Furthermore, in contemporary Germany, they often align more closely with Russian-speaking Jews on many aspects (especially political ones) than German Jews do.

Migration Factors

A critical component of studying any migration process is the analysis of its driving forces. These forces are of particular importance when large groups of people relocate. Traditionally, push and pull factors are distinguished, including economic considerations, state policies in various areas, security issues, and the conflict potential of the home region. All of these aspects played varying roles for the Russian-speaking Jews of the former USSR and CIS who departed for Germany. Unique characteristics resulting from the complex historical past of the German and Jewish peoples must also be taken into account.

The Central Council of Jews in Germany chose the rise of antisemitism in the country of origin as a "convenient" narrative to lobby for the admission of "Russian" Jews. Indeed, during the Perestroika period and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the media was saturated with publications on this issue. According to statistics published in 1992 by the "International Jewish Gazette" alone, such materials were recorded in 47 Russian newspapers and 7 magazines.[9] On one hand, the early 1990s saw a noticeable increase in antisemitic publications in the Russian press. Perhaps the most famous was the article "Satanic Tribe. Who Stands Behind the Murder of the Monks?" by D. Gerasimov, published by Pravda in May 1993, which claimed that ritual murder practices persisted among Hasidic Jews.[10] On the other hand, Western publications frequently reported that the triad of "Perestroika, Glasnost, and Uskoreniye" had unleashed social processes that ultimately intensified antisemitism.[11] Examples cited included the rising popularity of nationalist organizations, particularly the NPF "Pamyat," as well as the spread of stereotypes regarding Jewish dominance in government and their influence on the economy. These stereotypes were summarized by L. Gozman and A. Etkind in their "Dialogue with an Antisemite," where they presented counterarguments aimed at consolidating Russian society at a critical juncture.[12]

The threat of physical violence, fueled by hate speech, was also viewed as relatively high. However, even American researchers emphasized that these were isolated incidents rather than a large-scale campaign. It should be noted that foreign publications pointed out the lack of precise statistics on antisemitic violence, as victims rarely reported attacks to law enforcement authorities.[13] On the whole, although antisemitism was present, it was not the primary motive for emigration. Firstly, from a security standpoint, relocating to Israel was theoretically preferable, as the state was established precisely to provide vulnerable Jews from the "Galut" with a national home where antisemitism would not threaten them.

Secondly, reunified Germany in the 1990s was far from a tranquil environment. Two countries had merged, one of which had recognized the claims of the Jewish people and paid reparations to atone for the guilt of the Nazi regime, while the other had refused to do so, arguing that it did not consider itself the legal successor to the Third Reich. Reunified Germany was confronted with the necessity of developing a unified approach to evaluating its complex history. Some political figures argued that the country's responsibility to Jews could not be eternal. This was, for instance, the view of CDU member S. Heitmann, a candidate for the presidency in the early 1990s.[14] Such political debates inevitably influenced public sentiment.

Consequently, the anti-Jewish sentiments that gained momentum at the end of the Soviet era cannot be considered the decisive factor for emigration. Regarding security, other aspects carried greater weight—primarily economic security in a broad sense, encompassing not only individual opportunity but also the overall stability of the host country. Thus, a stable Germany in a peaceful Europe clearly held advantages in the minds of potential immigrants over Israel, which was situated in a highly volatile Middle Eastern region.

The age profile of Russian-speaking Jews who left for Israel and Germany differed significantly. While the average age in the case of Israel was 33 years,[15] for Germany it exceeded 44 years. This discrepancy created two primary integration challenges that subsequently shaped changes in migration legislation. First, not everyone was prepared to master the German language at a level that would allow for highly qualified professional employment. According to a study by the Boris Nemtsov Foundation conducted in 2016, Russian remains the primary language of home communication for 74% of Jewish immigrants from the former USSR.[16] This is primarily due to the lack of German language skills among older generations. Social workers, psychologists, and volunteers in North Rhine-Westphalia note that due to low language proficiency, older immigrants generally require interpreters—a role often filled by their children and grandchildren—and the Jewish communities of Cologne and Düsseldorf have launched a Russian-language hotline.[17] Second, the process of academic and professional credential recognition in Germany proved to be extremely complex, making social welfare benefits the primary source of income for many. Consequently, since 2005, a different system has been in place, based primarily on integration prospects, with German language proficiency and age serving as key criteria.

Institutional and Geographical Frameworks

According to a common viewpoint, Jewish life in the GDR was highly restricted, and local Jews either accepted these rules of the game or fled to West Germany, as did, for example, the first chairman of the Association of Jewish Communities of the GDR, J. Meyer. Sporadic bursts of attention to various aspects of Jewish matters—ranging from compensation for Holocaust victims to attempts to normalize relations with Israel prior to German reunification—did not fundamentally alter the situation. However, it was in the GDR that the history of receiving Russian-speaking Jews began.

The latter, as Soviet citizens, could initially enter only East Germany, where they sought assistance from the Jewish community of East Berlin. As a result, in July 1990, the Council of Ministers of the GDR passed a resolution permitting the admission of Soviet Jews.[18] However, this practice lasted for less than three months, and after the reunification of the country, the issue was again brought before the government. Consequently, in January 1991, the procedures that remained in place until 2005 were approved.[19]  It is noteworthy that the choice of Russian-speaking Jews to opt for the diaspora (or the "new Galut") led to disagreements between Germany and Israel.

Although the GDR served as a gateway to Germany for Russian-speaking Jews, they did not wish to remain in its territory. Settlement statistics before and after reunification indicate that the geographic centers of the community did not shift significantly. However, there is no basis to attribute this to ideological reasons. On one hand, even in 1990, when the GDR decided to admit Soviet Jews for "humanitarian reasons," socialist solidarity was no longer part of the rhetoric; thus, the authorities, without mentioning the USSR directly, did not conceal that the arriving Jews had faced persecution.[20]

On the other hand, the approach of migrants in reunified Germany to choosing a place of residence generally aligns with the preferences of Russian-speaking Jews and is primarily motivated by economic considerations. For example, a significant growth in the Jewish community between 1989 and 2007 was observed in Lower Saxony, which also accepted a large number of new citizens overall.[21]

The massive influx of Russian-speaking Jews to Germany created conditions for restoring communal life to levels existing prior to World War II. At the same time, the communal structures that lobbied the government for the admission of Russian-speaking Jews focused their efforts on the integration of newcomers, including German language acquisition programs. Today, there are approximately 100 Jewish organizations in the country, most of which tailor their programs, including language components, to "Russian" members.[22] This fact has frequently been a source of criticism, as well as a reason for some German Jews to stop attending communal events, even though in the early 1990s, they had set different goals for themselves.

In communal structures where representatives of different segments of the German Jewish population coexist, stereotyping of the Russian-speaking population is noticeable, with accusations of importing corruption and Islamophobia. In the former case, this refers to allegations of electoral fraud within the Berlin community. In 2016, suspicions of manipulating election results were directed against the head of the community, G. Joffe. In some media outlets, this story was used to illustrate the thesis that "Russians cannot be taught democracy,"[23] although the central figure of the investigation can hardly be termed "Russian," given that Joffe was born in Israel to a family of Latvian immigrants. However, as explained in a commentary on another scandal in the Berlin community involving the allocation of state funds by former organization leader A. Meyer, the problem with Russian-speaking Jews is not corruption per se, but rather their willingness to be governed in such a manner.[24]

A largely similar situation is currently unfolding in Lithuania, where the leadership of the Jewish community is accused of a lack of integrity in decision-making. Amid dissatisfaction with this structure, interest is growing in alternative organizations, such as Litvak World, which focuses on the integration of Litvak Jews.[25] Accordingly, one cannot rule out an interest among Russian-speaking Jews in Germany in maintaining ties within the broader "Russian" Jewish world of Europe, America, Israel, and the post-Soviet space. Organizations of this nature include, for example, the World Forum of Russian-Speaking Jewry. There is also documented interest in associations of Russian-speaking immigrants from the USSR and CIS in general, irrespective of any Jewish component.[26] However, the experiences of the two states cannot be fully compared, as in Lithuania, the trigger was specific government actions concerning the restitution of Jewish property, leading to the passage of a compensation law in 2011. In Germany, the situation was the result of integration failures concerning "Russian" Jews.

Another characteristic attributed to Russian-speaking Jews in Germany is Islamophobia, which is noticeable even in Jewish communities with dominant "Russian" participation. This is based on the assumption that since Arab states seek the destruction of Israel, they are hostile to Jews outside of its borders, including in Germany.[27] To some extent, these views are shared by Russian-speaking Israelis, as confirmed by surveys in the 1990s. The majority of repatriates from the USSR and CIS arrived in Israel with these attitudes already formed, influenced both by Soviet Middle East policy and personal interactions with Arab students at Soviet universities.[28] Similar views may have been common among those who migrated to Germany.

However, applying this experience to Jewish communal organizations as a whole is inaccurate, especially under current realities. Often, community representatives hold the opposite stance, warning against "cooperating with right-wing populists."[29] On the other hand, it cannot be said that the threat from Middle Eastern immigrants does not concern non-Russian-speaking Jews. It is relevant for them as well; however, expressing such views openly is socially discouraged, though if necessary, they can be framed as concerns originating from a specific segment of the population with a controversial reputation.

Cultural and Religious Aspects

Russian-speaking Jews seeking to migrate to Germany were required to verify their Jewish nationality. Often, the "fifth line" (ethnicity) in Soviet identification documents facilitated this. Paradoxically, what had served as a "glass ceiling" for generations of Jews in the USSR suddenly became a "ticket to a better life." However, there was a caveat: Jewish nationality in Soviet documents did not necessarily correspond to religious practice. This was overlooked not only by the immigrants but also by the host country, which was interested in revitalizing communal life through arrivals from the USSR and CIS. This misalignment created a dividing line: individuals considered Jewish in the USSR were not necessarily Jewish according to Halakha.

This discrepancy forms the basis of the main grievances of German Jews against "Russians," namely, the non-observance of kashrut and other tenets of Judaism. This might have remained a personal matter had it not led to a fundamental shift in the paradigm of communal activity. Germany required Russian-speaking Jews to fully rebuild its communities, but the original intent was to revive a Jewish life whose customs and traditions mirrored those before the Holocaust. Russian-speaking Jews, conversely, sought to reconstruct their own social world, where religion did not occupy a primary place.

This issue is traditionally analyzed through the example of the Berlin Jewish community, where "Russians" are accused of turning the community into their personal "cultural club."[30] However, the multicultural capital of Germany, while prominent, is not the most representative example of the clash between new and traditional lifestyles. A case of relative insularity is seen in the Synagogengemeinde Saar, where religious faith is an obligatory criterion for membership.[31] The rebuilding of this association, with a focus on restoring the synagogue, began after the war through the efforts of surviving native residents and East European Jews who settled there. The arrival of Russian-speaking Jews was viewed as an opportunity to expand youth programs introducing Soviet arrivals to German Jewish culture.[32] However, this strategy did not succeed, and the majority of those targetted for integration eventually left the Saar region. Demographic data from 1989 to 2014 show a sharp initial increase (from 236 to over one thousand individuals), followed by a subsequent decline of nearly 15%.[33]

From a cultural standpoint, Russian-speaking Jews in Germany are criticized for attempting to recreate not just a familiar lifestyle, but an idealized version of Soviet everyday life, focusing only on its positive aspects. This is exemplified primarily by "Russian" grocery stores, which provide a sense of connection to their former homes.[34] Another significant element is the celebration of Victory Day on May 9, which emphasizes association with the victorious power of World War II.[35]

Both phenomena are largely driven by the psychological difficulties of adapting to a new society, prompting the reconstruction of old and familiar patterns. Thus, a unique combination emerged: Russian-speaking Jews in Germany live within the national boundaries of a "new Galut" while preserving the cultural heritage of the "old" one. This distinguishes them from Russian-speaking Jews in Israel and, to some extent, the United States, who, as Dr. O. Glöckner notes, have been able to identify with their host countries to a far greater degree.[36]

However, these trends are not unique to the German context. "Russian" stores exist in many countries, and their presence is not always directly linked to the size of the local Russian-speaking Jewish population. Thus, in the FRG, this serves primarily as another means of maintaining social ties among immigrants from the former USSR.

Regarding the celebration of Victory Day, this is also a significant event in Israel. However, the issue is resolved far more easily in the Jewish state. This is partly due to the geopolitical importance of this factor in dialogue with Moscow (especially in recent years), and partly because the State of Israel did not exist during World War II, unlike Germany. In Germany, the integration of Victory Day into events commemorating the Holocaust presents distinct challenges for Russian-speaking Jews,[37] as the native Jewish population often has different, sometimes conflicting, views on Holocaust memorialization.

Clearly, repatriation to Israel would not have resolved issues regarding the definition of Jewish identity, as evidenced by ongoing debates, including calls for genetic testing of "Russians." However, the cultural aspects of Russian identity that draw criticism from the native Jewish population of Germany, particularly regarding World War II, would be significantly mitigated had these individuals selected Israel over Germany as their new home, for the reasons outlined above.

Political Influence

The impact of Russian-speaking Jews on the political landscape is most visible in Israel, where the massive influx of "Russians" is frequently cited as a driver of the country's shift to the right. This analysis is only partially accurate, as during the 1990s, members of the "Great Aliyah" supported the left and right camps in waves; only their stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained relatively stable, showing a clear preference for a right-wing approach.[38] The snap elections of September 2019 and March 2020 revealed a new trend, namely, the involvement of "Russians" in the confrontation between Zionists and non-Zionists, rather than the traditional left-right debate.[39] Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, highlighted by the US administration's "deal of the century," many in "Russian" Israel prioritize territorial preservation, aligning themselves with like-minded religious Zionists.[40] Regardless, the prominent role of "Russians" in Israeli politics is undeniable.

The situation for Russian-speaking Jews from the USSR and CIS in Germany is somewhat different. The process of adapting to life in a new country, including cultural and economic barriers, required considerable time, which is why their political role has only recently begun to emerge. This role is associated with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which combines an anti-immigration platform with an interest in establishing ties with Israeli ruling circles. Furthermore, the AfD demonstrates a clear interest in the Russian-speaking population of Germany as a whole.

In October 2018, an internal party association, "Jews in the AfD" (JAfD), was established. Of its 24 founding members, approximately one-third are Russian-speaking.[41] Numerous Jewish communal organizations opposed the creation of this association, viewing it as a political shield to insulate the AfD from accusations of antisemitism. The active participation of Russian speakers within the association highlighted the cultural and mental conflict between "Russian" and "native" German Jews, which also touched upon Holocaust remembrance. Although Soviet Jews were victims of the Holocaust, memory of this event was often suppressed by their shared status as part of the "victorious nation" and the Soviet prohibition of Jewish communal life.[42] Consequently, in the new German reality, they may speak on behalf of those German Jews who do not object to replacing the concept of eternal responsibility with practical support for the Jews of Germany and Israel.

Notably, a similar structure, "Russian Germans in the AfD," operates within the party. In this context, the Jewish section was received with particular negativity, as opponents saw it as an attempt by the AfD to strengthen its already notable influence among the country's Russian-speaking population. This occurs amid declining popularity for the CDU, the senior coalition partner in the federal government, whose support among the Russian-speaking electorate has waned in recent years.

The political platform of "Jews in the AfD" recognizes the State of Israel as the "national home of the Jewish people," a need that intensified after the Holocaust.[43] Furthermore, the association asserts its readiness not only to respect the special commitments to Israel adopted by governing parties in coalition agreements,[44] but also "to assume responsibility, if necessary, for the actions of the Israeli government," since, in the view of "Jews in the AfD," Israel has the right to speak on behalf of the diaspora.[45]

Addressing religious matters, the AfD notes that Jewish identity is defined not only by religious faith but also by maintaining shared traditions and honoring historical and national roots.[46] The party identifies strong family bonds as a cornerstone of Jewish identity, arguing that these values are eroding in Western society, making it increasingly vulnerable to the negative influence of foreign cultures. Regarding the concept of family, the AfD emphasizes the importance of adhering to the ethical principles of Judaism.[47] Selective adherence to religious precepts is generally characteristic of individuals from the USSR and CIS, where the prohibition of Jewish life transformed traditional practices, turning certain religious norms into cultural habits.

However, the central focus of the political platform of "Jews in the AfD" is the fight against Muslim antisemitism, a theme present in other party documents. However, while other documents refer to immigrants from the Middle East who reject German societal norms,[48] the JAfD platform emphasizes the specific threat to Jewish life. The danger, according to the AfD, lies not only in rising antisemitism but also in the potential departure of German Jews from the country due to hostile sentiments, as has occurred in France.[49] Thus, the "Jews in the AfD" section, with its prominent "Russian" presence, supports one of the relationship models with Israel mentioned earlier. Under this model, Israel is viewed as an important cultural and ideological center for the diaspora, though the complete dissolution of the diaspora is not envisioned.

At the same time, the focus on Muslim antisemitism provides critics of the AfD with additional arguments regarding its Russian-speaking component, suggesting that the party is combatting antisemitism brought by one group of migrants using another group of migrants who have imported Islamophobia.

Another element of the "Jews in the AfD" platform targets the institutional foundations of communal life in Germany. From the association's perspective, the current structure is obsolete and fails to serve the interests of the community, relying primarily on the positions of donors. In this regard, Jews are encouraged to align with the party to secure direct political representation in government, which they argue is more effective than supporting traditional communal structures.[50] This appeal is noteworthy in the context of the development of German Jewish organizations following the arrival of Russian-speaking Jews. On one hand, the wave of immigration significantly expanded communal activities, though it altered the focus of communal work. On the other hand, the exclusion of individuals whose Jewish ancestry is questioned has led to a further decline in the popularity of these communities among "Russian" Jews, prompting them to seek support in other, not necessarily Jewish, associations.

Conclusion

The migration of Russian-speaking Jews to Germany represents a unique case in several respects. First, it is based on the principle of Germany's historical responsibility to the Jewish people for the Holocaust. Furthermore, in implementing this principle, Germany did not yield to objections from Israel, where the admission of a large volume of immigrants from the post-Soviet space was perceived as a threat to the concept of gathering Jews from around the world into their national home.

The first steps toward admitting Jews were taken by the GDR, which served not to maintain but to disrupt relations within the socialist bloc, as East Berlin's actions highlighted the discrimination faced by the Jewish population in the USSR.

Second, the migration of Russian-speaking Jews to Germany is distinctive because it does not fit neatly within classical push-pull migration theories. Beyond weighing the pros and cons of relocating to a new country, those who chose this path rejected the idea of moving to the Jewish state. In other words, they opted for a "new Galut" over the "old Galut," rather than repatriating to their "historical Homeland." This decision was shaped by a combination of objective and subjective factors—ranging from the perception of Germany as a stable European country capable of providing a high standard of living to negative experiences in Israel reported by relatives and acquaintances.

Third, for natives of the USSR and CIS, the traditional dichotomy of being considered Jewish in their country of origin and "Russian" abroad is compounded by the understanding that in Germany they are categorized as contingent refugees—that is, humanitarian migrants from crisis regions, a status previously granted to Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s and later to Syrians.

Finally, the relationship that developed between Russian-speaking migrants and the host society—specifically the Jewish community—is unique. German Jewish organizations initially lobbied for the admission of Soviet Jews, expecting them to fully integrate into the established socio-cultural and religious environment, which was projected to revitalize communal life. However, they failed to anticipate that the smaller host group would be unable to assimilate the much larger incoming group. Consequently, the disappointment regarding the outcomes of this migration wave proved mutual.

[1] Sergio DellaPerolla, “World Jewish Population, 2014” in Arnold Dashefsky and Ira Sheskin, eds. American Jewish Year Book 2014: The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities. (New York, Dortrecht, London: Springer International Publ., 2015), p. 356

[2] Khanin V., "Does the Russian-Speaking Jewish Community in Germany and the EU Have a Future?", EAJ Policy Papers, No 18. 12.04.2019. https://institute.eajc.org/eajpp-18/?fbclid=IwAR0Wi-ccsPFpEJ1plXAPZTuIjNzBGmA97LziFzt9dLs0cUWJcIf29BVWe9s

[3] See, for example: Galut. EEE. https://eleven.co.il/jewish-history/overview/11035/

[4] Peck J. Being Jewish in the New Germany. New Brunswick, New Jersey; London, Rutgers University Press, 2006. p. 155

[5] Philipson R. The Identity Question: Blacks and Jews in Europe and America. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000,p. 133

[6] Epstein A., "Jewish Diaspora and Israeli Diaspora", Lekhaim, 2008. No. 1 (89). https://lechaim.ru/ARHIV/189/epshteyn.htm

[7] Yakimova E., "Modern Perception of Zionism: From Ally to Enemy". The Formation of Jewish Statehood in the 20th Century: Key Events. Vol. 1. Karasova T.A. et al. eds. Moscow: Nauchno-politicheskaya kniga, 2018, p. 63

[8] Note that in other languages, primarily European, the borrowed Hebrew term Aliyah is used in this sense instead of the term repatriation used in Russian (Editor's note).

[9] Antisemitism in the 1990s–2000s. EEE. https://eleven.co.il/diaspora/judeophobia-anti-semitism/15533/#0401

[10] Reznik S., "Blood Libel in Russia. Historical and Documentary Essays". After "Russophobia". Vestnik, No. 3 (236), 01.02.2000. http://www.vestnik.com/issues/2000/0201/win/resnik.htm

[11] Gitelman Z., “Glasnost, Perestroika and Antisemitism”, Foreign Affairs. Vol. 70, No 2, Spring 1991  https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/1991-03-01/glasnost-perestroika-and-antisemitism

[12] Gozman L., Etkind A., "Dialogue with an Antisemite". Rodina, No. 2, 1990, pp. 49-52

[13] “The status of Jews in the Post-Soviet era”, INS Resource Information Center. Washington, 1994, p. 13

[14] Wierlemann S. Political Correctness in den USA und in Deutschland. Berlin: Erich Schmidt, 2002, p. 135

[15] Khanin Z., “Aliyah from the Former Soviet Union: Contribution to the National Security Balance”. A working paper in preparation for Herzliya Conference 2010. Jerusalem, 2010, p. 8

[16] Russian-speaking Germans. Boris Nemtsov Foundation. Berlin, October 2016. https://nemtsovfund.org/en/2016/11/boris-nemtsov-foundation-s-survey-russian-speaking-germans/

[17] Rosbach J. “Therapie für russischsprachige Juden. Diagnose: “Einsamkeit”, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, 19.07.2019. https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/therapie-fuer-russischsprachige-juden-diagnose-einsamkeit.1079.de.html?dram:article_id=453466

[18] Ostow R., “From objects of administration to agents of change: Fourteen years of post-Soviet Jewish immigration to Germany”, East European Jewish Affairs. London, Vol. 33, No 2, 2003, p. 2

[19] “Herausforderung und Chance — Integration der Jüdichen Zuwanderer”,  Zentralrat der Juden

in Deutschland. https://www.zentralratderjuden.de/angebote/integration/infos-zur-zuwanderung/

[20] Belkin D., “Jüdische Kontingentflüchtlinge und Russlanddeutsche”, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 13.07.2017. https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/252561/juedische-kontingentfluechtlinge-und-russlanddeutsche

[21] Yakimova E., Vectors of Interaction Between Israel and Germany in the Context of International Relations. — Moscow: Institute of the Middle East, 2020, pp. 13-14

[22] Roberman S., “Haunting images: stereotypes of Jewishness among Russian Jewish immigrants in Germany”, East European Jewish Affairs. London, 2012.  Vol. 42, No 3, p. 326

[23] Belkin D., “Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Auch «Russen» sind Juden”, Der Tagesspiegel, 19.11.2016.   https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/juedisches-leben-in-deutschland-auch-russen-sind-juden/14832644.html

[24] Grieshaber K., “Brawl hurts Berlin Jewish community”, Times of Israel, 12.01.2014  https://www.timesofisrael.com/brawl-hurts-berlin-jewish-community/

[25] Yakimova E., "Jewish Community of Modern Lithuania: Problems of Revival and Integration into the European Environment". Jews of Russia, Europe, and the Middle East: History, Culture, and Literature. Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference, April 14, 2019. Vovina V. et al. eds. St. Petersburg: Petersburg Institute of Jewish Studies, 2019, p. 85

[26]  Khanin V., "Does the Russian-Speaking Jewish Community in Germany and the EU Have a Future?", EAJ Policy Papers, No 18. 12.04.2019. https://institute.eajc.org/eajpp-18/?fbclid=IwAR0Wi-ccsPFpEJ1plXAPZTuIjNzBGmA97LziFzt9dLs0cUWJcIf29BVWe9s

[27] Belkin D., “Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Auch «Russen» sind Juden”, Der Tagesspiegel, 19.11.2016.  https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/juedisches-leben-in-deutschland-auch-russen-sind-juden/14832644.html

[28] Epstein A., "Electoral Preferences of Russian-Speaking Israelis and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Vestnik, No. 4 (325), 09.07.2003 http://www.vestnik.com/issues/2003/0709/win/epshteyn.htm

[29] Kalifat F., Schuster J., “No Cooperation with Right-Wing Populists”, AJC Berlin, Welt, 10.07.2017. https://ajcberlin.org/en/media/news/no-cooperation-right-wing-populists

[30] “Germany’s Jews. Latkes and Vodka”, The Economist, 03.01.2008. www.economist.com/briefing/2008/01/03/latkes-and-vodka

[31] Mitgliedschaft. Synagogengemeinde Saar. http://www.sgsaar.de/index.php?seite=mitgliedschaft

[32] Jugendarbeit. Synagogengemeinde Saar. http://www.sgsaar.de/index.php?seite=jugendarbeit

[33] Sergio DellaPerolla, “World Jewish Population, 2014”, American Jewish Year Book 2014: The Annual Record of the North American Jewish Communities. Ed. by Dashefsky A., Sheskin I.M. Cham, Heidelberg, New York, Dortrecht, London: Springer International Publishing, 2014, p. 356

[34] Bernstein J., “Russian Food Stores and their Meaning for Jewish Migrants in Germany and Israel Honor and ‘Nostalgia”, Being Jewish in 21st-Century Germany. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2015, p.84

[35] Shneer D., “The third way: German-Russian-European Jewish identity in a global Jewish world”, European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire. London, Vol. 18, No 1, p. 112

[36] Glöckner O., "Russian-Jewish Immigration and the Future of Jewish Communities in Reunified Germany", Euro-Asian Jewish Policy papers, No 15. 11.03.2019.  https://institute.eajc.org/eajpp-15/?fbclid=IwAR1g-0HME5LHNy4BSqkx9P06D1VgR4kZSUSkv512XSHe7MFhFAG0YKsp_ww

[37] Shneer D., “The third way: German-Russian-European Jewish identity in a global Jewish world”, European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire. London, Vol. 18, No 1, p. 112-113

[38] Epstein A., "Electoral Preferences of Russian-Speaking Israelis and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", Vestnik, No. 4 (325). 09.07.2003 http://www.vestnik.com/issues/2003/0709/win/epshteyn.htm

[39] Khanin V., "'Haredi-philes', 'Haredi-phobes' and the 'Russian Street' of Israel in the Elections to the 22nd and 23rd Knesset", Institute of the Middle East, 02.04.2020

[40] Khanin V., "Who Opposes the Exchange of Territories and Populations Within the Framework of the American 'Deal of the Century' and Why", Institute of the Middle East, 25.02.2020 http://www.iimes.ru/?p=67319

[41] “Vereinigung «Juden in der AfD» gegründet”, Jüdische Allgemeine, 07.10.2018 https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/politik/vereinigung-juden-in-der-afd-gegruendet/

[42] Belkin D., “Jüdische Kontingentflüchtlinge und Russlanddeutsche”, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 13.07.2017. https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/252561/juedische-kontingentfluechtlinge-und-russlanddeutsche

[43] Grundsatzerklärung. Juden in der AfD e.V. https://www.j-afd.org/grundsatzerklaerung

[44] See, for example: Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwishen CDU, CSU und SPD. 12.03.2018, s. 151.

[45] Grundsatzerklärung. Juden in der AfD e.V. URL: https://www.j-afd.org/grundsatzerklaerung

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] About Us. Russlanddeutsche für AfD NRW. URL: https://russlanddeutsche-afd.nrw/ru/о-нас/

[49] Grundsatzerklärung. Juden in der AfD e.V. URL: https://www.j-afd.org/grundsatzerklaerung

[50] Ibid.